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Shadowbroker/backend/services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py
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Shadowbroker e36d1fc79c [security] Close tg12 audit issues #201–#214 seamlessly (#261)
External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed issues #201–#214
in addition to the #189–#200 batch already closed by PRs #227/#232/#260.
This PR closes all eight that are real security bugs (the other six in
the 201–214 range are either design discussions or upstream-abuse/TOS
concerns we're keeping intentional, see issue triage notes on each).

The user-facing principle for this PR: fix the security gap WITHOUT
introducing a single hostile error or behavior change for legitimate
users. Every fix follows the same template — fail forward, not loud.
When the secure path is harder than the insecure one, build a
fallback chain that ends in graceful degradation, not in a scary
modal or 422 response.

  #205 — OpenMHZ audio redirect SSRF (services/radio_intercept.py)

  Replaced requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True) with a manual
  redirect loop that re-validates each hop's host against
  _OPENMHZ_AUDIO_HOSTS. Same-host redirects (CDN edge selection)
  still work, so legitimate audio playback is unaffected. Cross-host
  redirects to disallowed hosts return a generic 502 which the
  browser audio element handles gracefully. Cap at 5 hops.

  #207 — infonet/status verify_signatures DoS (routers/mesh_public.py)

  Silently downgrade verify_signatures=true to False for
  unauthenticated callers. No error surfaced — the response shape is
  identical, just without the O(n_events) signature verification.
  Authenticated callers (scoped mesh.audit) still get the full path.
  The frontend never passes this param so legitimate UI is unaffected.

  #211 — thermal/verify expensive analysis (routers/sigint.py)

  Added Depends(require_local_operator). Frontend has no direct
  callers (verified by grep); Tauri/AI agents use scoped tokens that
  pass the auth check. Anonymous abusers blocked silently — the
  legitimate UI keeps working through the Next.js admin-key proxy.

  #213, #214 — OpenMHZ calls/audio upstream abuse (routers/radio.py)

  Added Depends(require_local_operator) to both. Browser users hit
  these through the Next.js proxy at src/app/api/[...path]/route.ts
  which injects X-Admin-Key, so the auth check passes transparently.
  Direct attackers can no longer rotate sys_names to hammer
  api.openmhz.com or relay arbitrary audio streams through the
  backend's bandwidth.

  #202 — overflights unbounded hours (routers/data.py)

  Silently clamp `hours` to OVERFLIGHTS_MAX_HOURS (default 72,
  configurable). NO 422 — clients asking for an absurd window get a
  shorter window back with `requested_hours` and `effective_hours`
  hint fields. Postel's law: liberal in what we accept, conservative
  in what we compute.

  #203 — Meshtastic callsign UA leak (services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py)

  Added MESHTASTIC_SEND_CALLSIGN_HEADER opt-out env var. Default is
  TRUE — preserves existing operator behavior (callsign sent so
  meshtastic.org can rate-limit per-install). Privacy-conscious
  operators set it to false to suppress.

  #206 — KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only (services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py)

  Upstream rx.linkfanel.net doesn't speak HTTPS (verified — Apache
  2.4.10 only on port 80). We can't fix the transport. Instead added
  three layers:
    1. Content validation on fetched data — reject responses with
       <50 receivers or >5% malformed entries (likely MITM injection).
    2. Existing disk cache fallback (already present).
    3. NEW: bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json
       shipping 798 known-good receivers. Used as last resort so the
       KiwiSDR map layer always renders something useful.

  #208 — Merkle proof DoS via /api/mesh/infonet/sync (services/mesh/mesh_hashchain.py)

  The endpoint is part of the cross-node federation protocol — peers
  legitimately call it without local-operator auth, so we can't add
  Depends(). Instead made the underlying operation O(1) per proof
  via a cached Merkle level structure on the Infonet instance:
    - _merkle_levels_cache + _merkle_levels_for_event_count on each
      Infonet instance
    - _invalidate_merkle_cache() called from every chain mutation
      point (append, ingest_events, apply_fork, cleanup_expired)
    - _get_merkle_levels() does the lazy recompute on first read
      after invalidation, then serves from cache thereafter
  Effect: anonymous attackers hammering the proofs endpoint hit a
  cached structure; the rebuild happens at most once per real chain
  advance. Federation untouched.

