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https://github.com/BigBodyCobain/Shadowbroker.git
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Tightens the bridge-trust check so a connection on the Docker bridge is only granted local-operator status when its source IP matches a configured frontend container hostname (default: `frontend` + the shipped `container_name` `shadowbroker-frontend`). Previously, when `SHADOWBROKER_TRUST_DOCKER_BRIDGE_LOCAL_OPERATOR=1` was set, ANY IP in the 172.16.0.0/12 range was granted local-operator privileges — on a shared Docker host that included any unrelated container on the same bridge. Operators with renamed services can list new hostnames via the new `SHADOWBROKER_TRUSTED_FRONTEND_HOSTS` env var (comma-separated). DNS resolution is cached for 30s; if Docker DNS can't resolve any of the configured names we fail closed and refuse the bridge entirely. Single-user installs see no behavior change — the default-named frontend container still resolves and is still trusted. Credit: tg12 (external security audit)
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@@ -87,16 +87,32 @@ class TestRequireLocalOperator:
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assert self._call_with_host("172.16.0.5") == 403
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def test_docker_bridge_blocked_without_compose_opt_in(self):
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# Even if DNS would resolve the frontend hostname to this IP,
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# the env opt-in is required.
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with patch.dict("os.environ", {"SHADOWBROKER_TRUST_DOCKER_BRIDGE_LOCAL_OPERATOR": ""}):
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assert self._call_with_host("172.18.0.3") == 403
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with patch("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", return_value=frozenset({"172.18.0.3"})):
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assert self._call_with_host("172.18.0.3") == 403
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def test_docker_bridge_passes_with_compose_opt_in(self):
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# Issue #250: opt-in alone is no longer sufficient — the source IP
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# must also reverse-match a trusted frontend container hostname.
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# Here we simulate Docker DNS resolving "frontend" to 172.18.0.3.
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with patch.dict("os.environ", {"SHADOWBROKER_TRUST_DOCKER_BRIDGE_LOCAL_OPERATOR": "1"}):
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assert self._call_with_host("172.18.0.3") == 200
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with patch("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", return_value=frozenset({"172.18.0.3"})):
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assert self._call_with_host("172.18.0.3") == 200
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def test_unknown_bridge_ip_blocked_even_with_compose_opt_in(self):
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# Issue #250 core regression: a rogue container on the same bridge
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# whose IP is NOT in the resolved frontend hostname set must NOT
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# be trusted, even when the bridge opt-in flag is on.
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with patch.dict("os.environ", {"SHADOWBROKER_TRUST_DOCKER_BRIDGE_LOCAL_OPERATOR": "1"}):
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with patch("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", return_value=frozenset({"172.18.0.3"})):
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assert self._call_with_host("172.18.0.99") == 403
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def test_lan_ip_still_blocked_with_compose_opt_in(self):
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with patch.dict("os.environ", {"SHADOWBROKER_TRUST_DOCKER_BRIDGE_LOCAL_OPERATOR": "1"}):
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assert self._call_with_host("192.168.1.100") == 403
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with patch("auth._resolve_trusted_bridge_ips", return_value=frozenset({"172.18.0.3"})):
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assert self._call_with_host("192.168.1.100") == 403
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def test_rfc1918_192168_blocked_without_key(self):
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assert self._call_with_host("192.168.1.100") == 403
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