test: replace product tests that fake the product with real-boundary tests (F)

- design: serve.test.ts drove an inline mirror server; now two tests run the
  real serve() on an ephemeral port (reload confinement, submit exit 0).
- setup-gbrain: rollback + voyage tests execute the template-extracted init
  blocks (3 sites) instead of drifted local bash copies.
- terminal-agent: internalHandler source greps replaced by a behavioral
  /internal/grant + /internal/revoke auth matrix (no/wrong/valid token).
- /health: server-security-surface and the server-auth / security-audit-r2 /
  sidebar-tabs source greps fold into one liveness-only check on the real
  body; the L4 sidecar wiring gets a behavioral /pty-inject-scan test.
- delete tautologies (browser-manager onDisconnect, memory-command #12),
  ios swiftui tap fixture self-check, memory-ingest put_page grep, detach
  source greps, sidebar-agent absence pins, dead-CSS pins + the dead CSS,
  security-audit-r2 Task 1 + the test-only meta-commands re-export,
  duplicate generated-SKILL.md checks.
- make-pdf coverage-gaps cases move into their owner test files.
This commit is contained in:
garrytan committed 2026-09-29 04:43:28 +00:00
1 parent 6dc624eda6
commit 5ec930d569
33 files changed
+638 -1830

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-36
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@@ -192,42 +192,6 @@ describe('resolveDisconnectCause', () => {
});
});
// ─── onDisconnect exit-code propagation (regression test) ──────────
//
// The contract: BrowserManager.onDisconnect is called with the resolved
// exit code (0 for clean Cmd+Q, 2 for crash). server.ts then forwards
// that code to activeShutdown(), which exits the process.
//
// Without this propagation, the headed-mode user-visible Cmd+Q respawn
// bug returns: server.ts hardcoded `activeShutdown?.(2)` ignores the
// resolved 0 and gbrowser's gbd HealthMonitor treats the clean quit as
// a crash, restarting the window.
describe('BrowserManager.onDisconnect exit-code propagation', () => {
it('signature accepts an optional exitCode argument', async () => {
const { BrowserManager } = await import('../src/browser-manager');
const bm = new BrowserManager();
const calls: Array<number | undefined> = [];
bm.onDisconnect = (code?: number) => { calls.push(code); };
bm.onDisconnect(0);
bm.onDisconnect(2);
bm.onDisconnect(undefined);
expect(calls).toEqual([0, 2, undefined]);
});
it('server.ts callback forwards exitCode when provided, falls back to 2', async () => {
// Mirror the production wiring in browse/src/server.ts so a refactor
// that drops the forward (e.g. reverting to `() => activeShutdown?.(2)`)
// fails CI before the user-visible bug returns.
const shutdownCalls: number[] = [];
const activeShutdown = (code: number) => { shutdownCalls.push(code); };
const onDisconnect = (code?: number) => activeShutdown(code ?? 2);
onDisconnect(0);
onDisconnect(2);
onDisconnect(undefined);
expect(shutdownCalls).toEqual([0, 2, 2]);
});
});
// ─── Stealth injected on EVERY launch path (regression tripwire) ───
//
// applyStealth must run on launch() (headless), launchHeaded(), AND
+23
View File
@@ -91,6 +91,29 @@ describe('GET /health never carries a token (IRON RULE)', () => {
});
});
describe('GET /health is liveness-only', () => {
beforeEach(() => __resetRegistry());
// Folds the former server-auth / security-audit-r2 / sidebar-tabs /
// server-security-surface source greps into one check on the real body.
// #2557: no `security` field (its only data source had no writer).
const FORBIDDEN = ['token', 'security', 'currentUrl', 'currentMessage', 'agentStatus', 'messageQueue', 'agentStartTime', 'chatEnabled'];
for (const [label, browserManager, headers] of [
['default mode', () => new BrowserManager(), {}],
['headed mode + pinned extension Origin', headedBrowserManager, { Origin: PINNED_ORIGIN }],
] as const) {
test(`${label}: no token, security, browsing-state or chat fields; terminal port survives`, async () => {
const handle = buildFetchHandler(makeConfig({ browserManager: browserManager() }));
const resp = await handle.fetchLocal(new Request('http://127.0.0.1:34567/health', { headers }), null);
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
const body = await resp.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(FORBIDDEN.filter((key) => key in body)).toEqual([]);
expect('terminalPort' in body).toBe(true);
});
}
});
describe('POST /extension-token pinned-origin bootstrap', () => {
beforeEach(() => __resetRegistry());
-28
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@@ -158,34 +158,6 @@ describe('handleMemoryCommand', () => {
expect(result).toContain('Chromium processes: (unavailable — see notes)');
});
test('12. text mode renders modificationHistory with evicted-count when > 0', async () => {
// formatSnapshotText is what we're really testing here — exercise it
// directly with a known snapshot so the live collectStructureStats
// doesn't override the fixture values.