  #201 — Tor bundle SHA-256 bypass (services/tor_hidden_service.py)

  Docker users were already covered — backend/Dockerfile installs
  Tor via apt-get at build time (signed by Debian's package system).
  No runtime download needed for the 80%-of-users case.

  For Tauri desktop, replaced the single .sha256sum check with a
  multi-source verification chain implemented in _verify_tor_bundle():
    1. Try upstream .sha256sum (current behavior — fast path)
    2. Try baked-in digest list at backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json
       (pinned per-version, maintainer-updated)
    3. If neither source is REACHABLE: HTTPS-only fallback with a loud
       warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the
       maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release)
  A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only
  the "no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only. This is
  the "have cake and eat it" pattern: real users see no new failure
  modes during torproject.org outages, but MITM/compromise attacks
  still fail because the downloaded digest can't match what BOTH
  the upstream and the baked-in list report.

  Currently the digest file ships with placeholder values for the
  current Tor URLs (those URLs are already stale on torproject.org
  too). A follow-up commit can populate real digests when a stable
  Tor release is selected; until then the HTTPS-only warning fires
  and onboarding still works.

Tests (82 total, all passing):
  test_openmhz_redirect_ssrf.py        (5 tests)  — #205
  test_infonet_status_verify_gate.py   (2 tests)  — #207
  test_overflights_clamp.py            (5 tests)  — #202
  test_meshtastic_callsign_optout.py   (3 tests)  — #203
  test_kiwisdr_fallback.py             (6 tests)  — #206
  test_merkle_cache.py                 (6 tests)  — #208
  test_tor_bundle_verification.py      (6 tests)  — #201
  test_control_surface_auth.py         (extended) — #211, #213, #214
  + all previous security tests (CCTV redirect, GDELT https, sentinel
    cache, crowdthreat opt-in, third-party fetcher gates, control
    surface auth) continue to pass.

Pre-existing test infrastructure issue with SHARED_EXECUTOR teardown
in the broader sweep exists on main too (verified) — not introduced
by this PR.

Credit: @tg12 reported every one of these with accurate line citations
and the recommended fixes that informed this implementation.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 19:57:06 -06:00

