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v1.68.2.0 fix: tunnel revoke exists and revokes everything — setup keys included, verified live (#2646)
* fix(browse): revokeToken deletes ALL tokens for a clientId, not the first Map hit
revokeToken deleted the first Map entry matching the clientId and returned
true. After a normal pairing, two entries share one clientId: the spent setup
key (kept by exchangeSetupKey for idempotent re-exchange) and the session
token, in that insertion order. Revoke ate the setup key, reported success,
and the live session survived: DELETE /token/<id> returned a false 200 while
/agents kept listing the agent. Worse, an unspent setup key created after the
session survived revoke, so a "revoked" agent could POST /connect and mint a
fresh session within the key's 5-minute validity window.
revokeToken now deletes every matching entry and returns the delete count
(truthy-compatible with the old boolean). The DELETE /token handler logs
"Revoked N token(s)" and returns tokens_deleted so the multi-token class
stays visible; revokeSkillToken wraps Boolean() to keep its documented
contract. Regression tests pin shapes a (spent-key shadowing), b (re-grant
hole), c (multiple pending keys), and bystander isolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(browse): tunnel revoke/agents CLI with post-revoke verification
`$B tunnel revoke <name>` was documented in the instruction block,
pair-agent/SKILL.md, and REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md but implemented nowhere:
the CLI forwarded it to the daemon as Unknown command 'tunnel', and nothing
in the repo called DELETE /token/:clientId or GET /agents.
New pre-server short-circuit (#2254 pattern: tokens are memory-only, never
boot a daemon to revoke against it). `tunnel revoke <name>` DELETEs the
token, prints the deleted count ("(count unknown)" for old daemons that
answer {revoked} without tokens_deleted), then RE-READS GET /agents to prove
the agent is gone. The still-listed branch is the version-skew net: a new
CLI against a still-running old daemon with the first-match revoke bug exits
1 and says to re-run (each old-daemon call deletes the next match) or stop.
An alive pid with an unreachable port reports "Could not reach daemon"
(exit 1), never a false "no daemon". `tunnel agents` lists sessions plus
pending (unexchanged) setup keys, which GET /agents now exposes via
listTokens({includeSetup}) — without them the revocation view was blind to
a paired-but-never-connected agent. Setup-key tokens never leave the server.
DELETE /token/ now decodeURIComponents the clientId (400 on malformed
encoding) so CLI-encoded names round-trip.
Tests: subprocess CLI coverage (usage paths, no-daemon exit 0 without
spawning, live pair/connect/revoke loop, pending-key listing), stub-daemon
pins for the skew and unreachable branches, and e2e pins for revoke-all
semantics, percent-encoded ids, and the second-DELETE-is-404 regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): CLI always sends explicit pair scopes via shared DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES
The effective pairing default lived in two places: the CLI omitted scopes
unless --restrict was passed, and the server filled in its own literal.
handlePairAgent now always sends an explicit scopes list and both sides
reference one exported constant, DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES, so the default cannot
silently drift again (pinned by a server-auth source tripwire).
Three input traps closed in the same surface:
- Bare --restrict (or --restrict swallowing the next flag) parsed as "no
restriction" and silently granted FULL access, the opposite of the user's
intent. validatePairAgentFlags rejects it pre-server, before any consent
gate, so an arg error never boots a daemon.
- A scopes list could smuggle the control scope past the explicit flag:
--restrict "read,control" minted a control-scoped session with no
--control. /pair now 400s on control in a scopes list without the control
flag, and the CLI points the user at --control.
- Option typos validated only at exchange time: createSetupKey stored any
scope string and any rateLimit, so /pair returned 200 with a poisoned
setup key whose failure surfaced to the REMOTE agent at /connect as a
misleading "Invalid request body". Shared validation now runs in both
creators and throws typed InvalidScopeError; /pair and /token 400 with the
message, naming the bad scope or negative rateLimit. Also
`opts.rateLimit || 10` became `?? 10` so the documented "0 = unlimited"
survives the /pair path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): 403 hint stops recommending --admin; invariant names both scope defaults
The scope-denied hint told restricted agents to "re-pair with --admin for
eval/cookies/storage" — but --admin is a legacy alias for --control, so
following it over-granted browser-wide destructive commands on top of the
admin scope the default already carries. The hint now matches the CLI's
sibling wording: re-pair without --restrict for page access, --control for
browser control.
