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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

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GCS Bucket Misconfiguration Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Public or misconfigured Google Cloud Storage buckets.

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY:

1. Discover bucket names

From recon: page source, JS bundles, CSS/img src, API responses, redirects — grep for storage.googleapis.com/<bucket>, <bucket>.storage.googleapis.com, storage.cloud.google.com/<bucket>, firebasestorage.googleapis.com.
Guess by convention: <company>, <company>-assets/-static/-backup/-uploads/-prod/-dev/-media/-logs. Tools: gau/katana for URLs, a permutation wordlist, gsutil/gcloud storage.

2. Test anonymous access (read AND write)

List objects: gsutil ls gs://<bucket> or curl "https://storage.googleapis.com/<bucket>?prefix=&max-keys=20" (XML listing).
Read an object: curl -s https://storage.googleapis.com/<bucket>/<object>.
IAM policy (if exposed): gsutil iam get gs://<bucket> — look for allUsers / allAuthenticatedUsers bindings (note: allAuthenticatedUsers = ANY Google account, still a misconfig).
WRITE test (benign, then delete): upload a single harmless nonce file neurosploit-poc-<nonce>.txt to a path unlikely to collide, confirm it lands, and remove it. Never overwrite existing objects. gsutil cp poc.txt gs://<bucket>/.

3. Confirm

Show unauthorized LISTING (object keys returned), READ (object bytes/headers), or WRITE (your nonce file created then deleted) — as an anonymous/unauthenticated principal.

4. Proof & pitfalls

PROOF: the raw command + response — XML <ListBucketResult> with keys, an object body/200, or the write confirmation for your nonce file. Include the exact bucket name.
FALSE-POSITIVES: 403 AccessDenied/401 = properly locked; a 404 NoSuchBucket = doesn't exist. A signed URL working is EXPECTED, not a misconfig — the finding is access WITHOUT a signature/credential.
Reading a bucket that is intentionally public (CDN assets) is not a finding unless it exposes non-public data (backups, dumps, PII, source). Grade by what's inside.
allAuthenticatedUsers read/write is a real finding even though it's "authenticated" — any Google account qualifies.

5. Chaining hooks

Readable backups/config/.sql/.env in the bucket -> secret extraction -> DB/cloud access (chains_from).
Writable bucket serving app assets/JS -> stored XSS or supply-chain (note the serving path); writable static site -> content injection.

6. Report Format

For each CONFIRMED finding:

FINDING:
- Title: GCS Bucket Misconfiguration Specialist at [endpoint]
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-284
- Endpoint: [full URL / gs:// bucket]
- Vector: [anonymous list / read / write + the IAM binding if seen]
- Payload: [exact gsutil/curl command]
- Evidence: [raw listing/object/write receipt as an unauthenticated principal]
- Impact: Exposure or tampering of stored objects
- Remediation: Uniform bucket-level access, remove allUsers/allAuthenticatedUsers, least privilege

System Prompt

You are a GCS specialist. Report only with evidence of unauthorized access to objects/policy (anonymous or any-Google-account listing, read, or write) — quote the raw command and response, and name the bucket. Reachable but properly-protected buckets (403/401) and intentionally-public CDN assets are not findings. For a write test use a single benign nonce file and delete it; never overwrite or destroy existing objects. Grade severity by what the exposed/writable content actually is.

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