Files
Shadowbroker/backend/tests/test_openclaw_connect_info_reveal.py
T
BigBodyCobain f91ddcf38b Fix #302: split OpenClaw HMAC reveal into dedicated POST with no-store
Reported by @tg12. Pre-fix, two problems lived on the GET endpoint:

  1. `GET /api/ai/connect-info?reveal=true` returned the full HMAC
     secret in the response body on every Connect modal open. Even
     gated to require_local_operator, that put the secret into
     browser history, dev-tools network panels, browser disk caches,
     HAR exports, and screen captures.

  2. The same GET endpoint auto-bootstrapped (generated + persisted)
     the secret on a mere read. Side effects on a GET are a footgun:
     browser prefetchers, mirror tools, and casual curl-from-history
     would all silently mint+persist a fresh secret.

Backend (backend/routers/ai_intel.py)
-------------------------------------
  GET  /api/ai/connect-info             — always returns the MASKED
                                          fingerprint (first6 + bullets
                                          + last4). No `?reveal` param.
                                          NO auto-bootstrap. When the
                                          secret is missing, returns
                                          `hmac_secret_set: false` and
                                          tells the caller to POST to
                                          /bootstrap.
  POST /api/ai/connect-info/bootstrap   — NEW. Mints+persists the secret
                                          if missing. Idempotent. Never
                                          returns the full secret in the
                                          response body.
  POST /api/ai/connect-info/reveal      — NEW. Returns the full secret
                                          with Cache-Control: no-store,
                                          no-cache, must-revalidate +
                                          Pragma: no-cache + Expires: 0.
                                          POST so the body never lands
                                          in URL history. 404 (with a
                                          pointer to /bootstrap) when
                                          the secret isn't set.
  POST /api/ai/connect-info/regenerate  — keeps existing one-time-reveal
                                          behavior (regen IS a deliberate
                                          destructive action triggered
                                          by the operator). Same
                                          no-store/no-cache headers added
                                          so even the regen response
                                          doesn't get cached.

Frontend (AIIntelPanel.tsx, OnboardingModal.tsx)
------------------------------------------------
  * On mount: GET (masked only). If hmac_secret_set: false, fire a
    transparent POST /bootstrap and refresh the masked fingerprint.
    Operator sees no behavior change from pre-#302.
  * Reveal (eye icon): lazy POST /reveal — secret only travels when
    the operator explicitly clicks the button.
  * Copy: lazy POST /reveal too — copying without a prior reveal
    works exactly like before, just routed through the new endpoint.
  * Regenerate: POST returns the new secret (same as before, but the
    response now has no-store headers).
  * The displayed snippet uses the masked fingerprint until the
    operator clicks Reveal or Copy.

Tests (backend/tests/test_openclaw_connect_info_reveal.py — 13 tests)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
  * GET returns masked + the full secret never appears in r.text
  * GET does NOT auto-bootstrap when missing
  * GET silently ignores any ?reveal=true query (back-compat noise)
  * POST /bootstrap mints when missing, idempotent when set
  * POST /bootstrap never returns the full secret
  * POST /reveal returns the full secret with Cache-Control: no-store,
    no-cache + Pragma: no-cache + Expires: 0
  * POST /reveal 404s with a pointer to /bootstrap when no secret
  * POST /regenerate returns the new secret with the same headers
  * Anonymous remote callers get 403 on ALL FOUR endpoints (parametric
    regression against the same allowlist used elsewhere).

Adjacent suites still green: test_openclaw_route_security,
test_no_new_duplicate_routes, test_control_surface_auth. 67/67 pass
locally.

