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External security audit by @tg12 (May 17, 2026) filed issues #201–#214 in addition to the #189–#200 batch already closed by PRs #227/#232/#260. This PR closes all eight that are real security bugs (the other six in the 201–214 range are either design discussions or upstream-abuse/TOS concerns we're keeping intentional, see issue triage notes on each). The user-facing principle for this PR: fix the security gap WITHOUT introducing a single hostile error or behavior change for legitimate users. Every fix follows the same template — fail forward, not loud. When the secure path is harder than the insecure one, build a fallback chain that ends in graceful degradation, not in a scary modal or 422 response. #205 — OpenMHZ audio redirect SSRF (services/radio_intercept.py) Replaced requests.get(..., allow_redirects=True) with a manual redirect loop that re-validates each hop's host against _OPENMHZ_AUDIO_HOSTS. Same-host redirects (CDN edge selection) still work, so legitimate audio playback is unaffected. Cross-host redirects to disallowed hosts return a generic 502 which the browser audio element handles gracefully. Cap at 5 hops. #207 — infonet/status verify_signatures DoS (routers/mesh_public.py) Silently downgrade verify_signatures=true to False for unauthenticated callers. No error surfaced — the response shape is identical, just without the O(n_events) signature verification. Authenticated callers (scoped mesh.audit) still get the full path. The frontend never passes this param so legitimate UI is unaffected. #211 — thermal/verify expensive analysis (routers/sigint.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator). Frontend has no direct callers (verified by grep); Tauri/AI agents use scoped tokens that pass the auth check. Anonymous abusers blocked silently — the legitimate UI keeps working through the Next.js admin-key proxy. #213, #214 — OpenMHZ calls/audio upstream abuse (routers/radio.py) Added Depends(require_local_operator) to both. Browser users hit these through the Next.js proxy at src/app/api/[...path]/route.ts which injects X-Admin-Key, so the auth check passes transparently. Direct attackers can no longer rotate sys_names to hammer api.openmhz.com or relay arbitrary audio streams through the backend's bandwidth. #202 — overflights unbounded hours (routers/data.py) Silently clamp `hours` to OVERFLIGHTS_MAX_HOURS (default 72, configurable). NO 422 — clients asking for an absurd window get a shorter window back with `requested_hours` and `effective_hours` hint fields. Postel's law: liberal in what we accept, conservative in what we compute. #203 — Meshtastic callsign UA leak (services/fetchers/meshtastic_map.py) Added MESHTASTIC_SEND_CALLSIGN_HEADER opt-out env var. Default is TRUE — preserves existing operator behavior (callsign sent so meshtastic.org can rate-limit per-install). Privacy-conscious operators set it to false to suppress. #206 — KiwiSDR upstream is HTTP-only (services/kiwisdr_fetcher.py) Upstream rx.linkfanel.net doesn't speak HTTPS (verified — Apache 2.4.10 only on port 80). We can't fix the transport. Instead added three layers: 1. Content validation on fetched data — reject responses with <50 receivers or >5% malformed entries (likely MITM injection). 2. Existing disk cache fallback (already present). 3. NEW: bundled static directory at backend/data/kiwisdr_directory.json shipping 798 known-good receivers. Used as last resort so the KiwiSDR map layer always renders something useful. #208 — Merkle proof DoS via /api/mesh/infonet/sync (services/mesh/mesh_hashchain.py) The endpoint is part of the cross-node federation protocol — peers legitimately call it without local-operator auth, so we can't add Depends(). Instead made the underlying operation O(1) per proof via a cached Merkle level structure on the Infonet instance: - _merkle_levels_cache + _merkle_levels_for_event_count on each Infonet instance - _invalidate_merkle_cache() called from every chain mutation point (append, ingest_events, apply_fork, cleanup_expired) - _get_merkle_levels() does the lazy recompute on first read after invalidation, then serves from cache thereafter Effect: anonymous attackers hammering the proofs endpoint hit a cached structure; the rebuild happens at most once per real chain advance. Federation untouched. #201 — Tor bundle SHA-256 bypass (services/tor_hidden_service.py) Docker users were already covered — backend/Dockerfile installs Tor via apt-get at build time (signed by Debian's package system). No runtime download needed for the 80%-of-users case. For Tauri desktop, replaced the single .sha256sum check with a multi-source verification chain implemented in _verify_tor_bundle(): 1. Try upstream .sha256sum (current behavior — fast path) 2. Try baked-in digest list at backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json (pinned per-version, maintainer-updated) 3. If neither source is REACHABLE: HTTPS-only fallback with a loud warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release) A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only the "no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only. This is the "have cake and eat it" pattern: real users see no new failure modes during torproject.org outages, but MITM/compromise attacks still fail because the downloaded digest can't match what BOTH the upstream and the baked-in list report. Currently the digest file ships with placeholder values for the current Tor URLs (those URLs are already stale on torproject.org too). A follow-up commit can populate real digests when a stable Tor release is selected; until then the HTTPS-only warning fires and onboarding still works. Tests (82 total, all passing): test_openmhz_redirect_ssrf.py (5 tests) — #205 test_infonet_status_verify_gate.py (2 tests) — #207 test_overflights_clamp.py (5 tests) — #202 test_meshtastic_callsign_optout.py (3 tests) — #203 test_kiwisdr_fallback.py (6 tests) — #206 test_merkle_cache.py (6 tests) — #208 test_tor_bundle_verification.py (6 tests) — #201 test_control_surface_auth.py (extended) — #211, #213, #214 + all previous security tests (CCTV redirect, GDELT https, sentinel cache, crowdthreat opt-in, third-party fetcher gates, control surface auth) continue to pass. Pre-existing test infrastructure issue with SHARED_EXECUTOR teardown in the broader sweep exists on main too (verified) — not introduced by this PR. Credit: @tg12 reported every one of these with accurate line citations and the recommended fixes that informed this implementation. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
146 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
146 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
"""Issue #201 (tg12): Tor bundle integrity must come from at least one
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trusted source. Previously, if the upstream ``.sha256sum`` was
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unreachable, the bundle was extracted and executed anyway with only
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HTTPS-level transport trust.
