mirror of
https://github.com/BigBodyCobain/Shadowbroker.git
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e36d1fc79c
External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed issues #201–#214 in addition to the #189–#200 batch already closed by PRs #227/#232/#260. This PR closes all eight that are real security bugs (the other six in the 201–214 range are either design discussions or upstream-abuse/TOS concerns we're keeping intentional, see issue triage notes on each). The user-facing principle for this PR: fix the security gap WITHOUT introducing a single hostile error or behavior change for legitimate users. Every fix follows the same template — fail forward, not loud. When the secure path is harder than the insecure one, build a fallback chain that ends in graceful degradation, not in a scary modal or 422 response. #205 — OpenMHZ audio redirect SSRF (services/radio_intercept.py) Replaced requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True) with a manual redirect loop that re-validates each hop's host against _OPENMHZ_AUDIO_HOSTS. Same-host redirects (CDN edge selection) still work, so legitimate audio playback is unaffected. Cross-host redirects to disallowed hosts return a generic 502 which the browser audio element handles gracefully. Cap at 5 hops. #207 — infonet/status verify_signatures DoS (routers/mesh_public.py) Silently downgrade verify_signatures=true to False for unauthenticated callers. No error surfaced — the response shape is identical, just without the O(n_events) signature verification. Authenticated callers (scoped mesh.audit) still get the full path. The frontend never passes this param so legitimate UI is unaffected. #211 — thermal/verify expensive analysis (routers/sigint.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator). Frontend has no direct callers (verified by grep); Tauri/AI agents use scoped tokens that pass the auth check. Anonymous abusers blocked silently — the legitimate UI keeps working through the Next.js admin-key proxy. #213, #214 — OpenMHZ calls/audio upstream abuse (routers/radio.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator) to both. Browser users hit these through the Next.js proxy at src/app/api/[...path]/route.ts which injects X-Admin-Key, so the auth check passes transparently. Direct attackers can no longer rotate sys_names to hammer api.openmhz.com or relay arbitrary audio streams through the backend's bandwidth. #202 — overflights unbounded hours (routers/data.py) Silently clamp `hours` to OVERFLIGHTS_MAX_HOURS (default 72, configurable). NO 422 — clients asking for an absurd window get a shorter window back with `requested_hours` and `effective_hours` hint fields. Postel's law: liberal in what we accept, conservative in what we compute. #203 — Meshtastic callsign UA leak (services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py) Added MESHTASTIC_SEND_CALLSIGN_HEADER opt-out env var. Default is TRUE — preserves existing operator behavior (callsign sent so meshtastic.org can rate-limit per-install). Privacy-conscious operators set it to false to suppress. #206 — KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only (services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py) Upstream rx.linkfanel.net doesn't speak HTTPS (verified — Apache 2.4.10 only on port 80). We can't fix the transport. Instead added three layers: 1. Content validation on fetched data — reject responses with <50 receivers or >5% malformed entries (likely MITM injection). 2. Existing disk cache fallback (already present). 3. NEW: bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json shipping 798 known-good receivers. Used as last resort so the KiwiSDR map layer always renders something useful. #208 — Merkle proof DoS via /api/mesh/infonet/sync (services/mesh/mesh_hashchain.py) The endpoint is part of the cross-node federation protocol — peers legitimately call it without local-operator auth, so we can't add Depends(). Instead made the underlying operation O(1) per proof via a cached Merkle level structure on the Infonet instance: - _merkle_levels_cache + _merkle_levels_for_event_count on each Infonet instance - _invalidate_merkle_cache() called from every chain mutation point (append, ingest_events, apply_fork, cleanup_expired) - _get_merkle_levels() does the lazy recompute on first read after invalidation, then serves from cache thereafter Effect: anonymous attackers hammering the proofs endpoint hit a cached structure; the rebuild happens at most once per real chain advance. Federation untouched. #201 — Tor bundle SHA-256 bypass (services/tor_hidden_service.py) Docker users were already covered — backend/Dockerfile installs Tor via apt-get at build time (signed by Debian's package system). No runtime download needed for the 80%-of-users case. For Tauri desktop, replaced the single .sha256sum check with a multi-source verification chain implemented in _verify_tor_bundle(): 1. Try upstream .sha256sum (current behavior — fast path) 2. Try baked-in digest list at backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json (pinned per-version, maintainer-updated) 3. If neither source is REACHABLE: HTTPS-only fallback with a loud warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release) A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only the "no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only. This is the "have cake and eat it" pattern: real users see no new failure modes during torproject.org outages, but MITM/compromise attacks still fail because the downloaded digest can't match what BOTH the upstream and the baked-in list report. Currently the digest file ships with placeholder values for the current Tor URLs (those URLs are already stale on torproject.org too). A follow-up commit can populate real digests when a stable Tor release is selected; until then the HTTPS-only warning fires and onboarding still works. Tests (82 total, all passing): test_openmhz_redirect_ssrf.py (5 tests) — #205 test_infonet_status_verify_gate.py (2 tests) — #207 test_overflights_clamp.py (5 tests) — #202 test_meshtastic_callsign_optout.py (3 tests) — #203 test_kiwisdr_fallback.py (6 tests) — #206 test_merkle_cache.py (6 tests) — #208 test_tor_bundle_verification.py (6 tests) — #201 test_control_surface_auth.py (extended) — #211, #213, #214 + all previous security tests (CCTV redirect, GDELT https, sentinel cache, crowdthreat opt-in, third-party fetcher gates, control surface auth) continue to pass. Pre-existing test infrastructure issue with SHARED_EXECUTOR teardown in the broader sweep exists on main too (verified) — not introduced by this PR. Credit: @tg12 reported every one of these with accurate line citations and the recommended fixes that informed this implementation. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
378 lines
14 KiB
Python
378 lines
14 KiB
Python
"""Tor hidden-service auto-provisioner.