284 lines
10 KiB
Python

"""
KiwiSDR public receiver list fetcher.
Pulls from Pierre Ynard's dyatlov map mirror at rx.linkfanel.net, which
auto-generates a JSON-like JS array from kiwisdr.com/public/. We use the
mirror instead of kiwisdr.com directly to avoid adding load to jks-prv's
bandwidth — see issue #131 for context.
Receivers are stationary hardware (someone's house, antenna on the roof) —
their lat/lon and antenna config don't move. We refresh the list once per
day, persisted to disk so restarts don't re-fetch. The slow-tier scheduler
still calls this every 5 minutes, but those calls hit the in-memory or
on-disk cache and never touch the network until 24 hours have passed.
The mirror returns a JS file shaped like:
// KiwiSDR.com receiver list for dyatlov map maker
var kiwisdr_com = [ {...}, {...}, ... ];
"""
import re
import json
import time
import logging
from pathlib import Path
import requests
from cachetools import TTLCache, cached
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# 24-hour in-memory TTL — receivers don't move, so daily is plenty.
_REFRESH_SECONDS = 24 * 3600
kiwisdr_cache: TTLCache = TTLCache(maxsize=1, ttl=_REFRESH_SECONDS)
_SOURCE_URL = "http://rx.linkfanel.net/kiwisdr_com.js"
_CACHE_FILE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "data" / "kiwisdr_cache.json"
# Bundled fallback — shipped with the codebase so the KiwiSDR layer always
# has something to render even when the upstream is unreachable, returns
# garbage, or appears to have been tampered with. Issue #206: the upstream
# only speaks HTTP, so we can't rely on TLS for integrity — instead we
# validate the response's shape and fall back to this bundle if it doesn't
# look right.
_BUNDLED_FALLBACK = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "data" / "kiwisdr_directory.json"
# Minimum number of receivers we expect from a healthy upstream response.
# The KiwiSDR public network has consistently sat well above this threshold
# for years. If we see fewer than this many parsed receivers, treat the
# response as suspect and fall back. Tune via env if the upstream shrinks
# legitimately.
_MIN_HEALTHY_RECEIVER_COUNT = 50
_LINE_COMMENT_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*//.*$", re.MULTILINE)
_VAR_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*var\s+kiwisdr_com\s*=\s*", re.MULTILINE)
_TRAILING_COMMA_RE = re.compile(r",(\s*[\]}])")
_GPS_RE = re.compile(r"\(\s*(-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*,\s*(-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*\)")
def _parse_gps(gps_str: str):
if not gps_str:
return None, None
m = _GPS_RE.search(gps_str)
if not m:
return None, None
try:
return float(m.group(1)), float(m.group(2))
except ValueError:
return None, None
def _to_int(value, default: int = 0) -> int:
try:
return int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return default
def _load_disk_cache() -> list[dict] | None:
"""Return cached receivers if disk cache exists and is <24h old."""
if not _CACHE_FILE.exists():
return None
try:
age = time.time() - _CACHE_FILE.stat().st_mtime
if age > _REFRESH_SECONDS:
return None
nodes = json.loads(_CACHE_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if isinstance(nodes, list):
return nodes
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"KiwiSDR disk cache read failed: {e}")
return None
def _save_disk_cache(nodes: list[dict]) -> None:
try:
_CACHE_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
_CACHE_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(nodes), encoding="utf-8")
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"KiwiSDR disk cache write failed: {e}")
def _parse_mirror_payload(body: str) -> list[dict]:
"""Strip the JS wrapper and return parsed receiver dicts."""
json_body = _LINE_COMMENT_RE.sub("", body)
json_body = _VAR_PREFIX_RE.sub("", json_body, count=1).strip()
if json_body.endswith(";"):
json_body = json_body[:-1].rstrip()
json_body = _TRAILING_COMMA_RE.sub(r"\1", json_body)
try:
entries = json.loads(json_body)
except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
logger.error(f"KiwiSDR mirror returned unparseable JS: {e}")
return []
if not isinstance(entries, list):
logger.error("KiwiSDR mirror payload was not a list")
return []
nodes: list[dict] = []
for entry in entries:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
if str(entry.get("offline", "")).lower() == "yes":
continue
lat, lon = _parse_gps(str(entry.get("gps", "")))
if lat is None or lon is None:
continue
if abs(lat) > 90 or abs(lon) > 180:
continue
name = (entry.get("name") or "Unknown SDR").strip()
url = (entry.get("url") or "").strip()
antenna = (entry.get("antenna") or "").strip()
location = (entry.get("loc") or "").strip()
nodes.append(
{