Registry invariant #2 claimed "admin scope denied by default" three releases
after b73f3644 deliberately made /pair grant admin. It now names BOTH
defaults precisely (registry API functions default read+write; the /pair
ceremony grants DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES) so the header cannot lie one layer down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(pair-agent): document the full-access default, --restrict, and real revocation
The pairing docs still described the pre-b73f3644 model: read+write default,
--admin as the opt-in for JS/cookies/storage. Reality for three releases:
/pair grants read+write+admin+meta (the pairing ceremony is the trust
boundary) and --admin is a legacy alias for --control. A user following the
skill believed they granted a sandboxed session and actually granted JS
execution on their logged-in browser.
pair-agent/SKILL.md.tmpl (SKILL.md regenerated in this commit) now states
the real default, the tunnel-allowlist nuance (eval works remotely; the
js/cookies/storage commands are local-only), --restrict for sandboxed
sessions with an untrusted-content advisory (scope caps prompt-injection
blast radius), and --control for browser-wide ops. "Revoking access"
documents the now-real tunnel revoke (deletes session + pending setup keys,
verifies against the agent list) and tunnel agents, and replaces the
never-implemented `tunnel rotate` with `$B stop` — tokens are memory-only,
so a daemon restart already rotates everything.
REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: /connect example shows the real default scopes,
the scope table gains the control row, the 403 hint row matches the new
server wording, and the false claim that /sidebar-chat is on the tunnel
allowlist is gone (TUNNEL_PATHS is /connect + /command; /sidebar-chat no
longer exists in server.ts at all). ARCHITECTURE.md drops the same phantom
endpoint from the allowlist prose and endpoint table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* v1.68.2.0: revoke-all, real tunnel revoke, truthful pairing docs
Version slot allocated against the live remote via bin/gstack-next-version
(clean patch bump from 1.68.1.0, no collision). CHANGELOG entry covers the
revoke-all fix, the new tunnel revoke/agents CLI, the explicit-scopes wire
contract, and the pairing-docs truth pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): adversarial-review hardening — 6 findings fixed, regression-pinned
Pre-push adversarial review (4 lenses, refute-style verification: 13 raw
findings, 7 refuted, 6 confirmed) caught these; each fix carries a pin:
1. --restrict=read (equals form) sailed past validatePairAgentFlags —
hasFlag/parseFlag are exact-token matches — so the user asked for a
read-only sandbox and silently got FULL access: the exact failure mode
this branch claims to close. The equals form is now a hard error before
any server work.
2. handleTunnel trimmed the agent name but clientIds are stored verbatim,
so a space-padded agent was unrevocable by the documented kill switch
(trimmed DELETE 404'd while the grant stayed live). Names now pass
through verbatim; the live-daemon test revokes ' padded'.
3. The sole pin for "CLI always sends explicit scopes" passed vacuously on
a simulated revert: toContain('DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES') was satisfied by a
comment. The tripwire now matches the code shape with a regex and bans
the conditional spread formatting-insensitively.
4. The rewritten 403 scope hint was unpinned — new e2e asserts it names
--restrict and --control and never --admin.
5. tunnelRevoke's verify-failure and HTTP-error branches and tunnelAgents'
unreadable-list branch had no coverage — three stub-daemon pins added
(an unreadable list must never render as "No paired agents").
6. CHANGELOG claimed "40+ new test cases"; the honest count is 35.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
Claude Fable 5
parent
9da6692930
commit
51932eceef
+48
-13
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ import {
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initRegistry, validateToken as validateScopedToken, checkScope, checkDomain,
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checkRate, createToken, createSetupKey, exchangeSetupKey, revokeToken,
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listTokens, recordCommand,
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isRootToken, checkConnectRateLimit, type TokenInfo,
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isRootToken, checkConnectRateLimit, type TokenInfo, type ScopeCategory,
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DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES, InvalidScopeError,
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} from './token-registry';
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import { validateTempPath } from './path-security';
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import { resolveConfig, ensureStateDir, readVersionHash, resolveChromiumProfile, cleanSingletonLocks, isPairAgentEnabled } from './config';
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@@ -999,7 +1000,7 @@ async function handleCommandInternalImpl(
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status: 403, json: true,
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result: JSON.stringify({
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error: `Command "${command}" not allowed by your token scope`,
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hint: `Your scopes: ${tokenInfo.scopes.join(', ')}. Ask the user to re-pair with --admin for eval/cookies/storage access.`,
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hint: `Your scopes: ${tokenInfo.scopes.join(', ')}. Ask the user to re-pair without --restrict for full page access, or with --control for browser control commands.`,
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}),
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};
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}
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@@ -2316,7 +2317,14 @@ export function buildFetchHandler(cfg: ServerConfig): ServerHandle {
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scopes: session.scopes,
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agent: session.clientId,
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}), { status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
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} catch {
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} catch (err) {
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// Name the caller's typo (bad scope, negative rateLimit) instead of
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// hiding it behind the generic body error.
