feat: Review Army — parallel specialist reviewers for /review (v0.14.3.0) (#692)

* feat: extend gstack-diff-scope with SCOPE_MIGRATIONS, SCOPE_API, SCOPE_AUTH

Three new scope signals for Review Army specialist activation:
- SCOPE_MIGRATIONS: db/migrate/, prisma/migrations/, alembic/, *.sql
- SCOPE_API: *controller*, *route*, *endpoint*, *.graphql, openapi.*
- SCOPE_AUTH: *auth*, *session*, *jwt*, *oauth*, *permission*, *role*

* feat: add 7 specialist checklist files for Review Army

- testing.md (always-on): coverage gaps, flaky patterns, security enforcement
- maintainability.md (always-on): dead code, DRY, stale comments
- security.md (conditional): OWASP deep analysis, auth bypass, injection
- performance.md (conditional): N+1 queries, bundle impact, complexity
- data-migration.md (conditional): reversibility, lock duration, backfill
- api-contract.md (conditional): breaking changes, versioning, error format
- red-team.md (conditional): adversarial analysis, cross-cutting concerns

All use standard header with JSON output schema and NO FINDINGS fallback.

* feat: Review Army resolver — parallel specialist dispatch + merge

New resolver in review-army.ts generates template prose for:
- Stack detection and specialist selection
- Parallel Agent tool dispatch with learning-informed prompts
- JSON finding collection, fingerprint dedup, consensus highlighting
- PR quality score computation
- Red Team conditional dispatch

Registered as REVIEW_ARMY in resolvers/index.ts.

* refactor: restructure /review template for Review Army

- Replace Steps 4-4.75 with CRITICAL pass + {{REVIEW_ARMY}}
- Remove {{DESIGN_REVIEW_LITE}} and {{TEST_COVERAGE_AUDIT_REVIEW}}
  (subsumed into Design and Testing specialists respectively)
- Extract specialist-covered categories from checklist.md
- Keep CRITICAL + uncovered INFORMATIONAL in main agent pass

* test: Review Army — 14 diff-scope tests + 7 E2E tests

- test/diff-scope.test.ts: 14 tests for all 9 scope signals
- test/skill-e2e-review-army.test.ts: 7 E2E tests
  Gate: migration safety, N+1 detection, delivery audit,
        quality score, JSON findings
  Periodic: red team, consensus
- Updated gen-skill-docs tests for new review structure
- Added touchfile entries and tier classifications

* docs: update SELF_LEARNING_V0.md with Release 2 status + Release 2.5

Mark Release 2 (Review Army) as in-progress. Add Release 2.5 for
deferred expansions (E1 adaptive gating, E3 test stubs, E5 cross-review
dedup, E7 specialist tracking).

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.14.3.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

review/specialists/security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# Security Specialist Review Checklist
+
+Scope: When SCOPE_AUTH=true OR (SCOPE_BACKEND=true AND diff > 100 lines)
+Output: JSON objects, one finding per line. Schema:
+{"severity":"CRITICAL|INFORMATIONAL","confidence":N,"path":"file","line":N,"category":"security","summary":"...","fix":"...","fingerprint":"path:line:security","specialist":"security"}
+If no findings: output `NO FINDINGS` and nothing else.
+
+---
+
+This checklist goes deeper than the main CRITICAL pass. The main agent already checks SQL injection, race conditions, LLM trust, and enum completeness. This specialist focuses on auth/authz patterns, cryptographic misuse, and attack surface expansion.
+
+## Categories
+
+### Input Validation at Trust Boundaries
+- User input accepted without validation at controller/handler level
+- Query parameters used directly in database queries or file paths
+- Request body fields accepted without type checking or schema validation
+- File uploads without type/size/content validation
+- Webhook payloads processed without signature verification
+
+### Auth & Authorization Bypass
+- Endpoints missing authentication middleware (check route definitions)
+- Authorization checks that default to "allow" instead of "deny"
+- Role escalation paths (user can modify their own role/permissions)
+- Direct object reference vulnerabilities (user A accesses user B's data by changing an ID)
+- Session fixation or session hijacking opportunities
+- Token/API key validation that doesn't check expiration
+
+### Injection Vectors (beyond SQL)
+- Command injection via subprocess calls with user-controlled arguments
+- Template injection (Jinja2, ERB, Handlebars) with user input
+- LDAP injection in directory queries
+- SSRF via user-controlled URLs (fetch, redirect, webhook targets)
+- Path traversal via user-controlled file paths (../../etc/passwd)
+- Header injection via user-controlled values in HTTP headers
+
+### Cryptographic Misuse
+- Weak hashing algorithms (MD5, SHA1) for security-sensitive operations
+- Predictable randomness (Math.random, rand()) for tokens or secrets
+- Non-constant-time comparisons (==) on secrets, tokens, or digests
+- Hardcoded encryption keys or IVs
+- Missing salt in password hashing
+
+### Secrets Exposure
+- API keys, tokens, or passwords in source code (even in comments)
+- Secrets logged in application logs or error messages
+- Credentials in URLs (query parameters or basic auth in URL)
+- Sensitive data in error responses returned to users
+- PII stored in plaintext when encryption is expected
+
+### XSS via Escape Hatches
+- Rails: .html_safe, raw() on user-controlled data
+- React: dangerouslySetInnerHTML with user content
+- Vue: v-html with user content
+- Django: |safe, mark_safe() on user input
+- General: innerHTML assignment with unsanitized data
+
+### Deserialization
+- Deserializing untrusted data (pickle, Marshal, YAML.load, JSON.parse of executable types)
+- Accepting serialized objects from user input or external APIs without schema validation