const mod = await import('../src/memory-command');
// formatSnapshotText is private; reach via re-rendering through
// --json mode then visually validating the JSON shape. The text-mode
// renderer is exercised by test 13 below with live (zero) values.
const stats = makeStructureStats();
stats.modificationHistory = { current: 200, cap: 200, evicted: 47 };
// Synthesize a "would-render" snapshot to assert the eviction note shape.
const renderedExpected =
'modificationHistory: 200 / 200 entries (47 evicted since reset)';
// Since formatSnapshotText isn't exported, validate the format
// contract by re-implementing the line and asserting our expectation
// matches the canonical format. This pins the user-visible string
// shape — a renderer change to drop the "evicted since reset" suffix
// would fail this assertion.
const evicted = stats.modificationHistory.evicted;
const current = stats.modificationHistory.current;
const cap = stats.modificationHistory.cap;
const expected =
`modificationHistory: ${current} / ${cap} entries` +
(evicted > 0 ? ` (${evicted} evicted since reset)` : '');
expect(expected).toBe(renderedExpected);
void mod;
});
test('13. text mode renders modificationHistory line shape', async () => {
const { handleMemoryCommand } = await import('../src/memory-command');
const result = await handleMemoryCommand([], makeFakeBm(makeSnapshot()));
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { beforeAll, describe, it, expect } from 'bun:test';
import { chromium } from 'playwright';
import { validateOutputPath } from '../src/meta-commands';
import { validateOutputPath } from '../src/path-security';
import { validateReadPath, SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME, SENSITIVE_COOKIE_VALUE } from '../src/read-commands';
import { BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS } from '../src/url-validation';
import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync, realpathSync } from 'fs';
+72 -1
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@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@
*/
import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'os';
import { join } from 'path';
const SERVER_SRC = readFileSync(
@@ -74,3 +75,73 @@ describe('/pty-inject-scan — server.ts static invariants', () => {
expect(SERVER_SRC).not.toContain("from './security-classifier'");
});
});
// Behavioral: the real buildFetchHandler consumes the L4 sidecar verdict.
// The sidecar client is replaced with mock.module inside a child `bun test`
// process, so the module mock cannot leak into other files of a shard.
describe('/pty-inject-scan — L4 sidecar verdict drives the response', () => {
test('unsafe → BLOCK, suspicious → WARN, unavailable → WARN (D7), blocklisted URL skips L4', async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'pty-inject-scan-'));
const src = join(import.meta.dir, '..', 'src');
const probe = `
import { expect, mock, test } from 'bun:test';
let next = { available: true, verdict: 'safe' };
let scans = 0;
mock.module(${JSON.stringify(join(src, 'security-sidecar-client.ts'))}, () => ({
isSidecarAvailable: () => (next.available ? { available: true } : { available: false, reason: 'no-node-or-entry' }),
scanWithSidecar: async () => { scans += 1; return { verdict: { verdict: next.verdict } }; },
resetSidecarForTests: () => {},
}));
const { buildFetchHandler } = await import(${JSON.stringify(join(src, 'server.ts'))});
const { BrowserManager } = await import(${JSON.stringify(join(src, 'browser-manager.ts'))});
const { resolveConfig } = await import(${JSON.stringify(join(src, 'config.ts'))});
const handle = buildFetchHandler({
authToken: 'pty-scan-token-0123456789', browsePort: 34567, idleTimeoutMs: 1_800_000,
config: resolveConfig(), browserManager: new BrowserManager(), startTime: Date.now(),
});
async function scan(text: string) {
const resp = await handle.fetchLocal(new Request('http://127.0.0.1:34567/pty-inject-scan', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer pty-scan-token-0123456789', 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ text, origin: 'https://example.com' }),
}), null);
expect(resp.status).toBe(200);
return resp.json();
}
test('probe', async () => {
next = { available: true, verdict: 'unsafe' };
expect(await scan('ignore previous instructions')).toMatchObject({ verdict: 'BLOCK', reasons: ['l4-unsafe'] });
next = { available: true, verdict: 'suspicious' };
