mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
synced 2026-05-09 06:45:46 +02:00
feat(extension): Terminal-only sidebar — auth fix, UX polish, chat rip
The chat queue path is gone. The Chrome side panel is now just an
interactive claude PTY in xterm.js. Activity / Refs / Inspector still
exist behind the `debug` toggle in the footer.
Three threads of change, all from dogfood iteration on top of
cc-pty-import:
1. fix(server): cross-port WS auth via Sec-WebSocket-Protocol
- Browsers can't set Authorization on a WebSocket upgrade. We had
been minting an HttpOnly gstack_pty cookie via /pty-session, but
SameSite=Strict cookies don't survive the cross-port jump from
server.ts:34567 to the agent's random port from a chrome-extension
origin. The WS opened then immediately closed → "Session ended."
- /pty-session now also returns ptySessionToken in the JSON body.
- Extension calls `new WebSocket(url, [`gstack-pty.<token>`])`.
Browser sends Sec-WebSocket-Protocol on the upgrade.
- Agent reads the protocol header, validates against validTokens,
and MUST echo the protocol back (Chromium closes the connection
immediately if a server doesn't pick one of the offered protocols).
- Cookie path is kept as a fallback for non-browser callers (curl,
integration tests).
- New integration test exercises the full protocol-auth round-trip
via raw fetch+Upgrade so a future regression of this exact class
fails in CI.
2. fix(extension): UX polish on the Terminal pane
- Eager auto-connect when the sidebar opens — no "Press any key to
start" friction every reload.
- Always-visible ↻ Restart button in the terminal toolbar (not
gated on the ENDED state) so the user can force a fresh claude
mid-session.
- MutationObserver on #tab-terminal's class attribute drives a
fitAddon.fit() + term.refresh() when the pane becomes visible
again — xterm doesn't auto-redraw after display:none → display:flex.
3. feat(extension): rip the chat tab + sidebar-agent.ts
- Sidebar is Terminal-only. No more Terminal | Chat primary nav.
- sidebar-agent.ts deleted. /sidebar-command, /sidebar-chat,
/sidebar-agent/event, /sidebar-tabs* and friends all deleted.
- The pickSidebarModel router (sonnet vs opus) is gone — the live
PTY uses whatever model the user's `claude` CLI is configured with.
- Quick-actions (🧹 Cleanup / 📸 Screenshot / 🍪 Cookies) survive
in the Terminal toolbar. Cleanup now injects its prompt into the
live PTY via window.gstackInjectToTerminal — no more
/sidebar-command POST. The Inspector "Send to Code" action uses
the same injection path.
- clear-chat button removed from the footer.
- sidepanel.js shed ~900 lines of chat polling, optimistic UI,
stop-agent, etc.
Net diff: -3.4k lines across 16 files. CLAUDE.md, TODOS.md, and
docs/designs/SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md rewritten to match. The sidebar
regression test (browse/test/sidebar-tabs.test.ts) is rewritten as 27
structural assertions locking the new layout — Terminal sole pane,
no chat input, quick-actions in toolbar, eager-connect, MutationObserver
repaint, restart helper.
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
+6
-55
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ Refs: After 'snapshot', use @e1, @e2... as selectors:
|
||||
// Delete stale state file
|
||||
safeUnlinkQuiet(config.stateFile);
|
||||
|
||||
console.log('Launching headed Chromium with extension + sidebar agent...');
|
||||
console.log('Launching headed Chromium with extension + terminal agent...');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// Start server in headed mode with extension auto-loaded
|
||||
// Use a well-known port so the Chrome extension auto-connects
|
||||
@@ -882,61 +882,12 @@ Refs: After 'snapshot', use @e1, @e2... as selectors:
|
||||
const status = await resp.text();
|
||||
console.log(`Connected to real Chrome\n${status}`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Auto-start sidebar agent
|
||||
// __dirname is inside $bunfs in compiled binaries — resolve from execPath instead
|
||||
let agentScript = path.resolve(__dirname, 'sidebar-agent.ts');
|
||||
if (!fs.existsSync(agentScript)) {
|
||||
agentScript = path.resolve(path.dirname(process.execPath), '..', 'src', 'sidebar-agent.ts');
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (!fs.existsSync(agentScript)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`sidebar-agent.ts not found at ${agentScript}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Clear old agent queue
|
||||
const agentQueue = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack', 'sidebar-agent-queue.jsonl');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(agentQueue), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(agentQueue, '', { mode: 0o600 });
|
||||
} catch (err: any) {
|
||||
if (err?.code !== 'EACCES') throw err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// sidebar-agent.ts spawn was here. Ripped alongside the chat queue —
|
||||
// the Terminal pane runs an interactive PTY now, no more one-shot
|
||||
// claude -p subprocesses to multiplex.
|
||||
|
||||
// Resolve browse binary path the same way — execPath-relative
|
||||
let browseBin = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', 'dist', 'browse');
|
||||
if (!fs.existsSync(browseBin)) {
|
||||
browseBin = process.execPath; // the compiled binary itself
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Kill any existing sidebar-agent processes before starting a new one.
|
||||
// Old agents have stale auth tokens and will silently fail to relay events,
|
||||
// causing the server to mark the agent as "hung".
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
|
||||
spawnSync('pkill', ['-f', 'sidebar-agent\\.ts'], { stdio: 'ignore', timeout: 3000 });
|
||||
} catch (err: any) {
|
||||
if (err?.code !== 'ENOENT') throw err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const agentProc = Bun.spawn(['bun', 'run', agentScript], {
|
||||
cwd: config.projectDir,
|
||||
env: {
|
||||
...process.env,
|
||||
BROWSE_BIN: browseBin,
|
||||
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: config.stateFile,
|
||||
BROWSE_SERVER_PORT: String(newState.port),
|
||||
},
|
||||
stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'ignore'],
|
||||
});
|
||||
agentProc.unref();
|
||||
console.log(`[browse] Sidebar agent started (PID: ${agentProc.pid})`);
|
||||
} catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.error(`[browse] Sidebar agent failed to start: ${err.message}`);
|
||||
console.error(`[browse] Run manually: bun run ${agentScript}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Auto-start terminal agent (non-compiled, parallel to sidebar-agent).
|
||||
// Owns the PTY WebSocket for the Terminal sidebar tab. Crash-isolated
|
||||
// from the chat agent per codex outside-voice review.
|
||||
// Auto-start terminal agent (non-compiled bun process). Owns the PTY
|
||||
// WebSocket for the sidebar Terminal pane.
