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Shadowbroker
084e563412
Both POST /api/mesh/oracle/resolve and POST /api/mesh/oracle/resolve-stakes were previously gated only by a rate limit (5/min) and tagged with `mesh_write_exempt(MeshWriteExemption.ADMIN_CONTROL)`. The exemption decorator is metadata only — it tells the mesh signed-write middleware not to require a signature envelope, it does NOT enforce caller authorization. Any network caller could: - /resolve: settle any prediction market to any outcome (corrupts every downstream profile/win-loss count derived from that ledger). - /resolve-stakes: trigger stake settlement for all expired contests at a time of their choosing (race against operator intent). Fix: add `dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)]` to both routes. The existing `mesh_write_exempt` tag stays in place because it accurately describes the route's relationship to the signed-write envelope system; adding `require_admin` is what closes the actual auth hole. Tests in backend/tests/test_oracle_resolve_auth_gate.py: - anonymous caller -> 403, ledger mutator NOT called - wrong admin key -> 403, ledger mutator NOT called - valid admin key -> 200, ledger mutator called - admin key unconfigured + no debug/insecure-admin -> 403 Credit: tg12 (external security audit)