Files
Shadowbroker/backend/tests/test_round5_settings_info_disclosure.py
Shadowbroker e125467721 Fix #243/#252/#253: stop leaking settings posture to anonymous callers (#283)
Three settings endpoints were disclosing operational posture or
operator-curated configuration to any network caller. This change
either tightens the redacted-public view (#243) or adds a
local-operator auth gate (#252, #253) per the audit recommendations.

Zero hostility to legitimate users: in all three cases, the Tauri
shell (loopback), the Docker bridge frontend container (#250 + #278),
and any caller with an admin key continue to see the full data. Only
anonymous LAN/internet callers see the reduced surface.

== #243 (Wormhole transport posture, anonymous-mode, profile, node mode)

Tightened the public-redaction allowlists in BOTH the main.py and
routers/wormhole.py copies:
- _WORMHOLE_PUBLIC_SETTINGS_FIELDS: {enabled, transport, anonymous_mode}
                                 -> {enabled}
- _WORMHOLE_PUBLIC_PROFILE_FIELDS: {profile, wormhole_enabled}
                                 -> {wormhole_enabled}

`GET /api/settings/node` (both the routers/admin.py and main.py copies)
now returns an empty stub for unauthenticated callers and the full
node_mode + node_enabled fields only for authenticated callers via
_scoped_view_authenticated(request, "node").

== #252 (news feed inventory disclosure)

`GET /api/settings/news-feeds` now requires Depends(require_local_operator)
in both the canonical routers/admin.py handler and the duplicate main.py
handler. Anonymous callers can no longer enumerate operator-curated
feed names and URLs.

== #253 (Time Machine archival-capture posture disclosure)

`GET /api/settings/timemachine` now requires Depends(require_local_operator).
Anonymous callers can no longer fingerprint whether a deployment is
retaining replayable historical surveillance data.

Tests: backend/tests/test_round5_settings_info_disclosure.py (10 tests)
- Wormhole settings: anonymous sees only `enabled`; authenticated sees full state.
- Privacy profile: anonymous sees only `wormhole_enabled`; authenticated sees `profile` + `transport` + `anonymous_mode`.
- Node settings: anonymous sees `{}`; authenticated sees node_mode + node_enabled + persisted state.
- news-feeds: anonymous gets 403 (and get_feeds() is NOT called); authenticated gets full inventory.
- timemachine: anonymous gets 403; authenticated sees enabled + storage_warning.

Local: 73/73 security suite (round 5 + earlier rounds) green.

Credit: tg12 (external security audit, P1 + 2x Medium).
2026-05-21 10:32:23 -06:00

