v1.91.320.0 stamp (train 48 slot 1): merge main ad8e12d

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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garrytanandcapy-ai[bot] committed 2026-10-29 15:58:47 +00:00
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@@ -149,7 +149,12 @@ Two stages with separate clocks, both printed:
~2.5 s for `regen` and under 200 ms for each of the others):
- `regen`: every registry entry whose inputs or outputs are touched is fresh
(`gstack-regen check` in a scratch worktree).
(`gstack-regen check` in a scratch worktree). A fresh entry with touched
outputs then runs once more with those outputs deleted; the ones the command
recreates byte-identically are the check's `proven` paths, which
`gstack-ship-receipt carry` reads. The verdict comes from the first run: an
output the second run does not recreate, or a second run that fails, is
simply not proven.
- `secrets`: `gstack-redact` over the branch's added lines (merge-base to the
working tree, untracked files included). HIGH, or MEDIUM in the `secret`
category, fails; other MEDIUM findings warn. Cannot be downgraded.
@@ -766,11 +771,13 @@ with a timing flake: never raise the bound.
```json
{ "sealed": {
"paths": ["heldout/**"],
"paths": ["heldout/**", "**/sealed/**"],
"transcripts": ["runs/**/transcript*.jsonl"],
"allow_paths": ["**/sealed/*/MANIFEST.json", "**/protected/MANIFEST.json"],
"answer_markers": ["SEALED ANSWER:"],
"seed_patterns": ["shuffle_seed=\\d+"],
"local_paths": true } }
"local_paths": true,
"case_insensitive": true } }
```
A repo with a `sealed` key gets a configured local check against accidental
@@ -790,8 +797,41 @@ gstack-pregate sealed [--range <a..b>] [--remote origin] [--base <branch>] [--js
in a later commit); `sealed.answer`, `sealed.seed` and `sealed.local_path`
(`/home/<user>/`, `/Users/<user>/`, `C:\Users\<user>\`) check each commit's added
lines. Findings print rule, `file[:line]` and commit, never the text.
- **Globs.** `paths`, `transcripts` and `allow_paths` match the whole
repo-relative path from the repository root. `*` and `?` stay inside one
path segment; `**/` spans zero or more directories; a `**` not followed by
`/` matches across directories (`heldout/**` covers every depth under
`heldout/`); `[` and `{` are literal. So `sealed/**` misses `tasks/x/sealed/a.json`:
to guard a `sealed/` directory wherever it sits, write `**/sealed/**`.
- **Case.** Matching is case-sensitive. `case_insensitive: true` folds case
for `paths` and `transcripts` only, so `**/heldout/**` also catches
`HELDOUT/` and `HeldOut/`. Separator and spelling variants (`hold-out/`,
`held_out/`, `heldout-v2/`) are not folded: list each as its own glob.
The effective value is the base branch's OR the pushed one (it only tightens).
- **Exceptions.** `allow_paths` exempts publishable files that sit next to
sealed data (a `MANIFEST.json` of hashes and counts) from `sealed.path` and
`sealed.transcript`, applied after the deny globs and before waivers. They
are read from the destination base branch only: an exception a push adds
takes effect once it lands on the base branch, so a branch can never widen
its own. They never fold case. An entry whose file name contains `**`, or
is only wildcards before its extension (`**`, `sealed/*`, `**/*.json`,
`sealed/**.json`), is refused; a partial wildcard such as `MANIFEST*.json`
is accepted and matches every file it spells, so name the file. An exempt file is checked by the
text rules only, so configure `answer_markers` when you exempt files next to
sealed data. Each exempt path is listed on every push (`exempt <rule>
<file> commit <sha> (sealed.allow_paths <glob>)`) and counted as
`exempt=<n>` on the `SEALED:` line.
- **Version skew.** A gstack older than the release whose CHANGELOG adds
`sealed.allow_paths` refuses `allow_paths` and `case_insensitive` as
unknown keys, so every push and `gstack-pregate run` in the repository
fail on that machine. Raise `min_gstack_version` in
`.gstack/ship-policy.json` to that release before landing either key.
- **Policy.** The union of the destination base branch's `sealed` and the
pushed commit's: a push can tighten it, never relax it. A malformed or
pushed commit's: a push can tighten it, never relax it (`allow_paths` come
from the base branch alone, and a pushed deny glob cannot override one). The
`SEALED:` line names both as `policy=<remote>/<base> + commit <sha12>`.
`gstack-pregate sealed` only checks and never pushes, so confirm a push with
`git ls-remote <remote> <ref>`. A malformed or
unreadable policy refuses. Waivers come only from the base branch's
`.gstack/sealed-allow.tsv` (`rule<TAB>path<TAB>sha<TAB>reason`) and are
listed on every push.