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The fix introduces a multi-source verification chain:
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1. Upstream ``.sha256sum`` (current behavior)
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2. Baked-in digest list at ``backend/data/tor_bundle_digests.json``
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3. If neither source is reachable AT ALL: HTTPS-only fallback with a
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loud warning (avoids breaking first-run onboarding while the
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maintainer hasn't yet pinned a new Tor release)
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A mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal — only the
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"no source reachable" case falls back to HTTPS-only.
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"""
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import hashlib
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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from services import tor_hidden_service as tor_svc
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from services.tor_hidden_service import (
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_DIGEST_PLACEHOLDER,
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_load_baked_in_digests,
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_verify_tor_bundle,
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)
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@pytest.fixture
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def fake_bundle(tmp_path):
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"""A tiny synthetic 'bundle' so we can compute its digest deterministically."""
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archive = tmp_path / "fake-tor.tar.gz"
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payload = b"this is not really a tar archive"
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archive.write_bytes(payload)
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expected = hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest().lower()
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return archive, expected
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def test_baked_in_digests_skips_placeholders(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Entries with the placeholder value are filtered out."""
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digest_file = tmp_path / "digests.json"
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digest_file.write_text(
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'{"https://example.com/a.tar.gz": "PLACEHOLDER_REPLACE_BEFORE_RELEASE", '
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'"https://example.com/b.tar.gz": "deadbeef"}',
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encoding="utf-8",
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "_TOR_DIGEST_FILE", digest_file)
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digests = _load_baked_in_digests()
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assert "https://example.com/a.tar.gz" not in digests
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assert digests.get("https://example.com/b.tar.gz") == "deadbeef"
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def test_verification_succeeds_when_upstream_matches(fake_bundle, monkeypatch):
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"""Path A: upstream .sha256sum returns the matching digest."""
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archive, expected = fake_bundle
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def fake_urlretrieve(url, dest):
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dest_path = Path(dest)
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dest_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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dest_path.write_text(f"{expected} bundle.tar.gz\n", encoding="utf-8")
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "urlretrieve", fake_urlretrieve)
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "_load_baked_in_digests", lambda: {})
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verified, reason = _verify_tor_bundle(archive, "https://example.com/bundle.tar.gz")
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assert verified is True
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assert "upstream" in reason
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def test_verification_succeeds_via_baked_in_when_upstream_unreachable(fake_bundle, monkeypatch):
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"""Path B: upstream .sha256sum fails; baked-in digest matches."""
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archive, expected = fake_bundle
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def fake_urlretrieve(url, dest):
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raise RuntimeError("upstream unreachable")
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "urlretrieve", fake_urlretrieve)
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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tor_svc, "_load_baked_in_digests",
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lambda: {"https://example.com/bundle.tar.gz": expected},
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)
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verified, reason = _verify_tor_bundle(archive, "https://example.com/bundle.tar.gz")
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assert verified is True
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assert "baked-in" in reason
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def test_verification_fails_when_upstream_disagrees(fake_bundle, monkeypatch):
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"""Mismatch from a source that DID respond is always fatal."""
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archive, _expected = fake_bundle
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def fake_urlretrieve(url, dest):
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dest_path = Path(dest)
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dest_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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dest_path.write_text("0" * 64 + " bundle.tar.gz\n", encoding="utf-8")
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "urlretrieve", fake_urlretrieve)
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "_load_baked_in_digests", lambda: {})
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verified, reason = _verify_tor_bundle(archive, "https://example.com/bundle.tar.gz")
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assert verified is False
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assert "mismatch" in reason.lower()
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def test_verification_fails_when_baked_in_disagrees(fake_bundle, monkeypatch):
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"""Even with no upstream, a baked-in mismatch is fatal."""
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archive, _expected = fake_bundle
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def fake_urlretrieve(url, dest):
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raise RuntimeError("upstream unreachable")
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "urlretrieve", fake_urlretrieve)
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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tor_svc, "_load_baked_in_digests",
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lambda: {"https://example.com/bundle.tar.gz": "0" * 64},
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)
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verified, reason = _verify_tor_bundle(archive, "https://example.com/bundle.tar.gz")
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assert verified is False
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def test_verification_falls_back_to_https_when_no_source_reachable(fake_bundle, monkeypatch, caplog):
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"""No source available → HTTPS-only fallback with a loud warning.
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This preserves first-run onboarding while the maintainer hasn't
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yet pinned a particular Tor release in the digest file.
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"""
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archive, _expected = fake_bundle
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def fake_urlretrieve(url, dest):
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raise RuntimeError("upstream unreachable")
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "urlretrieve", fake_urlretrieve)
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monkeypatch.setattr(tor_svc, "_load_baked_in_digests", lambda: {})
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import logging
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with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
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verified, reason = _verify_tor_bundle(archive, "https://example.com/bundle.tar.gz")
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assert verified is True
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assert "https-only" in reason.lower()
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assert any(
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"fell back to HTTPS-only" in record.getMessage() for record in caplog.records
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)
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