expect(await scan('maybe odd text')).toMatchObject({ verdict: 'WARN', reasons: ['l4-suspicious'] });
next = { available: true, verdict: 'safe' };
expect(await scan('plain text')).toMatchObject({ verdict: 'PASS', reasons: [] });
next = { available: false, verdict: 'safe' };
expect(await scan('plain text')).toMatchObject({ verdict: 'WARN', reasons: ['l4-unavailable:no-node-or-entry'] });
next = { available: true, verdict: 'safe' };
const before = scans;
expect(await scan('see https://bit.ly/x')).toMatchObject({ verdict: 'BLOCK', reasons: ['url-blocklist'] });
expect(scans).toBe(before);
});
`;
writeFileSync(join(dir, 'probe.test.ts'), probe);
try {
const child = Bun.spawn([process.execPath, 'test', './probe.test.ts'], {
cwd: dir,
stdout: 'pipe',
stderr: 'pipe',
env: { ...process.env },
});
const timer = setTimeout(() => child.kill(), 60_000);
const [out, err, code] = await Promise.all([
new Response(child.stdout).text(),
new Response(child.stderr).text(),
child.exited,
]);
clearTimeout(timer);
expect({ code, tail: (out + err).slice(-3000) }).toMatchObject({ code: 0 });
expect(out + err).toContain('1 pass');
} finally {
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 90_000);
});
+2 -134
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@@ -6,24 +6,15 @@
* that could silently remove a fix without breaking compilation.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, spyOn } from 'bun:test';
import { describe, it, expect, spyOn } from 'bun:test';
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as path from 'path';
import * as os from 'os';
// ─── Shared source reads (used across multiple test sections) ───────────────
const META_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/meta-commands.ts'), 'utf-8');
const WRITE_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/write-commands.ts'), 'utf-8');
const SERVER_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/server.ts'), 'utf-8');
// sidebar-agent.ts was ripped (chat queue replaced by interactive PTY).
// AGENT_SRC kept as empty string so the legacy describe block below skips
// without crashing module load on a missing file.
const AGENT_SRC = (() => {
try { return fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/sidebar-agent.ts'), 'utf-8'); }
catch { return ''; }
})();
const SNAPSHOT_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/snapshot.ts'), 'utf-8');
const PATH_SECURITY_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/path-security.ts'), 'utf-8');
// ─── Helper ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -121,104 +112,6 @@ describe('Task 2: CSS value validator blocks dangerous patterns', () => {
});
});
// ─── Task 1: Harden validateOutputPath to use realpathSync ──────────────────
describe('Task 1: validateOutputPath uses realpathSync', () => {
describe('source-level checks', () => {
it('path-security.ts validateOutputPath contains realpathSync', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(PATH_SECURITY_SRC, 'validateOutputPath');
expect(fn).toBeTruthy();
expect(fn).toContain('realpathSync');
});
it('path-security.ts SAFE_DIRECTORIES resolves with realpathSync', () => {
const safeBlock = sliceBetween(PATH_SECURITY_SRC, 'const SAFE_DIRECTORIES', ';');
expect(safeBlock).toContain('realpathSync');
});
it('meta-commands.ts re-exports validateOutputPath from path-security', () => {
expect(META_SRC).toContain("from './path-security'");
expect(META_SRC).toContain('validateOutputPath');
});
it('write-commands.ts imports validateOutputPath from path-security', () => {
expect(WRITE_SRC).toContain("from './path-security'");
expect(WRITE_SRC).toContain('validateOutputPath');
});
});
describe('behavioral checks', () => {
let tmpDir: string;
let symlinkPath: string;
beforeAll(() => {
tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gstack-sec-test-'));
symlinkPath = path.join(tmpDir, 'evil-link');
try {
fs.symlinkSync('/etc', symlinkPath);
} catch {
symlinkPath = '';
}
});
afterAll(() => {
try {
if (symlinkPath) fs.unlinkSync(symlinkPath);
fs.rmdirSync(tmpDir);
} catch {
// best-effort cleanup
}
});
it('meta-commands validateOutputPath rejects path through /etc symlink', async () => {
if (!symlinkPath) {
console.warn('Skipping: symlink creation failed');
return;
}
const mod = await import('../src/meta-commands.ts');
const attackPath = path.join(symlinkPath, 'passwd');
expect(() => mod.validateOutputPath(attackPath)).toThrow();
});
it('realpathSync on symlink-to-/etc resolves to /etc (out of safe dirs)', () => {
if (!symlinkPath) {
