fix: security audit remediation — 12 fixes, 20 tests (v0.13.1.0) (#595)

* fix: remove auth token from /health, secure extension bootstrap (CRITICAL-02 + HIGH-03)

- Remove token from /health response (was leaked to any localhost process)
- Write .auth.json to extension dir for Manifest V3 bootstrap
- sidebar-agent reads token from state file via BROWSE_STATE_FILE env var
- Remove getToken handler from extension (token via health broadcast)
- Extension loads token before first health poll to prevent race condition

* fix: require auth on cookie-picker data routes (CRITICAL-01)

- Add Bearer token auth gate on all /cookie-picker/* data/action routes
- GET /cookie-picker HTML page stays unauthenticated (UI shell)
- Token embedded in served HTML for picker's fetch calls
- CORS preflight now allows Authorization header

* fix: add state file TTL and plaintext cookie warning (HIGH-02)

- Add savedAt timestamp to state save output
- Warn on load if state file older than 7 days
- Auto-delete stale state files (>7 days) on server startup
- Warning about plaintext cookie storage in save message

* fix: innerHTML XSS in extension content script and sidepanel (MEDIUM-01)

- content.js: replace innerHTML with createElement/textContent for ref panel
- sidepanel.js: escape entry.command with escapeHtml() in activity feed
- Both found by security audit + Codex adversarial red team

* fix: symlink bypass in validateReadPath (MEDIUM-02)

- Always resolve to absolute path first (fixes relative path bypass)
- Use realpathSync to follow symlinks before boundary check
- Throw on non-ENOENT realpathSync failures (explicit over silent)
- Resolve SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync (macOS /tmp → /private/tmp)
- Resolve directory part for non-existent files (ENOENT with symlinked parent)

* fix: freeze hook symlink bypass and prefix collision (MEDIUM-03)

- Add POSIX-portable path resolution (cd + pwd -P, works on macOS)
- Fix prefix collision: /project-evil no longer matches /project freeze dir
- Use trailing slash in boundary check to require directory boundary

* fix: shell script injection in gstack-config and telemetry (MEDIUM-04)

- gstack-config: validate keys (alphanumeric+underscore only)
- gstack-config: use grep -F (fixed string) instead of -E (regex)
- gstack-config: escape sed special chars in values, drop newlines
- gstack-telemetry-log: sanitize REPO_SLUG and BRANCH via json_safe()

* test: 20 security tests for audit remediation

- server-auth: verify token removed from /health, auth on /refs, /activity/*
- cookie-picker: auth required on data routes, HTML page unauthenticated
- path-validation: symlink bypass blocked, realpathSync failure throws
- gstack-config: regex key rejected, sed special chars preserved
- state-ttl: savedAt timestamp, 7-day TTL warning
- telemetry: branch/repo with quotes don't corrupt JSON
- adversarial: sidepanel escapes entry.command, freeze prefix collision

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.1.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: tone down changelog — defense in depth, not catastrophic bugs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

extension/sidepanel.js

@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ function createEntryElement(entry) {
   div.innerHTML = `
     <div class="entry-header">
       <span class="entry-time">${formatTime(entry.timestamp)}</span>
-      <span class="entry-command">${entry.command || entry.type}</span>
+      <span class="entry-command">${escapeHtml(entry.command || entry.type)}</span>
     </div>
     ${argsText ? `<div class="entry-args">${escapeHtml(argsText)}</div>` : ''}
     ${entry.type === 'command_end' ? `
@@ -469,7 +469,8 @@ function connectSSE() {
   if (!serverUrl) return;
   if (eventSource) { eventSource.close(); eventSource = null; }
 
-  const url = `${serverUrl}/activity/stream?after=${lastId}`;
+  const tokenParam = serverToken ? `&token=${serverToken}` : '';
+  const url = `${serverUrl}/activity/stream?after=${lastId}${tokenParam}`;
   eventSource = new EventSource(url);
 
   eventSource.addEventListener('activity', (e) => {
@@ -493,7 +494,9 @@ function connectSSE() {
 async function fetchRefs() {
   if (!serverUrl) return;
   try {
-    const resp = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/refs`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000) });
+    const headers = {};
+    if (serverToken) headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${serverToken}`;
+    const resp = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/refs`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000), headers });
     if (!resp.ok) return;
     const data = await resp.json();
 
@@ -594,10 +597,8 @@ function tryConnect() {
   chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'getPort' }, (resp) => {
     if (resp && resp.port && resp.connected) {
       const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${resp.port}`;
-      // Get the token from background
-      chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'getToken' }, (tokenResp) => {
-        updateConnection(url, tokenResp?.token);
-      });
+      // Token arrives via health broadcast from background.js
+      updateConnection(url, null);
     } else {
       setTimeout(tryConnect, 2000);
     }