diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 41057d8d1..48888b314 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,5 +1,44 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [1.87.7.0] - 2026-09-22
+
+**Pre-push credential checks close four bypass paths.**
+**Every target remote resolves against its own base.**
+
+This release closes four paths where the pre-push credential hook exited 0 on pushed diffs carrying live keys. Pushing to a remote other than origin no longer evaluates diff ranges against origin/main. Unfetched remote tips and boundary-crossing proximity patterns now fail closed or scan with overlap instead of slipping past the hook.
+
+### The four numbers that matter
+
+Source: scenarios in `test/redact-prepush-fail-open.sh`, comparing the baseline scanner from v1.87.5.0 with this release. Run `bash test/redact-prepush-fail-open.sh` or `bun test test/redact-prepush-fail-open.test.ts` to execute the full gate. These are deterministic pre-push protocol checks covering range resolution, boundary slicing, and credential detection.
+
+| Metric | Before | After | Δ |
+|---|---:|---:|---:|
+| Fail-open pre-push scenarios | 4 | 0 | -4 |
+| Target remotes scoped to push target | No | Yes | Scoped |
+| Proximity slice overlap | 0 KiB | 16 KiB | +16 KiB |
+| Fail-open gate scenarios passing | 22/26 | 26/26 | +4 |
+
+Pushing to a secondary remote previously produced an empty diff range when local HEAD matched origin, letting secret-bearing commits ship with exit 0. That probe is now scoped directly to the push target.
+
+### What this means for developers
+
+Your pre-push hook blocks secrets when pushing to mirrors, staging targets, and non-origin remotes. Large minified bundles are sliced with overlap and scanned, reporting the matched rule instead of a generic size failure. Run `bun test test/redact-prepush-fail-open.test.ts` to verify your pre-push hook configuration.
+
+### Itemized changes
+
+#### Fixed
+
+- **Scoping default branch probes to push remote:** Pushing to a non-origin remote when HEAD matched origin/main previously resolved an empty diff range against origin, exiting 0 and allowing commits with credentials to push unscanned. The default branch probe now targets the destination remote and falls back to ref-listing when unresolvable.
+- **Fail closed on absent remote tips:** Well-shaped 40-character hex tips that do not exist in the local object store previously triggered a merge-base guess that could resolve to an empty diff. The hook now treats absent remote tips as unscannable ranges, blocking the push and instructing the user to run git fetch.
+- **Slice boundary overlap for proximity rules:** Added lines in large diffs are sliced in 768 KiB chunks. Patterns that require qualifying context within a character window previously missed secrets when the label and value straddled a boundary without overlap. Slices now overlap by 16 KiB.
+- **Zero-width character stripping on ingest:** Normalization of zero-width characters now happens before slice budgeting so that raw byte counts match what the detection engine inspects. Invisible padding can no longer push proximity pairs across slice boundaries.
+- **Dynamic empty-tree object resolution:** The fallback diff range used a hardcoded SHA-1 empty-tree object id, which does not exist in a SHA-256 repository and hard-blocked every legitimate first push of a new branch there. The id is now obtained from `git hash-object -t tree --stdin`, which is correct under either hash algorithm.
+- **Over-budget single line slicing:** Minified files with single lines exceeding the chunk budget are now sliced into overlapping chunks and inspected, identifying the specific credential finding rather than exiting with an uninspected size error.
+
+#### Added
+
+- **Pre-push fail-open gate:** Added `test/redact-prepush-fail-open.sh` and `test/redact-prepush-fail-open.test.ts` verifying all 26 pre-push range resolution, fail-closed, and boundary detection invariants.
+
 ## [1.87.5.0] - 2026-09-17
 
 **Tests finish sooner without dropping checks.**
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 133a1bb9d..0e386466d 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.87.5.0
+1.87.7.0
diff --git a/agents-digest/gstack-AGENTS.md b/agents-digest/gstack-AGENTS.md
index 79fdcac47..64418a1e4 100644
--- a/agents-digest/gstack-AGENTS.md
+++ b/agents-digest/gstack-AGENTS.md
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# gstack digest v1.87.5.0 — regenerate/re-copy after upgrading gstack
+# gstack digest v1.87.7.0 — regenerate/re-copy after upgrading gstack
 
 Behavioral rules from gstack (https://github.com/garrytan/gstack), compressed
 for agent hosts without a full skill install. The full skills add workflows,
diff --git a/bin/gstack-redact-prepush b/bin/gstack-redact-prepush
index 3e678f3a3..786d522a4 100755
--- a/bin/gstack-redact-prepush
+++ b/bin/gstack-redact-prepush
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ import { scan, type Finding } from "../lib/redact-engine";
 import { mkdirpSync } from "../lib/fs-utils";
 
 const ZERO = /^0+$/;
-// The canonical empty-tree object; diffing against it yields all content as added.
-const EMPTY_TREE = "4b825dc642cb6eb9a060e54bf8d69288fbee4904";
+// The canonical empty-tree object under SHA-1; diffing against it yields all
+// content as added. Only a FALLBACK — see emptyTree().
