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fix(doh,doq): port oversized response caps to master
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@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ import (
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"github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
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)
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// doqMaxResponseSize caps the bytes read from a DoQ stream: a 2-byte
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// length prefix plus a DNS message bounded by dns.MaxMsgSize. Anything
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// larger cannot be a valid response and is rejected before buffering more
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// data from the upstream.
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const doqMaxResponseSize = 2 + dns.MaxMsgSize
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type doqResolver struct {
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uc *UpstreamConfig
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}
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@@ -200,7 +206,13 @@ func (p *doqConnPool) doResolve(ctx context.Context, msg *dns.Msg) (*dns.Msg, er
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return nil, err
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}
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buf, err := io.ReadAll(stream)
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// A DoQ response is a 2-byte length prefix followed by a DNS message.
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// The DNS message is bounded by the protocol at dns.MaxMsgSize, so a
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// well-formed response is at most doqMaxResponseSize bytes. Read one
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// byte past that cap to distinguish "at limit" from "over limit" and
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// reject oversized responses before they can drive memory growth from
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// a malicious or compromised upstream.
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buf, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(stream, doqMaxResponseSize+1))
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if err != nil {
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p.putConn(conn, false)
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return nil, err
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@@ -212,6 +224,11 @@ func (p *doqConnPool) doResolve(ctx context.Context, msg *dns.Msg) (*dns.Msg, er
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return nil, io.EOF
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}
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if len(buf) > doqMaxResponseSize {
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p.putConn(conn, false)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("DoQ response exceeds %d-byte maximum", doqMaxResponseSize)
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}
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// RFC 9250: each DoQ DNS message is encoded as a 2-octet length field
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// followed by the DNS message. Reject responses that are shorter than
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// the prefix or whose prefix declares more bytes than were received,
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