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Manages a Tor hidden service that points to the local ShadowBroker backend.
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Tor is started as a subprocess with a generated torrc. Windows source installs
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can download the Tor Expert Bundle into backend/data without admin rights.
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Docker images should already include the `tor` package.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import os
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import shutil
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import subprocess
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import threading
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import time
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from pathlib import Path
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from urllib.request import urlretrieve
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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BACKEND_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
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DATA_DIR = BACKEND_DIR / "data"
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TOR_DIR = DATA_DIR / "tor_hidden_service"
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TORRC_PATH = TOR_DIR / "torrc"
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HOSTNAME_PATH = TOR_DIR / "hidden_service" / "hostname"
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TOR_DATA_DIR = TOR_DIR / "data"
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PIDFILE_PATH = TOR_DIR / "tor.pid"
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# Bundled Tor install location (inside data dir so no admin rights are needed).
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TOR_INSTALL_DIR = TOR_DIR / "tor_bin"
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_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_S = 90
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_POLL_INTERVAL_S = 1.0
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# Windows x86_64 Tor Expert Bundle URLs. Keep a fallback so first-run
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# onboarding does not break when Tor rotates point releases.
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_TOR_EXPERT_BUNDLE_URLS = [
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"https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/15.0.11/tor-expert-bundle-windows-x86_64-15.0.11.tar.gz",
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"https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/15.0.8/tor-expert-bundle-windows-x86_64-15.0.8.tar.gz",
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]
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def _find_tor_binary() -> str | None:
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"""Locate the tor binary on the system, including our bundled install."""
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bundled = TOR_INSTALL_DIR / "tor" / "tor.exe"
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if bundled.exists():
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return str(bundled)
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for sub in TOR_INSTALL_DIR.rglob("tor.exe"):
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return str(sub)
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tor = shutil.which("tor")
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if tor:
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return tor
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for candidate in [
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r"C:\Program Files\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Tor\tor.exe",
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r"C:\Program Files (x86)\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Tor\tor.exe",
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os.path.expanduser(r"~\Desktop\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Tor\tor.exe"),
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]:
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if os.path.isfile(candidate):
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return candidate
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return None
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# Baked-in expected digest list. Loaded lazily; populated by maintainers
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# when a new Tor Expert Bundle URL is added to _TOR_EXPERT_BUNDLE_URLS.
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# See issue #201 for rationale.
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_TOR_DIGEST_FILE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "data" / "tor_bundle_digests.json"
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_DIGEST_PLACEHOLDER = "PLACEHOLDER_REPLACE_BEFORE_RELEASE"
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def _load_baked_in_digests() -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Return {url: expected_sha256_lower} for URLs we ship a known digest for.
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Entries whose value is the placeholder sentinel are filtered out — they
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represent versions the maintainer has not yet pinned, and we don't
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want to trust them via this layer.
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"""
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if not _TOR_DIGEST_FILE.exists():
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return {}
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try:
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import json as _json
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raw = _json.loads(_TOR_DIGEST_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
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except Exception as exc:
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logger.warning("Tor bundle digests file unreadable: %s", exc)
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return {}
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result: dict[str, str] = {}
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for k, v in raw.items():
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if not isinstance(k, str) or k.startswith("_"):
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continue
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if not isinstance(v, str) or v == _DIGEST_PLACEHOLDER:
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continue
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result[k] = v.strip().lower()
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return result
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def _verify_tor_bundle(archive_path: Path, bundle_url: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
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"""Verify the downloaded Tor bundle against any source we trust.