264 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""Issues #243, #252, #253 (tg12): settings endpoints must not leak
operational posture to unauthenticated callers.
- **#243**: ``GET /api/settings/wormhole``, ``/api/settings/privacy-profile``,
and ``/api/settings/node`` were leaking transport choice, anonymous-mode
state, the named privacy profile, and node-participant state to any
unauthenticated caller. The fix tightens the redaction allowlists to
expose ONLY a bare "is this feature on?" boolean and gates node mode
behind authenticated reads.
- **#252**: ``GET /api/settings/news-feeds`` returned the operator's full
curated feed inventory (names + URLs) to anyone. Now gated on
local-operator.
- **#253**: ``GET /api/settings/timemachine`` returned whether archival
capture is enabled to anyone. Now gated on local-operator.
Auth model: ``require_local_operator`` allows loopback (Tauri shell),
the Docker bridge frontend container (via the hostname-bound trust from
PR #278), and any caller that presents the configured admin key.
Anonymous LAN or internet callers do NOT pass and either receive 403
(news-feeds, timemachine) or a redacted minimum (wormhole / node).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
_ADMIN_KEY = "test-admin-key-for-round5-fixture-32+chars"
@pytest.fixture
def client():
"""TestClient with the private-lane transport middleware disabled.
Same shape as the oracle resolve fixture — the mesh privacy
middleware returns 202 for ``/api/settings/*`` under TestClient
because Wormhole is not actually running. Patching out the tier
requirement lets requests reach the route's auth gate.
"""
import main
with patch("main._minimum_transport_tier", return_value=None):
yield TestClient(main.app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# #243: Wormhole posture redaction
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestWormholeSettingsRedaction:
"""``GET /api/settings/wormhole`` must NOT leak transport choice or
anonymous-mode state to unauthenticated callers."""
def _read_settings_payload(self):
return {
"enabled": True,
"transport": "tor_arti",
"anonymous_mode": True,
"privacy_profile": "high",
"socks_proxy": "socks5h://127.0.0.1:9050",
}
def test_anonymous_caller_sees_only_enabled_bool(self, client):
with (
patch("main.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._read_settings_payload()),
patch("routers.wormhole.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._read_settings_payload()),
patch("services.wormhole_settings.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._read_settings_payload()),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get("/api/settings/wormhole")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
# Only the bare "is Wormhole on?" boolean is exposed publicly.
assert "enabled" in body
assert body["enabled"] is True
# Posture fields the audit flagged must be absent.
assert "transport" not in body
assert "anonymous_mode" not in body
assert "privacy_profile" not in body
assert "socks_proxy" not in body
def test_authenticated_caller_sees_full_state(self, client):
with (
patch("main.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._read_settings_payload()),
patch("routers.wormhole.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._read_settings_payload()),
patch("services.wormhole_settings.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._read_settings_payload()),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get(
"/api/settings/wormhole",
headers={"X-Admin-Key": _ADMIN_KEY},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
# All fields visible when authenticated.
assert body["enabled"] is True
assert body["transport"] == "tor_arti"
assert body["anonymous_mode"] is True
assert body["privacy_profile"] == "high"
class TestPrivacyProfileRedaction:
"""``GET /api/settings/privacy-profile`` must NOT leak the named
profile to unauthenticated callers (the profile name itself
discloses operator intent)."""
def _payload(self):
return {
"enabled": True,
"transport": "tor_arti",
"anonymous_mode": True,
"privacy_profile": "high",
}
def test_anonymous_caller_sees_only_wormhole_enabled_bool(self, client):
with (
patch("main.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._payload()),
patch("routers.wormhole.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._payload()),
patch("services.wormhole_settings.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._payload()),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get("/api/settings/privacy-profile")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert "wormhole_enabled" in body
assert body["wormhole_enabled"] is True
# The named profile, transport, and anonymous mode must NOT
# leak to anonymous callers.
assert "profile" not in body or body.get("profile") is None
assert "transport" not in body
assert "anonymous_mode" not in body
def test_authenticated_caller_sees_named_profile_and_transport(self, client):
with (
patch("main.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._payload()),
patch("routers.wormhole.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._payload()),
patch("services.wormhole_settings.read_wormhole_settings", return_value=self._payload()),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get(
"/api/settings/privacy-profile",
headers={"X-Admin-Key": _ADMIN_KEY},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["profile"] == "high"
assert body["wormhole_enabled"] is True
assert body["transport"] == "tor_arti"
assert body["anonymous_mode"] is True
class TestNodeSettingsRedaction:
"""``GET /api/settings/node`` must NOT disclose node_mode or
node_enabled to anonymous callers."""
def _node_data(self):
return {"some_node_field": "value"}
def test_anonymous_caller_sees_empty_stub(self, client):
with (
patch("services.node_settings.read_node_settings", return_value=self._node_data()),
patch("routers.admin._current_node_mode", return_value="participant"),
patch("routers.admin._participant_node_enabled", return_value=True),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get("/api/settings/node")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
# No posture fields.
assert "node_mode" not in body
assert "node_enabled" not in body
assert "some_node_field" not in body
def test_authenticated_caller_sees_full_node_state(self, client):
with (
patch("services.node_settings.read_node_settings", return_value=self._node_data()),
patch("routers.admin._current_node_mode", return_value="participant"),
patch("routers.admin._participant_node_enabled", return_value=True),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get(
"/api/settings/node",
headers={"X-Admin-Key": _ADMIN_KEY},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["node_mode"] == "participant"
assert body["node_enabled"] is True
assert body["some_node_field"] == "value"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# #252: news-feeds auth gate
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestNewsFeedsAuthGate:
def _fake_feeds(self):
return [
{"name": "Custom Internal", "url": "https://internal.example/rss", "weight": 5},
{"name": "Default News", "url": "https://news.example/rss", "weight": 3},
]
def test_anonymous_caller_rejected(self, client):
with (
patch("services.news_feed_config.get_feeds", return_value=self._fake_feeds()) as get_feeds,
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get("/api/settings/news-feeds")
assert r.status_code == 403
# Critically: the underlying config read must NOT have been performed
# (else the response body could leak the count via response timing).
assert get_feeds.call_count == 0
def test_authenticated_caller_sees_full_feed_inventory(self, client):
with (
patch("services.news_feed_config.get_feeds", return_value=self._fake_feeds()),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get(
"/api/settings/news-feeds",
headers={"X-Admin-Key": _ADMIN_KEY},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert len(body) == 2
assert body[0]["name"] == "Custom Internal"
assert body[0]["url"] == "https://internal.example/rss"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# #253: timemachine auth gate
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestTimemachineAuthGate:
def test_anonymous_caller_rejected(self, client):
node_data = {"timemachine_enabled": True}
with (
patch("services.node_settings.read_node_settings", return_value=node_data),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get("/api/settings/timemachine")
assert r.status_code == 403
def test_authenticated_caller_sees_enabled_state(self, client):
node_data = {"timemachine_enabled": True}
with (
patch("services.node_settings.read_node_settings", return_value=node_data),
patch("auth._current_admin_key", return_value=_ADMIN_KEY),
):
r = client.get(
"/api/settings/timemachine",
headers={"X-Admin-Key": _ADMIN_KEY},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["enabled"] is True
assert "storage_warning" in body