|
||||
let termAgentScript = path.resolve(__dirname, 'terminal-agent.ts');
|
||||
if (!fs.existsSync(termAgentScript)) {
|
||||
termAgentScript = path.resolve(path.dirname(process.execPath), '..', 'src', 'terminal-agent.ts');
|
||||
|
||||
+47
-911
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,947 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Sidebar Agent — polls agent-queue from server, spawns claude -p for each
|
||||
* message, streams live events back to the server via /sidebar-agent/event.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This runs as a NON-COMPILED bun process because compiled bun binaries
|
||||
* cannot posix_spawn external executables. The server writes to the queue
|
||||
* file, this process reads it and spawns claude.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Usage: BROWSE_BIN=/path/to/browse bun run browse/src/sidebar-agent.ts
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { spawn } from 'child_process';
|
||||
import * as fs from 'fs';
|
||||
import * as path from 'path';
|
||||
import { safeUnlink } from './error-handling';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
checkCanaryInStructure, logAttempt, hashPayload, extractDomain,
|
||||
combineVerdict, writeSessionState, readSessionState, THRESHOLDS,
|
||||
readDecision, clearDecision, excerptForReview,
|
||||
type LayerSignal,
|
||||
} from './security';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
loadTestsavant, scanPageContent, checkTranscript,
|
||||
shouldRunTranscriptCheck, getClassifierStatus,
|
||||
loadDeberta, scanPageContentDeberta,
|
||||
type ToolCallInput,
|
||||
} from './security-classifier';
|
||||
|
||||
const QUEUE = process.env.SIDEBAR_QUEUE_PATH || path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack', 'sidebar-agent-queue.jsonl');
|
||||
const KILL_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(QUEUE), 'sidebar-agent-kill');
|
||||
const SERVER_PORT = parseInt(process.env.BROWSE_SERVER_PORT || '34567', 10);
|
||||
const SERVER_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${SERVER_PORT}`;
|
||||
const POLL_MS = 200; // 200ms poll — keeps time-to-first-token low
|
||||
const B = process.env.BROWSE_BIN || path.resolve(__dirname, '../../.claude/skills/gstack/browse/dist/browse');
|
||||
|
||||
const CANCEL_DIR = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack');
|
||||
function cancelFileForTab(tabId: number): string {
|
||||
return path.join(CANCEL_DIR, `sidebar-agent-cancel-${tabId}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface QueueEntry {
|
||||
prompt: string;
|
||||
args?: string[];
|
||||
stateFile?: string;
|
||||
cwd?: string;
|
||||
tabId?: number | null;
|
||||
message?: string | null;
|
||||
pageUrl?: string | null;
|
||||
sessionId?: string | null;
|
||||
ts?: string;
|
||||
canary?: string; // session-scoped token; leak = prompt injection evidence
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function isValidQueueEntry(e: unknown): e is QueueEntry {
|
||||
if (typeof e !== 'object' || e === null) return false;
|
||||
const obj = e as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
if (typeof obj.prompt !== 'string' || obj.prompt.length === 0) return false;
|
||||
if (obj.args !== undefined && (!Array.isArray(obj.args) || !obj.args.every(a => typeof a === 'string'))) return false;
|
||||
if (obj.stateFile !== undefined) {
|
||||
if (typeof obj.stateFile !== 'string') return false;
|
||||
if (obj.stateFile.includes('..')) return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (obj.cwd !== undefined) {
|
||||
if (typeof obj.cwd !== 'string') return false;
|
||||
if (obj.cwd.includes('..')) return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (obj.tabId !== undefined && obj.tabId !== null && typeof obj.tabId !== 'number') return false;
|
||||
if (obj.message !== undefined && obj.message !== null && typeof obj.message !== 'string') return false;
|
||||
if (obj.pageUrl !== undefined && obj.pageUrl !== null && typeof obj.pageUrl !== 'string') return false;
|
||||
if (obj.sessionId !== undefined && obj.sessionId !== null && typeof obj.sessionId !== 'string') return false;
|
||||
if (obj.canary !== undefined && typeof obj.canary !== 'string') return false;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let lastLine = 0;
|
||||
let authToken: string | null = null;
|
||||
// Per-tab processing — each tab can run its own agent concurrently
|
||||
const processingTabs = new Set<number>();
|
||||
// Active claude subprocesses — keyed by tabId for targeted kill
|
||||
const activeProcs = new Map<number, ReturnType<typeof spawn>>();
|
||||
let activeProc: ReturnType<typeof spawn> | null = null;
|
||||
// Kill-file timestamp last seen — avoids double-kill on same write
|
||||
let lastKillTs = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── File drop relay ──────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
function getGitRoot(): string | null {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const { execSync } = require('child_process');
|
||||
return execSync('git rev-parse --show-toplevel', { encoding: 'utf-8', stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }).trim();
|
||||
} catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.debug('[sidebar-agent] Not in a git repo:', err.message);
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function writeToInbox(message: string, pageUrl?: string, sessionId?: string): void {
|
||||
const gitRoot = getGitRoot();
|
||||
if (!gitRoot) {
|
||||
console.error('[sidebar-agent] Cannot write to inbox — not in a git repo');
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const inboxDir = path.join(gitRoot, '.context', 'sidebar-inbox');
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(inboxDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
|
||||
|
||||
const now = new Date();
|
||||
const timestamp = now.toISOString().replace(/:/g, '-');
|
||||
const filename = `${timestamp}-observation.json`;
|
||||
const tmpFile = path.join(inboxDir, `.${filename}.tmp`);
|
||||
const finalFile = path.join(inboxDir, filename);
|
||||
|
||||
const inboxMessage = {
|
||||
type: 'observation',
|
||||
timestamp: now.toISOString(),
|
||||
page: { url: pageUrl || 'unknown', title: '' },
|
||||
userMessage: message,
|
||||
sidebarSessionId: sessionId || 'unknown',
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(tmpFile, JSON.stringify(inboxMessage, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
|
||||
fs.renameSync(tmpFile, finalFile);
|
||||
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Wrote inbox message: ${filename}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Auth ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
async function refreshToken(): Promise<string | null> {
|
||||
// Read token from state file (same-user, mode 0o600) instead of /health
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const stateFile = process.env.BROWSE_STATE_FILE ||
|
||||
path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack', 'browse.json');
|
||||
const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8'));
|
||||
authToken = data.token || null;
|
||||
return authToken;
|
||||
} catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.error('[sidebar-agent] Failed to refresh auth token:', err.message);