console.warn('Skipping: symlink creation failed');
return;
}
const resolvedLink = fs.realpathSync(symlinkPath);
// macOS: /etc -> /private/etc
expect(resolvedLink).toBe(fs.realpathSync('/etc'));
const TEMP_DIR_VAL = process.platform === 'win32' ? os.tmpdir() : '/tmp';
const safeDirs = [TEMP_DIR_VAL, process.cwd()].map(d => {
try { return fs.realpathSync(d); } catch { return d; }
});
const passwdReal = path.join(resolvedLink, 'passwd');
const isSafe = safeDirs.some(d => passwdReal === d || passwdReal.startsWith(d + path.sep));
expect(isSafe).toBe(false);
});
it('meta-commands validateOutputPath accepts legitimate tmpdir paths', async () => {
const mod = await import('../src/meta-commands.ts');
// Use /tmp (which resolves to /private/tmp on macOS) — matches SAFE_DIRECTORIES
const tmpBase = process.platform === 'darwin' ? '/tmp' : os.tmpdir();
const legitimatePath = path.join(tmpBase, 'gstack-screenshot.png');
expect(() => mod.validateOutputPath(legitimatePath)).not.toThrow();
});
it('meta-commands validateOutputPath accepts paths in cwd', async () => {
const mod = await import('../src/meta-commands.ts');
const cwdPath = path.join(process.cwd(), 'output.png');
expect(() => mod.validateOutputPath(cwdPath)).not.toThrow();
});
it('meta-commands validateOutputPath rejects paths outside safe dirs', async () => {
const mod = await import('../src/meta-commands.ts');
expect(() => mod.validateOutputPath('/home/user/secret.png')).toThrow(/Path must be within/);
expect(() => mod.validateOutputPath('/var/log/access.log')).toThrow(/Path must be within/);
});
});
});
// ─── Round-2 review findings: applyStyle CSS check ──────────────────────────
describe('Round-2 finding 1: extension applyStyle blocks dangerous CSS values', () => {
@@ -298,19 +191,6 @@ describe('Round-2 finding 2: snapshot.ts annotated path uses realpathSync', () =
// traversal in browse-server's tab-state writer is covered by
// browse/test/terminal-agent.test.ts (handleTabState atomic-write tests).
// ─── Task 5: /health endpoint must not expose sensitive fields ───────────────
describe('/health endpoint security', () => {
it('must not expose currentMessage', () => {
const block = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/health'", "url.pathname === '/refs'");
expect(block).not.toContain('currentMessage');
});
it('must not expose currentUrl', () => {
const block = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/health'", "url.pathname === '/refs'");
expect(block).not.toContain('currentUrl');
});
});
// ─── Task 6: frame --url ReDoS fix ──────────────────────────────────────────
describe('frame --url ReDoS fix', () => {
@@ -325,9 +205,7 @@ describe('frame --url ReDoS fix', () => {
});
it('escapeRegExp neutralizes catastrophic patterns (behavioral)', async () => {
const mod = await import('../src/meta-commands.ts');
const { escapeRegExp } = mod as any;
expect(typeof escapeRegExp).toBe('function');
const { escapeRegExp } = await import('../src/path-security.ts');
const evil = '(a+)+$';
const escaped = escapeRegExp(evil);
const start = Date.now();
@@ -429,10 +307,6 @@ describe('Task 10: responsive screenshot path validation', () => {
expect(validateIdx).toBeLessThan(screenshotIdx);
});
it('results.push is present in the loop block (loop structure intact)', () => {
const block = sliceBetween(META_SRC, 'for (const vp of viewports)', 'Restore original viewport');
expect(block).toContain('results.push');
});
});
// ─── Task 11: State load — cookie + page URL validation ──────────────────────
@@ -538,12 +412,6 @@ describe('Task 17: viewport dimensions and wait timeouts are clamped', () => {
expect(block).toMatch(/Math\.min|Math\.max/);
});
it('viewport case uses rawW/rawH before clamping (not direct destructure)', () => {
const block = sliceBetween(WRITE_SRC, "case 'viewport':", "case 'cookie':");
expect(block).toContain('rawW');
expect(block).toContain('rawH');
});
it('wait case (networkidle branch) clamps timeout with MAX_WAIT_MS', () => {
const block = sliceBetween(WRITE_SRC, "case 'wait':", "case 'viewport':");
expect(block).toBeTruthy();
+3 -2
View File
@@ -243,8 +243,9 @@ describe('canary', () => {
// /health reported a false-green 'protected' indefinitely. The surfaces they
// covered (SessionState, read/writeSessionState, getStatus, the /health
// security field, the sidepanel SEC shield) were dead since the PTY terminal
// rewrite and are now removed. server-security-surface.test.ts pins the
// removal + the live L4 wiring.
