From 7d044525ce6e0ddf893b526bc5421b882f73f283 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Durieux <5577568+tdurieux@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2026 00:08:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] fix: exclude source repository lookups from captured paths --- deploy/logging/README.md | 2 +- deploy/logging/sanitize.vrl | 2 +- scripts/test-admin-logs.js | 6 +++--- src/core/log-reproduction.ts | 4 +++- test/log-diagnostics.test.js | 16 +++++++++++++++- test/request-monitoring.test.js | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/deploy/logging/README.md b/deploy/logging/README.md index 18c097d..8be8fb0 100644 --- a/deploy/logging/README.md +++ b/deploy/logging/README.md @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ unknown fields. Existing discarded exception details cannot be recovered. ### Admin reproduction context -Application requests to the supported anonymous repository endpoints retain their public anonymous repository ID and encoded request pathname, up to 2 KiB, under the existing admin log access controls. This is an explicit exception to template-only diagnostics: repository-relative filenames are retained for reproduction. Query strings, headers, bodies and upstream owner/repository URLs are still excluded. Filenames are operator-visible data under this policy; no generic filter can guarantee that a user has not put sensitive text in a filename. Capture includes successful, failed and interrupted requests; metrics still use only normalized routes. Supported paths are repository metadata, file contents, listings/counts/search, ZIP, options, refresh, coauthors and extend under `/api/repo/:repoId`; other endpoints and unsafe, oversized, malformed or traversal paths omit reproduction context. Historical records cannot be backfilled. The UI copies the exact captured pathname without a host or query. +Application requests to the supported anonymous repository endpoints retain their public anonymous repository ID and encoded request pathname, up to 2 KiB, under the existing admin log access controls. This is an explicit exception to template-only diagnostics: repository-relative filenames are retained for reproduction. Query strings, headers, bodies and upstream owner/repository URLs are still excluded. Filenames are operator-visible data under this policy; no generic filter can guarantee that a user has not put sensitive text in a filename. Capture includes successful, failed and interrupted requests; metrics still use only normalized routes. Supported paths are repository metadata, file contents, listings/counts/search, ZIP, options, refresh, coauthors and extend under `/api/repo/:repoId`; other endpoints and unsafe, oversized, malformed or traversal paths omit reproduction context. Listing capture is limited to the actual `/files`, `/files/counts` and `/files/search` endpoints; folder/search query values are not retained. Source lookups such as `/api/repo/:owner/files/readme` are excluded. Historical records cannot be backfilled. The UI copies the exact captured pathname without a host or query. For the focused restricted-file/rotation regression, run `LOGGING_ACCESS_ONLY=1 python3 scripts/test-logging.py`. This uses synthetic `0640` logs in an isolated Docker project and preserves capability restrictions. diff --git a/deploy/logging/sanitize.vrl b/deploy/logging/sanitize.vrl index 2afb127..3046075 100644 --- a/deploy/logging/sanitize.vrl +++ b/deploy/logging/sanitize.vrl @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ if includes(["/", "other", "/dashboard", "/anonymize", "/healthcheck", "/api/hea # Anonymous application request context at every outcome, never query strings. { path = to_string(record.requestPath) ?? "" - parsed, path_error = parse_regex(path, r'^/api/repo/(?P[A-Za-z0-9_-]{3,200})(?:/(?Pfile/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&\'()+,;=@%/-]+|files(?:/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&\'()+,;=@%/-]*)?|(?:zip|options|refresh|coauthors|extend)/?))?/?$') + parsed, path_error = parse_regex(path, r'^/api/repo/(?P[A-Za-z0-9_-]{3,200})(?:/(?Pfile/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&\'()+,;=@%/-]+|files(?:/(?:counts|search))?/?|(?:zip|options|refresh|coauthors|extend)/?))?/?$') decoded = decode_percent(to_string(parsed.file)) if path_error == null && length(path) <= 2048 && !match(path, r'%(?:[^a-fA-F0-9]|[a-fA-F0-9][^a-fA-F0-9]|[a-fA-F0-9]?$)') && !match(decoded, r'[\x00-\x1f\x7f-\x9f\x{2028}-\x{202e}\x{2066}-\x{2069}\x{fffd}\\:?#%]|//|(^|/)\.\.?