+const EMPTY_TREE_SHA1 = "4b825dc642cb6eb9a060e54bf8d69288fbee4904";
 
 /**
  * Permissive git for legitimately-fallible PROBES (symbolic-ref, rev-parse,
@@ -65,12 +66,56 @@ function gitStrict(args: string[]): string {
   return r.stdout ?? "";
 }
 
+/**
+ * The empty-tree OID for THIS repository's hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * The SHA-1 constant does not exist in a SHA-256 repository, so the fallback
+ * range `<sha1-empty-tree>..local` makes git error out, gitStrict throws, and
+ * every legitimate first push of a new branch is hard-blocked with a diff
+ * error. Asking git to hash the empty tree returns the right OID under either
+ * algorithm and needs no table of constants.
+ */
+let _emptyTree: string | undefined;
+function emptyTree(): string {
+  if (_emptyTree === undefined) {
+    // --stdin with empty input rather than /dev/null: portable to Windows.
+    const r = spawnSync("git", ["hash-object", "-t", "tree", "--stdin"], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      input: "",
+    });
+    const oid = r.status === 0 ? (r.stdout ?? "").trim() : "";
+    _emptyTree = /^[0-9a-f]{40,64}$/i.test(oid) ? oid : EMPTY_TREE_SHA1;
+  }
+  return _emptyTree;
+}
+
 /** True when the object exists in the local odb (cat-file -e signals via exit code). */
 function objectExists(sha: string): boolean {
   const r = spawnSync("git", ["cat-file", "-e", sha], { encoding: "utf8" });
   return r.status === 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * The remote this push targets, as git hands it to pre-push in $1 (and its URL
+ * as $2); the installed hook wrapper forwards "$@". Null when the name is
+ * unavailable (stdin/CLI invocation) or does not name a CONFIGURED remote — a
+ * URL push has no remote-tracking namespace at all — and every caller then
+ * falls back to the historical origin-shaped behavior.
+ */
+let _pushRemote: string | null | undefined;
+function pushRemote(): string | null {
+  if (_pushRemote === undefined) {
+    const name = process.argv[2];
+    const configured = name
+      ? git(["remote"]).split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean).includes(name)
+      : false;
+    _pushRemote = configured ? name! : null;
+  }
+  // `?? null` only narrows away the not-yet-computed sentinel; by here the
+  // cache is always set, and null legitimately means "no tracking namespace".
+  return _pushRemote ?? null;
+}
+
 /**
  * The remote-tracking exclusion used when narrowing to "commits new to the
  * remote" (#2592 catch-up merges, #2573 rebased force-pushes).
@@ -79,33 +124,43 @@ function objectExists(sha: string): boolean {
  * commits reachable from ANY remote-tracking ref, so a secret that had only
  * ever been fetched from (or pushed to) a private/local-path remote was never
  * scanned when later pushed to a PUBLIC remote — "already left this machine"
- * is not "already reached THIS remote". Git hands pre-push the push remote's
- * name as $1 (and its URL as $2); the installed hook wrapper forwards "$@".
- * Fallbacks keep the historical all-remotes behavior when the name is
- * unavailable (stdin/CLI invocation) or is not a configured remote (URL
- * pushes have no remote-tracking namespace) — falling back scans LESS than
- * the narrowed form would, but never less than the hook historically did.
+ * is not "already reached THIS remote". Falling back to the bare form scans
+ * LESS than the narrowed form would, but never less than the hook historically
+ * did.
  */
-let _remotesExclusion: string | undefined;
 function remotesExclusion(): string {
-  if (_remotesExclusion === undefined) {
-    const name = process.argv[2];
-    const configured = name
-      ? git(["remote"]).split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean).includes(name)
-      : false;
-    _remotesExclusion = configured ? `--remotes=${name}/*` : "--remotes";
-  }
-  return _remotesExclusion;
+  const name = pushRemote();
+  return name ? `--remotes=${name}/*` : "--remotes";
 }
 
-function defaultRemoteBranch(): string {
-  // origin/HEAD → origin/main, fall back to main/master.
-  const sym = git(["symbolic-ref", "refs/remotes/origin/HEAD"]).trim();
+/**
+ * The push target's default branch, or null when it has none we can resolve.
+ *
+ * ⚠ SCOPED TO THE PUSH TARGET, NOT HARDCODED TO origin.
+ *
+ * remotesExclusion() above already reasons this way for the rev-list exclusion,
+ * but this probe kept asking origin regardless of where the push was going, and
+ * the two together are what pick the scan range. The consequence was a
+ * fail-OPEN, measured: with HEAD == origin/main, `git push publish HEAD:main`
+ * to a brand-new second remote resolved a merge-base of HEAD against
+ * origin/main, producing the range HEAD..HEAD — an empty diff — so the entire
+ * tree, credentials included, shipped to an unknown (possibly public) remote
+ * with exit 0 and nothing scanned. That is the exact moment a scan matters most.
+ *
+ * Returning null when the target remote has no resolvable default branch drops
+ * the caller through to the rev-list step, which is already scoped to the push
+ * target and correctly reports "all of this is new" for a never-fetched remote.
+ * Scanning more is the safe direction here and matches the S1 reasoning above.
+ */
+function defaultRemoteBranch(): string | null {
+  const remote = pushRemote() ?? "origin";
+  // <remote>/HEAD → <remote>/main, fall back to main/master.
+  const sym = git(["symbolic-ref", `refs/remotes/${remote}/HEAD`]).trim();
   if (sym) return sym.replace("refs/remotes/", "");
-  for (const b of ["origin/main", "origin/master"]) {
+  for (const b of [`${remote}/main`, `${remote}/master`]) {
     if (git(["rev-parse", "--verify", b]).trim()) return b;
   }
-  return "origin/main";
+  return null;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -114,8 +169,11 @@ function defaultRemoteBranch(): string {
  * range, i.e. the whole history really is new content.
