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e36d1fc79c
External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed issues #201–#214 in addition to the #189–#200 batch already closed by PRs #227/#232/#260. This PR closes all eight that are real security bugs (the other six in the 201–214 range are either design discussions or upstream-abuse/TOS concerns we're keeping intentional, see issue triage notes on each). The user-facing principle for this PR: fix the security gap WITHOUT introducing a single hostile error or behavior change for legitimate users. Every fix follows the same template — fail forward, not loud. When the secure path is harder than the insecure one, build a fallback chain that ends in graceful degradation, not in a scary modal or 422 response. #205 — OpenMHZ audio redirect SSRF (services/radio_intercept.py) Replaced requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True) with a manual redirect loop that re-validates each hop's host against _OPENMHZ_AUDIO_HOSTS. Same-host redirects (CDN edge selection) still work, so legitimate audio playback is unaffected. Cross-host redirects to disallowed hosts return a generic 502 which the browser audio element handles gracefully. Cap at 5 hops. #207 — infonet/status verify_signatures DoS (routers/mesh_public.py) Silently downgrade verify_signatures=true to False for unauthenticated callers. No error surfaced — the response shape is identical, just without the O(n_events) signature verification. Authenticated callers (scoped mesh.audit) still get the full path. The frontend never passes this param so legitimate UI is unaffected. #211 — thermal/verify expensive analysis (routers/sigint.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator). Frontend has no direct callers (verified by grep); Tauri/AI agents use scoped tokens that pass the auth check. Anonymous abusers blocked silently — the legitimate UI keeps working through the Next.js admin-key proxy. #213, #214 — OpenMHZ calls/audio upstream abuse (routers/radio.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator) to both. Browser users hit these through the Next.js proxy at src/app/api/[...path]/route.ts which injects X-Admin-Key, so the auth check passes transparently. Direct attackers can no longer rotate sys_names to hammer api.openmhz.com or relay arbitrary audio streams through the backend's bandwidth. #202 — overflights unbounded hours (routers/data.py) Silently clamp `hours` to OVERFLIGHTS_MAX_HOURS (default 72, configurable). NO 422 — clients asking for an absurd window get a shorter window back with `requested_hours` and `effective_hours` hint fields. Postel's law: liberal in what we accept, conservative in what we compute. #203 — Meshtastic callsign UA leak (services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py) Added MESHTASTIC_SEND_CALLSIGN_HEADER opt-out env var. Default is TRUE — preserves existing operator behavior (callsign sent so meshtastic.org can rate-limit per-install). Privacy-conscious operators set it to false to suppress. #206 — KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only (services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py) Upstream rx.linkfanel.net doesn't speak HTTPS (verified — Apache 2.4.10 only on port 80). We can't fix the transport. Instead added three layers: 1. Content validation on fetched data — reject responses with <50 receivers or >5% malformed entries (likely MITM injection). 2. Existing disk cache fallback (already present). 3. NEW: bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json shipping 798 known-good receivers. Used as last resort so the KiwiSDR map layer always renders something useful. #208 — Merkle proof DoS via /api/mesh/infonet/sync (services/mesh/mesh_hashchain.py) The endpoint is part of the cross-node federation protocol — peers legitimately call it without local-operator auth, so we can't add Depends(). Instead made the underlying operation O(1) per proof via a cached Merkle level structure on the Infonet instance: - _merkle_levels_cache + _merkle_levels_for_event_count on each Infonet instance - _invalidate_merkle_cache() called from every chain mutation point (append, ingest_events, apply_fork, cleanup_expired) - _get_merkle_levels() does the lazy recompute on first read after invalidation, then serves from cache thereafter Effect: anonymous attackers hammering the proofs endpoint hit a cached structure; the rebuild happens at most once per real chain advance. Federation untouched. #201 — Tor bundle SHA-256 bypass (services/tor_hidden_service.py) Docker users were already covered — backend/Dockerfile installs Tor via apt-get at build time (signed by Debian's package system). No runtime download needed for the 80%-of-users case. For Tauri desktop, replaced the single .sha256sum check with a multi-source verification chain implemented in _verify_tor_bundle(): 1. Try upstream .sha256sum (current behavior — fast path) 2. Try baked-in digest list at backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json (pinned per-version, maintainer-updated) 3. If neither source is REACHABLE: HTTPS-only fallback with a loud warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release) A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only the "no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only. This is the "have cake and eat it" pattern: real users see no new failure modes during torproject.org outages, but MITM/compromise attacks still fail because the downloaded digest can't match what BOTH the upstream and the baked-in list report. Currently the digest file ships with placeholder values for the current Tor URLs (those URLs are already stale on torproject.org too). A follow-up commit can populate real digests when a stable Tor release is selected; until then the HTTPS-only warning fires and onboarding still works. Tests (82 total, all passing): test_openmhz_redirect_ssrf.py (5 tests) — #205 test_infonet_status_verify_gate.py (2 tests) — #207 test_overflights_clamp.py (5 tests) — #202 test_meshtastic_callsign_optout.py (3 tests) — #203 test_kiwisdr_fallback.py (6 tests) — #206 test_merkle_cache.py (6 tests) — #208 test_tor_bundle_verification.py (6 tests) — #201 test_control_surface_auth.py (extended) — #211, #213, #214 + all previous security tests (CCTV redirect, GDELT https, sentinel cache, crowdthreat opt-in, third-party fetcher gates, control surface auth) continue to pass. Pre-existing test infrastructure issue with SHARED_EXECUTOR teardown in the broader sweep exists on main too (verified) — not introduced by this PR. Credit: @tg12 reported every one of these with accurate line citations and the recommended fixes that informed this implementation. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
108 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request, Query, Depends
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from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from limiter import limiter
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from auth import require_admin, require_local_operator
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router = APIRouter()
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@router.get("/api/radio/top")
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@limiter.limit("30/minute")
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async def get_top_radios(request: Request):
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from services.radio_intercept import get_top_broadcastify_feeds