(/|$)') { out.requestPath = path diff --git a/scripts/test-admin-logs.js b/scripts/test-admin-logs.js index beaddf5..4439ce1 100644 --- a/scripts/test-admin-logs.js +++ b/scripts/test-admin-logs.js @@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ const sleep = ms => new Promise(resolve=>setTimeout(resolve,ms)); assert(projected.errorStack.includes('at (src/server/routes/repository-public.ts:224:23)')); assert.match(projected.errorStack,/at requestRoute \(src\/core\/request-monitoring.ts:\d+:\d+\)/); assert(!JSON.stringify(projected).includes(secret)); - const invalidPaths=['/api/repo/demo-123/file/a?token='+secret,'/api/repo/demo-123/file/%0a'+secret,'/api/repo/demo-123/file/../'+secret,'/api/repo/demo-123/file/%252e%252e/'+secret,'https://user:'+secret+'@example.test/file']; - const invalidSources=invalidPaths.map(requestPath=>({...rawSource,message:JSON.stringify({attrs:{tag:'api'},log:JSON.stringify({...diagnostic,requestPath,errorStack:'at (src/core/model/private.schema.ts:1:2)'})})})); + const invalidPaths=[...['readme','branches','tree','file'].flatMap(action=>['','/'].map(tail=>'/api/repo/private-owner/files/'+action+tail)),'/api/repo/demo-123/file/a?token='+secret,'/api/repo/demo-123/file/%0a'+secret,'/api/repo/demo-123/file/../'+secret,'/api/repo/demo-123/file/%252e%252e/'+secret,'https://user:'+secret+'@example.test/file']; + const invalidSources=invalidPaths.flatMap(requestPath=>[200,403,500].map(status=>({...rawSource,message:JSON.stringify({attrs:{tag:'api'},log:JSON.stringify({...diagnostic,status,httpStatus:status,severity:status===200?'info':'error',requestPath,errorStack:'at (src/core/model/private.schema.ts:1:2)'})})}))); const rejected=execFileSync('docker',['run','--rm','-i','--network','none','--memory','256m',vectorImage,'vrl','-i','/dev/stdin',fs.readFileSync('deploy/logging/sanitize.vrl','utf8')+'\nencode_json(.)'],{encoding:'utf8',input:invalidSources.map(JSON.stringify).join('\n')+'\n'}).trim().split('\n').map(line=>JSON.parse(JSON.parse(line))); assert(rejected.every(row=>!row.requestPath && !row.repoId && !row.errorStack)); assert(!JSON.stringify(rejected).includes(secret)); @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ const sleep = ms => new Promise(resolve=>setTimeout(resolve,ms)); const traced=await investigateLogs(logOptions({kind:'requestId',id:diagnosticId},true),true); const redis=safeRedisLog({ts:diagnostic.timestamp,level:'error',module:'route',raw:[diagnostic]}); for(const row of [traced.events[0],redis.raw[0]]) {assert.equal(row.requestPath,diagnostic.requestPath);assert.equal(row.repoId,'demo-123');assert.equal(row.route,diagnostic.route);assert.equal(row.method,'GET');assert.equal(row.errorStack,projected.errorStack);assert.equal(row.causeType,'RangeError');assert(!JSON.stringify(row).includes(secret));} - const paths=['/api/repo/demo-123','/api/repo/demo-123/zip','/api/repo/demo-123/files/docs/nested%20folder/','/api/repo/demo-123/files/counts','/api/repo/demo-123/options','/api/repo/demo-123/file/README.md']; + const paths=['/api/repo/demo-123','/api/repo/demo-123/zip','/api/repo/demo-123/files','/api/repo/demo-123/files/counts','/api/repo/demo-123/options','/api/repo/demo-123/file/README.md']; const pathRecords=paths.map((requestPath,i)=>logContext.run({requestId:randomUUID(),requestPath},()=>logRecord(i%2?'warn':'info','requests',['request',{status:200,outcome:i%2?'interrupted':'completed'}]))); const pathSources=pathRecords.map(record=>({...rawSource,message:JSON.stringify({attrs:{tag:'api'},log:JSON.stringify(record)})})); const pathOutput=execFileSync('docker',['run','--rm','-i','--network','none','--memory','256m',vectorImage,'vrl','-i','/dev/stdin',fs.readFileSync('deploy/logging/sanitize.vrl','utf8')+'\nencode_json(.)'],{encoding:'utf8',input:pathSources.map(JSON.stringify).join('\n')+'\n'}).trim().split('\n').map(line=>JSON.parse(JSON.parse(line))); diff --git a/src/core/log-reproduction.ts b/src/core/log-reproduction.ts index 649057d..9e18d4b 100644 --- a/src/core/log-reproduction.ts +++ b/src/core/log-reproduction.ts @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ // Explicit admin diagnostics: public anonymous repository ID and request pathname only. // Never collect upstream owner/repository URLs, headers, query strings or bodies. -const anonymousRequest = /^\/api\/repo\/([A-Za-z0-9_-]{3,200})(?:\/(file\/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()+,;=@%/-]+|files(?:\/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()+,;=@%/-]*)?|(?:zip|options|refresh|coauthors|extend)\/?))?\/?$/; +// Listing folders use query parameters; a wildcard here would capture upstream +// /:owner/files/{readme,branches,tree,file} source lookups. +const anonymousRequest = /^\/api\/repo\/([A-Za-z0-9_-]{3,200})(?:\/(file\/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()+,;=@%/-]+|files(?:\/(?:counts|search))?\/?|(?:zip|options|refresh|coauthors|extend)\/?))?\/?