  */
 function unknownRemoteTipBase(localSha: string): string | null {
-  // 1. The common case: a merge-base with the remote's default branch.
-  const base = git(["merge-base", localSha, defaultRemoteBranch()]).trim();
+  // 1. The common case: a merge-base with the remote's default branch. Null
+  //    means the PUSH TARGET has no default branch we can see (never fetched),
+  //    in which case there is nothing legitimate to anchor on — fall through.
+  const def = defaultRemoteBranch();
+  const base = def ? git(["merge-base", localSha, def]).trim() : "";
   if (base) return base;
 
   // 2. No merge-base. defaultRemoteBranch() guessed a ref that does not exist
@@ -235,13 +293,18 @@ function addedLinesFor(localSha: string, remoteSha: string): string {
   if (fromNew !== null) return collectAddedLines(fromNew);
 
   let range: string;
+  // Set when git NAMED a remote tip we do not have. Any base we derive locally
+  // is then a guess about content we cannot see — see the empty-result check
+  // at the end of this function.
+  let guessedFromUnresolvableTip = false;
   if (ZERO.test(remoteSha) || !objectExists(remoteSha)) {
     // Either a new branch (zero remote sha), or the remote tip object is absent
     // locally (shallow clone, force-push without a prior fetch, CI checkout) so
     // remote..local cannot resolve. Both need a base derived locally; scan MORE
     // rather than hard-blocking a legitimate push (adversarial review finding 8).
+    guessedFromUnresolvableTip = !ZERO.test(remoteSha);
     const base = unknownRemoteTipBase(localSha);
-    range = base ? `${base}..${localSha}` : `${EMPTY_TREE}..${localSha}`;
+    range = base ? `${base}..${localSha}` : `${emptyTree()}..${localSha}`;
   } else {
     // Existing branch (incl. force-push): net new content remote..local.
     range = `${remoteSha}..${localSha}`;
@@ -261,7 +324,34 @@ function addedLinesFor(localSha: string, remoteSha: string): string {
     "diff", "--unified=0", "--no-color", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv",
     range,
   ]);
-  return collectAddedLines(diff);
+  const added = collectAddedLines(diff);
+
+  // ⚠ A GUESS THAT SCANNED NOTHING IS NOT EVIDENCE OF NOTHING.
+  //
+  // git told us the remote is at a sha we do not have, which is itself proof
+  // that our remote-tracking refs do not describe this ref. Every base above is
+  // then a guess, and when the guess yields an EMPTY diff we have not concluded
+  // "this push adds nothing" — we have concluded nothing at all, while git is
+  // about to send whatever the real difference is.
+  //
+  // Measured fail-open: a four-field ref line with a valid local sha and a
+  // well-shaped but absent remote sha, on a repo where HEAD == origin/main,
+  // resolved to HEAD..HEAD and allowed a push carrying a live credential with
+  // exit 0. The shape check in main() rejects junk like "not-a-sha"; it cannot
+  // reject 40 plausible hex digits.
+  //
+  // Narrow by construction: the legitimate cases this path exists for (shallow
+  // clone, CI checkout, force-push without a prior fetch) all produce a
+  // NON-empty range and are untouched. Only "we guessed and saw nothing" blocks,
+  // and it blocks with the fix in the message: fetch the remote.
+  if (guessedFromUnresolvableTip && !added.trim()) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `remote tip ${remoteSha.slice(0, 12)} is not in the local object database and no ` +
+        "local base narrowed this push, so nothing was scanned — run `git fetch` for this " +
+        "remote and push again",
+    );
+  }
+  return added;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -294,6 +384,99 @@ function collectAddedLines(diff: string): string {
  */
 const SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES = 768 * 1024;
 
+/**
+ * Bytes replayed from the end of one slice into the start of the next.
+ *
+ * ⚠ WHY SLICING WITHOUT OVERLAP IS NOT SAFE.
+ *
+ * The reasoning this replaced said overlap was unnecessary because "every
+ * pattern is single-line, so a line boundary cannot bisect a detectable
+ * secret". True of the MATCH, false of the PROXIMITY requirement: five
+ * patterns in redact-patterns.ts carry a `nearRegex` and only fire when their
+ * qualifying label appears within `nearWindow` characters — aws.secret_key
+ * (HIGH) needs `aws_secret_access_key` within 100, gcp.service_account (HIGH)
+ * needs `"private_key_id"` within 300. Put the label at the end of one slice
+ * and the secret at the start of the next and the pattern never fires at all.
+ *
+ * Measured, not hypothetical: a 40-char AWS secret with its label straddling
+ * the cut produced ZERO HIGH findings and exit 0 — the guard allowed a push it
+ * would have blocked had the same bytes sat 41 bytes earlier.
+ *
+ * 16 KiB is ~55x the largest nearWindow, so the qualifying context always
+ * survives the seam with room to spare.
+ */
+const SCAN_OVERLAP_BYTES = 16 * 1024;
+
+/**
+ * Per-line budget. Kept a full overlap below the slice budget so that
+ * `carried overlap + one unit` can never exceed SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES, which keeps
+ * every scan() call provably under the engine's 1 MiB cap.
+ */
+const LINE_BUDGET_BYTES = SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES - SCAN_OVERLAP_BYTES;
+
+/**
+ * Zero-width characters, matching redact-engine's ZERO_WIDTH set exactly.