Credit: @tg12 for the audit report.
2026-05-22 18:40:24 -06:00

335 lines
13 KiB
Python

"""Issue #302 (tg12): OpenClaw connect-info HMAC secret disclosure.
Before this change, ``GET /api/ai/connect-info?reveal=true`` returned the
full HMAC secret in the response body on every modal open AND the same
GET endpoint auto-bootstrapped (generated + persisted) the secret on a
mere read. Even gated to ``require_local_operator``, that put the full
secret into:
* browser visit history
* dev-tools network panel
* browser disk cache
* HAR exports
* screen captures / shoulder-surfing
Every single time the OpenClaw Connect modal opened.
After this change:
GET /api/ai/connect-info — always returns the MASKED
fingerprint. No ?reveal param.
No side effects (auto-bootstrap
gone).
POST /api/ai/connect-info/bootstrap — mints+persists the secret if
missing. Idempotent. Never
returns the full secret.
POST /api/ai/connect-info/reveal — returns the full secret with
strict Cache-Control: no-store
headers. POST so the body
doesn't land in URL history.
POST /api/ai/connect-info/regenerate — keeps the one-time-disclosure
for the new secret (regen IS a
deliberate destructive action).
Same no-store headers added.
These tests pin every property.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
from unittest.mock import patch
import pytest
from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Loopback test client. ``require_local_operator`` resolves true for
# request.client.host == "127.0.0.1"; FastAPI's TestClient sets it to
# "testclient" which isn't on the allowlist. Use raw ASGITransport.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture
def loopback():
from main import app
class _Client:
def __init__(self, peer_ip: str = "127.0.0.1"):
self._loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
self._transport = ASGITransport(app=app, client=(peer_ip, 12345))
self._base = f"http://{peer_ip}:8000"
def _do(self, method: str, url: str, **kw):
async def go():
async with AsyncClient(transport=self._transport, base_url=self._base) as ac:
return await ac.request(method, url, **kw)
return self._loop.run_until_complete(go())
def get(self, url, **kw): return self._do("GET", url, **kw)
def post(self, url, **kw): return self._do("POST", url, **kw)
def close(self): self._loop.close()
c = _Client()
yield c
c.close()
@pytest.fixture
def remote():
from main import app
class _Client:
def __init__(self):
self._loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
self._transport = ASGITransport(app=app, client=("1.2.3.4", 12345))
self._base = "http://1.2.3.4:8000"
def _do(self, method: str, url: str, **kw):
async def go():
async with AsyncClient(transport=self._transport, base_url=self._base) as ac:
return await ac.request(method, url, **kw)
return self._loop.run_until_complete(go())
def get(self, url, **kw): return self._do("GET", url, **kw)
def post(self, url, **kw): return self._do("POST", url, **kw)
def close(self): self._loop.close()
c = _Client()
yield c
c.close()
@pytest.fixture
def stub_env(monkeypatch):
"""Isolate connect-info tests from the dev's real backend .env.
Pydantic ``Settings()`` reads from ``.env`` file directly on
instantiation, so monkey-patching ``os.environ`` isn't sufficient
— the real ``OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET`` would leak through. Instead we
override ``get_settings()`` in the route module to return a fresh
``Settings`` instance whose env values are driven entirely by an
in-test dict, AND we replace ``_write_env_value`` so writes update
that same dict instead of touching the developer's filesystem.
Yields the dict so individual tests can pre-seed values or assert
that writes happened.
"""
import routers.ai_intel as ai_intel
import services.config as config
state: dict[str, str] = {}
class _FakeSettings:
@property
def OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET(self) -> str:
return state.get("OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET", "")
@property
def OPENCLAW_ACCESS_TIER(self) -> str:
return state.get("OPENCLAW_ACCESS_TIER", "restricted")
fake = _FakeSettings()
def _fake_get_settings():
return fake
# Route code calls ``get_settings.cache_clear()`` after writing the
# env. The production version is wrapped with ``@lru_cache``, so
# cache_clear exists. Attach a no-op shim here.
_fake_get_settings.cache_clear = lambda: None # type: ignore[attr-defined]
monkeypatch.setattr(config, "get_settings", _fake_get_settings)
def _fake_write_env_value(key: str, value: str) -> None:
state[key] = value
monkeypatch.setattr(ai_intel, "_write_env_value", _fake_write_env_value)
yield state
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# GET /api/ai/connect-info — always masked, no auto-bootstrap
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestGetConnectInfoMasking:
def test_returns_masked_when_secret_set(self, loopback, stub_env):
secret = "abcdef" + "0" * 38 + "wxyz"
stub_env["OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET"] = secret
r = loopback.get("/api/ai/connect-info")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
# Body must NOT carry the full secret value anywhere.
assert secret not in r.text, (
"GET /api/ai/connect-info MUST NOT include the full HMAC "
"secret. Response body contained the secret value."
)
assert body["hmac_secret_set"] is True
assert body["masked_hmac_secret"].startswith("abcdef")
assert body["masked_hmac_secret"].endswith("wxyz")
assert "" in body["masked_hmac_secret"]
# Pre-fix field is gone.
assert "hmac_secret" not in body
def test_no_auto_bootstrap_when_secret_missing(self, loopback, stub_env):
"""Side-effect-on-GET was the second half of issue #302. A GET
with no secret configured must NOT mint one — that should
require an explicit POST /bootstrap."""
