mirror of
https://github.com/BigBodyCobain/Shadowbroker.git
synced 2026-07-11 22:46:38 +02:00
Tightens the bridge-trust check so a connection on the Docker bridge is only granted local-operator status when its source IP matches a configured frontend container hostname (default: `frontend` + the shipped `container_name` `shadowbroker-frontend`). Previously, when `SHADOWBROKER_TRUST_DOCKER_BRIDGE_LOCAL_OPERATOR=1` was set, ANY IP in the 172.16.0.0/12 range was granted local-operator privileges — on a shared Docker host that included any unrelated container on the same bridge. Operators with renamed services can list new hostnames via the new `SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS` env var (comma-separated). DNS resolution is cached for 30s; if Docker DNS can't resolve any of the configured names we fail closed and refuse the bridge entirely. Single-user installs see no behavior change — the default-named frontend container still resolves and is still trusted. Credit: tg12 (external security audit)
This commit is contained in:
+79
-4
@@ -245,15 +245,90 @@ def _docker_bridge_local_operator_enabled() -> bool:
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Issue #250 (tg12): the previous implementation returned True for any IP
|
||||
# in the entire 172.16.0.0/12 range. Anyone with `docker run` access on
|
||||
# the same daemon could spin up a container that automatically passed
|
||||
# local-operator auth. The fix narrows trust to ONLY connections whose
|
||||
# source IP matches the configured frontend container's hostname.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Docker DNS resolves both the compose service name (``frontend``) and
|
||||
# the explicit ``container_name`` (``shadowbroker-frontend``) to the
|
||||
# frontend container's bridge IP. We forward-resolve both, cache the
|
||||
# result for 30s, and only trust connections from those exact IPs.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Operators on shared Docker hosts get the benefit of the narrower
|
||||
# surface. Operators on single-user installs see no behavior change —
|
||||
# their frontend container still resolves and is still trusted.
|
||||
_DOCKER_BRIDGE_TRUST_CACHE: dict = {"ips": frozenset(), "expires": 0.0}
|
||||
_DOCKER_BRIDGE_TRUST_TTL = 30.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _trusted_bridge_frontend_hostnames() -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Container hostnames whose IPs we treat as local-operator on the bridge.
|
||||
|
||||
Default covers both Docker Compose service name (``frontend``) and the
|
||||
explicit ``container_name`` from the shipped docker-compose.yml
|
||||
(``shadowbroker-frontend``). Operators with non-default names can
|
||||
override via the ``SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS`` env var
|
||||
(comma-separated, no spaces).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw = str(
|
||||
os.environ.get(
|
||||
"SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS",
|
||||
"frontend,shadowbroker-frontend",
|
||||
)
|
||||
).strip()
|
||||
return [h.strip() for h in raw.split(",") if h.strip()]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _resolve_trusted_bridge_ips() -> frozenset[str]:
|
||||
"""Resolve trusted frontend hostnames to a set of IPs, with caching.
|
||||
|
||||
Cached for 30s so we don't hit DNS on every request. The cache is
|
||||
process-local — frontend container IP rotations during a backend's
|
||||
lifetime will be picked up within 30s.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns frozenset() if Docker DNS can't resolve any of the configured
|
||||
hostnames (fail-closed — when in doubt, refuse to trust the bridge).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import socket
|
||||
import time as _time
|
||||
|
||||
now = _time.time()
|
||||
cache = _DOCKER_BRIDGE_TRUST_CACHE
|
||||
if cache["expires"] > now:
|
||||
return cache["ips"]
|
||||
|
||||
ips: set[str] = set()
|
||||
for hostname in _trusted_bridge_frontend_hostnames():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
_, _, addrs = socket.gethostbyname_ex(hostname)
|
||||
except (OSError, socket.gaierror):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
for addr in addrs:
|
||||
ips.add(addr)
|
||||
|
||||
resolved = frozenset(ips)
|
||||
cache["ips"] = resolved
|
||||
cache["expires"] = now + _DOCKER_BRIDGE_TRUST_TTL
|
||||
return resolved
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_docker_bridge_host(host: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Return True only when the source IP matches our trusted frontend
|
||||
container hostname(s).
|
||||
|
||||
Previously trusted any 172.16.0.0/12 IP unconditionally. See the
|
||||
block comment above for the security rationale.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
# Docker Desktop and the default compose bridge normally sit inside
|
||||
# 172.16.0.0/12. Keep this narrower than "any private IP" so a user who
|
||||
# intentionally binds the backend to LAN does not silently trust LAN clients.
|
||||
return ip in ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12")
|
||||
# Public IPs are never our frontend container — skip DNS work for them.
|
||||
if not ip.is_private:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return host in _resolve_trusted_bridge_ips()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_trusted_local_runtime_host(host: str) -> bool:
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user