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cmd/cli: discard upstream answers whose question mismatches the request
Defense in depth against cache poisoning: a compromised or misbehaving upstream can return an answer for a different name than was asked (e.g. records for attacker.example in response to a query for victim.example). Such an answer would be cached under the legitimate request key and served to subsequent queries. Validate that the upstream answer echoes the request's question (case-insensitive name plus Qtype/Qclass, per RFC 1035 section 4.1.2) before serving or caching it. A mismatch is logged at debug level and the upstream is skipped, failing safe to the next upstream or SERVFAIL. Refs github.com/Control-D-Inc/ctrld/issues/322
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@@ -974,6 +974,17 @@ func (p *prog) processUpstream(ctx context.Context, req *proxyRequest, upstream
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}
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ctrld.Log(ctx, p.Debug(), "Upstream query successful")
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// Reject an answer whose question does not match the request before it
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// can be served or cached. A mismatched question means the upstream
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// answered a different name/type than asked; caching it would poison
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// the shared cache with wrong-domain records for the requested name.
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// See github.com/Control-D-Inc/ctrld/issues/322.
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if !sameQuestion(req.msg, answer) {
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ctrld.Log(ctx, p.Debug(),
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"Discarding answer from %s: question mismatch (asked %q, got %q)",
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upstream, questionString(req.msg), questionString(answer))
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return nil
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}
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if p.shouldContinueWithNextUpstream(ctx, req, answer, upstream, lastUpstream) {
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return nil
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}
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@@ -1132,6 +1143,33 @@ func requestID() string {
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return hex.EncodeToString(b)
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}
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// sameQuestion reports whether the upstream answer echoes the request's
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// question. A well-behaved resolver always copies the question section from
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// the query (RFC 1035 section 4.1.2); names are compared case-insensitively
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// because DNS names are case-insensitive. A mismatch means the upstream
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// answered a different name/type than asked - malformed or malicious - and the
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// answer must not be served or cached, or it would poison the shared cache with
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// wrong-domain records. See github.com/Control-D-Inc/ctrld/issues/322.
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func sameQuestion(req, answer *dns.Msg) bool {
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if req == nil || answer == nil {
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return false
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}
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if len(req.Question) == 0 || len(answer.Question) == 0 {
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return false
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}
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rq, aq := req.Question[0], answer.Question[0]
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return rq.Qtype == aq.Qtype && rq.Qclass == aq.Qclass && strings.EqualFold(rq.Name, aq.Name)
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}
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// questionString renders a message's first question as "name/type" for logging.
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func questionString(msg *dns.Msg) string {
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if msg == nil || len(msg.Question) == 0 {
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return "<none>"
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}
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q := msg.Question[0]
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return q.Name + "/" + dns.TypeToString[q.Qtype]
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}
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// setCachedAnswerTTL updates the TTL of each DNS record in the provided message based on the current and expiration times.
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func setCachedAnswerTTL(answer *dns.Msg, now, expiredTime time.Time) {
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ttlSecs := expiredTime.Sub(now).Seconds()
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