mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
synced 2026-08-29 09:20:39 +02:00
v1.68.2.0 fix: tunnel revoke exists and revokes everything — setup keys included, verified live (#2646)
* fix(browse): revokeToken deletes ALL tokens for a clientId, not the first Map hit
revokeToken deleted the first Map entry matching the clientId and returned
true. After a normal pairing, two entries share one clientId: the spent setup
key (kept by exchangeSetupKey for idempotent re-exchange) and the session
token, in that insertion order. Revoke ate the setup key, reported success,
and the live session survived: DELETE /token/<id> returned a false 200 while
/agents kept listing the agent. Worse, an unspent setup key created after the
session survived revoke, so a "revoked" agent could POST /connect and mint a
fresh session within the key's 5-minute validity window.
revokeToken now deletes every matching entry and returns the delete count
(truthy-compatible with the old boolean). The DELETE /token handler logs
"Revoked N token(s)" and returns tokens_deleted so the multi-token class
stays visible; revokeSkillToken wraps Boolean() to keep its documented
contract. Regression tests pin shapes a (spent-key shadowing), b (re-grant
hole), c (multiple pending keys), and bystander isolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(browse): tunnel revoke/agents CLI with post-revoke verification
`$B tunnel revoke <name>` was documented in the instruction block,
pair-agent/SKILL.md, and REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md but implemented nowhere:
the CLI forwarded it to the daemon as Unknown command 'tunnel', and nothing
in the repo called DELETE /token/:clientId or GET /agents.
New pre-server short-circuit (#2254 pattern: tokens are memory-only, never
boot a daemon to revoke against it). `tunnel revoke <name>` DELETEs the
token, prints the deleted count ("(count unknown)" for old daemons that
answer {revoked} without tokens_deleted), then RE-READS GET /agents to prove
the agent is gone. The still-listed branch is the version-skew net: a new
CLI against a still-running old daemon with the first-match revoke bug exits
1 and says to re-run (each old-daemon call deletes the next match) or stop.
An alive pid with an unreachable port reports "Could not reach daemon"
(exit 1), never a false "no daemon". `tunnel agents` lists sessions plus
pending (unexchanged) setup keys, which GET /agents now exposes via
listTokens({includeSetup}) — without them the revocation view was blind to
a paired-but-never-connected agent. Setup-key tokens never leave the server.
DELETE /token/ now decodeURIComponents the clientId (400 on malformed
encoding) so CLI-encoded names round-trip.
Tests: subprocess CLI coverage (usage paths, no-daemon exit 0 without
spawning, live pair/connect/revoke loop, pending-key listing), stub-daemon
pins for the skew and unreachable branches, and e2e pins for revoke-all
semantics, percent-encoded ids, and the second-DELETE-is-404 regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): CLI always sends explicit pair scopes via shared DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES
The effective pairing default lived in two places: the CLI omitted scopes
unless --restrict was passed, and the server filled in its own literal.
handlePairAgent now always sends an explicit scopes list and both sides
reference one exported constant, DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES, so the default cannot
silently drift again (pinned by a server-auth source tripwire).
Three input traps closed in the same surface:
- Bare --restrict (or --restrict swallowing the next flag) parsed as "no
restriction" and silently granted FULL access, the opposite of the user's
intent. validatePairAgentFlags rejects it pre-server, before any consent
gate, so an arg error never boots a daemon.
- A scopes list could smuggle the control scope past the explicit flag:
--restrict "read,control" minted a control-scoped session with no
--control. /pair now 400s on control in a scopes list without the control
flag, and the CLI points the user at --control.
- Option typos validated only at exchange time: createSetupKey stored any
scope string and any rateLimit, so /pair returned 200 with a poisoned
setup key whose failure surfaced to the REMOTE agent at /connect as a
misleading "Invalid request body". Shared validation now runs in both
creators and throws typed InvalidScopeError; /pair and /token 400 with the
message, naming the bad scope or negative rateLimit. Also
`opts.rateLimit || 10` became `?? 10` so the documented "0 = unlimited"
survives the /pair path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): 403 hint stops recommending --admin; invariant names both scope defaults
The scope-denied hint told restricted agents to "re-pair with --admin for
eval/cookies/storage" — but --admin is a legacy alias for --control, so
following it over-granted browser-wide destructive commands on top of the
admin scope the default already carries. The hint now matches the CLI's
sibling wording: re-pair without --restrict for page access, --control for
browser control.
