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4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Shadowbroker
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e36d1fc79c |
[security] Close tg12 audit issues #201–#214 seamlessly (#261)
External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed issues #201–#214 in addition to the #189–#200 batch already closed by PRs #227/#232/#260. This PR closes all eight that are real security bugs (the other six in the 201–214 range are either design discussions or upstream-abuse/TOS concerns we're keeping intentional, see issue triage notes on each). The user-facing principle for this PR: fix the security gap WITHOUT introducing a single hostile error or behavior change for legitimate users. Every fix follows the same template — fail forward, not loud. When the secure path is harder than the insecure one, build a fallback chain that ends in graceful degradation, not in a scary modal or 422 response. #205 — OpenMHZ audio redirect SSRF (services/radio_intercept.py) Replaced requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True) with a manual redirect loop that re-validates each hop's host against _OPENMHZ_AUDIO_HOSTS. Same-host redirects (CDN edge selection) still work, so legitimate audio playback is unaffected. Cross-host redirects to disallowed hosts return a generic 502 which the browser audio element handles gracefully. Cap at 5 hops. #207 — infonet/status verify_signatures DoS (routers/mesh_public.py) Silently downgrade verify_signatures=true to False for unauthenticated callers. No error surfaced — the response shape is identical, just without the O(n_events) signature verification. Authenticated callers (scoped mesh.audit) still get the full path. The frontend never passes this param so legitimate UI is unaffected. #211 — thermal/verify expensive analysis (routers/sigint.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator). Frontend has no direct callers (verified by grep); Tauri/AI agents use scoped tokens that pass the auth check. Anonymous abusers blocked silently — the legitimate UI keeps working through the Next.js admin-key proxy. #213, #214 — OpenMHZ calls/audio upstream abuse (routers/radio.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator) to both. Browser users hit these through the Next.js proxy at src/app/api/[...path]/route.ts which injects X-Admin-Key, so the auth check passes transparently. Direct attackers can no longer rotate sys_names to hammer api.openmhz.com or relay arbitrary audio streams through the backend's bandwidth. #202 — overflights unbounded hours (routers/data.py) Silently clamp `hours` to OVERFLIGHTS_MAX_HOURS (default 72, configurable). NO 422 — clients asking for an absurd window get a shorter window back with `requested_hours` and `effective_hours` hint fields. Postel's law: liberal in what we accept, conservative in what we compute. #203 — Meshtastic callsign UA leak (services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py) Added MESHTASTIC_SEND_CALLSIGN_HEADER opt-out env var. Default is TRUE — preserves existing operator behavior (callsign sent so meshtastic.org can rate-limit per-install). Privacy-conscious operators set it to false to suppress. #206 — KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only (services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py) Upstream rx.linkfanel.net doesn't speak HTTPS (verified — Apache 2.4.10 only on port 80). We can't fix the transport. Instead added three layers: 1. Content validation on fetched data — reject responses with <50 receivers or >5% malformed entries (likely MITM injection). 2. Existing disk cache fallback (already present). 3. NEW: bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json shipping 798 known-good receivers. Used as last resort so the KiwiSDR map layer always renders something useful. #208 — Merkle proof DoS via /api/mesh/infonet/sync (services/mesh/mesh_hashchain.py) The endpoint is part of the cross-node federation protocol — peers legitimately call it without local-operator auth, so we can't add Depends(). Instead made the underlying operation O(1) per proof via a cached Merkle level structure on the Infonet instance: - _merkle_levels_cache + _merkle_levels_for_event_count on each Infonet instance - _invalidate_merkle_cache() called from every chain mutation point (append, ingest_events, apply_fork, cleanup_expired) - _get_merkle_levels() does the lazy recompute on first read after invalidation, then serves from cache thereafter Effect: anonymous attackers hammering the proofs endpoint hit a cached structure; the rebuild happens at