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Event relay to server ──────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
async function sendEvent(event: Record<string, any>, tabId?: number): Promise<void> {
|
||||
if (!authToken) await refreshToken();
|
||||
if (!authToken) return;
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await fetch(`${SERVER_URL}/sidebar-agent/event`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: {
|
||||
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
|
||||
'Authorization': `Bearer ${authToken}`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ ...event, tabId: tabId ?? null }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
console.error('[sidebar-agent] Failed to send event:', err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Claude subprocess ──────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
function shorten(str: string): string {
|
||||
return str
|
||||
.replace(new RegExp(B.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&'), 'g'), '$B')
|
||||
.replace(/\/Users\/[^/]+/g, '~')
|
||||
.replace(/\/conductor\/workspaces\/[^/]+\/[^/]+/g, '')
|
||||
.replace(/\.claude\/skills\/gstack\//g, '')
|
||||
.replace(/browse\/dist\/browse/g, '$B');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function describeToolCall(tool: string, input: any): string {
|
||||
if (!input) return '';
|
||||
|
||||
// For Bash commands, generate a plain-English description
|
||||
if (tool === 'Bash' && input.command) {
|
||||
const cmd = input.command;
|
||||
|
||||
// Browse binary commands — the most common case
|
||||
const browseMatch = cmd.match(/\$B\s+(\w+)|browse[^\s]*\s+(\w+)/);
|
||||
if (browseMatch) {
|
||||
const browseCmd = browseMatch[1] || browseMatch[2];
|
||||
const args = cmd.split(/\s+/).slice(2).join(' ');
|
||||
switch (browseCmd) {
|
||||
case 'goto': return `Opening ${args.replace(/['"]/g, '')}`;
|
||||
case 'snapshot': return args.includes('-i') ? 'Scanning for interactive elements' : args.includes('-D') ? 'Checking what changed' : 'Taking a snapshot of the page';
|
||||
case 'screenshot': return `Saving screenshot${args ? ` to ${shorten(args)}` : ''}`;
|
||||
case 'click': return `Clicking ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'fill': { const parts = args.split(/\s+/); return `Typing "${parts.slice(1).join(' ')}" into ${parts[0]}`; }
|
||||
case 'text': return 'Reading page text';
|
||||
case 'html': return args ? `Reading HTML of ${args}` : 'Reading full page HTML';
|
||||
case 'links': return 'Finding all links on the page';
|
||||
case 'forms': return 'Looking for forms';
|
||||
case 'console': return 'Checking browser console for errors';
|
||||
case 'network': return 'Checking network requests';
|
||||
case 'url': return 'Checking current URL';
|
||||
case 'back': return 'Going back';
|
||||
case 'forward': return 'Going forward';
|
||||
case 'reload': return 'Reloading the page';
|
||||
case 'scroll': return args ? `Scrolling to ${args}` : 'Scrolling down';
|
||||
case 'wait': return `Waiting for ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'inspect': return args ? `Inspecting CSS of ${args}` : 'Getting CSS for last picked element';
|
||||
case 'style': return `Changing CSS: ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'cleanup': return 'Removing page clutter (ads, popups, banners)';
|
||||
case 'prettyscreenshot': return 'Taking a clean screenshot';
|
||||
case 'css': return `Checking CSS property: ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'is': return `Checking if element is ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'diff': return `Comparing ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'responsive': return 'Taking screenshots at mobile, tablet, and desktop sizes';
|
||||
case 'status': return 'Checking browser status';
|
||||
case 'tabs': return 'Listing open tabs';
|
||||
case 'focus': return 'Bringing browser to front';
|
||||
case 'select': return `Selecting option in ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'hover': return `Hovering over ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'viewport': return `Setting viewport to ${args}`;
|
||||
case 'upload': return `Uploading file to ${args.split(/\s+/)[0]}`;
|
||||
default: return `Running browse ${browseCmd} ${args}`.trim();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Non-browse bash commands
|
||||
if (cmd.includes('git ')) return `Running: ${shorten(cmd)}`;
|
||||
let short = shorten(cmd);
|
||||
return short.length > 100 ? short.slice(0, 100) + '…' : short;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (tool === 'Read' && input.file_path) {
|
||||
// Skip Claude's internal tool-result file reads — they're plumbing, not user-facing
|
||||
if (input.file_path.includes('/tool-results/') || input.file_path.includes('/.claude/projects/')) return '';
|
||||
return `Reading ${shorten(input.file_path)}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (tool === 'Edit' && input.file_path) return `Editing ${shorten(input.file_path)}`;
|
||||
if (tool === 'Write' && input.file_path) return `Writing ${shorten(input.file_path)}`;
|
||||
if (tool === 'Grep' && input.pattern) return `Searching for "${input.pattern}"`;
|
||||
if (tool === 'Glob' && input.pattern) return `Finding files matching ${input.pattern}`;
|
||||
try { return shorten(JSON.stringify(input)).slice(0, 80); } catch { return ''; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Keep the old name as an alias for backward compat
|
||||
function summarizeToolInput(tool: string, input: any): string {
|
||||
return describeToolCall(tool, input);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Scan a Claude stream event for the session canary. Returns the channel where
|
||||
* it leaked, or null if clean. Covers every outbound channel: text blocks,
|
||||
* text deltas, tool_use arguments (including nested URL/path/command strings),
|
||||
* and result payloads.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function detectCanaryLeak(event: any, canary: string, buf?: DeltaBuffer): string | null {
|
||||
if (!canary) return null;
|
||||
|
||||
if (event.type === 'assistant' && event.message?.content) {
|
||||
for (const block of event.message.content) {
|
||||
if (block.type === 'text' && typeof block.text === 'string' && block.text.includes(canary)) {
|
||||
return 'assistant_text';
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (block.type === 'tool_use' && checkCanaryInStructure(block.input, canary)) {
|
||||
return `tool_use:${block.name}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (event.type === 'content_block_start' && event.content_block?.type === 'tool_use') {
|
||||
if (checkCanaryInStructure(event.content_block.input, canary)) {
|
||||
return `tool_use:${event.content_block.name}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (event.type === 'content_block_delta' && event.delta?.type === 'text_delta') {
|
||||
if (typeof event.delta.text === 'string') {
|
||||
// Rolling buffer: an attacker can ask Claude to emit the canary split
|
||||
// across two deltas (e.g., "CANARY-" then "ABCDEF"). A per-delta
|
||||
// substring check misses this. Concatenate the previous tail with
|
||||
// this chunk and search, then trim the tail to last canary.length-1
|
||||
// chars for the next event.
