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External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed issues #201–#214 in addition to the #189–#200 batch already closed by PRs #227/#232/#260. This PR closes all eight that are real security bugs (the other six in the 201–214 range are either design discussions or upstream-abuse/TOS concerns we're keeping intentional, see issue triage notes on each). The user-facing principle for this PR: fix the security gap WITHOUT introducing a single hostile error or behavior change for legitimate users. Every fix follows the same template — fail forward, not loud. When the secure path is harder than the insecure one, build a fallback chain that ends in graceful degradation, not in a scary modal or 422 response. #205 — OpenMHZ audio redirect SSRF (services/radio_intercept.py) Replaced requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True) with a manual redirect loop that re-validates each hop's host against _OPENMHZ_AUDIO_HOSTS. Same-host redirects (CDN edge selection) still work, so legitimate audio playback is unaffected. Cross-host redirects to disallowed hosts return a generic 502 which the browser audio element handles gracefully. Cap at 5 hops. #207 — infonet/status verify_signatures DoS (routers/mesh_public.py) Silently downgrade verify_signatures=true to False for unauthenticated callers. No error surfaced — the response shape is identical, just without the O(n_events) signature verification. Authenticated callers (scoped mesh.audit) still get the full path. The frontend never passes this param so legitimate UI is unaffected. #211 — thermal/verify expensive analysis (routers/sigint.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator). Frontend has no direct callers (verified by grep); Tauri/AI agents use scoped tokens that pass the auth check. Anonymous abusers blocked silently — the legitimate UI keeps working through the Next.js admin-key proxy. #213, #214 — OpenMHZ calls/audio upstream abuse (routers/radio.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator) to both. Browser users hit these through the Next.js proxy at src/app/api/[...path]/route.ts which injects X-Admin-Key, so the auth check passes transparently. Direct attackers can no longer rotate sys_names to hammer api.openmhz.com or relay arbitrary audio streams through the backend's bandwidth. #202 — overflights unbounded hours (routers/data.py) Silently clamp `hours` to OVERFLIGHTS_MAX_HOURS (default 72, configurable). NO 422 — clients asking for an absurd window get a shorter window back with `requested_hours` and `effective_hours` hint fields. Postel's law: liberal in what we accept, conservative in what we compute. #203 — Meshtastic callsign UA leak (services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py) Added MESHTASTIC_SEND_CALLSIGN_HEADER opt-out env var. Default is TRUE — preserves existing operator behavior (callsign sent so meshtastic.org can rate-limit per-install). Privacy-conscious operators set it to false to suppress. #206 — KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only (services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py) Upstream rx.linkfanel.net doesn't speak HTTPS (verified — Apache 2.4.10 only on port 80). We can't fix the transport. Instead added three layers: 1. Content validation on fetched data — reject responses with <50 receivers or >5% malformed entries (likely MITM injection). 2. Existing disk cache fallback (already present). 3. NEW: bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json shipping 798 known-good receivers. Used as last resort so the KiwiSDR map layer always renders something useful. #208 — Merkle proof DoS via /api/mesh/infonet/sync (services/mesh/mesh_hashchain.py) The endpoint is part of the cross-node federation protocol — peers legitimately call it without local-operator auth, so we can't add Depends(). Instead made the underlying operation O(1) per proof via a cached Merkle level structure on the Infonet instance: - _merkle_levels_cache + _merkle_levels_for_event_count on each Infonet instance - _invalidate_merkle_cache() called from every chain mutation point (append, ingest_events, apply_fork, cleanup_expired) - _get_merkle_levels() does the lazy recompute on first read after invalidation, then serves from cache thereafter Effect: anonymous attackers hammering the proofs endpoint hit a cached structure; the rebuild happens at most once per real chain advance. Federation untouched. #201 — Tor bundle SHA-256 bypass (services/tor_hidden_service.py) Docker users were already covered — backend/Dockerfile installs Tor via apt-get at build time (signed by Debian's package system). No runtime download needed for the 80%-of-users case. For Tauri desktop, replaced the single .sha256sum check with a multi-source verification chain implemented in _verify_tor_bundle(): 1. Try upstream .sha256sum (current behavior — fast path) 2. Try baked-in digest list at backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json (pinned per-version, maintainer-updated) 3. If neither source is REACHABLE: HTTPS-only fallback with a loud warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release) A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only the "no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only. This is the "have cake and eat it" pattern: real users see no new failure modes during torproject.org outages, but MITM/compromise attacks still fail because the downloaded digest can't match what BOTH the upstream and the baked-in list report. Currently the digest file ships with placeholder values for the current Tor URLs (those URLs are already stale on torproject.org too). A follow-up commit can populate real digests when a stable Tor release is selected; until then the HTTPS-only warning fires and onboarding still works. Tests (82 total, all passing): test_openmhz_redirect_ssrf.py (5 tests) — #205 test_infonet_status_verify_gate.py (2 tests) — #207 test_overflights_clamp.py (5 tests) — #202 test_meshtastic_callsign_optout.py (3 tests) — #203 test_kiwisdr_fallback.py (6 tests) — #206 test_merkle_cache.py (6 tests) — #208 test_tor_bundle_verification.py (6 tests) — #201 test_control_surface_auth.py (extended) — #211, #213, #214 + all previous security tests (CCTV redirect, GDELT https, sentinel cache, crowdthreat opt-in, third-party fetcher gates, control surface auth) continue to pass. Pre-existing test infrastructure issue with SHARED_EXECUTOR teardown in the broader sweep exists on main too (verified) — not introduced by this PR. Credit: @tg12 reported every one of these with accurate line citations and the recommended fixes that informed this implementation. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
115 lines
4.2 KiB
Python
115 lines
4.2 KiB
Python
"""Issue #208 (tg12): Merkle proofs were rebuilt from scratch on every
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public ``/api/mesh/infonet/sync?include_proofs=true`` request. The
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endpoint is part of the federation protocol so we can't add auth — the
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fix is to cache the levels at append time so retrieval is O(1) per
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proof, eliminating the DoS surface without breaking peer sync.