Registry invariant #2 claimed "admin scope denied by default" three releases
after b73f3644 deliberately made /pair grant admin. It now names BOTH
defaults precisely (registry API functions default read+write; the /pair
ceremony grants DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES) so the header cannot lie one layer down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(pair-agent): document the full-access default, --restrict, and real revocation
The pairing docs still described the pre-b73f3644 model: read+write default,
--admin as the opt-in for JS/cookies/storage. Reality for three releases:
/pair grants read+write+admin+meta (the pairing ceremony is the trust
boundary) and --admin is a legacy alias for --control. A user following the
skill believed they granted a sandboxed session and actually granted JS
execution on their logged-in browser.
pair-agent/SKILL.md.tmpl (SKILL.md regenerated in this commit) now states
the real default, the tunnel-allowlist nuance (eval works remotely; the
js/cookies/storage commands are local-only), --restrict for sandboxed
sessions with an untrusted-content advisory (scope caps prompt-injection
blast radius), and --control for browser-wide ops. "Revoking access"
documents the now-real tunnel revoke (deletes session + pending setup keys,
verifies against the agent list) and tunnel agents, and replaces the
never-implemented `tunnel rotate` with `$B stop` — tokens are memory-only,
so a daemon restart already rotates everything.
REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: /connect example shows the real default scopes,
the scope table gains the control row, the 403 hint row matches the new
server wording, and the false claim that /sidebar-chat is on the tunnel
allowlist is gone (TUNNEL_PATHS is /connect + /command; /sidebar-chat no
longer exists in server.ts at all). ARCHITECTURE.md drops the same phantom
endpoint from the allowlist prose and endpoint table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* v1.68.2.0: revoke-all, real tunnel revoke, truthful pairing docs
Version slot allocated against the live remote via bin/gstack-next-version
(clean patch bump from 1.68.1.0, no collision). CHANGELOG entry covers the
revoke-all fix, the new tunnel revoke/agents CLI, the explicit-scopes wire
contract, and the pairing-docs truth pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): adversarial-review hardening — 6 findings fixed, regression-pinned
Pre-push adversarial review (4 lenses, refute-style verification: 13 raw
findings, 7 refuted, 6 confirmed) caught these; each fix carries a pin:
1. --restrict=read (equals form) sailed past validatePairAgentFlags —
hasFlag/parseFlag are exact-token matches — so the user asked for a
read-only sandbox and silently got FULL access: the exact failure mode
this branch claims to close. The equals form is now a hard error before
any server work.
2. handleTunnel trimmed the agent name but clientIds are stored verbatim,
so a space-padded agent was unrevocable by the documented kill switch
(trimmed DELETE 404'd while the grant stayed live). Names now pass
through verbatim; the live-daemon test revokes ' padded'.
3. The sole pin for "CLI always sends explicit scopes" passed vacuously on
a simulated revert: toContain('DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES') was satisfied by a
comment. The tripwire now matches the code shape with a regex and bans
the conditional spread formatting-insensitively.
4. The rewritten 403 scope hint was unpinned — new e2e asserts it names
--restrict and --control and never --admin.
5. tunnelRevoke's verify-failure and HTTP-error branches and tunnelAgents'
unreadable-list branch had no coverage — three stub-daemon pins added
(an unreadable list must never render as "No paired agents").
6. CHANGELOG claimed "40+ new test cases"; the honest count is 35.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
Claude Fable 5
parent
9da6692930
commit
51932eceef
@@ -194,6 +194,217 @@ describe('pair-agent flow end-to-end (HTTP only, no ngrok)', () => {
|
||||
expect(Array.isArray(scopes)).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Pair scope contract: defaults, explicit lists, typo naming ───────
|
||||
|
||||
test('default /connect scopes are exactly read,write,admin,meta', async () => {
|
||||
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'default-scopes' }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { setup_key, scopes: pairScopes } = await pairResp.json() as any;
|
||||
expect(pairScopes).toEqual(['read', 'write', 'admin', 'meta']);
|
||||
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { scopes } = await connectResp.json() as any;
|
||||
expect(scopes).toEqual(['read', 'write', 'admin', 'meta']);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('explicit scopes are honored end-to-end (the --restrict wire contract)', async () => {
|
||||
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'restricted-scopes', scopes: ['read'] }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
|
||||
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { scopes } = await connectResp.json() as any;
|
||||
expect(scopes).toEqual(['read']);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('POST /pair with a scope typo fails fast, naming the scope', async () => {
|
||||
// Regression: pre-fix this returned 200 with a poisoned setup key whose
|
||||
// failure surfaced at /connect as a misleading "Invalid request body".
