Files
anonymous_github/test/trust-proxy.test.js
T
Thomas Durieux 6a820408a1 fix: rate-limit visitors by real IP regardless of Cloudflare proxy hops (#750)
Since the night of 2026-07-16 production keyed the rate limiter on
Cloudflare edge IPs instead of visitor IPs: every visitor routed through
the same edge shared one 175-req/15min bucket, causing widespread 429s
(confirmed by probing: sequential requests alternated 200/429 across
fresh and exhausted buckets).

Root cause: 'trust proxy' used a fixed hop count (TRUST_PROXY=1), which
silently breaks whenever the proxy chain gains or loses an
X-Forwarded-For entry (e.g. a Cloudflare-side change).

- TRUST_PROXY now accepts a comma-separated subnet list; the new default
  'loopback,uniquelocal,cloudflare' expands Cloudflare's published IP
  ranges so Express skips trusted proxies no matter how many entries
  they add. Plain numbers keep the legacy hop-count behavior.
- If resolution still stops at a Cloudflare address (visitor missing
  from X-Forwarded-For entirely), the limiter key falls back to
  cf-connecting-ip — safe because request.ip can only be a Cloudflare
  address when the whole chain to it is trusted.
- CIDR matching uses Node's built-in net.BlockList (no new dependency).

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 06:44:21 +02:00

143 lines
5.2 KiB
JavaScript

const { expect } = require("chai");
require("ts-node/register/transpile-only");
const {
resolveTrustProxy,
isCloudflareIP,
CLOUDFLARE_IP_RANGES,
} = require("../src/server/trustProxy");
describe("trustProxy", function () {
describe("resolveTrustProxy", function () {
it("parses a plain integer as a legacy hop count", function () {
expect(resolveTrustProxy("1")).to.equal(1);
expect(resolveTrustProxy("2")).to.equal(2);
expect(resolveTrustProxy(" 3 ")).to.equal(3);
});
it("parses zero as a number", function () {
expect(resolveTrustProxy("0")).to.equal(0);
});
it("expands the cloudflare keyword to the published ranges", function () {
const result = resolveTrustProxy("cloudflare");
expect(result).to.be.an("array");
expect(result).to.have.members([...CLOUDFLARE_IP_RANGES]);
});
it("keeps named subnets and mixes them with cloudflare ranges", function () {
const result = resolveTrustProxy("loopback,uniquelocal,cloudflare");
expect(result).to.include("loopback");
expect(result).to.include("uniquelocal");
expect(result).to.include("173.245.48.0/20");
expect(result).to.include("2400:cb00::/32");
expect(result).to.have.length(2 + CLOUDFLARE_IP_RANGES.length);
});
it("accepts literal CIDRs and trims whitespace and empty tokens", function () {
const result = resolveTrustProxy(" 10.0.0.0/8 , , 192.168.1.1 ");
expect(result).to.deep.equal(["10.0.0.0/8", "192.168.1.1"]);
});
it("is case-insensitive for the cloudflare keyword", function () {
const result = resolveTrustProxy("Cloudflare");
expect(result).to.have.length(CLOUDFLARE_IP_RANGES.length);
});
});
describe("isCloudflareIP", function () {
it("matches IPv4 addresses inside Cloudflare ranges", function () {
expect(isCloudflareIP("104.16.132.229")).to.be.true; // 104.16.0.0/13
expect(isCloudflareIP("172.64.0.1")).to.be.true; // 172.64.0.0/13
expect(isCloudflareIP("173.245.48.10")).to.be.true; // 173.245.48.0/20
});
it("matches IPv6 addresses inside Cloudflare ranges", function () {
expect(isCloudflareIP("2400:cb00::1")).to.be.true;
expect(isCloudflareIP("2606:4700:4700::1111")).to.be.true;
});
it("matches IPv4-mapped IPv6 representations", function () {
expect(isCloudflareIP("::ffff:104.16.0.1")).to.be.true;
});
it("rejects addresses outside Cloudflare ranges", function () {
expect(isCloudflareIP("8.8.8.8")).to.be.false;
expect(isCloudflareIP("127.0.0.1")).to.be.false;
expect(isCloudflareIP("192.168.1.1")).to.be.false;
expect(isCloudflareIP("2001:4860:4860::8888")).to.be.false;
expect(isCloudflareIP("::ffff:8.8.8.8")).to.be.false;
});
it("rejects garbage input without throwing", function () {
expect(isCloudflareIP("")).to.be.false;
expect(isCloudflareIP("not-an-ip")).to.be.false;
expect(isCloudflareIP("104.16.0")).to.be.false;
});
});
describe("integration with Express trust proxy resolution", function () {
const express = require("express");
function requestIp(trustProxy, headers) {
const app = express();
app.set("trust proxy", trustProxy);
let captured = null;
app.get("/", (req, res) => {
captured = req.ip;
res.end();
});
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const server = app.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
const { port } = server.address();
const http = require("http");
const req = http.get(
{ host: "127.0.0.1", port, path: "/", headers },
(res) => {
res.resume();
res.on("end", () => {
server.close();
resolve(captured);
});
}
);
req.on("error", (err) => {
server.close();
reject(err);
});
});
});
}
it("resolves the visitor IP through Cloudflare hops regardless of count", async function () {
const trust = resolveTrustProxy("loopback,uniquelocal,cloudflare");
// Simulate: visitor -> Cloudflare edge -> local nginx -> app, where
// Cloudflare appended an extra internal hop to X-Forwarded-For.
const ip = await requestIp(trust, {
"x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.7, 104.16.0.9, 172.64.0.3",
});
expect(ip).to.equal("203.0.113.7");
});
it("does not honour X-Forwarded-For from an untrusted public peer entry", async function () {
const trust = resolveTrustProxy("loopback,uniquelocal,cloudflare");
// The last entry is a non-Cloudflare public address: resolution stops
// there, so a forged visitor entry further left is ignored.
const ip = await requestIp(trust, {
"x-forwarded-for": "1.2.3.4, 8.8.8.8",
});
expect(ip).to.equal("8.8.8.8");
});
it("legacy hop count still works", async function () {
const ip = await requestIp(resolveTrustProxy("1"), {
"x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.7, 104.16.0.9",
});
// hop count 1 trusts only the direct peer, so req.ip is the last
// X-Forwarded-For entry — the fragile behavior this change moves
// away from.
expect(ip).to.equal("104.16.0.9");
});
});
});