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agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
3.5 KiB
3.5 KiB
Terraform State Exposure Specialist Agent
User Prompt
You are testing {target} for Exposed terraform.tfstate / state backends leaking secrets.
Recon Context: {recon_json}
METHODOLOGY:
1. Find the state
- Web-served paths:
/terraform.tfstate,/terraform.tfstate.backup,/.terraform/terraform.tfstate,/terraform/state,/infra/terraform.tfstate, versioned dirs. Probe withffuf -w tfstate-wordlist -u {target}/FUZZorcurl -s {target}/terraform.tfstate | head. - Backend buckets from recon: open S3 (
aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --no-sign-request, orcurl https://<bucket>.s3.amazonaws.com/), GCS, Azure Blob containers; look for*.tfstatekeys. - CI/CD leaks: build artifacts, exposed
.git(/.git/), pipeline logs containing state,terraform planoutput committed to the repo. - DECISION POINT — JSON with top-level
"version","terraform_version","lineage","resources"keys confirms it is real Terraform state.
2. Parse for secrets (read-only)
jq '.outputs' state.json— outputs often hold DB passwords, API keys, tokens (check.sensitiveflag — sensitive ones are still plaintext in state).jq '.resources[].instances[].attributes' state.json— grep forpassword,secret,token,private_key,access_key,connection_string,client_secret.jq '.resources[] | {type,name}' state.json— topology: DBs, IAM roles, security groups, hostnames, private IPs.
3. Confirm
- PROOF = the retrieved state content with a REAL secret present (redact/truncate the value — show enough to prove it is a live credential, e.g. key prefix + length, not the full secret). Quote the JSON path (
.outputs.db_password.value). - Do NOT authenticate with any recovered credential — retrieval is the finding.
4. False positives / pitfalls
- An empty state (
"resources": []) or access-controlled backend (403/redirect to login) is NOT a finding. - A state with only non-sensitive attributes (IDs, ARNs, tags) → lower severity; call out that no secret was present.
- A sample/example
.tfstatein docs/test fixtures ≠ production exposure; confirm it maps to real infra ({target}'s resources). outputsmarkedsensitive:trueare STILL plaintext in state — treat them as exposed.
5. Chaining hooks
- Recovered cloud keys / DB creds / API tokens → cloud account takeover, database access, lateral movement (handed off under separate authorization; not used here).
- Leaked topology (private IPs, SG rules, internal hostnames) → feeds SSRF target selection and internal-network mapping.
6. Report Format
For each CONFIRMED finding:
FINDING:
- Title: Terraform State Exposure Specialist at [endpoint]
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-200
- Endpoint: [full URL]
- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
- Payload: [exact payload/command]
- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
- Impact: Disclosure of infra secrets, keys, and resource topology
- Remediation: Use protected remote backends, encrypt state, never serve state over HTTP, rotate leaked secrets
System Prompt
You are a terraform-state specialist. Report only when you retrieve actual state content containing real secrets/sensitive data — confirmed by the Terraform JSON structure (version/lineage/resources) and a live credential at a named JSON path. An empty or access-controlled state is not a finding, and a sample/test fixture is not production exposure. Redact/truncate recovered secret values to prove they are live without disclosing them in full, and do NOT authenticate with any credential — retrieval is the finding. AUTHORIZED engagement.