When stream.aisstream.io is unreachable (cert outage, server down — see
2026-05-20 and 2026-05-23 events) the ships layer goes empty. This adds
a slow REST fallback to data.aishub.net so the layer stays populated in
degraded mode.
Behavior:
* Opt-in via AISHUB_USERNAME (free registration at aishub.net/api).
Without the env var the fetcher is a no-op.
* Default poll cadence 20 min — well inside their free-tier limits, gives
ships time to move enough to look "alive". Configurable via
AISHUB_POLL_INTERVAL_MINUTES, clamped to [1, 360].
* Internal gate: skips the poll entirely when the WebSocket primary is
currently connected. Stomping fresh live data with 20-min-old REST
data would be worse than leaving it alone.
* Vessels merge into the shared _vessels dict with source="aishub" so
the existing UI / health tooling can attribute the provider.
* Live data wins races: if a WebSocket update for the same MMSI lands in
the last 1s, we don't overwrite with the slower REST record.
Scheduler job runs every AISHUB_POLL_INTERVAL_MINUTES minutes alongside
the existing ais_prune job in data_fetcher.py.
24 tests cover gating (no-username, primary-connected), response parsing
(success / error / empty / malformed / unexpected shape), record
normalization (sentinels, missing fields, range checks, AIS @ padding),
poll interval clamping, and end-to-end merge with live-data-wins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
== Per-install operator handle for every third-party API call ==
Before this PR, every Shadowbroker install identified itself to
Wikipedia, Wikidata, Nominatim, GDELT, OpenMHz, Broadcastify,
weather.gov, NUFORC, Sentinel/Planetary Computer, TinyGS / CelesTrak,
Shodan, Finnhub, and others with a single project-wide User-Agent
("Shadowbroker/1.0" or "ShadowBroker-OSINT/1.0"). From the upstream's
perspective every install in the world looked like one giant scraper.
If one install misbehaved, the upstream's only recourse was to block
"Shadowbroker" as a whole.
PR #284 inadvertently doubled down on this in the frontend by
introducing a shared `WIKIMEDIA_API_USER_AGENT` constant. This PR
retrofits both backends to per-operator attribution.
New setting: OPERATOR_HANDLE (env var / settings UI / auto-gen)
New helper: network_utils.outbound_user_agent("purpose")
The handle is auto-generated as "operator-XXXXXX" on first call (the
"shadow-" prefix from earlier drafts was deliberately dropped — too
suspicious-looking for abuse-detection systems). Operators can
override via OPERATOR_HANDLE; the value is sanitized to lowercase
alphanumeric+dash+underscore and capped at 48 chars. Persisted to
backend/data/operator_handle.json so it survives container restarts.
Retrofitted call sites (every previously-MONSTER User-Agent):
- services/region_dossier.py (Wikipedia + Wikidata + Nominatim)
- services/geocode.py (Nominatim)
- services/sentinel_search.py (Microsoft Planetary Computer)
- services/feed_ingester.py (operator-curated RSS feeds)
- services/fetchers/earth_observation.py (weather.gov, NUFORC)
- services/fetchers/infrastructure.py
- services/fetchers/aircraft_database.py
- services/fetchers/route_database.py
- services/fetchers/trains.py
- services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py
- services/shodan_connector.py
- services/unusual_whales_connector.py (Finnhub)
- services/tinygs_fetcher.py (CelesTrak + TinyGS)
- services/sar/sar_products_client.py
- services/geopolitics.py (GDELT)
- services/radio_intercept.py (Broadcastify + OpenMHz)
- routers/cctv.py + main.py (CCTV proxy)
- routers/ai_intel.py
- scripts/convert_power_plants.py (release-time data refresh)
Spoofed browser UAs removed (issues #289 / #290 / #291 — tg12 audit):
- cloudscraper-based Chrome impersonation against api.openmhz.com
-> replaced with honest requests + per-install UA
- Mozilla/5.0 spoofed UA on Broadcastify scrape
-> replaced with honest UA
- Mozilla/5.0 + fake first-party Referer on OpenMHz audio relay
-> replaced with honest UA
- cloudscraper dependency dropped from pyproject.toml + uv.lock
Frontend retrofit:
- new GET /api/settings/operator-handle endpoint (local-operator
gated) returns the install's handle
- frontend/src/lib/wikimediaClient.ts fetches the handle once on
first use, caches it for page lifetime, embeds it in the
Api-User-Agent for every Wikipedia / Wikidata browser-direct call
== GDELT GCS-direct fix ==
GDELT's data.gdeltproject.org is a CNAME to a Google Cloud Storage
bucket. GCS responds with the wildcard *.storage.googleapis.com cert
which legitimately does NOT cover the GDELT custom domain, so Python's
TLS verification correctly refuses the connection. Some networks
happen to route through a path where this works; many (notably Docker
Desktop's outbound NAT on local installs) do not. Verified on the
maintainer's local install: GDELT was unreachable; 1610 geopolitical
events / 48 export files were dropping silently.