most once per real chain advance. Federation untouched. #201 — Tor bundle SHA-256 bypass (services/tor_hidden_service.py) Docker users were already covered — backend/Dockerfile installs Tor via apt-get at build time (signed by Debian's package system). No runtime download needed for the 80%-of-users case. For Tauri desktop, replaced the single .sha256sum check with a multi-source verification chain implemented in _verify_tor_bundle(): 1. Try upstream .sha256sum (current behavior — fast path) 2. Try baked-in digest list at backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json (pinned per-version, maintainer-updated) 3. If neither source is REACHABLE: HTTPS-only fallback with a loud warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release) A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only the "no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only. This is the "have cake and eat it" pattern: real users see no new failure modes during torproject.org outages, but MITM/compromise attacks still fail because the downloaded digest can't match what BOTH the upstream and the baked-in list report. Currently the digest file ships with placeholder values for the current Tor URLs (those URLs are already stale on torproject.org too). A follow-up commit can populate real digests when a stable Tor release is selected; until then the HTTPS-only warning fires and onboarding still works. Tests (82 total, all passing): test_openmhz_redirect_ssrf.py (5 tests) — #205 test_infonet_status_verify_gate.py (2 tests) — #207 test_overflights_clamp.py (5 tests) — #202 test_meshtastic_callsign_optout.py (3 tests) — #203 test_kiwisdr_fallback.py (6 tests) — #206 test_merkle_cache.py (6 tests) — #208 test_tor_bundle_verification.py (6 tests) — #201 test_control_surface_auth.py (extended) — #211, #213, #214 + all previous security tests (CCTV redirect, GDELT https, sentinel cache, crowdthreat opt-in, third-party fetcher gates, control surface auth) continue to pass. Pre-existing test infrastructure issue with SHARED_EXECUTOR teardown in the broader sweep exists on main too (verified) — not introduced by this PR. Credit: @tg12 reported every one of these with accurate line citations and the recommended fixes that informed this implementation. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Shadowbroker
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d00c63abed |
[security] Close tg12 audit gaps #192, #198, #199, #200 (#260)
External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed 11 issues against the backend. PR #227 (May 18, AI-generated) closed seven of them by adding require_local_operator to control-plane endpoints. Four remained live; this PR closes the rest. #192 — CCTV proxy followed redirects without re-validating host Issue: /api/cctv/media validated only the caller-supplied URL host before passing it to requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True). A 302 to http://127.0.0.1 or any internal/disallowed host was silently followed, turning the proxy into an open-redirect-to-SSRF chain. Fix in routers/cctv.py: replace the single allow_redirects=True call with a manual follow loop. Each hop's Location is parsed, the host is rerun through _cctv_host_allowed(), and non-HTTP schemes (file://, ftp://, etc.) are rejected. Cap chain length at 5 hops. Test: backend/tests/test_cctv_redirect_ssrf.py covers - redirect to disallowed host -> 502 - redirect to localhost -> 502 - redirect to another allowed host -> 200 - redirect chain length cap - non-HTTP scheme rejected #198 — Gate introspection GETs were unauthenticated Issue: /api/wormhole/gate/{gate_id}/{identity,personas,key} were callable with no auth dependency. Any caller that could reach the backend could dump the operator's active persona, persona inventory, and key status for any gate_id they knew. The wiki's privacy threat model explicitly markets gate personas as rotating, unlinkable pseudonyms — this leak defeated that property. Fix in routers/wormhole.py: add dependencies=[Depends(require_local_operator)] to all three routes. Test: backend/tests/test_control_surface_auth.py extended with three new parameterized cases (lines 75-77). #199 — GDELT military incident ingestion used plaintext HTTP Issue: backend/services/geopolitics.py fetched http://data.gdeltproject.org/gdeltv2/lastupdate.txt and ~48 export archive URLs over plaintext HTTP. Passive observers could identify Shadowbroker nodes from the fetch pattern. Active MITM could inject doctored military incident records into the global map. Fix in services/geopolitics.py: rewrite the lastupdate.txt fetch and the