|
||||
const combined = buf ? buf.text_delta + event.delta.text : event.delta.text;
|
||||
if (combined.includes(canary)) return 'text_delta';
|
||||
if (buf) buf.text_delta = combined.slice(-(canary.length - 1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (event.type === 'content_block_delta' && event.delta?.type === 'input_json_delta') {
|
||||
if (typeof event.delta.partial_json === 'string') {
|
||||
const combined = buf ? buf.input_json_delta + event.delta.partial_json : event.delta.partial_json;
|
||||
if (combined.includes(canary)) return 'tool_input_delta';
|
||||
if (buf) buf.input_json_delta = combined.slice(-(canary.length - 1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (event.type === 'content_block_stop' && buf) {
|
||||
// Block boundary — reset the rolling buffer so a canary straddling
|
||||
// two independent tool_use blocks isn't inferred.
|
||||
buf.text_delta = '';
|
||||
buf.input_json_delta = '';
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (event.type === 'result' && typeof event.result === 'string' && event.result.includes(canary)) {
|
||||
return 'result';
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Rolling-window tails for delta canary detection. See detectCanaryLeak. */
|
||||
interface DeltaBuffer {
|
||||
text_delta: string;
|
||||
input_json_delta: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface CanaryContext {
|
||||
canary: string;
|
||||
pageUrl: string;
|
||||
onLeak: (channel: string) => void;
|
||||
deltaBuf: DeltaBuffer;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
interface ToolResultScanContext {
|
||||
scan: (toolName: string, text: string) => Promise<void>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Per-tab map of tool_use_id → tool name. Lets the tool_result handler
|
||||
* know what tool produced the content (Read, Grep, Glob, Bash $B ...) so
|
||||
* we can tag attack logs with the ingress source.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const toolUseRegistry = new Map<string, { toolName: string; toolInput: unknown }>();
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Extract plain-text content from a tool_result block. The Claude stream
|
||||
* encodes it as either a string or an array of content blocks (text, image).
|
||||
* We care about text — images can't carry prompt injection at this layer.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function extractToolResultText(content: unknown): string {
|
||||
if (typeof content === 'string') return content;
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(content)) return '';
|
||||
const parts: string[] = [];
|
||||
for (const block of content) {
|
||||
if (block && typeof block === 'object') {
|
||||
const b = block as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
if (b.type === 'text' && typeof b.text === 'string') parts.push(b.text);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return parts.join('\n');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Tools whose outputs should be ML-scanned. Bash/$B outputs already get
|
||||
* scanned via the page-content flow. Read/Glob/Grep outputs have been
|
||||
* uncovered — Codex review flagged this gap. Adding coverage here closes it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const SCANNED_TOOLS = new Set(['Read', 'Grep', 'Glob', 'Bash', 'WebFetch']);
|
||||
|
||||
async function handleStreamEvent(event: any, tabId?: number, canaryCtx?: CanaryContext, toolResultScanCtx?: ToolResultScanContext): Promise<void> {
|
||||
// Canary check runs BEFORE any outbound send — we never want to relay
|
||||
// a leaked token to the sidepanel UI.
|
||||
if (canaryCtx) {
|
||||
const channel = detectCanaryLeak(event, canaryCtx.canary, canaryCtx.deltaBuf);
|
||||
if (channel) {
|
||||
canaryCtx.onLeak(channel);
|
||||
return; // drop the event — never relay content that leaked the canary
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (event.type === 'system' && event.session_id) {
|
||||
// Relay claude session ID for --resume support
|
||||
await sendEvent({ type: 'system', claudeSessionId: event.session_id }, tabId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (event.type === 'assistant' && event.message?.content) {
|
||||
for (const block of event.message.content) {
|
||||
if (block.type === 'tool_use') {
|
||||
// Register the tool_use so we can correlate tool_results back to
|
||||
// the originating tool when they arrive in the next user-role message.
|
||||
if (block.id) toolUseRegistry.set(block.id, { toolName: block.name, toolInput: block.input });
|
||||
await sendEvent({ type: 'tool_use', tool: block.name, input: summarizeToolInput(block.name, block.input) }, tabId);
|
||||
} else if (block.type === 'text' && block.text) {
|
||||
await sendEvent({ type: 'text', text: block.text }, tabId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tool results come back in user-role messages. Content can be a string
|
||||
// or an array of typed content blocks.
|
||||
if (event.type === 'user' && event.message?.content) {
|
||||
for (const block of event.message.content) {
|
||||
if (block && typeof block === 'object' && block.type === 'tool_result') {
|
||||
const meta = block.tool_use_id ? toolUseRegistry.get(block.tool_use_id) : null;
|
||||
const toolName = meta?.toolName ?? 'Unknown';
|
||||
const text = extractToolResultText(block.content);
|
||||
// Scan this tool output with the ML classifier if the tool is in
|
||||
// the SCANNED_TOOLS set and the content is non-trivial.
|
||||
if (SCANNED_TOOLS.has(toolName) && text.length >= 32 && toolResultScanCtx) {
|
||||
// Fire-and-forget — never block the stream handler. If BLOCK
|
||||
// fires, onToolResultBlock handles kill + emit.