$/; export function safeReproductionPath(value: unknown): string | undefined { if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length > 2048) return undefined; const match = anonymousRequest.exec(value); diff --git a/test/log-diagnostics.test.js b/test/log-diagnostics.test.js index 918efc5..866e63a 100644 --- a/test/log-diagnostics.test.js +++ b/test/log-diagnostics.test.js @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ describe('safe actionable exception diagnostics',()=>{ expect(safeRedisLog({ts:record.timestamp,level:'error',module:'route',raw:[record]}).raw[0]).include({requestPath,repoId:'demo-123'}); }); it('preserves anonymous endpoints at all outcomes through both API projections',async()=>{ - for(const suffix of ['', '/', '/zip', '/files', '/files/docs/nested%20folder/', '/files/counts', '/files/search', '/options', '/refresh', '/coauthors', '/extend', '/file/README.md']){ + for(const suffix of ['', '/', '/zip', '/files', '/files/counts', '/files/search', '/options', '/refresh', '/coauthors', '/extend', '/file/README.md']){ const requestPath='/api/repo/demo-123'+suffix; expect(requestReproduction(requestPath+'?token=SECRET')).deep.equal({requestPath,repoId:'demo-123'}); for(const status of [200,304,404,500]){ @@ -35,6 +35,20 @@ describe('safe actionable exception diagnostics',()=>{ for(const suffix of ['/files/../secret','/files/%2fsecret','/files/%0aSECRET','/files/%252e%252e/secret','/zip?token=SECRET']) expect(safeReproductionPath('/api/repo/demo-123'+suffix)).equal(undefined); }); + it('rejects upstream lookups for repositories named files at every logging boundary',()=>{ + for(const action of ['readme','branches','tree','file']){ + const requestPath='/api/repo/private-owner/files/'+action; + for(const suffix of ['', '/', '?token=SECRET']){ + expect(requestReproduction(requestPath+suffix)).deep.equal({}); + for(const status of [200,403,500]){ + const row=logContext.run({requestPath:requestPath+suffix},()=>logRecord('error','route',['failure',{httpStatus:status}])); + expect(row).not.have.property('requestPath');expect(row).not.have.property('repoId'); + const redis=safeRedisLog({ts:row.timestamp,level:'error',module:'route',raw:[{...row,requestPath:requestPath+suffix,repoId:'private-owner'}]}); + expect(redis.raw[0]).not.have.property('requestPath');expect(redis.raw[0]).not.have.property('repoId'); + } + } + } + }); it('preserves dotted allowlisted source files and anonymous/named async frames',()=>{ const error=new Error(secret); error.stack='Error: '+secret+'\n at async '+path.resolve('src/server/routes/repository-public.ts')+':224:23\n at async printError ('+path.resolve('src/server/routes/route-utils.ts')+':200:7)\n at '+path.resolve('src/core/model/owner-alert-lifecycle.schema.ts')+':12:3\n at async https://'+secret+':1:2'; diff --git a/test/request-monitoring.test.js b/test/request-monitoring.test.js index 46f6845..a24fb6d 100644 --- a/test/request-monitoring.test.js +++ b/test/request-monitoring.test.js @@ -48,13 +48,26 @@ describe("bounded request monitoring", function () { }); it("records the actual listing path on successful requests while keeping metrics templated", async function () { - app.get('/api/repo/:repoId/files/*path',(_req,res)=>res.json([])); - await listen(); await fetch(server,'/api/repo/demo-123/files/docs/nested%20folder/?token=SECRET'); - expect(logs[0][1]).include({status:200,requestPath:'/api/repo/demo-123/files/docs/nested%20folder/',repoId:'demo-123'}); + app.get('/api/repo/:repoId/files',(_req,res)=>res.json([])); + await listen(); await fetch(server,'/api/repo/demo-123/files?path=docs%2Fnested&token=SECRET'); + expect(logs[0][1]).include({status:200,requestPath:'/api/repo/demo-123/files',repoId:'demo-123'}); expect(JSON.stringify(logs)).not.include('SECRET'); expect(JSON.stringify(metrics.drain())).not.include('demo-123'); }); + it("never captures upstream identities from files-named source repository handlers", async function () { + const {logRecord}=require('../src/core/log-record'); + const records=[]; + for(const action of ['readme','branches','tree','file']) + app.get('/api/repo/:owner/:repo/'+action,(_req,res)=>{ + records.push(logRecord('error','route',['failure',{httpStatus:403}]));res.status(403).end(); + }); + await listen(); + for(const action of ['readme','branches','tree','file']) + await fetch(server,'/api/repo/private-owner/files/'+action); + expect(JSON.stringify([...records,...logs])).not.include('private-owner'); + }); + it("keeps labels bounded and removes source identities and query values", function () { expect(requestRoute("/api/repo/private-name/file/secret.txt?token=abc", "api")).to.equal("/api/repo/:repoId/file/:path"); expect(requestRoute("/api/repo/secret-owner/secret-repo/readme?branch=secret", "api")).to.equal("/api/repo/:owner/:repo/readme");