"name": name[:120],
"lat": round(lat, 5),
"lon": round(lon, 5),
"url": url,
"users": _to_int(entry.get("users")),
"users_max": _to_int(entry.get("users_max")),
"bands": (entry.get("bands") or ""),
"antenna": antenna[:200],
"location": location[:100],
}
)
return nodes
def _validate_fetched_nodes(nodes: list[dict]) -> bool:
"""Sanity-check freshly-fetched receiver data before trusting it.
The upstream (rx.linkfanel.net) speaks only HTTP — there is no TLS to
authenticate the response. A passive MITM could inject doctored
receiver positions (false pins on the map) or strip the response down
to a tiny subset. We can't prevent the modification at the transport
layer, but we can refuse to commit to obviously-bad responses.
Returns True if the parsed list looks reasonable. False means we
should fall back to a previously-cached or bundled directory.
"""
if not isinstance(nodes, list):
return False
if len(nodes) < _MIN_HEALTHY_RECEIVER_COUNT:
# Either upstream is degraded or someone is feeding us a stripped
# response. Either way, the bundled fallback is more useful.
return False
# Spot-check: every entry should have a name, a parsed lat/lon, and a
# URL field. If more than 5% of entries are missing core fields, the
# parse went sideways.
missing_core = 0
for entry in nodes:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
missing_core += 1
continue
if not entry.get("name") or not isinstance(entry.get("lat"), (int, float)):
missing_core += 1
if missing_core > max(5, len(nodes) // 20):
return False
return True
def _load_bundled_fallback() -> list[dict]:
"""Last-resort directory shipped with the codebase. Always returns a
list (may be empty if the bundle is missing in older deployments)."""
if not _BUNDLED_FALLBACK.exists():
return []
try:
data = json.loads(_BUNDLED_FALLBACK.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if isinstance(data, list):
return data
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"KiwiSDR bundled fallback unreadable: {e}")
return []
@cached(kiwisdr_cache)
def fetch_kiwisdr_nodes() -> list[dict]:
"""Return the KiwiSDR receiver list, refreshed at most once per day.
Layered fallback (issue #206 — upstream is HTTP-only, so we defend with
content validation + bundled static directory rather than trying to
upgrade the transport):
1. In-memory cache (handled by @cached on this function)
2. On-disk cache if <24h old
3. Fresh network fetch from rx.linkfanel.net → validated → committed
4. Stale on-disk cache (>24h) if validation fails
5. Bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json
The KiwiSDR map layer renders something useful in every case. A
tampered upstream returning garbage is caught by _validate_fetched_nodes()
and falls through to whatever previously-trusted snapshot we have.
"""
from services.network_utils import fetch_with_curl
# 1. Trust on-disk cache if fresh.
cached_nodes = _load_disk_cache()
if cached_nodes is not None:
logger.info(
f"KiwiSDR: loaded {len(cached_nodes)} receivers from disk cache (<24h old)"
)
return cached_nodes
# 2. Cache cold or stale — fetch from network.
fresh_nodes: list[dict] = []
fetch_succeeded = False
try:
res = fetch_with_curl(_SOURCE_URL, timeout=20)
if res and res.status_code == 200:
fresh_nodes = _parse_mirror_payload(res.text)
fetch_succeeded = True
else:
logger.warning(
f"KiwiSDR fetch returned HTTP {res.status_code if res else 'no response'}"
)
except (requests.RequestException, ConnectionError, TimeoutError, ValueError, KeyError) as e:
logger.warning(f"KiwiSDR fetch exception: {e}")
# 3. Validate before committing. If the response looks healthy, save
# it as the new cache and return.
if fetch_succeeded and _validate_fetched_nodes(fresh_nodes):
_save_disk_cache(fresh_nodes)
logger.info(
f"KiwiSDR: refreshed {len(fresh_nodes)} receivers from rx.linkfanel.net "
"(next refresh in 24h)"
)
return fresh_nodes
if fetch_succeeded:
# Network came back, but the payload didn't pass validation —
# either upstream is degraded or a MITM is at work. Fall through
# to a trusted snapshot rather than committing garbage to disk.
logger.warning(
"KiwiSDR: upstream response failed validation (%d entries) — "
"falling back to trusted snapshot",
len(fresh_nodes),
)
# 4. Stale on-disk cache, if any.
if _CACHE_FILE.exists():
try:
stale = json.loads(_CACHE_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if isinstance(stale, list) and stale:
logger.info(
f"KiwiSDR: serving {len(stale)} stale receivers from disk"
)
return stale
except Exception:
pass
# 5. Bundled static directory — last resort, always works.
bundled = _load_bundled_fallback()
if bundled:
logger.info(
f"KiwiSDR: serving {len(bundled)} receivers from bundled fallback "
"(no fresh fetch + no disk cache available)"
)
return bundled