|
||||
toolResultScanCtx.scan(toolName, text).catch(() => {});
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (block.tool_use_id) toolUseRegistry.delete(block.tool_use_id);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (event.type === 'content_block_start' && event.content_block?.type === 'tool_use') {
|
||||
if (event.content_block.id) {
|
||||
toolUseRegistry.set(event.content_block.id, {
|
||||
toolName: event.content_block.name,
|
||||
toolInput: event.content_block.input,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
await sendEvent({ type: 'tool_use', tool: event.content_block.name, input: summarizeToolInput(event.content_block.name, event.content_block.input) }, tabId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (event.type === 'content_block_delta' && event.delta?.type === 'text_delta' && event.delta.text) {
|
||||
await sendEvent({ type: 'text_delta', text: event.delta.text }, tabId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Relay tool results so the sidebar can show what happened
|
||||
if (event.type === 'content_block_delta' && event.delta?.type === 'input_json_delta') {
|
||||
// Tool input streaming — skip, we already announced the tool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (event.type === 'result') {
|
||||
await sendEvent({ type: 'result', text: event.result || '' }, tabId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tool result events — summarize and relay
|
||||
if (event.type === 'tool_result' || (event.type === 'assistant' && event.message?.content)) {
|
||||
// Tool results come in the next assistant turn — handled above
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Fire the prompt-injection-detected event to the server. This terminates
|
||||
* the session from the sidepanel's perspective and renders the canary leak
|
||||
* banner. Also logs locally (salted hash + domain only) and fires telemetry
|
||||
* if configured.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function onCanaryLeaked(params: {
|
||||
tabId: number;
|
||||
channel: string;
|
||||
canary: string;
|
||||
pageUrl: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const { tabId, channel, canary, pageUrl } = params;
|
||||
const domain = extractDomain(pageUrl);
|
||||
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] CANARY LEAK detected on ${channel} for tab ${tabId} (domain=${domain || 'unknown'})`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Local log — salted hash + domain only, never the payload
|
||||
logAttempt({
|
||||
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
|
||||
urlDomain: domain,
|
||||
payloadHash: hashPayload(canary), // hash the canary, not the payload (which might be leaked content)
|
||||
confidence: 1.0,
|
||||
layer: 'canary',
|
||||
verdict: 'block',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Broadcast to sidepanel so it can render the approved banner
|
||||
await sendEvent({
|
||||
type: 'security_event',
|
||||
verdict: 'block',
|
||||
reason: 'canary_leaked',
|
||||
layer: 'canary',
|
||||
channel,
|
||||
domain,
|
||||
}, tabId);
|
||||
|
||||
// Also emit agent_error so the sidepanel's existing error surface
|
||||
// reflects that the session terminated. Keeps old clients working.
|
||||
await sendEvent({
|
||||
type: 'agent_error',
|
||||
error: `Session terminated — prompt injection detected${domain ? ` from ${domain}` : ''}`,
|
||||
}, tabId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Pre-spawn ML scan of the user message. If the classifier fires at BLOCK,
|
||||
* we log the attempt, emit a security_event to the sidepanel, and DO NOT
|
||||
* spawn claude. Returns true if the scan blocked the session.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Fail-open: any classifier error or degraded state returns false (safe) so
|
||||
* the sidebar keeps working. The architectural controls (XML framing +
|
||||
* command allowlist, live in server.ts:554-577) still defend.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function preSpawnSecurityCheck(entry: QueueEntry): Promise<boolean> {
|
||||
const { message, canary, pageUrl, tabId } = entry;
|
||||
if (!message || message.length === 0) return false;
|
||||
const tid = tabId ?? 0;
|
||||
|
||||
// L4: scan the user message for direct injection patterns (TestSavantAI)
|
||||
// L4c: also scan with DeBERTa-v3 when ensemble is enabled (opt-in)
|
||||
const [contentSignal, debertaSignal] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
scanPageContent(message),
|
||||
scanPageContentDeberta(message),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const signals: LayerSignal[] = [contentSignal, debertaSignal];
|
||||
|
||||
// L4b: only bother with Haiku if another layer already lit up at >= LOG_ONLY.
|
||||
// Saves ~70% of Haiku calls per plan §E1 "gating optimization".
|
||||
if (shouldRunTranscriptCheck(signals)) {
|
||||
const transcriptSignal = await checkTranscript({
|
||||
user_message: message,
|
||||
tool_calls: [], // no tool calls yet at session start
|
||||
});
|
||||
signals.push(transcriptSignal);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const result = combineVerdict(signals);
|
||||
if (result.verdict !== 'block') return false;
|
||||
|
||||
// BLOCK verdict. Log + emit + refuse to spawn.
|
||||
const domain = extractDomain(pageUrl ?? '');
|
||||
const leaderSignal = signals.reduce((a, b) => (a.confidence > b.confidence ? a : b));
|
||||
|
||||
logAttempt({
|
||||
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
|
||||
urlDomain: domain,
|
||||
payloadHash: hashPayload(message),
|
||||
confidence: result.confidence,
|
||||
layer: leaderSignal.layer,
|
||||
verdict: 'block',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Pre-spawn BLOCK (${result.reason}) for tab ${tid}, confidence=${result.confidence.toFixed(3)}`);
|
||||
|
||||
await sendEvent({
|
||||
type: 'security_event',
|
||||
verdict: 'block',
|
||||
reason: result.reason ?? 'ml_classifier',
|
||||
layer: leaderSignal.layer,
|
||||
confidence: result.confidence,
|
||||
domain,
|
||||
}, tid);
|
||||
await sendEvent({
|
||||
type: 'agent_error',
|
||||
error: `Session blocked — prompt injection detected${domain ? ` from ${domain}` : ' in your message'}`,
|
||||
}, tid);
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function askClaude(queueEntry: QueueEntry): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const { prompt, args, stateFile, cwd, tabId, canary, pageUrl } = queueEntry;
|
||||
const tid = tabId ?? 0;
|
||||
|
||||
processingTabs.add(tid);
|
||||
await sendEvent({ type: 'agent_start' }, tid);
|
||||
|
||||
// Pre-spawn ML scan: if the user message trips the ensemble, refuse to
|
||||
// spawn claude. Fail-open on classifier errors.
|
||||
if (await preSpawnSecurityCheck(queueEntry)) {
|
||||
processingTabs.delete(tid);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
// Canary context is set after proc is spawned (needs proc reference for kill).
|
||||
let canaryCtx: CanaryContext | undefined;
|
||||
let canaryTriggered = false;
|
||||
|
||||
// Use args from queue entry (server sets --model, --allowedTools, prompt framing).
|
||||
// Fall back to defaults only if queue entry has no args (backward compat).
|
||||
// Write doesn't expand attack surface beyond what Bash already provides.
|
||||
// The security boundary is the localhost-only message path, not the tool allowlist.
|
||||
let claudeArgs = args || ['-p', prompt, '--output-format', 'stream-json', '--verbose',
|
||||
'--allowedTools', 'Bash,Read,Glob,Grep,Write'];
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate cwd exists — queue may reference a stale worktree
|
||||
let effectiveCwd = cwd || process.cwd();
|
||||
try { fs.accessSync(effectiveCwd); } catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.warn('[sidebar-agent] Worktree path inaccessible, falling back to cwd:', effectiveCwd, err.message);
|
||||
effectiveCwd = process.cwd();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Clear any stale cancel signal for this tab before starting
|
||||
const cancelFile = cancelFileForTab(tid);
|
||||
safeUnlink(cancelFile);
|
||||
|
||||
const proc = spawn('claude', claudeArgs, {
|
||||
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
||||
cwd: effectiveCwd,
|
||||
env: {
|
||||
...process.env,
|
||||
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: stateFile || '',
|
||||
// Connect to the existing headed browse server, never start a new one.