Fix: services/geopolitics._gcs_direct_gdelt_url() rewrites any
data.gdeltproject.org URL to its GCS-direct equivalent
(storage.googleapis.com/data.gdeltproject.org/...) where the standard
GCS cert is genuinely valid. api.gdeltproject.org and every other host
are left untouched.
Confirmed live: backend log goes from
GDELT lastupdate failed: 500
to
Downloading 48 GDELT export files...
Downloaded 48/48 GDELT exports
GDELT parsed: 1610 conflict locations from 48 files
== Tests ==
backend/tests/test_per_operator_outbound_attribution.py (12 tests)
backend/tests/test_gdelt_gcs_direct_rewrite.py (6 tests)
backend/tests/test_region_dossier_wikimedia_ua.py (updated to
pin the helper + per-operator handle, not the old constant)
frontend/src/__tests__/utils/wikimediaClient.test.ts (rewritten
to mock /api/settings/operator-handle and assert per-operator UA)
Local: backend 114/114 security+audit+round7a suite green;
frontend 718/718 vitest suite green.
Credit: tg12 (external security audit, issues #289/#290/#291
relating to spoofed UAs); BigBodyCobain (operator-prefix call,
GDELT cloud-vs-local diagnosis).
External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed issues #201–#214
in addition to the #189–#200 batch already closed by PRs #227/#232/#260.
This PR closes all eight that are real security bugs (the other six in
the 201–214 range are either design discussions or upstream-abuse/TOS
concerns we're keeping intentional, see issue triage notes on each).
The user-facing principle for this PR: fix the security gap WITHOUT
introducing a single hostile error or behavior change for legitimate
users. Every fix follows the same template — fail forward, not loud.
When the secure path is harder than the insecure one, build a
fallback chain that ends in graceful degradation, not in a scary
modal or 422 response.
#205 — OpenMHZ audio redirect SSRF (services/radio_intercept.py)
Replaced requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True) with a manual
redirect loop that re-validates each hop's host against
_OPENMHZ_AUDIO_HOSTS. Same-host redirects (CDN edge selection)
still work, so legitimate audio playback is unaffected. Cross-host
redirects to disallowed hosts return a generic 502 which the
browser audio element handles gracefully. Cap at 5 hops.
#207 — infonet/status verify_signatures DoS (routers/mesh_public.py)
Silently downgrade verify_signatures=true to False for
unauthenticated callers. No error surfaced — the response shape is
identical, just without the O(n_events) signature verification.
Authenticated callers (scoped mesh.audit) still get the full path.
The frontend never passes this param so legitimate UI is unaffected.
#211 — thermal/verify expensive analysis (routers/sigint.py)
Added Depends(require_local_operator). Frontend has no direct
callers (verified by grep); Tauri/AI agents use scoped tokens that
pass the auth check. Anonymous abusers blocked silently — the
legitimate UI keeps working through the Next.js admin-key proxy.
#213, #214 — OpenMHZ calls/audio upstream abuse (routers/radio.py)
Added Depends(require_local_operator) to both. Browser users hit
these through the Next.js proxy at src/app/api/[...path]/route.ts
which injects X-Admin-Key, so the auth check passes transparently.
Direct attackers can no longer rotate sys_names to hammer
api.openmhz.com or relay arbitrary audio streams through the
backend's bandwidth.
#202 — overflights unbounded hours (routers/data.py)
Silently clamp `hours` to OVERFLIGHTS_MAX_HOURS (default 72,
configurable). NO 422 — clients asking for an absurd window get a
shorter window back with `requested_hours` and `effective_hours`
hint fields. Postel's law: liberal in what we accept, conservative
in what we compute.
#203 — Meshtastic callsign UA leak (services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py)
Added MESHTASTIC_SEND_CALLSIGN_HEADER opt-out env var. Default is
TRUE — preserves existing operator behavior (callsign sent so
meshtastic.org can rate-limit per-install). Privacy-conscious
operators set it to false to suppress.
