fix(security): delete the dead ML layers — transcript classifier and DeBERTa ensemble

The L4b Haiku transcript classifier and the opt-in DeBERTa ensemble
(GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta, a documented 721MB download) had ZERO
production callers since the chat-path agent that invoked them was ripped.
The only live ML path is scanPageContent (testsavant) inside the security
sidecar subprocess. Deleted by import graph:

- security-classifier.ts 614 -> 265 lines: HAIKU_MODEL, checkTranscript,
  shouldRunTranscriptCheck, loadDeberta, scanPageContentDeberta, ToolCallInput,
  all DEBERTA_* consts + load state. Header now states the live truth
  (imported only by security-sidecar-entry.ts). downloadFile kept, name
  intact — it is an enumerated egress sink (HF model download).
- security-bunnative.ts + test: a research skeleton self-described as 'NOT a
  production replacement', shipped into src/ with zero importers.
- security-bench-ensemble{,-live}.test.ts + the Haiku response fixture: a
  paid live-model benchmark for a layer that could not fire. The
  security-classifier-tdz test's only case exercised checkTranscript — gone.
- security.ts: layer-model header rewritten to the live architecture;
  StatusDetail.layers -> {testsavant, canary}; getStatus() no longer requires
  the impossible transcript==='ok' for 'protected' (old on-disk session state
  with a transcript key is tolerated on read, never re-emitted).
- security-sidecar-entry.ts needed zero changes: it serializes
  getClassifierStatus() verbatim and no consumer read .transcript (verified
  in sidecar-client + server.ts).
- BROWSER.md security section matches reality (ensemble knob gone, 112MB not
  22MB, sidecar hosting documented). combineVerdict/THRESHOLDS retained as
  the pure, tested combiner of record — comments now flag transcript/deberta
  votes as producer-less.

Net: 26 pass in security.test.ts incl. a NEW regression test for stale-
transcript disk tolerance; egress-receipt tripwire green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-08-14 21:00:17 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent ef186cccb3
commit 4328748136
16 changed files with 153 additions and 15966 deletions
-133
View File
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
import type { Host } from './types';
const OPENAI_SHORT_DESCRIPTION_LIMIT = 120;
export function extractNameAndDescription(content: string): { name: string; description: string } {
const fmStart = content.indexOf('---\n');
if (fmStart !== 0) return { name: '', description: '' };
const fmEnd = content.indexOf('\n---', fmStart + 4);
if (fmEnd === -1) return { name: '', description: '' };
const frontmatter = content.slice(fmStart + 4, fmEnd);
const nameMatch = frontmatter.match(/^name:\s*(.+)$/m);
const name = nameMatch ? nameMatch[1].trim() : '';
let description = '';
const lines = frontmatter.split('\n');
let inDescription = false;
const descLines: string[] = [];
for (const line of lines) {
if (line.match(/^description:\s*\|?\s*$/)) {
inDescription = true;
continue;
}
if (line.match(/^description:\s*\S/)) {
description = line.replace(/^description:\s*/, '').trim();
break;
}
if (inDescription) {
if (line === '' || line.match(/^\s/)) {
descLines.push(line.replace(/^ /, ''));
} else {
break;
}
}
}
if (descLines.length > 0) {
description = descLines.join('\n').trim();
}
return { name, description };
}
export function condenseOpenAIShortDescription(description: string): string {
const firstParagraph = description.split(/\n\s*\n/)[0] || description;
const collapsed = firstParagraph.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
if (collapsed.length <= OPENAI_SHORT_DESCRIPTION_LIMIT) return collapsed;
const truncated = collapsed.slice(0, OPENAI_SHORT_DESCRIPTION_LIMIT - 3);
const lastSpace = truncated.lastIndexOf(' ');
const safe = lastSpace > 40 ? truncated.slice(0, lastSpace) : truncated;
return `${safe}...`;
}
export function generateOpenAIYaml(displayName: string, shortDescription: string): string {
return `interface:
display_name: ${JSON.stringify(displayName)}
short_description: ${JSON.stringify(shortDescription)}
default_prompt: ${JSON.stringify(`Use ${displayName} for this task.`)}
policy:
allow_implicit_invocation: true
`;
}
/** Compute skill name for external hosts (Codex, Factory, etc.) */
export function externalSkillName(skillDir: string): string {
if (skillDir === '.' || skillDir === '') return 'gstack';
// Don't double-prefix: gstack-upgrade → gstack-upgrade (not gstack-gstack-upgrade)
if (skillDir.startsWith('gstack-')) return skillDir;
return `gstack-${skillDir}`;
}
/**
* Transform frontmatter for Codex: keep only name + description.
* Strips allowed-tools, hooks, version, and all other fields.
* Handles multiline block scalar descriptions (YAML | syntax).
*/
export function transformFrontmatter(content: string, host: Host): string {
if (host === 'claude') return content;
// Find frontmatter boundaries
const fmStart = content.indexOf('---\n');
if (fmStart !== 0) return content; // frontmatter must be at the start
const fmEnd = content.indexOf('\n---', fmStart + 4);
if (fmEnd === -1) return content;
const body = content.slice(fmEnd + 4); // includes the leading \n after ---
const { name, description } = extractNameAndDescription(content);
// Codex 1024-char description limit — fail build, don't ship broken skills
const MAX_DESC = 1024;
if (description.length > MAX_DESC) {
throw new Error(
`Codex description for "${name}" is ${description.length} chars (max ${MAX_DESC}). ` +
`Compress the description in the .tmpl file.`
);
}
// Re-emit Codex frontmatter (name + description only)
const indentedDesc = description.split('\n').map(l => ` ${l}`).join('\n');
const codexFm = `---\nname: ${name}\ndescription: |\n${indentedDesc}\n---`;
return codexFm + body;
}
/**
* Extract hook descriptions from frontmatter for inline safety prose.
* Returns a description of what the hooks do, or null if no hooks.
*/
export function extractHookSafetyProse(tmplContent: string): string | null {
if (!tmplContent.match(/^hooks:/m)) return null;
// Parse the hook matchers to build a human-readable safety description
const matchers: string[] = [];
const matcherRegex = /matcher:\s*"(\w+)"/g;
let m;
while ((m = matcherRegex.exec(tmplContent)) !== null) {
if (!matchers.includes(m[1])) matchers.push(m[1]);
}
if (matchers.length === 0) return null;
// Build safety prose based on what tools are hooked
const toolDescriptions: Record<string, string> = {
Bash: 'check bash commands for destructive operations (rm -rf, DROP TABLE, force-push, git reset --hard, etc.) before execution',
Edit: 'verify file edits are within the allowed scope boundary before applying',
Write: 'verify file writes are within the allowed scope boundary before applying',
};
const safetyChecks = matchers
.map(t => toolDescriptions[t] || `check ${t} operations for safety`)
.join(', and ');
return `> **Safety Advisory:** This skill includes safety checks that ${safetyChecks}. When using this skill, always pause and verify before executing potentially destructive operations. If uncertain about a command's safety, ask the user for confirmation before proceeding.`;
}