feat: full ui refresh

src-tauri/src/sync/encryption.rs

@@ -4,10 +4,40 @@ use aes_gcm::{
 };
 use argon2::{password_hash::SaltString, Argon2, PasswordHasher};
 use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64, Engine};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::sync::Mutex;
 
 const E2E_FILE_HEADER: &[u8] = b"DBE2E";
 const E2E_FILE_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 
+/// Argon2id is intentionally expensive (~80–150 ms per call). During an
+/// encryption rollover, every synced entity (proxy, group, vpn, extension,
+/// extension group, profile metadata) goes through `derive_profile_key`,
+/// which without caching means hundreds of sequential 100 ms derivations.
+///
+/// Cache the derived key keyed on (sha256(password), salt). Entries are
+/// evicted on `set_e2e_password` / `delete_e2e_password` so a password
+/// change cannot use stale keys.
+type DerivedKeyCache = HashMap<([u8; 32], String), [u8; 32]>;
+static KEY_CACHE: std::sync::LazyLock<Mutex<DerivedKeyCache>> =
+  std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
+
+fn password_fingerprint(pwd: &str) -> [u8; 32] {
+  use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+  let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+  hasher.update(pwd.as_bytes());
+  let result = hasher.finalize();
+  let mut out = [0u8; 32];
+  out.copy_from_slice(&result);
+  out
+}
+
+fn invalidate_key_cache() {
+  if let Ok(mut cache) = KEY_CACHE.lock() {
+    cache.clear();
+  }
+}
+
 fn get_e2e_password_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
   crate::app_dirs::settings_dir().join("e2e_password.dat")
 }
@@ -17,6 +47,7 @@ fn get_vault_password() -> String {
 }
 
 pub fn store_e2e_password(password: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+  invalidate_key_cache();
   let file_path = get_e2e_password_path();
 
   if let Some(parent) = file_path.parent() {
@@ -149,6 +180,7 @@ pub fn has_e2e_password() -> bool {
 }
 
 pub fn remove_e2e_password() -> Result<(), String> {
+  invalidate_key_cache();
   let file_path = get_e2e_password_path();
   if file_path.exists() {
     std::fs::remove_file(&file_path)
@@ -157,8 +189,20 @@ pub fn remove_e2e_password() -> Result<(), String> {
   Ok(())
 }
 
-/// Derive a per-profile encryption key using Argon2id
+/// Derive a per-profile encryption key using Argon2id, with an in-process
+/// cache keyed on `(sha256(password), salt)`. Repeated calls with the same
+/// password+salt are O(1); a password change calls `invalidate_key_cache`
+/// to drop stale entries.
 pub fn derive_profile_key(user_password: &str, profile_salt: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], String> {
+  let pwd_fp = password_fingerprint(user_password);
+  let cache_key = (pwd_fp, profile_salt.to_string());
+
+  if let Ok(cache) = KEY_CACHE.lock() {
+    if let Some(cached) = cache.get(&cache_key) {
+      return Ok(*cached);
+    }
+  }
+
   let salt_bytes = BASE64
     .decode(profile_salt)
     .map_err(|e| format!("Invalid salt encoding: {e}"))?;
@@ -175,6 +219,11 @@ pub fn derive_profile_key(user_password: &str, profile_salt: &str) -> Result<[u8
 
   let mut key = [0u8; 32];
   key.copy_from_slice(&hash_bytes[..32]);
+
+  if let Ok(mut cache) = KEY_CACHE.lock() {
+    cache.insert(cache_key, key);
+  }
+
   Ok(key)
 }
 
@@ -220,13 +269,75 @@ pub fn decrypt_bytes(key: &[u8; 32], encrypted: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String
     .map_err(|e| format!("Decryption failed: {e}"))
 }
 
