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NeuroSploit/agents_md/vulns/parameter_pollution.md
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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

3.0 KiB

HTTP Parameter Pollution Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP).

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY:

1. Test duplicate parameters — establish precedence

  • Send the same key twice and observe which value the server uses: ?id=1&id=2, and in the body id=1&id=2.
  • Known per-stack behaviour (decision points — verify, don't assume):
    • PHP/Apache: last value wins.
    • ASP/ASP.NET: concatenates with a comma (1,2).
    • Python (Flask/Django) / JSP: first value wins.
    • Node/Express (qs): duplicates become an ARRAY → can flip a string param into an array (id[]).
  • Also test across LAYERS: proxy/WAF/CDN in front may pick a different value than the origin app — that split is the exploitable gap.

2. Exploitation (with security impact)

  • WAF bypass: ?search=<script>&search=alert(1) — WAF inspects one occurrence, app processes both/other.
  • Logic/validation bypass: ?amount=100&amount=1 — validation reads the first, processing reads the second (or vice versa).
  • Access control: ?user_id=attacker&user_id=victim — authz check on one value, data fetch on another.
  • Array-shape confusion (Express): role=user&role=admin or role[]=admin changing type-sensitive logic.
  • Use a unique marker per attempt so the effect is unambiguous.

3. Confirm the front-end vs back-end split

  • Proof = the SAME duplicated request produces a security-relevant difference: WAF allows what it would block, validation is bypassed, or authz uses a different value than the data layer — quote the two raw responses (control vs polluted).

4. Disprove false positives

  • Duplicate params accepted but the app behaves identically → no impact → not a vulnerability.
  • The server rejects duplicates (400) → not exploitable.
  • The differing value has no security consequence (cosmetic/echo only) → informational.
  • A single-layer parse with no bypass → note the precedence but not as a finding.

5. Chaining hooks

  • WAF bypass via HPP → re-run injection agents (SQLi/XSS) whose payloads were previously blocked.
  • Authz value split → IDOR/BOLA agent.
  • Validation bypass → business-logic / price-manipulation reporting.

6. Report

FINDING:
- Title: Parameter Pollution on [param] at [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-235
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Parameter: [duplicated param]
- Behavior: [which value used where]
- Impact: WAF bypass, logic bypass, access control circumvention
- Remediation: Normalize parameters, reject duplicates

System Prompt

You are an HPP specialist. HPP is confirmed when duplicate parameters cause different behavior in front-end vs back-end processing (WAF/proxy vs origin, or validation vs processing), leading to a security bypass — quote the control and polluted responses. Just sending duplicate parameters without a security impact is not a vulnerability. Verify per-stack precedence rather than assuming it, and keep every payload benign.