Commit Graph
13 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Dev Scribe 8013bb72d2 dns intercept: handle DNS-less networks and canceled-recovery state leak
macOS intercept mode fails totally on networks that provide no usable
IPv4 DNS (e.g. IPv6-only iPhone tethering with 464XLAT): the pf ruleset
blocks all outbound IPv6 port 53, and with no IPv4 DNS configured
mDNSResponder emits no DNS packets at all, so pf has nothing to
intercept while the Control D upstream stays provably healthy.

When network-change recovery discovers no usable IPv4 DNS on the
default-route service, set 127.0.0.1 as that service DNS so macOS can
emit queries that land directly on the listener. The entry is removed
when the network regains IPv4 DNS and on intercept shutdown; networks
that provide IPv4 DNS are never modified. Runs on the already-debounced
recovery path so interface flaps do not churn networksetup.

Also fix the canceled-recovery state leak: the cancellation early
return never reset recoveryBypass/recoveryRunning, so a flap burst
ending in a canceled recovery left the daemon in bypass forever with
the DNS watchdog disabled. Cleanup is generation-gated so a superseded
recovery never clears state owned by its successor.
2026-09-01 11:08:13 +07:00
Anthony Wong 1f001a559a feat(cli): add stable provisioning failure codes for manual and MDM installs 2026-08-21 14:52:02 +07:00
Cuong Manh Le d7c30b18ed fix(darwin): probe interception when stabilization finishes
The post-stabilization reconcile verifies rule text, which cannot tell a
live redirect from an anchor pf has stopped evaluating. Sleep/wake QA
caught exactly that split: references intact, anchor rules intact,
post-load verification passed, and every query through the system
resolver timing out while the direct listener answered.

Nothing else probed. The interception probe monitor stands down while
stabilization owns pf and is never re-armed afterwards, so functional
recovery waited for the periodic watchdog - 11 seconds in the captured
run, up to a full 30-second interval - on a host whose link and default
route were already back. The watchdog's probe then failed once, forced a
reload, and public and VPN split-DNS both recovered immediately.

Probe once at the end of stabilization and, if it fails, force exactly
one reload and confirm with one more probe. Not the probe monitor: that
keeps probing for ~7.5s and can force a reload per failed probe, where
this path needs a single bounded repair before handing back to the
watchdog. Skipped when a monitor already owns probing, when intercept
state is gone, or during exec backoff.

Hand ownership over deterministically rather than skipping on sight. A
probe monitor started by an ignored network change claimed
functional-probe ownership before checking whether it could work, then
stood down because stabilization still owned pf; the verifier read that
claimed flag as "somebody is probing" and skipped, so neither path
probed and recovery fell back to the watchdog anyway. The monitor now
checks eligibility before claiming, and the verifier waits out a holder
that releases, yielding only to one that keeps probing.

Extract the completion block into finishPFStabilization so the wiring is
testable, and cover the bounded repair, the healthy path that must not
reload, a prober that claims and stands down, a prober that keeps
working, and a monitor that must not claim ownership while stabilizing.
2026-08-21 14:47:58 +07:00
Dev Scribe 4d026d836c windows: adopt GP-managed NRPT catch-all 2026-08-21 14:46:44 +07:00
Dev Scribe 779fe015f0 fix: validate pf state before stabilization 2026-08-21 14:45:56 +07:00
Dev Scribe 3ef17bc5b9 fix: back off macOS pf watchdog exec storms 2026-07-14 01:09:14 +07:00
Codescribe 18f01baa01 fix: flush pf states after forced DNS intercept reload 2026-06-16 15:05:08 +07:00
Dev Scribe 1e1c998c89 Refresh macOS VPN DNS after pf stabilization 2026-06-16 14:52:28 +07:00
Cuong Manh Le 5dd5846cca cmd/cli: skip upstream.os healthcheck when WFP loopback protect enabled
Since the check will always be failed in this case, causing unnecessary
log spamming.
2026-05-05 22:15:54 +07:00
Codescribe 3f59cdad1a fix: block IPv6 DNS in intercept mode, remove raw socket approach
IPv6 DNS interception on macOS is not feasible with current pf capabilities.
The kernel rejects sendmsg from [::1] to global unicast (EINVAL), nat on lo0
doesn't fire for route-to'd packets, raw sockets bypass routing but pf doesn't
match them against rdr state, and DIOCNATLOOK can't be used because bind()
fails for non-local addresses.

Replace all IPv6 interception code with a simple pf block rule:
  block out quick on ! lo0 inet6 proto { udp, tcp } from any to any port 53

macOS automatically retries DNS over IPv4 when IPv6 is blocked.

Changes:
- Remove rawipv6_darwin.go and rawipv6_other.go
- Remove [::1] listener spawn on macOS (needLocalIPv6Listener returns false)
- Remove IPv6 rdr, route-to, pass, and reply-to pf rules
- Add block rule for all outbound IPv6 DNS
- Update docs/pf-dns-intercept.md with what was tried and why it failed
2026-04-01 17:35:08 +07:00
Codescribe 22a796f673 fix: use raw IPv6 socket for DNS responses in macOS intercept mode
macOS rejects sendmsg from [::1] to global unicast IPv6 (EINVAL), and
nat on lo0 doesn't fire for route-to'd packets (pf skips translation
on the second interface pass). ULA addresses on lo0 also fail (EHOSTUNREACH
- kernel segregates lo0 routing).

Solution: wrap the [::1] UDP listener's ResponseWriter with rawIPv6Writer
that sends responses via SOCK_RAW (IPPROTO_UDP) on lo0, bypassing the
kernel's routing validation. pf's rdr state reverses the address
translation on the response path.

Changes:
- Add rawipv6_darwin.go: rawIPv6Writer wraps dns.ResponseWriter, sends
  UDP responses via raw IPv6 socket with proper checksum calculation
- Add rawipv6_other.go: no-op wrapIPv6Handler for non-darwin platforms
- Remove nat rules from pf anchor (no longer needed)
- Block IPv6 TCP DNS (block return) - falls back to IPv4 (~1s, rare)
- Remove IPv6 TCP rdr/route-to/pass rules (only UDP intercepted)
2026-04-01 17:24:17 +07:00
Cuong Manh Le fe08f00746 fix(darwin): correct pf rules tests 2026-03-03 15:36:46 +07:00
Codescribe 289a46dc2c feat: add macOS pf DNS interception
Implement DNS interception on macOS using pf (packet filter):
- Anchor injection into running ruleset (not /etc/pf.conf)
- route-to lo0 + rdr rules for locally-originated DNS capture
- _ctrld group exemption so ctrld's own queries bypass interception
- Watchdog to detect and restore wiped anchor rules
- Probe-based auto-heal for Parallels VM pf corruption
- IPv6 DNS blocking and block-return for clean timeouts
- Interface-specific tunnel detection for VPN coexistence
- Port 5354 fallback in intercept mode

Includes pf technical reference docs and test scripts.

Squashed from intercept mode development on v1.0 branch (#497).
2026-03-03 14:27:43 +07:00