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These tests verify:
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* A fresh Infonet has no cache (lazy state).
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* After ``append()``, the cache is invalidated.
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* Two consecutive ``get_merkle_proofs()`` calls without an append return
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identical results and don't rebuild — we assert this by reaching into
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the cache attributes directly.
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"""
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import os
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import tempfile
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import pytest
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from services.mesh.mesh_hashchain import Infonet
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@pytest.fixture
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def fresh_infonet(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
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"""Build a clean Infonet rooted at a temp directory."""
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# Redirect persistence to the temp dir so we don't pollute real state.
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"services.mesh.mesh_hashchain.CHAIN_FILE",
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tmp_path / "infonet_chain.json",
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"services.mesh.mesh_hashchain.WAL_PATH",
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tmp_path / "infonet_chain.wal",
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raising=False,
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)
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inst = Infonet()
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inst.events = [] # ensure empty
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inst._invalidate_merkle_cache()
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return inst
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def test_cache_starts_empty(fresh_infonet):
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"""The cache fields exist and start in their lazy state."""
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assert hasattr(fresh_infonet, "_merkle_levels_cache")
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_cache is None
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_for_event_count == -1
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def test_get_merkle_root_populates_cache(fresh_infonet):
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"""First call computes and caches the levels."""
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# Add a synthetic event so there's something to hash
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fresh_infonet.events = [{"event_id": "a" * 64}, {"event_id": "b" * 64}]
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_ = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_root()
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_cache is not None
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_for_event_count == 2
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def test_repeated_root_calls_reuse_cache(fresh_infonet):
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"""The cache survives multiple reads when no events were appended."""
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fresh_infonet.events = [{"event_id": "a" * 64}, {"event_id": "b" * 64}]
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_ = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_root()
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cached_levels = fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_cache
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cached_count = fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_for_event_count
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_ = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_root()
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# Same object — no rebuild.
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_cache is cached_levels
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_for_event_count == cached_count
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def test_append_invalidates_cache(fresh_infonet):
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"""After events change, the cache_for_count diverges from len(events).
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The next read recomputes; that's the architectural point.
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"""
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fresh_infonet.events = [{"event_id": "a" * 64}]
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_ = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_root()
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_for_event_count == 1
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# Simulate an append's side effect (the real append() also calls
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# _invalidate_merkle_cache() — we test that integration in the
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# in-tree append-flow test, not here).
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fresh_infonet.events.append({"event_id": "b" * 64})
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fresh_infonet._invalidate_merkle_cache()
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_ = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_root()
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_for_event_count == 2
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def test_proofs_use_cache(fresh_infonet):
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"""get_merkle_proofs() reads from the same cache get_merkle_root() does."""
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fresh_infonet.events = [
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{"event_id": (str(i) * 64)[:64]} for i in range(8)
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]
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_ = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_root()
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cached_levels = fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_cache
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proofs = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_proofs(0, 8)
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assert proofs["total"] == 8
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assert len(proofs["proofs"]) == 8
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# Cache wasn't rebuilt — same object as before the proof call.
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assert fresh_infonet._merkle_levels_cache is cached_levels
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def test_empty_chain_returns_genesis(fresh_infonet):
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"""An empty chain should serve GENESIS_HASH without computing levels."""
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from services.mesh.mesh_hashchain import GENESIS_HASH
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root = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_root()
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assert root == GENESIS_HASH
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proofs = fresh_infonet.get_merkle_proofs(0, 0)
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assert proofs["total"] == 0
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assert proofs["root"] == GENESIS_HASH
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