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return get_top_broadcastify_feeds()
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@router.get("/api/radio/openmhz/systems")
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@limiter.limit("30/minute")
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async def api_get_openmhz_systems(request: Request):
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from services.radio_intercept import get_openmhz_systems
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return get_openmhz_systems()
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# Issue #213: rotating sys_name bypasses the 20s TTL cache and lets an
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# anonymous caller hammer api.openmhz.com through this proxy, risking an
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# IP-ban for the project. require_local_operator scopes this to the local
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# UI (which goes through the Next.js proxy with admin-key injection) and
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# scoped agent tokens.
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@router.get(
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"/api/radio/openmhz/calls/{sys_name}",
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dependencies=[Depends(require_local_operator)],
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)
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@limiter.limit("60/minute")
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async def api_get_openmhz_calls(request: Request, sys_name: str):
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from services.radio_intercept import get_recent_openmhz_calls
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return get_recent_openmhz_calls(sys_name)
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# Issue #214: this is a streaming bandwidth relay. An anonymous caller can
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# stream audio through the backend, saturating the operator's outbound
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# bandwidth. Scope to local operator; the legitimate browser UI still
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# works because relative /api/... paths go through the Next.js proxy
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# which injects the admin key automatically.
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@router.get(
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"/api/radio/openmhz/audio",
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dependencies=[Depends(require_local_operator)],
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)
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@limiter.limit("120/minute")
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async def api_get_openmhz_audio(request: Request, url: str = Query(..., min_length=10)):
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from services.radio_intercept import openmhz_audio_response
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return openmhz_audio_response(url)
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@router.get("/api/radio/nearest")
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@limiter.limit("60/minute")
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async def api_get_nearest_radio(
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request: Request,
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lat: float = Query(..., ge=-90, le=90),
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lng: float = Query(..., ge=-180, le=180),
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):
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from services.radio_intercept import find_nearest_openmhz_system
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return find_nearest_openmhz_system(lat, lng)
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@router.get("/api/radio/nearest-list")
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@limiter.limit("60/minute")
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async def api_get_nearest_radios_list(
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request: Request,
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lat: float = Query(..., ge=-90, le=90),
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lng: float = Query(..., ge=-180, le=180),
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limit: int = Query(5, ge=1, le=20),
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):
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from services.radio_intercept import find_nearest_openmhz_systems_list
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return find_nearest_openmhz_systems_list(lat, lng, limit=limit)
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@router.get("/api/route/{callsign}")
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@limiter.limit("60/minute")
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async def get_flight_route(request: Request, callsign: str, lat: float = 0.0, lng: float = 0.0):
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from services.network_utils import fetch_with_curl
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r = fetch_with_curl(
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"https://api.adsb.lol/api/0/routeset",
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method="POST",
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json_data={"planes": [{"callsign": callsign, "lat": lat, "lng": lng}]},
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timeout=10,
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)
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if r and r.status_code == 200:
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data = r.json()
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route_list = []
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if isinstance(data, dict):
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route_list = data.get("value", [])
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elif isinstance(data, list):
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route_list = data
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if route_list and len(route_list) > 0:
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route = route_list[0]
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airports = route.get("_airports", [])
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if len(airports) >= 2:
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orig = airports[0]
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dest = airports[-1]
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return {
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"orig_loc": [orig.get("lon", 0), orig.get("lat", 0)],
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"dest_loc": [dest.get("lon", 0), dest.get("lat", 0)],
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"origin_name": f"{orig.get('iata', '') or orig.get('icao', '')}: {orig.get('name', 'Unknown')}",
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"dest_name": f"{dest.get('iata', '') or dest.get('icao', '')}: {dest.get('name', 'Unknown')}",
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}
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return {}
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