|
||||
// BROWSE_PORT tells the CLI which port to check.
|
||||
// BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART prevents spawning an invisible headless browser
|
||||
// if the headed server is down — fail fast with a clear error instead.
|
||||
BROWSE_PORT: process.env.BROWSE_PORT || '34567',
|
||||
BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART: '1',
|
||||
// Pin this agent to its tab — prevents cross-tab interference
|
||||
// when multiple agents run simultaneously
|
||||
BROWSE_TAB: String(tid),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Track active procs so kill-file polling can terminate them
|
||||
activeProcs.set(tid, proc);
|
||||
activeProc = proc;
|
||||
|
||||
proc.stdin.end();
|
||||
|
||||
// Now that proc exists, set up the canary-leak handler. It fires at most
|
||||
// once; on fire we kill the subprocess, emit security_event + agent_error,
|
||||
// and let the normal close handler resolve the promise.
|
||||
if (canary) {
|
||||
canaryCtx = {
|
||||
canary,
|
||||
pageUrl: pageUrl ?? '',
|
||||
deltaBuf: { text_delta: '', input_json_delta: '' },
|
||||
onLeak: (channel: string) => {
|
||||
if (canaryTriggered) return;
|
||||
canaryTriggered = true;
|
||||
onCanaryLeaked({ tabId: tid, channel, canary, pageUrl: pageUrl ?? '' });
|
||||
try { proc.kill('SIGTERM'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; }
|
||||
setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
try { proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; }
|
||||
}, 2000);
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tool-result ML scan context. Addresses the Codex review gap: Read,
|
||||
// Grep, Glob, and WebFetch outputs enter Claude's context without
|
||||
// passing through the Bash $B pipeline that content-security.ts
|
||||
// already wraps. Scan them here.
|
||||
let toolResultBlockFired = false;
|
||||
const toolResultScanCtx: ToolResultScanContext = {
|
||||
scan: async (toolName: string, text: string) => {
|
||||
if (toolResultBlockFired) return;
|
||||
// Parallel L4 + L4c ensemble scan (DeBERTa no-op when disabled).
|
||||
// We run L4/L4c AND Haiku in parallel on tool outputs regardless of
|
||||
// L4's score, because BrowseSafe-Bench shows L4 (TestSavantAI) has
|
||||
// low recall on browser-agent-specific attacks (~15% at v1). Gating
|
||||
// Haiku on L4 meant our best signal almost never ran. The cost is
|
||||
// ~$0.002 + ~300ms per tool output, bounded by the Haiku timeout
|
||||
// and offset by Haiku actually seeing the real attack context.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Haiku only runs when the Claude CLI is available (checkHaikuAvailable
|
||||
// caches the probe). In environments without it, the call returns a
|
||||
// degraded signal and the verdict falls back to L4 alone.
|
||||
const [contentSignal, debertaSignal, transcriptSignal] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
scanPageContent(text),
|
||||
scanPageContentDeberta(text),
|
||||
checkTranscript({
|
||||
user_message: queueEntry.message ?? '',
|
||||
tool_calls: [{ tool_name: toolName, tool_input: {} }],
|
||||
tool_output: text,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const signals: LayerSignal[] = [contentSignal, debertaSignal, transcriptSignal];
|
||||
const result = combineVerdict(signals, { toolOutput: true });
|
||||
if (result.verdict !== 'block') return;
|
||||
toolResultBlockFired = true;
|
||||
const domain = extractDomain(pageUrl ?? '');
|
||||
const payloadHash = hashPayload(text.slice(0, 4096));
|
||||
|
||||
// Log pending — if the user overrides, we'll update via a separate
|
||||
// log line. The attempts.jsonl is append-only so both entries survive.
|
||||
logAttempt({
|
||||
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
|
||||
urlDomain: domain,
|
||||
payloadHash,
|
||||
confidence: result.confidence,
|
||||
layer: 'testsavant_content',
|
||||
verdict: 'block',
|
||||
});
|
||||
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Tool-result BLOCK on ${toolName} for tab ${tid} (confidence=${result.confidence.toFixed(3)}) — awaiting user decision`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Surface a REVIEWABLE block event. Sidepanel renders the suspected
|
||||
// text + layer scores + [Allow and continue] / [Block session] buttons.
|
||||
// The user has 60s to decide; default is BLOCK (safe fallback).
|
||||
const layerScores = signals
|
||||
.filter((s) => s.confidence > 0)
|
||||
.map((s) => ({ layer: s.layer, confidence: s.confidence }));
|
||||
await sendEvent({
|
||||
type: 'security_event',
|
||||
verdict: 'block',
|
||||
reason: 'tool_result_ml',
|
||||
layer: 'testsavant_content',
|
||||
confidence: result.confidence,
|
||||
domain,
|
||||
tool: toolName,
|
||||
reviewable: true,
|
||||
suspected_text: excerptForReview(text),
|
||||
signals: layerScores,
|
||||
}, tid);
|
||||
|
||||
// Poll for the user's decision. Default to BLOCK on timeout.
|
||||
const REVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;
|
||||
const POLL_MS = 500;
|
||||
clearDecision(tid); // clear any stale decision from a prior session
|
||||
const deadline = Date.now() + REVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
||||
let decision: 'allow' | 'block' = 'block';
|
||||
let decisionReason = 'timeout';
|
||||
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
|
||||
const rec = readDecision(tid);
|
||||
if (rec?.decision === 'allow' || rec?.decision === 'block') {
|
||||
decision = rec.decision;
|
||||
decisionReason = rec.reason ?? 'user';
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, POLL_MS));
|
||||
}
|
||||
clearDecision(tid);
|
||||
|
||||
if (decision === 'allow') {
|
||||
// User overrode. Log the override so the audit trail captures it.
|
||||
// toolResultBlockFired stays true so we don't re-prompt within the
|
||||
// same message — one override per BLOCK event.
|
||||
logAttempt({
|
||||
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
|
||||
urlDomain: domain,
|
||||
payloadHash,
|
||||
confidence: result.confidence,
|
||||
layer: 'testsavant_content',
|
||||
verdict: 'user_overrode',
|
||||
});
|
||||
await sendEvent({
|
||||
type: 'security_event',
|
||||
verdict: 'user_overrode',
|
||||
reason: 'tool_result_ml',
|
||||
layer: 'testsavant_content',
|
||||
confidence: result.confidence,
|
||||
domain,
|
||||
tool: toolName,
|
||||
}, tid);
|
||||
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Tab ${tid}: user overrode BLOCK — session continues`);
|
||||
// Let the block stay consumed; reset the flag so subsequent tool
|
||||
// results get scanned fresh.
