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Shadowbroker/backend/tests/test_kiwisdr_fallback.py
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Shadowbroker e36d1fc79c [security] Close tg12 audit issues #201–#214 seamlessly (#261)
External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed issues #201–#214
in addition to the #189–#200 batch already closed by PRs #227/#232/#260.
This PR closes all eight that are real security bugs (the other six in
the 201–214 range are either design discussions or upstream-abuse/TOS
concerns we're keeping intentional, see issue triage notes on each).

The user-facing principle for this PR: fix the security gap WITHOUT
introducing a single hostile error or behavior change for legitimate
users. Every fix follows the same template — fail forward, not loud.
When the secure path is harder than the insecure one, build a
fallback chain that ends in graceful degradation, not in a scary
modal or 422 response.

  #205 — OpenMHZ audio redirect SSRF (services/radio_intercept.py)

  Replaced requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True) with a manual
  redirect loop that re-validates each hop's host against
  _OPENMHZ_AUDIO_HOSTS. Same-host redirects (CDN edge selection)
  still work, so legitimate audio playback is unaffected. Cross-host
  redirects to disallowed hosts return a generic 502 which the
  browser audio element handles gracefully. Cap at 5 hops.

  #207 — infonet/status verify_signatures DoS (routers/mesh_public.py)

  Silently downgrade verify_signatures=true to False for
  unauthenticated callers. No error surfaced — the response shape is
  identical, just without the O(n_events) signature verification.
  Authenticated callers (scoped mesh.audit) still get the full path.
  The frontend never passes this param so legitimate UI is unaffected.

  #211 — thermal/verify expensive analysis (routers/sigint.py)

  Added Depends(require_local_operator). Frontend has no direct
  callers (verified by grep); Tauri/AI agents use scoped tokens that
  pass the auth check. Anonymous abusers blocked silently — the
  legitimate UI keeps working through the Next.js admin-key proxy.

  #213, #214 — OpenMHZ calls/audio upstream abuse (routers/radio.py)

  Added Depends(require_local_operator) to both. Browser users hit
  these through the Next.js proxy at src/app/api/[...path]/route.ts
  which injects X-Admin-Key, so the auth check passes transparently.
  Direct attackers can no longer rotate sys_names to hammer
  api.openmhz.com or relay arbitrary audio streams through the
  backend's bandwidth.

  #202 — overflights unbounded hours (routers/data.py)

  Silently clamp `hours` to OVERFLIGHTS_MAX_HOURS (default 72,
  configurable). NO 422 — clients asking for an absurd window get a
  shorter window back with `requested_hours` and `effective_hours`
  hint fields. Postel's law: liberal in what we accept, conservative
  in what we compute.

  #203 — Meshtastic callsign UA leak (services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py)

  Added MESHTASTIC_SEND_CALLSIGN_HEADER opt-out env var. Default is
  TRUE — preserves existing operator behavior (callsign sent so
  meshtastic.org can rate-limit per-install). Privacy-conscious
  operators set it to false to suppress.

  #206 — KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only (services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py)

  Upstream rx.linkfanel.net doesn't speak HTTPS (verified — Apache
  2.4.10 only on port 80). We can't fix the transport. Instead added
  three layers:
    1. Content validation on fetched data — reject responses with
       <50 receivers or >5% malformed entries (likely MITM injection).
    2. Existing disk cache fallback (already present).
    3. NEW: bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json
       shipping 798 known-good receivers. Used as last resort so the
       KiwiSDR map layer always renders something useful.

  #208 — Merkle proof DoS via /api/mesh/infonet/sync (services/mesh/mesh_hashchain.py)

  The endpoint is part of the cross-node federation protocol — peers
  legitimately call it without local-operator auth, so we can't add
  Depends(). Instead made the underlying operation O(1) per proof
  via a cached Merkle level structure on the Infonet instance:
    - _merkle_levels_cache + _merkle_levels_for_event_count on each
      Infonet instance
    - _invalidate_merkle_cache() called from every chain mutation
      point (append, ingest_events, apply_fork, cleanup_expired)
    - _get_merkle_levels() does the lazy recompute on first read
      after invalidation, then serves from cache thereafter
  Effect: anonymous attackers hammering the proofs endpoint hit a
  cached structure; the rebuild happens at most once per real chain
  advance. Federation untouched.

  #201 — Tor bundle SHA-256 bypass (services/tor_hidden_service.py)

  Docker users were already covered — backend/Dockerfile installs
  Tor via apt-get at build time (signed by Debian's package system).
  No runtime download needed for the 80%-of-users case.