+ *
+ * The engine strips these before matching, so they cost bytes here while
+ * contributing nothing to the text a pattern actually sees. Budgeting slices in
+ * RAW bytes therefore lets invisible padding decide where the seam falls:
+ * ~900 KB of U+200B between a label and its secret pushed them into different
+ * slices while their NORMALIZED distance stayed a couple of characters, and the
+ * push went out with exit 0. Stripping on ingest makes this file's budget and
+ * overlap measure the same thing the engine measures.
+ *
+ * Finding-preserving by construction — the engine would have removed exactly
+ * these characters anyway, so no match is created or destroyed.
+ */
+const ZERO_WIDTH = /[\u200B\u200C\u200D\u2060\uFEFF]/g;
+
+/** Never cut between the halves of a surrogate pair. */
+function safeCut(s: string, i: number): number {
+  if (i <= 0 || i >= s.length) return i;
+  const prev = s.charCodeAt(i - 1);
+  return prev >= 0xd800 && prev <= 0xdbff ? i - 1 : i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Cut one over-budget line into byte-bounded pieces that overlap.
+ *
+ * A minified bundle or a single-line JSON blob is one "line" of megabytes. Handed
+ * to the engine whole it trips input_too_large: the push is blocked, which is
+ * safe, but blocked WITHOUT the content ever being read — so the operator is
+ * told a size error where a credential may be sitting, and learns to bypass.
+ * Slicing with overlap reads it for real; the 2 MiB one-liner that used to
+ * report `engine.input_too_large` now names the aws.access_key inside it.
+ */
+function sliceLongLine(line: string, budget: number, overlap: number): string[] {
+  const pieces: string[] = [];
+  let start = 0;
+  while (start < line.length) {
+    // One char is never fewer than one byte, so `budget` chars is never short
+    // of the byte budget; shrink proportionally until it fits.
+    let end = Math.min(line.length, start + budget);
+    let bytes = Buffer.byteLength(line.slice(start, end), "utf8");
+    while (end > start + 1 && bytes > budget) {
+      const scaled = start + Math.max(1, Math.floor((end - start) * (budget / bytes)));
+      end = scaled < end ? scaled : end - 1;
+      bytes = Buffer.byteLength(line.slice(start, end), "utf8");
+    }
+    end = Math.max(start + 1, safeCut(line, end));
+    pieces.push(line.slice(start, end));
+    if (end >= line.length) break;
+    // Step back by the overlap so a secret sitting on the cut — and the label
+    // that qualifies it — land together in the next piece.
+    let back = 0;
+    let backBytes = 0;
+    while (end - back - 1 > start && backBytes < overlap) {
+      backBytes += Buffer.byteLength(line[end - back - 1]!, "utf8");
+      back++;
+    }
+    // start strictly increases: the loop guarantees end - back > start.
+    start = Math.max(start + 1, safeCut(line, end - back));
+  }
+  return pieces;
+}
+
 /**
  * Scan added lines in line-aligned slices, unioning the findings.
  *
@@ -306,15 +489,9 @@ const SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES = 768 * 1024;
  * people to reach for --no-verify, defeating the guardrail far more thoroughly
  * than a large diff does.
  *
- * Slicing loses NO detection coverage, because every pattern is single-line:
- * none in redact-patterns.ts carries the `m` or `s` flag, the
- * BEGIN-PRIVATE-KEY patterns capture only the header line rather than the key
- * body, and the engine itself iterates line by line. A line boundary therefore
- * cannot bisect a detectable secret, so no inter-slice overlap is needed.
- *
- * Fail-closed is preserved: a SINGLE line over the budget is still passed to
- * the engine intact, so a genuinely unscannable blob (minified bundle,
- * embedded base64) trips input_too_large and blocks exactly as before.
+ * Slices overlap by SCAN_OVERLAP_BYTES and are budgeted in zero-width-stripped
+ * bytes, so a seam cannot separate a proximity-qualified secret from its label;
+ * see those two constants for the fail-open each one closes.
  *
  * Findings' line/col are slice-relative, which is fine here — this hook only
  * reads severity, id and preview. Do not lift this into the engine, where
@@ -322,26 +499,66 @@ const SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES = 768 * 1024;
  */
 function scanAddedLines(added: string, opts: Parameters<typeof scan>[1]): Finding[] {
   const findings: Finding[] = [];
+  // Overlap deliberately re-scans the seam, so one occurrence can surface
+  // twice. Dedup on id+preview: line/col are slice-relative and cannot identify
+  // an occurrence. Worst case two DIFFERENT occurrences share a preview and are
+  // counted once — that lowers a count, never a block.
+  const seen = new Set<string>();
+
   let slice: string[] = [];
   let sliceBytes = 0;
 
-  const flush = () => {
+  const flush = (carryOverlap: boolean) => {
     if (slice.length === 0) return;
-    findings.push(...scan(slice.join("\n"), opts).findings);
-    slice = [];
-    sliceBytes = 0;
+    for (const f of scan(slice.join("\n"), opts).findings) {
+      const key = `${f.id}\u0000${f.preview}`;
+      if (seen.has(key)) continue;
+      seen.add(key);
+      findings.push(f);
+    }
+    if (!carryOverlap) {
+      slice = [];
+      sliceBytes = 0;
+      return;
+    }
+    // Re-seed the next slice with the trailing lines worth up to one overlap.