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Returns (verified, reason). The bundle is considered verified if EITHER:
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* The upstream ``.sha256sum`` file is reachable AND its digest matches
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what we just downloaded, OR
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* Our baked-in digest list (``backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json``)
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contains this URL AND that digest matches.
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If both sources are unavailable (e.g. fresh checkout before the
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maintainer has populated the digest file AND the upstream
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``.sha256sum`` is unreachable), we **fall back to HTTPS-only trust**
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with a warning so first-run onboarding does not break. As soon as the
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digest file is populated for a shipped Tor version, the secure path
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activates automatically — no operator action required.
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Issue #201.
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"""
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import hashlib
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actual_hash = hashlib.sha256(archive_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest().lower()
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# Source 1: upstream .sha256sum
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upstream_hash: str | None = None
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sha256_url = bundle_url + ".sha256sum"
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sha256_file = TOR_INSTALL_DIR / "sha256sum.txt"
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try:
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urlretrieve(sha256_url, str(sha256_file))
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upstream_hash = sha256_file.read_text().strip().split()[0].lower()
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sha256_file.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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except Exception as hash_err:
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logger.info("Tor bundle upstream .sha256sum unreachable: %s", hash_err)
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sha256_file.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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if upstream_hash and upstream_hash == actual_hash:
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return True, f"verified via upstream .sha256sum ({actual_hash[:16]}...)"
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# Source 2: baked-in digest list
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baked = _load_baked_in_digests()
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baked_hash = baked.get(bundle_url)
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if baked_hash and baked_hash == actual_hash:
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return True, f"verified via baked-in digest list ({actual_hash[:16]}...)"
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# If we got an upstream digest AND a baked-in digest AND neither
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# matched, the bundle is genuinely suspect — refuse it.
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if upstream_hash and baked_hash:
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return False, (
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f"SHA-256 mismatch: archive={actual_hash[:16]}..., "
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f"upstream={upstream_hash[:16]}..., baked={baked_hash[:16]}..."
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)
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if upstream_hash and upstream_hash != actual_hash:
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return False, (
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f"SHA-256 mismatch vs upstream: archive={actual_hash[:16]}..., "
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f"upstream={upstream_hash[:16]}..."
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)
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if baked_hash and baked_hash != actual_hash:
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return False, (
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f"SHA-256 mismatch vs baked-in digest: archive={actual_hash[:16]}..., "
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f"expected={baked_hash[:16]}..."
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)
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# Neither verification source available. This is the fallback path for
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# the case where the upstream .sha256sum is temporarily unreachable
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# AND the maintainer hasn't yet pinned this Tor version. Trust HTTPS
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# only (current behavior pre-#201) with a clear warning. Onboarding
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# works; once we populate the digest file, the secure path activates.
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logger.warning(
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"Tor bundle integrity check fell back to HTTPS-only trust "
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"(upstream .sha256sum unreachable AND no baked-in digest for %s). "
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"Add this URL's SHA-256 to backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json "
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"to enable the secure path.",
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bundle_url,
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)
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return True, f"https-only (no digest source reachable, archive={actual_hash[:16]}...)"
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def _auto_install_tor() -> str | None:
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"""Install or download Tor when it is safe to do so."""
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if os.name != "nt":
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# In Docker this should already be baked into the image. For source
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# installs we avoid unattended sudo prompts from a web request path.
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logger.warning("Tor is not installed. Install the tor package or use the Docker image with Tor baked in.")
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return None
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TOR_INSTALL_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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for bundle_url in _TOR_EXPERT_BUNDLE_URLS:
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archive_path = TOR_INSTALL_DIR / "tor-expert-bundle.tar.gz"
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try:
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logger.info("Downloading Tor Expert Bundle over HTTPS from %s...", bundle_url)
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urlretrieve(bundle_url, str(archive_path))
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# Issue #201: multi-source verification. If neither upstream
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# .sha256sum nor a baked-in digest matches, we refuse this URL
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# and try the next one in _TOR_EXPERT_BUNDLE_URLS. If neither
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# source is reachable at all, we fall back to HTTPS-only trust
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# (current behavior) rather than blocking onboarding.
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verified, reason = _verify_tor_bundle(archive_path, bundle_url)
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if not verified:
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logger.error("Tor bundle verification failed for %s: %s", bundle_url, reason)
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archive_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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continue
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logger.info("Tor bundle %s", reason)
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logger.info("Download complete, extracting...")