// rewrite and are now removed. extension-token.test.ts ("GET /health is
// liveness-only") pins the removal on the real /health body;
// pty-inject-scan.test.ts pins the live L4 sidecar wiring behaviorally.
// ─── URL domain extraction ───────────────────────────────────
-18
View File
@@ -22,17 +22,6 @@ function sliceBetween(source: string, startMarker: string, endMarker: string): s
}
describe('Server auth security', () => {
// Test 1 (IRON RULE, inverted in v1.62): /health NEVER serves a token in
// ANY mode. Both carve-outs (headed-mode disjunct + chrome-extension://
// Origin disjunct) are gone. Token bootstrap moved to POST /extension-token
// with a pinned extension Origin.
test('/health never serves a token — no headed-mode or chrome-extension carve-out', () => {
const healthBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/health'", "url.pathname === '/connect'");
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain('token: authToken');
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain("getConnectionMode() === 'headed'");
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain("startsWith('chrome-extension://')");
});
// Test 1a: the pinned-origin bootstrap endpoint exists and gates on both
// the exact extension Origin and a loopback Host.
test('POST /extension-token gates on pinned Origin and loopback Host', () => {
@@ -47,13 +36,6 @@ describe('Server auth security', () => {
expect(tokenBlock).toContain('403');
});
// Test 1b: /health does not expose sensitive browsing state
test('/health does not expose currentUrl or currentMessage', () => {
const healthBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/health'", "url.pathname === '/connect'");
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain('currentUrl');
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain('currentMessage');
});
// Test 1c: newtab must check domain restrictions (CSO finding #5)
// Domain check for newtab is now unified with goto in the scope check section:
// (command === 'goto' || command === 'newtab') && args[0] → checkDomain
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
/**
* #2557 / ENG-OV9: pins the dead-shield removal AND the live L4 wiring.
*
* The removed surface: /health's `security` field read getStatus(), whose
* only data source (~/.gstack/security/session-state.json) lost its only
* writer when sidebar-agent.ts was ripped — so /health reported a permanent
* 'inactive' or, wherever an old state file survived, a stale FALSE-GREEN
* 'protected' ("no threats detected" when the real state was "not
* measured"). Same fail-open class as #2026.
*
* The kept surface (ENG-OV9): security.ts is NOT dead — server.ts's
* /pty-inject-scan path is the live L4 consumer (sidecar scan + URL
* blocklist + datamark envelope), and security.ts's pure combiner/canary
* exports stay. This test pins both directions so a future "cleanup" can't
* silently take the live half, and a future re-feed of /health.security
* from LIVE signals (isSidecarAvailable, content filters) must update this
* test deliberately rather than resurrect the state-file path.
*
* Source-level, same style as windows-spawn-hide.test.ts.
*/
import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as path from 'path';
const SRC = (f: string) => fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src', f), 'utf-8');
describe('#2557: dead shield surface stays dead', () => {
test('/health carries no security field and server.ts does not import getStatus', () => {
const server = SRC('server.ts');
expect(server).not.toMatch(/security:\s*getSecurityStatus\(\)/);
expect(server).not.toMatch(/getStatus as getSecurityStatus/);
// The SECURITY session-state file must not be read anywhere in src/ —
// that file has no writer, so any reader is a false-signal feed.
// (session-persist.ts's per-project <stateDir>/session-state.json is a
// different, live file — only the ~/.gstack/security/ one is dead.)
for (const f of fs.readdirSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src')).filter((x) => x.endsWith('.ts'))) {
const code = SRC(f).replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '').replace(/^\s*\/\/.*$/gm, '').replace(/^\s*\*.*$/gm, '');
const refs = /security[/'",\s][^\n]{0,80}session-state\.json/.test(code);
expect({ file: f, refs }).toEqual({ file: f, refs: false });
}
});
test('security.ts no longer exports the unfed status surface', () => {
const security = SRC('security.ts');
expect(security).not.toMatch(/export function getStatus/);
expect(security).not.toMatch(/export function (read|write)SessionState/);
expect(security).not.toMatch(/export interface SessionState/);
expect(security).not.toMatch(/export interface StatusDetail/);
});
test('the sidepanel shield markup is gone', () => {
const html = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../../extension/sidepanel.html'), 'utf-8');
const css = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../../extension/sidepanel.css'), 'utf-8');
expect(html).not.toContain('security-shield');
expect(css).not.toMatch(/\.security-shield\s*\{/);
});
});
describe('ENG-OV9: the LIVE L4 path is untouched', () => {
test('server.ts still consumes the sidecar on the inject-scan path', () => {
const server = SRC('server.ts');
expect(server).toContain("from './security-sidecar-client'");
expect(server).toMatch(/isSidecarAvailable/);
expect(server).toMatch(/scanWithSidecar\(/);
});
test('security.ts keeps the pure combiner + canary exports', () => {
const security = SRC('security.ts');
expect(security).toMatch(/export const THRESHOLDS/);
expect(security).toMatch(/export function combineVerdict/);
expect(security).toMatch(/export function generateCanary/);
expect(security).toMatch(/export function injectCanary/);
expect(security).toMatch(/export function checkCanaryInStructure/);
expect(security).toMatch(/export function extractDomain/);
});
test('/health stays liveness-only: no token in any mode (regression wall from v1.63)', () => {
const server = SRC('server.ts');
// The /health handler block must not interpolate a token.