+    const tail: string[] = [];
+    let tailBytes = 0;
+    for (let i = slice.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+      const b = Buffer.byteLength(slice[i]!, "utf8") + 1;
+      if (tailBytes + b > SCAN_OVERLAP_BYTES) break;
+      tail.unshift(slice[i]!);
+      tailBytes += b;
+    }
+    slice = tail;
+    sliceBytes = tailBytes;
   };
 
-  for (const line of added.split("\n")) {
-    // +1 for the newline that rejoins it.
+  // unitBytes counts the newline that rejoins the unit.
+  const push = (unit: string, unitBytes: number) => {
+    // Close the current slice BEFORE overflowing it, carrying the overlap.
+    if (sliceBytes > 0 && sliceBytes + unitBytes > SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES) flush(true);
+    slice.push(unit);
+    sliceBytes += unitBytes;
+  };
+
+  for (const raw of added.split("\n")) {
+    const line = raw.replace(ZERO_WIDTH, "");
     const lineBytes = Buffer.byteLength(line, "utf8") + 1;
-    // Close the current slice BEFORE overflowing it. A single oversized line
-    // lands in a slice of its own and is handed to the engine as-is.
-    if (sliceBytes > 0 && sliceBytes + lineBytes > SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES) flush();
-    slice.push(line);
-    sliceBytes += lineBytes;
+    if (lineBytes > LINE_BUDGET_BYTES) {
+      // An over-budget line cannot share a slice with anything else. Close the
+      // current slice first (carrying its tail so context leading INTO the long
+      // line survives), then feed the pieces one slice at a time.
+      flush(true);
+      for (const piece of sliceLongLine(line, LINE_BUDGET_BYTES - 1, SCAN_OVERLAP_BYTES)) {
+        push(piece, Buffer.byteLength(piece, "utf8") + 1);
+        flush(true);
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    push(line, lineBytes);
   }
-  flush();
+  flush(false);
 
   return findings;
 }
diff --git a/test/redact-prepush-fail-open.sh b/test/redact-prepush-fail-open.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..f75fae3bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/redact-prepush-fail-open.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# test/redact-prepush-fail-open.sh — regression gate for pre-push credential
+# redaction fail-open paths and adjacent range-resolution invariants.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   bash test/redact-prepush-fail-open.sh [scanner-path]
+#
+# Defaults to the in-tree scanner at bin/gstack-redact-prepush.
+#
+# Every fixture credential below is synthetic: assembled at runtime from
+# halves that match nothing on their own. None is, or ever was, a live secret.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+SCANNER="${1:-$REPO_ROOT/bin/gstack-redact-prepush}"
+
+command -v bun >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "bun not found"; exit 2; }
+command -v git >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "git not found"; exit 2; }
+command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "python3 not found"; exit 2; }
+[ -f "$SCANNER" ] || { echo "no scanner at $SCANNER"; exit 2; }
+
+_K1='AKIA'; _K2='3QZ7YB2LKWVNPCJD'; KEY="${_K1}${_K2}"
+_P1='-----BEGIN '; _P2='RSA PRIVATE KEY'; _P3='-----'
+PEM_BEGIN="${_P1}${_P2}${_P3}"; PEM_END="${_P3}END ${_P2}${_P3}"
+_S1='wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG'; _S2='/bPxRfiCYzQ9v2tKzXq'; SEC="${_S1}${_S2}"; export SEC
+ZERO40=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+
+WORK=$(mktemp -d -t prepush-gate-XXXXXX)
+trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+STAGE="$WORK/stage"
+mkdir -p "$STAGE/bin"
+ln -s "$REPO_ROOT/lib" "$STAGE/lib"
+cp "$SCANNER" "$STAGE/bin/cand.ts"
+CAND="$STAGE/bin/cand.ts"
+
+WINDOW=$(grep -oE 'const (WINDOW_BYTES|SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES) = [0-9]+ \* 1024' "$CAND" \
+         | grep -oE '[0-9]+ \* 1024' | head -1 | awk '{print $1*1024}')
+: "${WINDOW:=786432}"
+
+R="$WORK/repos"
+mkdir -p "$R"
+
+mkrepo() {
+  local d="$R/$1"
+  rm -rf "$d"
+  mkdir -p "$d"
+  cd "$d" || exit 1
+  git init -q .
+  git config user.email t@t.t
+  git config user.name t
+  git checkout -q -b probe
+}
+
+run_probe() {
+  cd "$1" || exit 1
+  local sha
+  sha=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+  printf 'refs/heads/probe %s refs/heads/probe %s\n' "$sha" "${2:-$ZERO40}" \
+    | bun "$CAND" 2>&1
+  echo "___EXIT:$?"