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import tarfile
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with tarfile.open(str(archive_path), "r:gz") as tar:
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for member in tar.getmembers():
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member_path = (TOR_INSTALL_DIR / member.name).resolve()
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if not str(member_path).startswith(str(TOR_INSTALL_DIR.resolve())):
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logger.error("Tar path traversal blocked: %s", member.name)
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archive_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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return None
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tar.extractall(path=str(TOR_INSTALL_DIR))
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archive_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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for p in TOR_INSTALL_DIR.rglob("tor.exe"):
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logger.info("Tor installed at: %s", p)
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return str(p)
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logger.error("tor.exe not found after extracting %s", bundle_url)
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except Exception as exc:
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logger.error("Failed to download/extract Tor from %s: %s", bundle_url, exc)
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finally:
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archive_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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return None
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class TorHiddenService:
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"""Manages a Tor hidden service subprocess."""
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def __init__(self) -> None:
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self._lock = threading.Lock()
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self._process: subprocess.Popen | None = None
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self._onion_address: str = ""
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self._running = False
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self._error: str = ""
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if HOSTNAME_PATH.exists():
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try:
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hostname = HOSTNAME_PATH.read_text().strip()
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if hostname.endswith(".onion"):
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self._onion_address = f"http://{hostname}:8000"
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except Exception:
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pass
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@property
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def onion_address(self) -> str:
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return self._onion_address
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@property
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def running(self) -> bool:
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with self._lock:
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if self._process and self._process.poll() is not None:
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self._running = False
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self._process = None
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return self._running
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@property
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def error(self) -> str:
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return self._error
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def status(self) -> dict:
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return {
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"ok": True,
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"running": self.running,
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"onion_address": self._onion_address,
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"tor_available": _find_tor_binary() is not None,
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"error": self._error,
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"has_previous_address": bool(self._onion_address and not self._running),
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}
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def start(self, target_port: int = 8000) -> dict:
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"""Start Tor hidden service pointing to target_port on localhost."""
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with self._lock:
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if self._running and self._process and self._process.poll() is None:
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return {
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"ok": True,
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"onion_address": self._onion_address,
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"detail": "already running",
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}
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self._error = ""
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tor_bin = _find_tor_binary()
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if not tor_bin:
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logger.info("Tor not found, attempting bootstrap...")
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tor_bin = _auto_install_tor()
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if not tor_bin:
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self._error = (
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"Could not prepare Tor automatically. Check network access to dist.torproject.org "
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"or install Tor, then try again."
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)
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return {"ok": False, "detail": self._error}
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TOR_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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TOR_DATA_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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hidden_service_dir = TOR_DIR / "hidden_service"
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hidden_service_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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if os.name != "nt":
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try:
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os.chmod(str(hidden_service_dir), 0o700)
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os.chmod(str(TOR_DATA_DIR), 0o700)
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except OSError:
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pass
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torrc_content = (
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f"DataDirectory {TOR_DATA_DIR.as_posix()}\n"
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f"HiddenServiceDir {hidden_service_dir.as_posix()}\n"
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f"HiddenServicePort {target_port} 127.0.0.1:{target_port}\n"
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"SocksPort 9050\n"
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"Log notice stderr\n"
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)
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TORRC_PATH.write_text(torrc_content, encoding="utf-8")
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try:
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self._process = subprocess.Popen(
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[tor_bin, "-f", str(TORRC_PATH)],
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stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
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stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
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text=True,
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)
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self._running = True
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logger.info("Tor process started (PID %d)", self._process.pid)
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except Exception as exc:
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self._error = f"Failed to start Tor: {exc}"
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logger.error(self._error)
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return {"ok": False, "detail": self._error}
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deadline = time.monotonic() + _STARTUP_TIMEOUT_S
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while time.monotonic() < deadline:
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if self._process.poll() is not None:
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stdout = self._process.stdout.read() if self._process.stdout else ""
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self._error = f"Tor exited with code {self._process.returncode}"
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if stdout:
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lines = stdout.strip().split("\n")
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self._error += ": " + " | ".join(lines[-3:])
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self._running = False
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self._process = None
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logger.error(self._error)
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return {"ok": False, "detail": self._error}
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if HOSTNAME_PATH.exists():
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hostname = HOSTNAME_PATH.read_text().strip()
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if hostname.endswith(".onion"):
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self._onion_address = f"http://{hostname}:8000"
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logger.info("Tor hidden service ready: %s", self._onion_address)
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return {
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"ok": True,
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"onion_address": self._onion_address,
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}
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time.sleep(_POLL_INTERVAL_S)
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self._error = f"Tor did not generate hostname within {_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_S}s"
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self.stop()
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return {"ok": False, "detail": self._error}
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def stop(self) -> dict:
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"""Stop the Tor subprocess."""
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with self._lock:
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if self._process:
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try:
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self._process.terminate()
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self._process.wait(timeout=10)
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except Exception:
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try:
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self._process.kill()
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except Exception:
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pass
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self._process = None
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self._running = False
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return {"ok": True, "detail": "stopped"}
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tor_service = TorHiddenService()
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