r = loopback.get("/api/ai/connect-info")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["hmac_secret_set"] is False
assert body["masked_hmac_secret"] == ""
# The bootstrap_behavior block should advertise the new flow.
assert body["bootstrap_behavior"]["auto_generates_when_missing"] is False
# And no _write_env_value call happened.
assert "OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET" not in stub_env
def test_no_reveal_query_param(self, loopback, stub_env):
"""Pre-fix, ?reveal=true would return the full secret. Post-fix
the param is silently ignored — the response is the same as
without it (still masked, no leak)."""
secret = "abcdef" + "0" * 38 + "wxyz"
stub_env["OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET"] = secret
r = loopback.get("/api/ai/connect-info?reveal=true")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert secret not in r.text, (
"?reveal=true must be a no-op on GET — the full secret "
"MUST NOT come back in the response body."
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# POST /api/ai/connect-info/bootstrap
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestBootstrap:
def test_mints_when_missing(self, loopback, stub_env):
r = loopback.post("/api/ai/connect-info/bootstrap")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["ok"] is True
assert body["generated"] is True
assert body["hmac_secret_set"] is True
# Bootstrap must NOT return the full secret in-line.
assert "hmac_secret" not in body or not body.get("hmac_secret")
assert "" in body["masked_hmac_secret"]
# _write_env_value was actually called.
assert stub_env.get("OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET")
# The full value isn't echoed back in the response text either.
assert stub_env["OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET"] not in r.text
def test_idempotent_when_already_set(self, loopback, stub_env):
existing = "abcdef" + "0" * 38 + "wxyz"
stub_env["OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET"] = existing
r = loopback.post("/api/ai/connect-info/bootstrap")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["ok"] is True
assert body["generated"] is False
assert body["hmac_secret_set"] is True
# Existing secret untouched — value is still the seeded one.
assert stub_env["OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET"] == existing
# No full secret in the response.
assert existing not in r.text
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# POST /api/ai/connect-info/reveal
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestReveal:
def test_returns_full_secret_when_set(self, loopback, stub_env):
secret = "abcdef" + "0" * 38 + "wxyz"
stub_env["OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET"] = secret
r = loopback.post("/api/ai/connect-info/reveal")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["ok"] is True
assert body["hmac_secret"] == secret
def test_strict_cache_control_headers(self, loopback, stub_env):
"""The whole point of POST /reveal vs GET ?reveal=true is that
the response carries headers that prevent every cache layer
from persisting the secret."""
secret = "abcdef" + "0" * 38 + "wxyz"
stub_env["OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET"] = secret
r = loopback.post("/api/ai/connect-info/reveal")
cc = r.headers.get("cache-control", "")
assert "no-store" in cc, (
f"reveal MUST set Cache-Control: no-store — got {cc!r}"
)
assert "no-cache" in cc
# Pragma + Expires as well for HTTP/1.0 caches.
assert r.headers.get("pragma", "").lower() == "no-cache"
assert r.headers.get("expires") == "0"
def test_404_when_no_secret_configured(self, loopback, stub_env):
r = loopback.post("/api/ai/connect-info/reveal")
assert r.status_code == 404
# Hint should point at the bootstrap endpoint, not just say "404".
detail = r.json().get("detail", "")
assert "/bootstrap" in detail or "bootstrap" in detail.lower()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# POST /api/ai/connect-info/regenerate — still returns the new secret
# inline (deliberate destructive action), but with no-store headers.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestRegenerate:
def test_returns_new_secret_with_no_store_headers(self, loopback, stub_env):
# Seed an existing secret so we can prove it changes.
old = "oldold" + "0" * 38 + "1234"
stub_env["OPENCLAW_HMAC_SECRET"] = old
r = loopback.post("/api/ai/connect-info/regenerate")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["ok"] is True
assert body["hmac_secret"]
assert body["hmac_secret"] != old
# no-store headers MUST be present so the new secret doesn't
# land in browser disk cache after the regenerate click.
cc = r.headers.get("cache-control", "")
assert "no-store" in cc and "no-cache" in cc
assert r.headers.get("pragma", "").lower() == "no-cache"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth-gate regression — every endpoint still rejects anonymous remote
# callers. This is the property we already enforce for the rest of the
# operator-only surface; adding the three new endpoints to the audit
# coverage prevents a future refactor from dropping the dependency.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestAnonymousRejection:
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"method,path,body",
[
("get", "/api/ai/connect-info", None),
("post", "/api/ai/connect-info/bootstrap", None),
("post", "/api/ai/connect-info/reveal", None),
("post", "/api/ai/connect-info/regenerate", None),
],
)
def test_remote_rejected(self, remote, method, path, body):
fn = getattr(remote, method)
r = fn(path, json=body) if body is not None else fn(path)
assert r.status_code == 403, (
f"{method.upper()} {path} must reject anonymous remote callers; "
f"got {r.status_code}"
)