#206 — KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only (services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py)
Upstream rx.linkfanel.net doesn't speak HTTPS (verified — Apache
2.4.10 only on port 80). We can't fix the transport. Instead added
three layers:
1. Content validation on fetched data — reject responses with
<50 receivers or >5% malformed entries (likely MITM injection).
2. Existing disk cache fallback (already present).
3. NEW: bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json
shipping 798 known-good receivers. Used as last resort so the
KiwiSDR map layer always renders something useful.
#208 — Merkle proof DoS via /api/mesh/infonet/sync (services/mesh/mesh_hashchain.py)
The endpoint is part of the cross-node federation protocol — peers
legitimately call it without local-operator auth, so we can't add
Depends(). Instead made the underlying operation O(1) per proof
via a cached Merkle level structure on the Infonet instance:
- _merkle_levels_cache + _merkle_levels_for_event_count on each
Infonet instance
- _invalidate_merkle_cache() called from every chain mutation
point (append, ingest_events, apply_fork, cleanup_expired)
- _get_merkle_levels() does the lazy recompute on first read
after invalidation, then serves from cache thereafter
Effect: anonymous attackers hammering the proofs endpoint hit a
cached structure; the rebuild happens at most once per real chain
advance. Federation untouched.
#201 — Tor bundle SHA-256 bypass (services/tor_hidden_service.py)
Docker users were already covered — backend/Dockerfile installs
Tor via apt-get at build time (signed by Debian's package system).
No runtime download needed for the 80%-of-users case.
For Tauri desktop, replaced the single .sha256sum check with a
multi-source verification chain implemented in _verify_tor_bundle():
1. Try upstream .sha256sum (current behavior — fast path)
2. Try baked-in digest list at backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json
(pinned per-version, maintainer-updated)
3. If neither source is REACHABLE: HTTPS-only fallback with a loud
warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the
maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release)
A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only
the "no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only. This is
the "have cake and eat it" pattern: real users see no new failure
modes during torproject.org outages, but MITM/compromise attacks
still fail because the downloaded digest can't match what BOTH
the upstream and the baked-in list report.
Currently the digest file ships with placeholder values for the
current Tor URLs (those URLs are already stale on torproject.org
too). A follow-up commit can populate real digests when a stable
Tor release is selected; until then the HTTPS-only warning fires
and onboarding still works.
Tests (82 total, all passing):
test_openmhz_redirect_ssrf.py (5 tests) — #205
test_infonet_status_verify_gate.py (2 tests) — #207
test_overflights_clamp.py (5 tests) — #202
test_meshtastic_callsign_optout.py (3 tests) — #203
test_kiwisdr_fallback.py (6 tests) — #206
test_merkle_cache.py (6 tests) — #208
test_tor_bundle_verification.py (6 tests) — #201
test_control_surface_auth.py (extended) — #211, #213, #214
+ all previous security tests (CCTV redirect, GDELT https, sentinel
cache, crowdthreat opt-in, third-party fetcher gates, control
surface auth) continue to pass.
Pre-existing test infrastructure issue with SHARED_EXECUTOR teardown
in the broader sweep exists on main too (verified) — not introduced
by this PR.
Credit: @tg12 reported every one of these with accurate line citations
and the recommended fixes that informed this implementation.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #227 hardened most Wormhole/Infonet control surfaces behind
require_local_operator and made the CrowdThreat fetcher opt-in. An
audit of the codebase against that PR's stated goals turned up four
classes of gap that the original change missed:
1. Two operator-only endpoints were left unprotected:
- POST /api/wormhole/join: calls bootstrap_wormhole_identity() and
flips the node into Tor mode, exactly the surface #227 hardened
on /api/wormhole/identity/bootstrap.
- POST /api/sigint/transmit: relays APRS-IS packets over radio
using operator-supplied credentials. Anything that reached the
API could transmit on the operator's authority.
Both now require_local_operator. test_control_surface_auth.py
extended with regression coverage for both.
2. Five third-party fetchers were still default-on, phoning home to
politically/commercially sensitive upstreams on every poll cycle:
- fimi.py -> euvsdisinfo.eu -> FIMI_ENABLED
- prediction_markets -> Polymarket + Kalshi -> PREDICTION_MARKETS_ENABLED
- financial.py -> Finnhub / yfinance -> FINANCIAL_ENABLED or FINNHUB_API_KEY
- nuforc_enrichment -> huggingface.co -> NUFORC_ENABLED
- news.py -> configured RSS feeds -> NEWS_ENABLED (default on, kill switch)
Same CrowdThreat-style pattern: explicit env-var opt-in, empty
the data slot and mark_fresh when disabled. New regression test
file test_third_party_fetchers_opt_in.py asserts each fetcher's
network entry point is not called when its gate is off.