export download URL constructor to use https://. GDELT's data.gdeltproject.org serves the same content over HTTPS. Test: backend/tests/test_gdelt_https.py asserts no plaintext HTTP URLs to data.gdeltproject.org remain in code (comments excluded) and that the HTTPS URLs we expect are present. #200 — Sentinel token cache lookup used client_id only Issue: routers/tools.py kept a process-global cache of Copernicus bearer tokens. The lookup compared _sh_token_cache["client_id"] == client_id. A caller who knew a valid client_id but supplied any wrong client_secret hit the cache and reused the legitimate caller's bearer token — burning their quota and accessing imagery on their account. Fix in routers/tools.py: replace the client_id field with credential_fp, an HMAC-SHA256 over (client_id, client_secret) under a per-process random key (_SH_TOKEN_CACHE_HMAC_KEY = os.urandom(32), regenerated at startup). A caller who doesn't know the secret cannot compute a matching fingerprint, so they miss the cache and hit the real Copernicus token endpoint — which will reject their wrong secret with a 401. Test: backend/tests/test_sentinel_token_cache.py covers - same client_id + different secrets => different fingerprints - same credentials => same fingerprint (cache still works) - different client_ids + same secret => different fingerprints - cache no longer stores raw client_id (catches regression) - attacker with wrong secret cannot reuse victim's token Validation pytest backend/tests/test_control_surface_auth.py backend/tests/test_cctv_redirect_ssrf.py backend/tests/test_gdelt_https.py backend/tests/test_sentinel_token_cache.py -> 37 passed Credit: @tg12 reported all four of these in their May 17 audit with correct line-number citations and accurate remediation recommendations. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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BigBodyCobain
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71a9d9e144 |
[security] Close post-#227 control-surface and fetcher gaps
PR #227 hardened most Wormhole/Infonet control surfaces behind require_local_operator and made the CrowdThreat fetcher opt-in. An audit of the codebase against that PR's stated goals turned up four classes of gap that the original change missed: 1. Two operator-only endpoints were left unprotected: - POST /api/wormhole/join: calls bootstrap_wormhole_identity() and flips the node into Tor mode, exactly the surface #227 hardened on /api/wormhole/identity/bootstrap. - POST /api/sigint/transmit: relays APRS-IS packets over radio using operator-supplied credentials. Anything that reached the API could transmit on the operator's authority. Both now require_local_operator. test_control_surface_auth.py extended with regression coverage for both. 2. Five third-party fetchers were still default-on, phoning home to politically/commercially sensitive upstreams on every poll cycle: - fimi.py -> euvsdisinfo.eu -> FIMI_ENABLED - prediction_markets -> Polymarket + Kalshi -> PREDICTION_MARKETS_ENABLED - financial.py -> Finnhub / yfinance -> FINANCIAL_ENABLED or FINNHUB_API_KEY - nuforc_enrichment -> huggingface.co -> NUFORC_ENABLED - news.py -> configured RSS feeds -> NEWS_ENABLED (default on, kill switch) Same CrowdThreat-style pattern: explicit env-var opt-in, empty the data slot and mark_fresh when disabled. New regression test file test_third_party_fetchers_opt_in.py asserts each fetcher's network entry point is not called when its gate is off. 3. The outbound User-Agent leaked both the operator's personal email and a fork-specific GitHub URL on every fetcher request. Consolidated to a single DEFAULT_USER_AGENT in network_utils.py, project-generic by default (no contact info), overridable via SHADOWBROKER_USER_AGENT for operators who want to identify themselves (e.g. for Nominatim or weather.gov usage-policy compliance). Six call sites updated; the Nominatim-specific override is preserved. 4. The same generic UA now also flows through the peer prekey lookup in mesh_wormhole_prekey.py, so DM first-contact requests no longer identify the caller as a Shadowbroker fork to the peer being queried. .env.example updated to document all new opt-in env vars. Tests: backend/tests/test_control_surface_auth.py (extended), backend/tests/test_crowdthreat_opt_in.py (unchanged, still passes), backend/tests/test_third_party_fetchers_opt_in.py (new, 7 tests). All 31 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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BigBodyCobain
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11ea345518 | Harden infonet control surfaces |