+}
+
+verdict() {
+  local out="$1" rc id
+  rc=$(printf '%s' "$out" | sed -n 's/^___EXIT:\(.*\)$/\1/p' | tail -1)
+  [ "$rc" = "0" ] && { echo "ALLOW"; return; }
+  id=$(printf '%s' "$out" | grep -oE 'HIGH  [a-z0-9._]+' | head -1 | awk '{print $2}')
+  if [ -z "$id" ]; then
+    id=$(printf '%s' "$out" | grep -oE '^  engine\.[a-z_]+' | head -1 | tr -d ' ')
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$id" ]; then
+    echo "BLOCK($id)"
+  else
+    echo "BLOCK(unscannable)"
+  fi
+}
+
+TOTAL=0
+FAILURES=0
+
+row() {
+  local name="$1" out="$2" want="$3"
+  TOTAL=$((TOTAL + 1))
+  local got
+  got=$(verdict "$out")
+  local mark="ok"
+  if [ "$want" = "BLOCK" ]; then
+    case "$got" in
+      BLOCK*) ;;
+      *) mark="FAIL (want $want)"; FAILURES=$((FAILURES + 1)) ;;
+    esac
+  elif [ "$got" != "$want" ]; then
+    mark="FAIL (want $want)"
+    FAILURES=$((FAILURES + 1))
+  fi
+  printf '%-48s %-26s %-26s %s\n' "$name" "$want" "$got" "$mark"
+}
+
+printf '\n%-48s %-26s %-26s %s\n' "SCENARIO" "EXPECTED" "ACTUAL" "GATE"
+printf -- '-%.0s' {1..110}; printf '\n'
+
+# 1: 2 MiB innocuous
+mkrepo s1; python3 -c "
+with open('d.json','w') as f:
+    f.write('{\n')
+    for i in range(60000): f.write('  \"prop%07d\": {\"n\": %d},\n' % (i, i*7919%999983))
+    f.write('  \"end\": 1\n}\n')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm big
+S1=$(run_probe "$R/s1")
+row "1 clean 2 MiB, no credential" "$S1" "ALLOW"
+
+# 2: small + AWS key
+mkrepo s2; printf 'cfg = 1\naws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > app.py
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm secret
+S2=$(run_probe "$R/s2")
+row "2 small + AWS key" "$S2" "BLOCK(aws.access_key)"
+
+# 3: key buried in 3 MiB
+mkrepo s3; python3 -c "
+k='$KEY'
+with open('d.json','w') as f:
+    f.write('{\n')
+    for i in range(45000): f.write('  \"prop%07d\": {\"n\": %d},\n' % (i, i*7919%999983))
+    f.write('  \"aws_key\": \"%s\",\n' % k)
+    for i in range(45000): f.write('  \"item%07d\": {\"n\": %d},\n' % (i, i*104729%999983))
+    f.write('  \"end\": 1\n}\n')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm buried
+S3=$(run_probe "$R/s3")
+row "3 AWS key buried in 3 MiB" "$S3" "BLOCK(aws.access_key)"
+
+# 4: PEM straddling the cut
+mkrepo s4; PEM_BEGIN="$PEM_BEGIN" PEM_END="$PEM_END" python3 -c "
+import base64, os
+W=$WINDOW; line='f'*40; n=(W-500)//41
+body='\n'.join(base64.b64encode(bytes((i*37+j)%256 for i in range(48))).decode() for j in range(25))
+with open('d.txt','w') as f:
+    for i in range(n): f.write(line+'\n')
+    f.write(os.environ['PEM_BEGIN']+'\n'+body+'\n'+os.environ['PEM_END']+'\n')
+    for i in range(2000): f.write('t'*40+'\n')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm pem
+S4=$(run_probe "$R/s4")
+row "4 PEM straddling window cut" "$S4" "BLOCK(pem.private_key)"
+
+# 5: key exactly at the cut
+mkrepo s5; python3 -c "
+k='$KEY'; W=$WINDOW; line='f'*40; n=(W-60)//41
+with open('d.txt','w') as f:
+    for i in range(n): f.write(line+'\n')
+    f.write('aws_key = \"%s\"\n' % k)
+    for i in range(2000): f.write('t'*40+'\n')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm atcut
+S5=$(run_probe "$R/s5")
+row "5 AWS key exactly at window cut" "$S5" "BLOCK(aws.access_key)"
+
+# 6: bogus local sha -> range unreadable -> must fail closed
+mkrepo s6; echo hi > a.txt; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm init
+run_badlocal() { cd "$1" || exit 1
+  printf 'refs/heads/probe deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef refs/heads/probe 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n' \
+    | bun "$CAND" 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?"; }
+S6=$(run_badlocal "$R/s6")
+row "6 unreadable range (fail-closed)" "$S6" "BLOCK(unscannable)"
+
+# 7: credential on a line whose own content starts with "++"
+mkrepo s7; printf 'harmless\n++ aws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > notes.patch
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm plusplus
+S7=$(run_probe "$R/s7")
+row "7 credential on a '++...' line" "$S7" "BLOCK(aws.access_key)"
+
+# 8: malformed stdin
+run_malformed() { cd "$1" || exit 1
+  printf 'refs/heads/probe\n' | bun "$CAND" 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?"; }
+mkrepo s8; echo hi > a.txt; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm init
+S8=$(run_malformed "$R/s8")
+row "8 malformed stdin (fail-closed)" "$S8" "BLOCK(unscannable)"
+
+# 9: gcp key spanning the cut
+mkrepo s9; PEM_BEGIN="$PEM_BEGIN" python3 -c "
+import os
+W=$WINDOW; line='f'*40; n=(W-20)//41
+with open('sa.json','w') as f:
+    for i in range(n): f.write(line+'\n')
+    f.write('\"private_key\"\n')
+    f.write(': \"'+os.environ['PEM_BEGIN']+'\n')
+    for i in range(2000): f.write('t'*40+'\n')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm gcpsplit
+S9=$(run_probe "$R/s9")
+row "9 gcp key spanning the window cut" "$S9" "BLOCK(pem.private_key)"
+
+# 10: diff.external replaces the diff
+mkrepo s10; printf 'cfg = 1\naws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > app.py
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm extdiff
+git config diff.external /bin/echo
+S10=$(run_probe "$R/s10")
+row "10 diff.external set + real key" "$S10" "BLOCK(aws.access_key)"
+
+# 11: 2 MiB single minified line carrying a credential
+mkrepo s11; KEY="$KEY" python3 -c "
+import os
+k=os.environ['KEY']
+with open('bundle.min.js','w') as f:
+    f.write('var d={'+','.join('\"k%05d\":%d'%(i,i) for i in range(90000))+',\"aws_key\":\"'+k+'\"};')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm minified
+S11=$(run_probe "$R/s11")
+row "11 credential in a 2 MiB one-liner" "$S11" "BLOCK"
+
+# 12: push to a remote that is NOT origin
+run_remote() { cd "$1" || exit 1; local sha; sha=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+  printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n' "$sha" \
+    | bun "$CAND" publish https://example.invalid/publish.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?"; }
+mkrepo s12; git branch -m main 2>/dev/null || true
+printf 'cfg = 1\naws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > app.py
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm seed
+git update-ref refs/remotes/origin/main HEAD
+git remote add origin https://example.invalid/origin.git
+git remote add publish https://example.invalid/publish.git
+S12=$(run_remote "$R/s12")
+row "12 push to a non-origin remote" "$S12" "BLOCK(aws.access_key)"
+
+# 13: 4 fields, valid local sha, junk REMOTE sha
+run_junkremote() { cd "$1" || exit 1; local sha; sha=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+  printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main not-a-sha\n' "$sha" \
+    | bun "$CAND" origin https://example.invalid/origin.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?"; }
+S13=$(run_junkremote "$R/s12")
+row "13 junk REMOTE sha" "$S13" "BLOCK(unscannable)"
+
+# 14: zero-width padding between proximity label and secret
+mkrepo s14; SEC="${_S1}${_S2}" python3 -c "
+import os
+zw='\u200b'*200000
+with open('conf.txt','w') as f:
+    f.write('aws_secret_access_key =\n')
+    f.write(zw+'\n')
+    f.write('\"'+os.environ['SEC']+'\"\n')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm zerowidth
+S14=$(run_probe "$R/s14")
+row "14 zero-width padding at the seam" "$S14" "BLOCK(aws.secret_key)"
+
+# 15: localSha="0" is not a branch delete
+run_shortzero() { cd "$1" || exit 1
+  printf 'refs/heads/probe 0 refs/heads/probe 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\n' \
+    | bun "$CAND" origin url 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?"; }
+S15=$(run_shortzero "$R/s2")
+row "15 localSha=\"0\" is not a delete" "$S15" "BLOCK(unscannable)"
+
+# 16: missing-but-shaped remote sha
+run_missingremote() { cd "$1" || exit 1; local sha; sha=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+  printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main cafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabecafebabe\n' "$sha" \
+    | bun "$CAND" origin https://example.invalid/origin.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?"; }
+S16=$(run_missingremote "$R/s12")
+row "16 missing-but-shaped remote sha" "$S16" "BLOCK(unscannable)"
+
+# 17: zero-width across slice boundary
+mkrepo s17; SEC="${_S1}${_S2}" python3 -c "
+import os
+zw='\u200b'*4500
+with open('conf.txt','w') as f:
+    f.write('aws_secret_access_key =\n')
+    for i in range(70): f.write(zw+'\n')
+    f.write('\"'+os.environ['SEC']+'\"\n')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm zwslice
+S17=$(run_probe "$R/s17")
+row "17 zero-width across slice boundary" "$S17" "BLOCK(aws.secret_key)"
+
+# 18: proximity split by slice cut
+mkrepo s18; SEC="${_S1}${_S2}" python3 -c "
+import os
+W=$WINDOW; line='-'*40
+lab='aws_secret_access_key ='
+sec='\"'+os.environ['SEC']+'\"'
+n=(W-len(lab)-1)//41
+assert 41*n+len(lab)+1+len(sec)+1 > W, 'fixture does not straddle the cut'
+with open('conf.txt','w') as f:
+    for i in range(n): f.write(line+'\n')
+    f.write(lab+'\n')
+    f.write(sec+'\n')
+    for i in range(100): f.write('-'*40+'\n')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm proxsplit
+S18=$(run_probe "$R/s18")
+row "18 proximity split by slice cut" "$S18" "BLOCK(aws.secret_key)"
+
+# E1: ordinary new-branch push must scan ONLY the new commit
+mkrepo e1
+printf 'aws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > old.py
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm old >/dev/null
+git update-ref refs/remotes/origin/main HEAD
+git remote add origin https://example.invalid/o.git
+git checkout -q -b feature
+echo 'harmless = 1' > new.py; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm new >/dev/null
+E1=$(cd "$R/e1" && printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main %s\n' "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" "$ZERO40" \
+  | bun "$CAND" origin https://example.invalid/o.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?")
+row "E1 new branch off origin/main stays narrow" "$E1" "ALLOW"
+
+# E2: default branch reachable via origin/HEAD -> trunk
+mkrepo e2
+printf 'aws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > old.py
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm old >/dev/null
+git update-ref refs/remotes/origin/trunk HEAD
+git symbolic-ref refs/remotes/origin/HEAD refs/remotes/origin/trunk
+git remote add origin https://example.invalid/o.git
+git checkout -q -b feature
+echo 'harmless = 1' > new.py; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm new >/dev/null
+E2=$(cd "$R/e2" && printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main %s\n' "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" "$ZERO40" \
+  | bun "$CAND" origin https://example.invalid/o.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?")