3. The outbound User-Agent leaked both the operator's personal email
and a fork-specific GitHub URL on every fetcher request. Consolidated
to a single DEFAULT_USER_AGENT in network_utils.py, project-generic
by default (no contact info), overridable via SHADOWBROKER_USER_AGENT
for operators who want to identify themselves (e.g. for Nominatim or
weather.gov usage-policy compliance). Six call sites updated; the
Nominatim-specific override is preserved.
4. The same generic UA now also flows through the peer prekey lookup
in mesh_wormhole_prekey.py, so DM first-contact requests no longer
identify the caller as a Shadowbroker fork to the peer being
queried.
.env.example updated to document all new opt-in env vars.
Tests: backend/tests/test_control_surface_auth.py (extended),
backend/tests/test_crowdthreat_opt_in.py (unchanged, still passes),
backend/tests/test_third_party_fetchers_opt_in.py (new, 7 tests).
All 31 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add Tor/onion runtime wiring and faster Infonet node status refresh.
Keep node bootstrap state clearer across Docker and local runtimes.
Use selected aircraft trail history for cumulative tracked-aircraft emissions.
Use cipher0's existing MESH_PEER_PUSH_SECRET so nodes connect
to the relay out of the box without configuration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 — Transport layer fix:
- Bake in default MESH_PEER_PUSH_SECRET so peer push, real-time
propagation, and pull-sync all work out of the box instead of
silently no-oping on an empty secret.
- Pass secret through docker-compose.yml for container deployments.
Phase 2 — Per-gate content keys:
- Generate a cryptographically random 32-byte secret per gate on
creation (and backfill existing gates on startup).
- Upgrade HKDF envelope encryption to use per-gate secret as IKM
so knowing a gate name alone no longer decrypts messages.
- 3-tier decryption fallback (phase2 key → legacy name-only →
legacy node-local) preserves backward compatibility.
- Expose gate_secret via list_gates API for authorized members.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gate messages now propagate via the Infonet hashchain as encrypted blobs — every node syncs them
through normal chain sync while only Gate members with MLS keys can decrypt. Added mesh reputation
system, peer push workers, voluntary Wormhole opt-in for node participation, fork recovery,
killwormhole scripts, obfuscated terminology, and hardened the self-updater to protect encryption
keys and chain state during updates.
New features: Shodan search, train tracking, Sentinel Hub imagery, 8 new intelligence layers,
CCTV expansion to 11,000+ cameras across 6 countries, Mesh Terminal CLI, prediction markets,
desktop-shell scaffold, and comprehensive mesh test suite (215 frontend + backend tests passing).
Community contributors: @wa1id, @AlborzNazari, @adust09, @Xpirix, @imqdcr, @csysp, @suranyami,
@chr0n1x, @johan-martensson, @singularfailure, @smithbh, @OrfeoTerkuci, @deuza, @tm-const,
@Elhard1, @ttulttul
New features:
- POTUS fleet (AF1, AF2, Marine One) with hot-pink icons + gold halo ring
- 9-color aircraft system: military, medical, police, VIP, privacy, dictators
- Sentinel-2 fullscreen overlay with download/copy/open buttons (green themed)
- Carrier homeport deconfliction — distinct pier positions instead of stacking
- Toggle all data layers button (cyan when active, excludes MODIS Terra)
- Version badge + update checker + Discussions shortcut in UI
- Overhauled MapLegend with POTUS fleet, wildfires, infrastructure sections
- Data center map layer with ~700 global DCs from curated dataset
Fixes:
- All Air Force Two ICAO hex codes now correctly identified
- POTUS icon priority over grounded state
- Sentinel-2 no longer overlaps bottom coordinate bar
- Region dossier Nominatim 429 rate-limit retry/backoff
- Docker ENV legacy format warnings resolved
- UI buttons cyan in dark mode, grey in light mode
- Circuit breaker for flaky upstream APIs
Community: @suranyami — parallel multi-arch Docker builds + runtime BACKEND_URL fix (PR #35, #44)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Former-commit-id: 7c523df70a2d26f675603166e3513d29230592cd
BigBodyCobain