+/// Versioned encryption envelope used for non-profile entities (proxies,
+/// VPNs, groups, extensions, extension groups). Each upload has its own
+/// random per-entity salt so the bucket can't be rainbow-table-attacked
+/// even with a shared password across many entities.
+#[derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
+pub struct EncryptedEnvelope {
+  /// Format version. Increment when changing how `ct` is structured.
+  pub v: u32,
+  /// Base64 of the per-entity salt. Plaintext on the wire — salts are public.
+  pub salt: String,
+  /// Base64 of `nonce(12B) || AES-256-GCM ciphertext` (output of `encrypt_bytes`).
+  pub ct: String,
+}
+
+/// Wrap a plaintext JSON byte slice into an encrypted envelope if the user
+/// has E2E enabled. Returns `(payload_bytes, content_type)` ready to upload.
+/// On no-password, returns the original JSON unchanged.
+pub fn maybe_seal_for_upload(json: &[u8]) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, &'static str), String> {
+  let pwd = match load_e2e_password()? {
+    Some(p) => p,
+    None => return Ok((json.to_vec(), "application/json")),
+  };
+  let salt = generate_salt();
+  let key = derive_profile_key(&pwd, &salt)?;
+  let ct = encrypt_bytes(&key, json)?;
+  let envelope = EncryptedEnvelope {
+    v: 1,
+    salt,
+    ct: BASE64.encode(&ct),
+  };
+  let payload =
+    serde_json::to_vec(&envelope).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to serialize envelope: {e}"))?;
+  Ok((payload, "application/json"))
+}
+
+/// Reverse of `maybe_seal_for_upload`. Returns the inner plaintext JSON
+/// bytes regardless of whether `raw` was an envelope or legacy plaintext.
+///
+/// Distinguishes three cases:
+/// - `raw` is plaintext JSON, no password set → returns `raw` unchanged.
+/// - `raw` is an envelope, password set → decrypts and returns plaintext.
+/// - `raw` is an envelope, no password set → returns `Err(EncryptedEnvelope)`
+///   so callers (subscription / startup probe) can show "enter password to
+///   continue syncing" UI.
+pub fn maybe_unseal_after_download(raw: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
+  // Try parsing as envelope first; envelopes are JSON objects with a "v" field.
+  if let Ok(env) = serde_json::from_slice::<EncryptedEnvelope>(raw) {
+    if env.v != 1 {
+      return Err(format!("Unsupported envelope version: {}", env.v));
+    }
+    let pwd = load_e2e_password()?.ok_or_else(|| "ENCRYPTION_PASSWORD_REQUIRED".to_string())?;
+    let key = derive_profile_key(&pwd, &env.salt)?;
+    let ct = BASE64
+      .decode(&env.ct)
+      .map_err(|e| format!("Invalid envelope ciphertext: {e}"))?;
+    return decrypt_bytes(&key, &ct);
+  }
+  // Not an envelope — legacy plaintext. Caller will JSON-parse it directly.
+  Ok(raw.to_vec())
+}
+
 // Tauri commands
 
 #[tauri::command]
-pub fn set_e2e_password(password: String) -> Result<(), String> {
+pub async fn set_e2e_password(password: String) -> Result<(), String> {
   if password.len() < 8 {
     return Err("Password must be at least 8 characters".to_string());
   }
+  enforce_team_owner_for_encryption_change().await?;
   store_e2e_password(&password)
 }
 
@@ -236,10 +347,23 @@ pub fn check_has_e2e_password() -> bool {
 }
 
 #[tauri::command]
-pub fn delete_e2e_password() -> Result<(), String> {
+pub async fn delete_e2e_password() -> Result<(), String> {
+  enforce_team_owner_for_encryption_change().await?;
   remove_e2e_password()
 }
 
+/// On Team plans, only the team owner is allowed to flip the E2E password
+/// state — otherwise members could lock each other out by changing the key.
+async fn enforce_team_owner_for_encryption_change() -> Result<(), String> {
+  use crate::cloud_auth::CLOUD_AUTH;
+  if let Some(state) = CLOUD_AUTH.get_user().await {
+    if state.user.plan == "team" && state.user.team_role.as_deref() != Some("owner") {
+      return Err("TEAM_OWNER_ONLY".to_string());
+    }
+  }
+  Ok(())
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
   use super::*;