const healthIdx = server.indexOf("url.pathname === '/health'");
expect(healthIdx).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const healthBlock = server.slice(healthIdx, healthIdx + 1500);
expect(healthBlock).not.toMatch(/token:\s*[^n]/i);
});
});
-24
View File
@@ -198,19 +198,6 @@ describe('server.ts: chat / sidebar-agent endpoints are gone', () => {
expect(SERVER_SRC).not.toMatch(/^interface ChatEntry/m);
expect(SERVER_SRC).not.toMatch(/^interface SidebarSession/m);
});
test('/health no longer surfaces agentStatus or messageQueue length', () => {
const health = SERVER_SRC.slice(SERVER_SRC.indexOf("url.pathname === '/health'"));
const slice = health.slice(0, 2000);
expect(slice).not.toContain('agentStatus');
expect(slice).not.toContain('messageQueue');
expect(slice).not.toContain('agentStartTime');
// chatEnabled is gone entirely — the chat pane no longer exists in any
// extension build, so /health stopped advertising a chat mode.
expect(slice).not.toContain('chatEnabled');
// terminalPort survives.
expect(slice).toContain('terminalPort');
});
});
describe('cli.ts: sidebar-agent is no longer spawned', () => {
@@ -240,17 +227,6 @@ describe('cli.ts: sidebar-agent is no longer spawned', () => {
});
});
describe('files: sidebar-agent.ts and its tests are deleted', () => {
test('browse/src/sidebar-agent.ts is gone', () => {
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/sidebar-agent.ts'))).toBe(false);
});
test('sidebar-agent test files are gone', () => {
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, 'sidebar-agent.test.ts'))).toBe(false);
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, 'sidebar-agent-roundtrip.test.ts'))).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('manifest: ws permission + xterm-safe CSP', () => {
test('host_permissions covers ws localhost', () => {
expect(MANIFEST.host_permissions).toContain('ws://127.0.0.1:*/');
-71
View File
@@ -182,43 +182,6 @@ describe('browser tab bar (sidepanel.css)', () => {
});
});
// ─── Sidebar CSS tests ──────────────────────────────────────────
describe('sidebar CSS (sidepanel.css)', () => {
const css = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, '..', 'extension', 'sidepanel.css'), 'utf-8');
test('stop button style exists', () => {
expect(css).toContain('.stop-btn');
});
test('stop button uses error color', () => {
const stopBtnSection = css.slice(
css.indexOf('.stop-btn {'),
css.indexOf('}', css.indexOf('.stop-btn {')) + 1,
);
expect(stopBtnSection).toContain('--error');
});
test('experimental-banner no longer uses amber warning colors', () => {
const bannerSection = css.slice(
css.indexOf('.experimental-banner {'),
css.indexOf('}', css.indexOf('.experimental-banner {')) + 1,
);
// Should not be amber/warning anymore
expect(bannerSection).not.toContain('245, 158, 11, 0.15');
expect(bannerSection).not.toContain('#F59E0B');
});
test('tool description uses system font not mono', () => {
const toolSection = css.slice(
css.indexOf('.agent-tool {'),
css.indexOf('}', css.indexOf('.agent-tool {')) + 1,
);
expect(toolSection).toContain('font-system');
expect(toolSection).not.toContain('font-mono');
});
});
// ─── Inspector message allowlist fix ────────────────────────────
describe('inspector message allowlist fix', () => {
@@ -491,11 +454,6 @@ describe('tab switching does not steal focus', () => {
const serverSrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, 'src', 'server.ts'), 'utf-8');
const bmSrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, 'src', 'browser-manager.ts'), 'utf-8');
test('switchTab has bringToFront option', () => {
expect(bmSrc).toContain('bringToFront?: boolean');
expect(bmSrc).toContain('bringToFront !== false');
});
test('handleCommand tab pinning does NOT steal focus', () => {
// All switchTab calls in handleCommand should use bringToFront: false
const handleFn = serverSrc.slice(
@@ -1004,41 +962,12 @@ describe('BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART (sidebar headless prevention)', () => {
// chat-queue rip (PR #1216) — /command and /batch reset the timer and are
// covered by that factory suite.
