docs: document sidebar prompt injection defense across user docs

README adds a user-facing paragraph on the layered defense with links to
ARCHITECTURE. ARCHITECTURE gains a "Prompt injection defense (sidebar
agent)" subsection under Security model covering the L1-L6 layers, the
Bun-compile import constraint, env knobs, and visibility affordances.
BROWSER.md expands the "Untrusted content" note into a concrete
description of the classifier stack. docs/skills.md adds a defense
sentence to the /open-gstack-browser deep dive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-04-20 11:13:15 +08:00
parent 375a317f5f
commit 2eb093f8c8
4 changed files with 26 additions and 0 deletions
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@@ -963,6 +963,8 @@ This is my **co-presence mode**.
The sidebar chat is a Claude instance that controls the browser. It auto-routes to the right model: Sonnet for navigation and actions (click, goto, fill, screenshot), Opus for reading and analysis (summarize, find bugs, describe). One-click cookie import from the sidebar footer. The browser stays alive as long as the window is open... no idle timeout in headed mode. The menu bar says "GStack Browser" instead of "Chrome for Testing."
The sidebar agent ships a layered prompt injection defense: a local 22MB ML classifier scans every page and tool output, a Haiku transcript check votes on the full conversation, a canary token catches session-exfil attempts, and a verdict combiner requires two classifiers to agree before blocking. A shield icon in the header shows status (green/amber/red). Details in [ARCHITECTURE.md](../ARCHITECTURE.md#prompt-injection-defense-sidebar-agent).
```
You: /open-gstack-browser