|
||||
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'typo-agent', scopes: ['raed'] }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
|
||||
const body = await resp.json() as any;
|
||||
expect(body.error).toContain('Invalid scope: raed');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('POST /token with a scope typo names the scope too', async () => {
|
||||
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'typo-token', scopes: ['wirte'] }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
|
||||
const body = await resp.json() as any;
|
||||
expect(body.error).toContain('Invalid scope: wirte');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('control cannot ride in through a /pair scopes list without the control flag', async () => {
|
||||
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'sneaky', scopes: ['read', 'control'] }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(resp.status).toBe(400);
|
||||
const body = await resp.json() as any;
|
||||
expect(body.error).toContain('control');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('scope-denied 403 hint points at --restrict/--control, never --admin', async () => {
|
||||
// Regression: the old hint said "re-pair with --admin", which is a legacy
|
||||
// alias for --control — following it over-granted browser-wide control.
|
||||
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'hint-agent', scopes: ['read'] }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
|
||||
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { token } = await connectResp.json() as any;
|
||||
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'goto', args: ['https://example.com'] }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(resp.status).toBe(403);
|
||||
const body = await resp.json() as any;
|
||||
expect(body.hint).toContain('--restrict');
|
||||
expect(body.hint).toContain('--control');
|
||||
expect(body.hint).not.toContain('--admin');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Revocation e2e: revoke-all + the /agents verification surface ────
|
||||
|
||||
test('DELETE /token revokes session AND setup keys; agent leaves /agents; token 401s; re-connect fails', async () => {
|
||||
const pair = async () => {
|
||||
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'revoke-e2e' }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
return (await resp.json() as any).setup_key as string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
const key1 = await pair();
|
||||
const connectResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key: key1 }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { token: scopedToken } = await connectResp.json() as any;
|
||||
|
||||
// A second, UNSPENT setup key for the same clientId (the re-grant hole).
|
||||
const key2 = await pair();
|
||||
|
||||
const pre = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${scopedToken}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(pre.status).not.toBe(401);
|
||||
|
||||
// /agents lists the session AND the pending setup key, never the token.
|
||||
const agentsPre = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
})).json() as any;
|
||||
expect(agentsPre.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e' && !a.pending)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(agentsPre.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e' && a.pending)).toBe(true);
|
||||
for (const a of agentsPre.agents) expect(a.token).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
|
||||
// Regression: pre-fix this deleted only the spent setup key and returned
|
||||
// a false 200 while the session survived. Count covers session + spent
|
||||
// key + pending key.
|
||||
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/revoke-e2e`, {
|
||||
method: 'DELETE',
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(del.status).toBe(200);
|
||||
const delBody = await del.json() as any;
|
||||
expect(delBody.revoked).toBe('revoke-e2e');
|
||||
expect(delBody.tokens_deleted).toBe(3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert per-clientId absence, NOT list-empty: this file shares one
|
||||
// daemon and other tests' agents remain listed.
|
||||
const agentsPost = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
})).json() as any;
|
||||
expect(agentsPost.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'revoke-e2e')).toBe(false);
|
||||
|
||||
const post = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${scopedToken}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(post.status).toBe(401);
|
||||
|
||||
// The leftover unspent key is dead too (re-grant hole closed).
|
||||
const reconnect = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key: key2 }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(reconnect.status).toBe(401);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('second DELETE /token for the same clientId returns 404, not a false 200', async () => {
|
||||
// Regression: pre-fix, consecutive DELETEs both returned 200 — the first
|
||||
// consumed the spent setup key, the second the session. Depends on the
|
||||
// previous test having revoked 'revoke-e2e' (bun runs file tests in order).
|
||||
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/revoke-e2e`, {
|
||||
method: 'DELETE',
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(del.status).toBe(404);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('DELETE /token decodes percent-encoded clientIds', async () => {
|
||||
const pairResp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/pair`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'space agent' }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const { setup_key } = await pairResp.json() as any;
|
||||
await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/connect`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/${encodeURIComponent('space agent')}`, {
|
||||
method: 'DELETE',
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(del.status).toBe(200);
|
||||
const agents = await (await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/agents`, {
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
})).json() as any;
|
||||
expect(agents.agents.some((a: any) => a.clientId === 'space agent')).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('DELETE /token with malformed percent-encoding returns 400', async () => {
|
||||
const del = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/token/%E0%A4%A`, {
|
||||
method: 'DELETE',
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${daemon.token}` },
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(del.status).toBe(400);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('POST /command with no auth returns 401', async () => {
|
||||
const resp = await fetch(`${daemon.baseUrl}/command`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user