fix: community security wave — 8 PRs, 4 contributors (v0.15.13.0) (#847)

* fix(bin): pass search params via env vars (RCE fix) (#819)

Replace shell string interpolation with process.env in gstack-learnings-search
to prevent arbitrary code execution via crafted learnings entries. Also fixes
the CROSS_PROJECT interpolation that the original PR missed.

Adds 3 regression tests verifying no shell interpolation remains in the bun -e block.

Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): add path validation to upload command (#821)

Add isPathWithin() and path traversal checks to the upload command,
blocking file exfiltration via crafted upload paths. Uses existing
SAFE_DIRECTORIES constant instead of a local copy. Adds 3 regression tests.

Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): symlink resolution in meta-commands validateOutputPath (#820)

Add realpathSync to validateOutputPath in meta-commands.ts to catch
symlink-based directory escapes in screenshot, pdf, and responsive
commands. Resolves SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync to handle
macOS /tmp -> /private/tmp symlinks. Existing path validation tests
pass with the hardened implementation.

Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add uninstall instructions to README (#812)

Community PR #812 by @0531Kim. Adds two uninstall paths: the gstack-uninstall
script (handles everything) and manual removal steps for when the repo isn't
cloned. Includes CLAUDE.md cleanup note and Playwright cache guidance.

Co-Authored-By: 0531Kim <0531Kim@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): Windows launcher extraEnv + headed-mode token (#822)

Community PR #822 by @pieterklue. Three fixes:
1. Windows launcher now merges extraEnv into spawned server env (was
   only passing BROWSE_STATE_FILE, dropping all other env vars)
2. Welcome page fallback serves inline HTML instead of about:blank
   redirect (avoids ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT on Windows)
3. /health returns auth token in headed mode even without Origin header
   (fixes Playwright Chromium extensions that don't send it)

Also adds HOME/USERPROFILE fallback for cross-platform compatibility.

Co-Authored-By: pieterklue <pieterklue@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): terminate orphan server when parent process exits (#808)

Community PR #808 by @mmporong. Passes BROWSE_PARENT_PID to the spawned
server process. The server polls every 15s with signal 0 and calls
shutdown() if the parent is gone. Prevents orphaned chrome-headless-shell
processes when Claude Code sessions exit abnormally.

Co-Authored-By: mmporong <mmporong@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): IPv6 ULA blocking, cookie redaction, per-tab cancel, targeted token (#664)

Community PR #664 by @mr-k-man (security audit round 1, new parts only).

- IPv6 ULA prefix blocking (fc00::/7) in url-validation.ts with false-positive
  guard for hostnames like fd.example.com
- Cookie value redaction for tokens, API keys, JWTs in browse cookies command
- Per-tab cancel files in killAgent() replacing broken global kill-signal
- design/serve.ts: realpathSync upgrade prevents symlink bypass in /api/reload
- extension: targeted getToken handler replaces token-in-health-broadcast
- Supabase migration 003: column-level GRANT restricts anon UPDATE scope
- Telemetry sync: upsert error logging
- 10 new tests for IPv6, cookie redaction, DNS rebinding, path traversal

Co-Authored-By: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): CSS injection guard, timeout clamping, session validation, tests (#806)

Community PR #806 by @mr-k-man (security audit round 2, new parts only).

- CSS value validation (DANGEROUS_CSS) in cdp-inspector, write-commands, extension inspector
- Queue file permissions (0o700/0o600) in cli, server, sidebar-agent
- escapeRegExp for frame --url ReDoS fix
- Responsive screenshot path validation with validateOutputPath
- State load cookie filtering (reject localhost/.internal/metadata cookies)
- Session ID format validation in loadSession
- /health endpoint: remove currentUrl and currentMessage fields
- QueueEntry interface + isValidQueueEntry validator for sidebar-agent
- SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation in timeout handler
- Viewport dimension clamping (1-16384), wait timeout clamping (1s-300s)
- Cookie domain validation in cookie-import and cookie-import-browser
- DocumentFragment-based tab switching (XSS fix in sidepanel)
- pollInProgress reentrancy guard for pollChat
- toggleClass/injectCSS input validation in extension inspector
- Snapshot annotated path validation with realpathSync
- 714-line security-audit-r2.test.ts + 33-line learnings-injection.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.13.0)

Community security wave: 8 PRs from 4 contributors (@garagon, @mr-k-man,
@mmporong, @0531Kim, @pieterklue). IPv6 ULA blocking, cookie redaction,
per-tab cancel signaling, CSS injection guards, timeout clamping, session
validation, DocumentFragment XSS fix, parent process watchdog, uninstall
docs, Windows fixes, and 750+ lines of security regression tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: 0531Kim <0531Kim@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: pieterklue <pieterklue@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mmporong <mmporong@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com>

browse/src/meta-commands.ts

@@ -15,16 +15,40 @@ import { resolveConfig } from './config';
 import type { Frame } from 'playwright';
 