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if (err instanceof InvalidScopeError) {
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: err.message }), {
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status: 400, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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}
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Invalid request body' }), {
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status: 400, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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@@ -2330,15 +2338,23 @@ export function buildFetchHandler(cfg: ServerConfig): ServerHandle {
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status: 403, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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}
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const clientId = url.pathname.slice('/token/'.length);
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// decodeURIComponent so CLI-encoded names (spaces, UTF-8) round-trip.
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let clientId: string;
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try {
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clientId = decodeURIComponent(url.pathname.slice('/token/'.length));
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} catch {
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Malformed client ID encoding' }), {
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status: 400, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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}
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const revoked = revokeToken(clientId);
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if (!revoked) {
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: `Agent "${clientId}" not found` }), {
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status: 404, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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}
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console.log(`[browse] Revoked token for: ${clientId}`);
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ revoked: clientId }), {
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console.log(`[browse] Revoked ${revoked} token(s) for: ${clientId}`);
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ revoked: clientId, tokens_deleted: revoked }), {
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status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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}
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@@ -2350,13 +2366,17 @@ export function buildFetchHandler(cfg: ServerConfig): ServerHandle {
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status: 403, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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}
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const agents = listTokens().map(t => ({
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// includeSetup: pending (unexchanged) setup keys are live grants the
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// operator must be able to see — without them, revoking a paired-but-
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// never-connected agent "works" while the list shows nothing.
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const agents = listTokens({ includeSetup: true }).map(t => ({
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clientId: t.clientId,
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scopes: t.scopes,
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domains: t.domains,
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expiresAt: t.expiresAt,
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commandCount: t.commandCount,
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createdAt: t.createdAt,
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pending: t.type === 'setup',
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}));
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ agents }), {
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status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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@@ -2372,12 +2392,20 @@ export function buildFetchHandler(cfg: ServerConfig): ServerHandle {
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}
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try {
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const pairBody = await req.json() as any;
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// Default: full access (read+write+admin+meta). The trust boundary is
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// the pairing ceremony itself, not the scope. --control adds browser-wide
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// destructive commands (stop, restart, disconnect). --restrict limits scope.
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// Default: DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES (full page access). The trust boundary
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// is the pairing ceremony itself, not the scope. --control adds
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// browser-wide destructive commands (stop, restart, disconnect).
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// --restrict limits scope — but can never grant control: that scope
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// stays behind the explicit control flag.
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if (!pairBody.control && !pairBody.admin
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&& Array.isArray(pairBody.scopes) && pairBody.scopes.includes('control')) {
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({
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error: 'The control scope requires the control flag (--control); it cannot be granted via a scopes list.',
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}), { status: 400, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
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}
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const scopes = pairBody.control || pairBody.admin
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? ['read', 'write', 'admin', 'meta', 'control'] as const
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: (pairBody.scopes || ['read', 'write', 'admin', 'meta']) as const;
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? [...DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES, 'control' as const]
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: ((pairBody.scopes || [...DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES]) as ScopeCategory[]);
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const setupKey = createSetupKey({
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clientId: pairBody.clientId,
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scopes: [...scopes],
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@@ -2413,7 +2441,14 @@ export function buildFetchHandler(cfg: ServerConfig): ServerHandle {
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tunnel_url: verifiedTunnelUrl,
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server_url: `http://127.0.0.1:${browsePort}`,
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}), { status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
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} catch {
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} catch (err) {
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// Name the caller's typo (bad scope, negative rateLimit) instead of
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// hiding it behind the generic body error.
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if (err instanceof InvalidScopeError) {
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: err.message }), {
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status: 400, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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}
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Invalid request body' }), {
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status: 400, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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