DoH, DoH3, and DoQ response paths previously used io.ReadAll on
attacker-controlled upstream responses before enforcing any protocol-level
size limit. A malicious or compromised upstream could return an oversized
body or stream and force ctrld to buffer unbounded data before eventually
failing DNS parsing.
Cap DoH/DoH3 response bodies at dns.MaxMsgSize and cap DoQ streams at the
2-byte length prefix plus dns.MaxMsgSize. Also limit non-200 DoH error
bodies so error formatting cannot consume large upstream responses.
Go's default is already TLS 1.2+ (since Go 1.18), but making this
explicit satisfies RFC 7858/9250 recommendations and makes the security
intent clear for auditors.
Added more descriptive error messages for TLS certificate verification
failures across DoH, DoT, DoQ, and DoH3 protocols. The error messages
now include:
- Certificate subject information
- Issuer organization details
- Common name of the certificate
This helps users and developers better understand certificate validation
failures by providing specific details about the untrusted certificate,
rather than just a generic "unknown authority" message.
Example error message change:
Before: "certificate signed by unknown authority"
After: "certificate signed by unknown authority: TestCA, TestOrg, TestIssuerOrg"
Cuong Manh Le