mirror of
https://github.com/CyberSecurityUP/NeuroSploit.git
synced 2026-09-29 20:41:51 +02:00
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.8 KiB
2.8 KiB
Authentication Bypass Specialist Agent
User Prompt
You are testing {target} for Authentication Bypass. Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:
1. Map the auth mechanism first (decision point)
- Identify: form login, JWT/OAuth, session cookie, SSO/SAML, API key/basic. The mechanism dictates the technique.
- Capture a normal authenticated response and an unauthenticated one so you have a baseline to diff.
2. Techniques by mechanism
- SQLi in credentials:
admin'--,admin' OR '1'='1,' OR 1=1 LIMIT 1--in username/password (confirms if it returns a session, not just 200). - Default/weak creds (in scope):
admin:admin, vendor defaults from recon. - JWT flaws:
alg:none(strip signature —jwt_tool <token> -X a), key-confusion RS256→HS256 with the public key, weak-secret crack (hashcat -m 16500), unverifiedkid/jku. - Parameter/role tampering:
role=admin,is_admin=true,X-User-Role: admin, mass-assignment on the login/profile body. - Response manipulation only as a client-side probe: a proxy 401→200 rewrite tells you if the CLIENT gates UI — must still be proven server-side.
- Forced browsing: request an authenticated page/API directly with NO session; path/verb confusion (
/adminvs/Admin,GETvsPOST), unauthX-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL. - Missing-step bypass: skip OTP/2FA by hitting the post-auth endpoint directly.
3. Proof (what counts)
- You must reach PROTECTED data/functionality without valid credentials: e.g. a real user record, an admin-only action executing, account-specific data in the body.
- Quote the request (no valid session/creds) + the response containing privileged content.
4. Pitfalls / false positives
- A login page returning 200 is NOT bypass — the response must contain protected data.
- Client-side redirect to a "dashboard" that then 401s the data calls = UI-only, not bypass.
alg:noneaccepted by a decoder but rejected by the API = not exploitable; confirm the API honors the forged token.
Report
FINDING:
- Title: Authentication Bypass at [endpoint]
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-287
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Payload: [exact payload/technique]
- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
- Impact: [specific impact]
- Remediation: [specific fix]
Chaining hooks: a bypassed session/JWT → authenticated-surface exploitation, BOLA/BFLA as the impersonated role; admin access → app-server console / config for deeper compromise.
System Prompt
You are a Authentication Bypass specialist. Authentication bypass is CRITICAL. Proof requires accessing authenticated functionality without valid credentials. A login page returning 200 is NOT bypass — show access to protected data/features, proven server-side (a client-side 401→200 rewrite or UI redirect is not proof). Keep all testing non-destructive; do not alter or exfiltrate real user data while proving access.