// ─── Shutdown kills the terminal-agent (server.ts) ──────────────
describe('shutdown cleanup (server.ts)', () => {
const serverSrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, 'src', 'server.ts'), 'utf-8');
test('shutdown kills the terminal-agent via identity-based kill (no pkill)', () => {
// v1.44+ identity-based teardown: only the PID recorded by THIS
// daemon's agent is signaled. The pre-v1.44 `pkill -f terminal-agent`
// regex killed sibling gstack sessions on the same host (also pinned
// by browse/test/terminal-agent-pid-identity.test.ts).
const shutdownFn = serverSrc.slice(
serverSrc.indexOf('async function shutdown('),
serverSrc.indexOf('try { detachSession()', serverSrc.indexOf('async function shutdown(')),
);
expect(shutdownFn).toContain('stopAgentByRecord');
expect(shutdownFn).toContain('isOurAgent(record, process.pid)');
expect(shutdownFn).toContain('readAgentRecord');
// No pkill CALL — the word may appear in the explanatory comment, so
// match invocation shapes only. The repo-wide reintroduction tripwire
// is browse/test/terminal-agent-pid-identity.test.ts.
expect(shutdownFn).not.toMatch(/(?:spawnSync|execSync|\$)\(\s*['"`]pkill/);
});
});
// ─── Cookie button in sidebar footer ────────────────────────────
describe('cookie import button (sidebar)', () => {
const html = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, '..', 'extension', 'sidepanel.html'), 'utf-8');
const js = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, '..', 'extension', 'sidepanel.js'), 'utf-8');
test('quick actions toolbar has cookies button', () => {
expect(html).toContain('id="chat-cookies-btn"');
expect(html).toContain('Cookies');
});
test('cookies button navigates to cookie-picker', () => {
expect(js).toContain("'chat-cookies-btn'");
expect(js).toContain('cookie-picker');
@@ -13,19 +13,6 @@ import * as path from 'path';
const AGENT_TS = path.resolve(import.meta.path, '..', '..', 'src', 'terminal-agent.ts');
describe('terminal-agent detach + re-attach (v1.44+ Commit 3)', () => {
test('1. PtySession carries ring buffer + alt-screen + detach state', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
const i = src.indexOf('interface PtySession {');
const j = src.indexOf('\n}', i);
const block = src.slice(i, j);
expect(block).toContain('liveWs: any | null');
expect(block).toContain('ringBuffer: Buffer[]');
expect(block).toContain('ringBufferBytes: number');
expect(block).toContain('altScreenActive: boolean');
expect(block).toContain('detached: boolean');
expect(block).toContain('detachTimer:');
});
test('2. RING_BUFFER_MAX_BYTES default is 1 MB, env-overridable', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
expect(src).toContain('GSTACK_PTY_RING_BUFFER_BYTES');
@@ -38,36 +25,6 @@ describe('terminal-agent detach + re-attach (v1.44+ Commit 3)', () => {
expect(src).toContain("'60000'");
});
test('4. appendToRingBuffer evicts oldest frames past the cap', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
expect(src).toMatch(/function appendToRingBuffer\(/);
// Eviction loop: must keep at least one frame even at extreme caps
// (otherwise a single oversized frame would empty the buffer).
expect(src).toMatch(/session\.ringBufferBytes > RING_BUFFER_MAX_BYTES/);
expect(src).toContain('session.ringBuffer.length > 1');
expect(src).toContain('session.ringBuffer.shift()');
});
test('5. alt-screen tracking watches for CSI ?1049h / CSI ?1049l', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
// Canonical xterm enter/exit alt-screen sequences. Must update
// session.altScreenActive so the replay prelude knows.
expect(src).toContain('\\x1b[?1049h');
expect(src).toContain('\\x1b[?1049l');
expect(src).toContain('session.altScreenActive');
});
test('6. buildReplayPayload prefixes soft-reset (+ alt-screen if active)', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
expect(src).toMatch(/function buildReplayPayload\(/);
// DECSTR soft reset — re-defaults character attributes after the
// client's RIS clears the xterm buffer.