 // Security: Path validation to prevent path traversal attacks
-const SAFE_DIRECTORIES = [TEMP_DIR, process.cwd()];
+// Resolve safe directories through realpathSync to handle symlinks (e.g., macOS /tmp → /private/tmp)
+const SAFE_DIRECTORIES = [TEMP_DIR, process.cwd()].map(d => {
+  try { return fs.realpathSync(d); } catch { return d; }
+});
 
 export function validateOutputPath(filePath: string): void {
   const resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
-  const isSafe = SAFE_DIRECTORIES.some(dir => isPathWithin(resolved, dir));
+
+  // Resolve real path of the parent directory to catch symlinks.
+  // The file itself may not exist yet (e.g., screenshot output).
+  let dir = path.dirname(resolved);
+  let realDir: string;
+  try {
+    realDir = fs.realpathSync(dir);
+  } catch {
+    try {
+      realDir = fs.realpathSync(path.dirname(dir));
+    } catch {
+      throw new Error(`Path must be within: ${SAFE_DIRECTORIES.join(', ')}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  const realResolved = path.join(realDir, path.basename(resolved));
+  const isSafe = SAFE_DIRECTORIES.some(dir => isPathWithin(realResolved, dir));
   if (!isSafe) {
     throw new Error(`Path must be within: ${SAFE_DIRECTORIES.join(', ')}`);
   }
 }
 
+/** Escape special regex metacharacters in a user-supplied string to prevent ReDoS. */
+export function escapeRegExp(s: string): string {
+  return s.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
+}
+
 /** Tokenize a pipe segment respecting double-quoted strings. */
 function tokenizePipeSegment(segment: string): string[] {
   const tokens: string[] = [];
@@ -195,9 +219,10 @@ export async function handleMetaCommand(
 
       for (const vp of viewports) {
         await page.setViewportSize({ width: vp.width, height: vp.height });
-        const path = `${prefix}-${vp.name}.png`;
-        await page.screenshot({ path, fullPage: true });
-        results.push(`${vp.name} (${vp.width}x${vp.height}): ${path}`);
+        const screenshotPath = `${prefix}-${vp.name}.png`;
+        validateOutputPath(screenshotPath);
+        await page.screenshot({ path: screenshotPath, fullPage: true });
+        results.push(`${vp.name} (${vp.width}x${vp.height}): ${screenshotPath}`);
       }
 
       // Restore original viewport
@@ -238,7 +263,11 @@ export async function handleMetaCommand(
         try {
           let result: string;
           if (WRITE_COMMANDS.has(name)) {
-            result = await handleWriteCommand(name, cmdArgs, bm);
+            if (bm.isWatching()) {
+              result = 'BLOCKED: write commands disabled in watch mode';
+            } else {
+              result = await handleWriteCommand(name, cmdArgs, bm);
+            }
             lastWasWrite = true;
           } else if (READ_COMMANDS.has(name)) {
             result = await handleReadCommand(name, cmdArgs, bm);
@@ -443,8 +472,8 @@ export async function handleMetaCommand(
 
       for (const msg of messages) {
         const ts = msg.timestamp ? `[${msg.timestamp}]` : '[unknown]';
-        lines.push(`${ts} ${msg.url}`);
-        lines.push(`  "${msg.userMessage}"`);
+        lines.push(`${ts} ${wrapUntrustedContent(msg.url, 'inbox-url')}`);
+        lines.push(`  "${wrapUntrustedContent(msg.userMessage, 'inbox-message')}"`);
         lines.push('');
       }
 
@@ -495,6 +524,18 @@ export async function handleMetaCommand(
         if (!Array.isArray(data.cookies) || !Array.isArray(data.pages)) {
           throw new Error('Invalid state file: expected cookies and pages arrays');
         }
+        // Validate and filter cookies — reject malformed or internal-network cookies
+        const validatedCookies = data.cookies.filter((c: any) => {
+          if (typeof c !== 'object' || !c) return false;
+          if (typeof c.name !== 'string' || typeof c.value !== 'string') return false;
+          if (typeof c.domain !== 'string' || !c.domain) return false;
+          const d = c.domain.startsWith('.') ? c.domain.slice(1) : c.domain;
+          if (d === 'localhost' || d.endsWith('.internal') || d === '169.254.169.254') return false;
+          return true;
+        });
+        if (validatedCookies.length < data.cookies.length) {
+          console.warn(`[browse] Filtered ${data.cookies.length - validatedCookies.length} invalid cookies from state file`);
+        }
         // Warn on state files older than 7 days
         if (data.savedAt) {
           const ageMs = Date.now() - new Date(data.savedAt).getTime();
@@ -507,7 +548,7 @@ export async function handleMetaCommand(
         bm.setFrame(null);
         await bm.closeAllPages();
         await bm.restoreState({
-          cookies: data.cookies,
+          cookies: validatedCookies,
           pages: data.pages.map((p: any) => ({ ...p, storage: null })),
         });
         return `State loaded: ${data.cookies.length} cookies, ${data.pages.length} pages`;
@@ -535,7 +576,7 @@ export async function handleMetaCommand(
         frame = page.frame({ name: args[1] });
       } else if (target === '--url') {
         if (!args[1]) throw new Error('Usage: frame --url <pattern>');
-        frame = page.frame({ url: new RegExp(args[1]) });
+        frame = page.frame({ url: new RegExp(escapeRegExp(args[1])) });
       } else {
         // CSS selector or @ref for the iframe element
         const resolved = await bm.resolveRef(target);