|
||||
toolResultBlockFired = false;
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// User chose BLOCK (or timed out). Kill the session as before.
|
||||
await sendEvent({
|
||||
type: 'agent_error',
|
||||
error: `Session terminated — prompt injection detected in ${toolName} output${decisionReason === 'timeout' ? ' (review timeout)' : ''}`,
|
||||
}, tid);
|
||||
try { proc.kill('SIGTERM'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; }
|
||||
setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
try { proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; }
|
||||
}, 2000);
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Poll for per-tab cancel signal from server's killAgent()
|
||||
const cancelCheck = setInterval(() => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (fs.existsSync(cancelFile)) {
|
||||
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Cancel signal received for tab ${tid} — killing claude subprocess`);
|
||||
try { proc.kill('SIGTERM'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; }
|
||||
setTimeout(() => { try { proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; } }, 3000);
|
||||
fs.unlinkSync(cancelFile);
|
||||
clearInterval(cancelCheck);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ENOENT') throw err; }
|
||||
}, 500);
|
||||
|
||||
let buffer = '';
|
||||
|
||||
proc.stdout.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
|
||||
buffer += data.toString();
|
||||
const lines = buffer.split('\n');
|
||||
buffer = lines.pop() || '';
|
||||
for (const line of lines) {
|
||||
if (!line.trim()) continue;
|
||||
try { handleStreamEvent(JSON.parse(line), tid, canaryCtx, toolResultScanCtx); } catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.error(`[sidebar-agent] Tab ${tid}: Failed to parse stream line:`, line.slice(0, 100), err.message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let stderrBuffer = '';
|
||||
proc.stderr.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
|
||||
stderrBuffer += data.toString();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
proc.on('close', (code) => {
|
||||
clearInterval(cancelCheck);
|
||||
activeProc = null;
|
||||
activeProcs.delete(tid);
|
||||
if (buffer.trim()) {
|
||||
try { handleStreamEvent(JSON.parse(buffer), tid, canaryCtx, toolResultScanCtx); } catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.error(`[sidebar-agent] Tab ${tid}: Failed to parse final buffer:`, buffer.slice(0, 100), err.message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
const doneEvent: Record<string, any> = { type: 'agent_done' };
|
||||
if (code !== 0 && stderrBuffer.trim()) {
|
||||
doneEvent.stderr = stderrBuffer.trim().slice(-500);
|
||||
}
|
||||
sendEvent(doneEvent, tid).then(() => {
|
||||
processingTabs.delete(tid);
|
||||
resolve();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
proc.on('error', (err) => {
|
||||
clearInterval(cancelCheck);
|
||||
activeProc = null;
|
||||
const errorMsg = stderrBuffer.trim()
|
||||
? `${err.message}\nstderr: ${stderrBuffer.trim().slice(-500)}`
|
||||
: err.message;
|
||||
sendEvent({ type: 'agent_error', error: errorMsg }, tid).then(() => {
|
||||
processingTabs.delete(tid);
|
||||
resolve();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Timeout (default 300s / 5 min — multi-page tasks need time)
|
||||
const timeoutMs = parseInt(process.env.SIDEBAR_AGENT_TIMEOUT || '300000', 10);
|
||||
setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
try { proc.kill('SIGTERM'); } catch (killErr: any) {
|
||||
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Tab ${tid}: Failed to kill timed-out process:`, killErr.message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
setTimeout(() => { try { proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; } }, 3000);
|
||||
const timeoutMsg = stderrBuffer.trim()
|
||||
? `Timed out after ${timeoutMs / 1000}s\nstderr: ${stderrBuffer.trim().slice(-500)}`
|
||||
: `Timed out after ${timeoutMs / 1000}s`;
|
||||
sendEvent({ type: 'agent_error', error: timeoutMsg }, tid).then(() => {
|
||||
processingTabs.delete(tid);
|
||||
resolve();
|
||||
});
|
||||
}, timeoutMs);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Poll loop ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
function countLines(): number {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return fs.readFileSync(QUEUE, 'utf-8').split('\n').filter(Boolean).length;
|
||||
} catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.error('[sidebar-agent] Failed to read queue file:', err.message);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function readLine(n: number): string | null {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const lines = fs.readFileSync(QUEUE, 'utf-8').split('\n').filter(Boolean);
|
||||
return lines[n - 1] || null;
|
||||
} catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.error(`[sidebar-agent] Failed to read queue line ${n}:`, err.message);
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function poll() {
|
||||
const current = countLines();
|
||||
if (current <= lastLine) return;
|
||||
|
||||
while (lastLine < current) {
|
||||
lastLine++;
|
||||
const line = readLine(lastLine);
|
||||
if (!line) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
let parsed: unknown;
|
||||
try { parsed = JSON.parse(line); } catch (err: any) {
|
||||
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Skipping malformed queue entry at line ${lastLine}:`, line.slice(0, 80), err.message);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!isValidQueueEntry(parsed)) {
|
||||
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Skipping invalid queue entry at line ${lastLine}: failed schema validation`);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const entry = parsed;
|
||||
|
||||
const tid = entry.tabId ?? 0;
|
||||
// Skip if this tab already has an agent running — server queues per-tab
|
||||
if (processingTabs.has(tid)) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Processing tab ${tid}: "${entry.message}"`);
|
||||
// Write to inbox so workspace agent can pick it up
|
||||
writeToInbox(entry.message || entry.prompt, entry.pageUrl, entry.sessionId);
|
||||
// Fire and forget — each tab's agent runs concurrently
|
||||
askClaude(entry).catch((err) => {
|
||||
console.error(`[sidebar-agent] Error on tab ${tid}:`, err);
|
||||
sendEvent({ type: 'agent_error', error: String(err) }, tid);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Main ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
function pollKillFile(): void {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const stat = fs.statSync(KILL_FILE);
|
||||
const mtime = stat.mtimeMs;
|
||||
if (mtime > lastKillTs) {
|
||||
lastKillTs = mtime;
|
||||
if (activeProcs.size > 0) {
|
||||
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Kill signal received — terminating ${activeProcs.size} active agent(s)`);
|
||||
for (const [tid, proc] of activeProcs) {
|
||||
try { proc.kill('SIGTERM'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; }
|
||||
setTimeout(() => { try { proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ESRCH') throw err; } }, 2000);
|
||||
processingTabs.delete(tid);
|
||||
}
|
||||
activeProcs.clear();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
// Kill file doesn't exist yet — normal state
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function main() {
|
||||
const dir = path.dirname(QUEUE);
|
||||
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
|
||||
if (!fs.existsSync(QUEUE)) fs.writeFileSync(QUEUE, '', { mode: 0o600 });
|
||||
try { fs.chmodSync(QUEUE, 0o600); } catch (err: any) { if (err?.code !== 'ENOENT') throw err; }
|
||||
|
||||
lastLine = countLines();
|
||||
await refreshToken();
|
||||
|
||||
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Started. Watching ${QUEUE} from line ${lastLine}`);
|
||||
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Server: ${SERVER_URL}`);
|
||||
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Browse binary: ${B}`);
|
||||
|
||||
// If GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta is set, also warm the DeBERTa-v3
|
||||
// ensemble classifier. Fire-and-forget alongside TestSavantAI — they
|
||||
// warm in parallel. No-op when the env var is unset.