  For Tauri desktop, replaced the single .sha256sum check with a
  multi-source verification chain implemented in _verify_tor_bundle():
    1. Try upstream .sha256sum (current behavior — fast path)
    2. Try baked-in digest list at backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json
       (pinned per-version, maintainer-updated)
    3. If neither source is REACHABLE: HTTPS-only fallback with a loud
       warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the
       maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release)
  A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only
  the "no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only. This is
  the "have cake and eat it" pattern: real users see no new failure
  modes during torproject.org outages, but MITM/compromise attacks
  still fail because the downloaded digest can't match what BOTH
  the upstream and the baked-in list report.

  Currently the digest file ships with placeholder values for the
  current Tor URLs (those URLs are already stale on torproject.org
  too). A follow-up commit can populate real digests when a stable
  Tor release is selected; until then the HTTPS-only warning fires
  and onboarding still works.

Tests (82 total, all passing):
  test_openmhz_redirect_ssrf.py        (5 tests)  — #205
  test_infonet_status_verify_gate.py   (2 tests)  — #207
  test_overflights_clamp.py            (5 tests)  — #202
  test_meshtastic_callsign_optout.py   (3 tests)  — #203
  test_kiwisdr_fallback.py             (6 tests)  — #206
  test_merkle_cache.py                 (6 tests)  — #208
  test_tor_bundle_verification.py      (6 tests)  — #201
  test_control_surface_auth.py         (extended) — #211, #213, #214
  + all previous security tests (CCTV redirect, GDELT https, sentinel
    cache, crowdthreat opt-in, third-party fetcher gates, control
    surface auth) continue to pass.

Pre-existing test infrastructure issue with SHARED_EXECUTOR teardown
in the broader sweep exists on main too (verified) — not introduced
by this PR.

Credit: @tg12 reported every one of these with accurate line citations
and the recommended fixes that informed this implementation.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 19:57:06 -06:00

80 lines
2.9 KiB
Python

"""Issue #206 (tg12): KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only and cannot be upgraded
to TLS. We defend with content validation + a bundled static directory
so the layer always renders something useful and a MITM injecting
garbage can't corrupt the map.
"""
import json
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from services import kiwisdr_fetcher
from services.kiwisdr_fetcher import (
_MIN_HEALTHY_RECEIVER_COUNT,
_load_bundled_fallback,
_validate_fetched_nodes,
)
def test_bundled_fallback_file_exists_and_is_nonempty():
"""The codebase ships a static snapshot for last-resort use."""
bundle = _load_bundled_fallback()
assert isinstance(bundle, list)
assert len(bundle) >= _MIN_HEALTHY_RECEIVER_COUNT
def test_validation_rejects_too_few_entries():
too_short = [{"name": "x", "lat": 0.0, "lon": 0.0, "url": ""}] * (_MIN_HEALTHY_RECEIVER_COUNT - 1)
assert _validate_fetched_nodes(too_short) is False
def test_validation_accepts_healthy_response():
healthy = [
{"name": f"Receiver {i}", "lat": 50.0, "lon": -1.0, "url": "http://example"}
for i in range(_MIN_HEALTHY_RECEIVER_COUNT)
]
assert _validate_fetched_nodes(healthy) is True
def test_validation_rejects_non_list():
assert _validate_fetched_nodes(None) is False # type: ignore[arg-type]
assert _validate_fetched_nodes("a string") is False # type: ignore[arg-type]
assert _validate_fetched_nodes({}) is False # type: ignore[arg-type]
def test_validation_rejects_too_many_malformed_entries():
"""If more than 5% of entries lack a name or numeric lat, reject."""
nodes = []
# 100 entries, 20 of them malformed — well over the 5% threshold.
for i in range(_MIN_HEALTHY_RECEIVER_COUNT + 50):
if i % 5 == 0:
nodes.append({}) # missing name + lat
else:
nodes.append({"name": f"R{i}", "lat": 50.0, "lon": -1.0, "url": ""})
assert _validate_fetched_nodes(nodes) is False
def test_fallback_used_when_validation_fails(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""If a fetch returns garbage, the fallback chain reaches the bundle."""
# Force disk cache miss
fake_cache = tmp_path / "kiwisdr_cache.json"
monkeypatch.setattr(kiwisdr_fetcher, "_CACHE_FILE", fake_cache)
# Make fetch_with_curl return a parseable but UNHEALTHY response
# (only 3 entries — well below the validation threshold).
class _GarbageResp:
status_code = 200
text = "var kiwisdr_com = [{\"name\":\"x\",\"gps\":\"(0,0)\"}];"
monkeypatch.setattr(
"services.network_utils.fetch_with_curl", lambda *a, **kw: _GarbageResp()
)
# Bypass the @cached decorator
kiwisdr_fetcher.kiwisdr_cache.clear()
result = kiwisdr_fetcher.fetch_kiwisdr_nodes()
# Should be the bundled fallback (798 entries), not the garbage (1 entry)
assert isinstance(result, list)
assert len(result) >= _MIN_HEALTHY_RECEIVER_COUNT