expect(src).toContain('\\x1b[!p');
// Conditionally re-enter alt-screen if claude was in a tool-call
// (alt-screen mode) at detach.
expect(src).toContain('session.altScreenActive');
});
test('7. WS open() re-attaches when sessionId already lives in sessionsById', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
const block = sliceBetween(src, 'open(ws) {', 'message(ws, raw) {');
@@ -115,6 +115,50 @@ describe('terminal-agent: /internal/grant', () => {
});
});
describe('terminal-agent: /internal/grant and /internal/revoke bearer auth', () => {
function post(route: 'grant' | 'revoke', token: string, authorization?: string): Promise<Response> {
const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };
if (authorization !== undefined) headers.Authorization = authorization;
return fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${agentPort}/internal/${route}`, {
method: 'POST',
headers,
body: JSON.stringify({ token }),
});
}
function wsStatus(token: string): Promise<number> {
return fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${agentPort}/ws`, {
headers: { 'Origin': 'chrome-extension://abc123', 'Cookie': `gstack_pty=${token}` },
}).then((r) => r.status);
}
for (const route of ['grant', 'revoke'] as const) {
test(`${route}: no token → 403, wrong token → 403, valid internal token → 200`, async () => {
const target = `auth-matrix-${route}-token-long-enough`;
expect((await post(route, target)).status).toBe(403);
expect((await post(route, target, 'Bearer wrong-token')).status).toBe(403);
expect((await post(route, target, `Bearer ${internalToken}`)).status).toBe(200);
});
}
test('an unauthenticated revoke leaves the grant usable; an authenticated revoke removes it', async () => {
const token = 'revoke-auth-token-at-least-seventeen';
expect((await grantToken(token)).status).toBe(200);
expect(await wsStatus(token)).not.toBe(401);
expect((await post('revoke', token)).status).toBe(403);
expect((await post('revoke', token, 'Bearer wrong-token')).status).toBe(403);
expect(await wsStatus(token)).not.toBe(401);
expect((await post('revoke', token, `Bearer ${internalToken}`)).status).toBe(200);
expect(await wsStatus(token)).toBe(401);
});
test('an unauthenticated grant does not register the token', async () => {
const token = 'forged-grant-token-at-least-seventeen';
expect((await post('grant', token, 'Bearer wrong-token')).status).toBe(403);
expect(await wsStatus(token)).toBe(401);
});
});
describe('terminal-agent: /ws gates', () => {
test('rejects upgrade attempts without an extension Origin', async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${agentPort}/ws`);
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as path from 'path';
// Static-grep tripwire for the v1.44 internalHandler refactor.
//
// /internal/grant and /internal/revoke were copies of the same dance:
// bearer-auth → x-browse-gen check → req.json().then(...).catch(...).
// internalHandler<T>(req, fn) collapses that into a single helper call.
// This test fails CI if the helper goes away or the existing routes
// regress to inline auth + JSON parse boilerplate. Wiring tests
// (token grant/revoke behavior) already live in
// browse/test/terminal-agent-integration.test.ts.
const AGENT_TS = path.resolve(import.meta.path, '..', '..', 'src', 'terminal-agent.ts');
describe('terminal-agent internalHandler refactor (v1.44+)', () => {
test('1. internalHandler<T> exists with the documented signature', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
expect(src).toMatch(/async function internalHandler<T>\s*\(/);
// Body must include the auth gate, body parse, and result coercion.
expect(src).toContain('checkInternalAuth(req)');
expect(src).toContain('await req.json()');
expect(src).toContain('instanceof Response');
});
test('2. /internal/grant routes through internalHandler', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
// Match the route handler block.
const block = sliceBetween(src, "url.pathname === '/internal/grant'", "url.pathname === '/internal/revoke'");
expect(block).toContain('internalHandler(req');
// Must NOT have the old inline pattern (would be a regression).
expect(block).not.toContain('req.headers.get(\'authorization\')');
expect(block).not.toContain('req.json().then(');
});
test('3. /internal/revoke routes through internalHandler', () => {
const src = fs.readFileSync(AGENT_TS, 'utf-8');
const block = sliceBetween(src, "url.pathname === '/internal/revoke'", "url.pathname === '/internal/healthz'");
expect(block).toContain('internalHandler(req');
expect(block).not.toContain('req.json().then(');
});
});
function sliceBetween(source: string, start: string, end: string): string {
const i = source.indexOf(start);
if (i === -1) throw new Error(`marker not found: ${start}`);
const j = source.indexOf(end, i + start.length);
if (j === -1) throw new Error(`end marker not found: ${end}`);
return source.slice(i, j);
}