+row "E2 origin/HEAD -> trunk resolves, stays narrow" "$E2" "ALLOW"
+
+# E3: fetched second remote anchors on its own default branch
+mkrepo e3
+printf 'aws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > old.py
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm old >/dev/null
+git update-ref refs/remotes/publish/main HEAD
+git remote add origin https://example.invalid/o.git
+git remote add publish https://example.invalid/p.git
+git checkout -q -b feature
+echo 'harmless = 1' > new.py; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm new >/dev/null
+E3=$(cd "$R/e3" && printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main %s\n' "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" "$ZERO40" \
+  | bun "$CAND" publish https://example.invalid/p.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?")
+row "E3 fetched non-origin remote anchors on its own" "$E3" "ALLOW"
+
+# E4: real branch delete stays a skip
+mkrepo e4; echo hi > a.txt; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm init >/dev/null
+E4=$(cd "$R/e4" && printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main %s\n' "$ZERO40" "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
+  | bun "$CAND" origin https://example.invalid/o.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?")
+row "E4 branch delete skipped" "$E4" "ALLOW"
+
+# E5: URL push keeps historical origin-shaped fallback
+mkrepo e5
+printf 'aws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > old.py
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm old >/dev/null
+git update-ref refs/remotes/origin/main HEAD
+git remote add origin https://example.invalid/o.git
+git checkout -q -b feature
+echo 'harmless = 1' > new.py; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm new >/dev/null
+E5=$(cd "$R/e5" && printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main %s\n' "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" "$ZERO40" \
+  | bun "$CAND" https://example.invalid/direct.git '' 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?")
+row "E5 URL push falls back to origin (narrow)" "$E5" "ALLOW"
+
+# E6: long-line slicer survives multi-byte text
+mkrepo e6; KEY="$KEY" python3 -c "
+import os
+k=os.environ['KEY']
+pad='žřáčě\U0001f600'
+with open('b.min.js','w') as f:
+    f.write('var d=\"'+pad*160000+'\",aws_key=\"'+k+'\";')"
+git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm mb >/dev/null
+E6=$(cd "$R/e6" && printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main %s\n' "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" "$ZERO40" \
+  | bun "$CAND" origin https://example.invalid/o.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?")
+row "E6 long-line slicer survives multi-byte text" "$E6" "BLOCK"
+
+# E7: clean repo, ordinary existing-branch push
+mkrepo e7; echo 'a = 1' > a.py; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm one >/dev/null
+BASE=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
+git update-ref refs/remotes/origin/main "$BASE"
+git remote add origin https://example.invalid/o.git
+echo 'b = 2' >> a.py; git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm two >/dev/null
+E7=$(cd "$R/e7" && printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main %s\n' "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" "$BASE" \
+  | bun "$CAND" origin https://example.invalid/o.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?")
+row "E7 ordinary push of clean content" "$E7" "ALLOW"
+
+# E8: sha256 repo, new branch
+if git init -q --object-format=sha256 "$R/.probe256" 2>/dev/null; then
+  rm -rf "$R/.probe256"
+  d="$R/e8"; rm -rf "$d"; mkdir -p "$d"; cd "$d" || exit 1
+  git init -q --object-format=sha256 .
+  git config user.email t@t.t; git config user.name t; git checkout -q -b main
+  printf 'cfg = 1\naws_key = "%s"\n' "$KEY" > app.py
+  git add -A >/dev/null; git commit -qm seed >/dev/null
+  git remote add origin https://example.invalid/o.git
+  ZERO64=$(printf '0%.0s' {1..64})
+  E8=$(cd "$d" && printf 'refs/heads/main %s refs/heads/main %s\n' "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" "$ZERO64" \
+    | bun "$CAND" origin https://example.invalid/o.git 2>&1; echo "___EXIT:$?")
+  row "E8 sha256 repo, new branch" "$E8" "BLOCK"
+fi
+
+echo
+if [ "$FAILURES" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo "GATE: PASS ($TOTAL/$TOTAL)"
+  exit 0
+else
+  echo "GATE: FAIL"
+  exit 1
+fi
diff --git a/test/redact-prepush-fail-open.test.ts b/test/redact-prepush-fail-open.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9a2b3f7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/redact-prepush-fail-open.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from "bun:test";
+import { spawnSync } from "child_process";
+import * as path from "path";
+
+const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.dir, "..");
+const GATE_SCRIPT = path.join(REPO_ROOT, "test", "redact-prepush-fail-open.sh");
+
+describe("pre-push fail-open regression gate", () => {
+  test.skipIf(!Bun.which("git") || !Bun.which("bun") || !Bun.which("python3"))(
+    "executes full prepush fail-open gate cleanly (exit 0)",
+    () => {
+      const r = spawnSync("bash", [GATE_SCRIPT], {
+        cwd: REPO_ROOT,
+        encoding: "utf8",
+        timeout: 180_000,
+        env: { ...process.env },
+      });
+      if (r.status !== 0) {
+        console.error("Gate stdout:\n", r.stdout);
+        console.error("Gate stderr:\n", r.stderr);
+      }
+      expect(r.status).toBe(0);
+      expect(r.stdout).toContain("GATE: PASS");
+    },
+    200_000,
+  );
+});