|
||||
loadDeberta((msg) => console.log(`[security-classifier] ${msg}`))
|
||||
.catch((err) => console.warn('[sidebar-agent] DeBERTa warmup failed:', err?.message));
|
||||
|
||||
// Warm up the ML classifier in the background. First call triggers a 112MB
|
||||
// download (~30s on average broadband). Non-blocking — the sidebar stays
|
||||
// functional on cold start; classifier just reports 'off' until warmed.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// On warmup completion (success or failure), write the classifier status to
|
||||
// ~/.gstack/security/session-state.json so server.ts's /health endpoint can
|
||||
// report it to the sidepanel for shield icon rendering.
|
||||
loadTestsavant((msg) => console.log(`[security-classifier] ${msg}`))
|
||||
.then(() => {
|
||||
const s = getClassifierStatus();
|
||||
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Classifier warmup complete: ${JSON.stringify(s)}`);
|
||||
const existing = readSessionState();
|
||||
writeSessionState({
|
||||
sessionId: existing?.sessionId ?? String(process.pid),
|
||||
canary: existing?.canary ?? '',
|
||||
warnedDomains: existing?.warnedDomains ?? [],
|
||||
classifierStatus: s,
|
||||
lastUpdated: new Date().toISOString(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
})
|
||||
.catch((err) => console.warn('[sidebar-agent] Classifier warmup failed (degraded mode):', err?.message));
|
||||
|
||||
setInterval(poll, POLL_MS);
|
||||
setInterval(pollKillFile, POLL_MS);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main().catch(console.error);
|
||||
@@ -200,10 +200,18 @@ function buildServer() {
|
||||
|
||||
// /ws — WebSocket upgrade. CRITICAL gates:
|
||||
// (1) Origin must be chrome-extension://<id>. Cross-site WS hijacking
|
||||
// defense per codex finding #9.
|
||||
// (2) Cookie gstack_pty must be in validTokens. The cookie was
|
||||
// minted by the parent server's /pty-session route under a
|
||||
// valid AUTH_TOKEN, so a request without it can't get a shell.
|
||||
// defense — required, not optional.
|
||||
// (2) Token must be in validTokens. We accept the token via two
|
||||
// transports for compatibility:
|
||||
// - Sec-WebSocket-Protocol (preferred for browsers — the only
|
||||
// auth header settable from the browser WebSocket API)
|
||||
// - Cookie gstack_pty (works for non-browser callers and
|
||||
// same-port browser callers; doesn't survive the cross-port
|
||||
// jump from server.ts:34567 to the agent's random port
|
||||
// when SameSite=Strict is set)
|
||||
// Either path works; both verify against the same in-memory
|
||||
// validTokens Set, populated by the parent server's
|
||||
// authenticated /pty-session → /internal/grant chain.
|
||||
if (url.pathname === '/ws') {
|
||||
const origin = req.headers.get('origin') || '';
|
||||
const isExtensionOrigin = origin.startsWith('chrome-extension://');
|
||||
@@ -214,18 +222,48 @@ function buildServer() {
|
||||
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const cookieHeader = req.headers.get('cookie') || '';
|
||||
let cookieToken: string | null = null;
|
||||
for (const part of cookieHeader.split(';')) {
|
||||
const [name, ...rest] = part.trim().split('=');
|
||||
if (name === 'gstack_pty') { cookieToken = rest.join('=') || null; break; }
|
||||
// Try Sec-WebSocket-Protocol first. Format: a single token, possibly
|
||||
// with a `gstack-pty.` prefix (which we strip). Browsers send a
|
||||
// comma-separated list when multiple were requested; we pick the
|
||||
// first that matches a known token.
|
||||
const protoHeader = req.headers.get('sec-websocket-protocol') || '';
|
||||
let token: string | null = null;
|
||||
let acceptedProtocol: string | null = null;
|
||||
for (const raw of protoHeader.split(',').map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)) {
|
||||
const candidate = raw.startsWith('gstack-pty.') ? raw.slice('gstack-pty.'.length) : raw;
|
||||
if (validTokens.has(candidate)) {
|
||||
token = candidate;
|
||||
acceptedProtocol = raw;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!cookieToken || !validTokens.has(cookieToken)) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Fallback: Cookie gstack_pty (legacy / non-browser callers).
|
||||
if (!token) {
|
||||
const cookieHeader = req.headers.get('cookie') || '';
|
||||
for (const part of cookieHeader.split(';')) {
|
||||
const [name, ...rest] = part.trim().split('=');
|
||||
if (name === 'gstack_pty') {
|
||||
const candidate = rest.join('=') || null;
|
||||
if (candidate && validTokens.has(candidate)) {
|
||||
token = candidate;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!token) {
|
||||
return new Response('unauthorized', { status: 401 });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const upgraded = server.upgrade(req, {
|
||||
data: { cookie: cookieToken },
|
||||
data: { cookie: token },
|
||||
// Echo the protocol back so the browser accepts the upgrade.
|
||||
// Required when the client sends Sec-WebSocket-Protocol — the
|
||||
// server MUST select one of the offered protocols, otherwise
|
||||
// the browser closes the connection immediately.
|
||||
...(acceptedProtocol ? { headers: { 'Sec-WebSocket-Protocol': acceptedProtocol } } : {}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
return upgraded ? undefined : new Response('upgrade failed', { status: 500 });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user