chore: drop sidebar-agent test refs after chat rip

Five test files / describe blocks targeted the deleted chat path:
- browse/test/security-e2e-fullstack.test.ts (full-stack chat-pipeline E2E
  with mock claude — whole file gone)
- browse/test/security-review-fullstack.test.ts (review-flow E2E with real
  classifier — whole file gone)
- browse/test/security-review-sidepanel-e2e.test.ts (Playwright E2E for
  the security event banner that was ripped from sidepanel.html)
- browse/test/security-audit-r2.test.ts (5 describe blocks: agent queue
  permissions, isValidQueueEntry stateFile traversal, loadSession session-ID
  validation, switchChatTab DocumentFragment, pollChat reentrancy guard,
  /sidebar-tabs URL sanitization, sidebar-agent SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation,
  AGENT_SRC top-level read converted to graceful fallback)
- browse/test/security-adversarial-fixes.test.ts (canary stream-chunk split
  detection on detectCanaryLeak; one tool-output test on sidebar-agent)
- test/skill-validation.test.ts (sidebar agent #584 describe block)

These all assumed sidebar-agent.ts existed and tested chat-queue plumbing,
chat-tab DOM round-trip, chat-polling reentrancy, or per-message classifier
canary detection. With the live PTY there is no chat queue, no chat tab,
no LLM stream to canary-scan, and no per-message subprocess. The Terminal
pane's invariants are covered by the new browse/test/sidebar-tabs.test.ts
(27 structural assertions), browse/test/terminal-agent.test.ts, and
browse/test/terminal-agent-integration.test.ts.

bun test → exit 0, 0 failures.
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-04-25 21:48:31 -07:00
parent b1f3d7a0fd
commit b5fa1df9c1
6 changed files with 53 additions and 1251 deletions
+40 -224
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,13 @@ import * as os from 'os';
const META_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/meta-commands.ts'), 'utf-8');
const WRITE_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/write-commands.ts'), 'utf-8');
const SERVER_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/server.ts'), 'utf-8');
const AGENT_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/sidebar-agent.ts'), 'utf-8');
// sidebar-agent.ts was ripped (chat queue replaced by interactive PTY).
// AGENT_SRC kept as empty string so the legacy describe block below skips
// without crashing module load on a missing file.
const AGENT_SRC = (() => {
try { return fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/sidebar-agent.ts'), 'utf-8'); }
catch { return ''; }
})();
const SNAPSHOT_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/snapshot.ts'), 'utf-8');
const PATH_SECURITY_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/path-security.ts'), 'utf-8');
@@ -51,53 +57,12 @@ function extractFunction(src: string, name: string): string {
return src.slice(start);
}
// ─── Task 4: Agent queue poisoning — full schema validation + permissions ───
describe('Agent queue security', () => {
it('server queue directory must use restricted permissions', () => {
const queueSection = SERVER_SRC.slice(SERVER_SRC.indexOf('agentQueue'), SERVER_SRC.indexOf('agentQueue') + 2000);
expect(queueSection).toMatch(/0o700/);
});
it('sidebar-agent queue directory must use restricted permissions', () => {
// The mkdirSync for the queue dir lives in main() — search the main() body
const mainStart = AGENT_SRC.indexOf('async function main');
const queueSection = AGENT_SRC.slice(mainStart);
expect(queueSection).toMatch(/0o700/);
});
it('cli.ts queue file creation must use restricted permissions', () => {
const CLI_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/cli.ts'), 'utf-8');
const queueSection = CLI_SRC.slice(CLI_SRC.indexOf('queue') || 0, CLI_SRC.indexOf('queue') + 2000);
expect(queueSection).toMatch(/0o700|0o600|mode/);
});
it('queue reader must have a validator function covering all fields', () => {
// Extract ONLY the validator function body by walking braces
const validatorStart = AGENT_SRC.indexOf('function isValidQueueEntry');
expect(validatorStart).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
let depth = 0;
let bodyStart = AGENT_SRC.indexOf('{', validatorStart);
let bodyEnd = bodyStart;
for (let i = bodyStart; i < AGENT_SRC.length; i++) {
if (AGENT_SRC[i] === '{') depth++;
if (AGENT_SRC[i] === '}') depth--;
if (depth === 0) { bodyEnd = i + 1; break; }
}
const validatorBlock = AGENT_SRC.slice(validatorStart, bodyEnd);
expect(validatorBlock).toMatch(/prompt.*string/);
expect(validatorBlock).toMatch(/Array\.isArray/);
expect(validatorBlock).toMatch(/\.\./);
expect(validatorBlock).toContain('stateFile');
expect(validatorBlock).toContain('tabId');
expect(validatorBlock).toMatch(/number/);
expect(validatorBlock).toContain('null');
expect(validatorBlock).toContain('message');
expect(validatorBlock).toContain('pageUrl');
expect(validatorBlock).toContain('sessionId');
});
});
// ─── Agent queue security ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Original block validated the chat queue's filesystem permissions and
// schema validator on sidebar-agent.ts. Both are gone (chat queue ripped
// in favor of the interactive Terminal PTY). The remaining 0o700 / 0o600
// invariants on extension queue paths are now covered by terminal-agent
// integration tests and the sidebar-tabs regression suite.
// ─── Shared source reads for CSS validator tests ────────────────────────────
const CDP_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/cdp-inspector.ts'), 'utf-8');
@@ -325,30 +290,13 @@ describe('Round-2 finding 2: snapshot.ts annotated path uses realpathSync', () =
});
});
// ─── Round-2 finding 3: stateFile path traversal check in isValidQueueEntry
describe('Round-2 finding 3: isValidQueueEntry checks stateFile for path traversal', () => {
it('isValidQueueEntry checks stateFile for .. traversal sequences', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(AGENT_SRC, 'isValidQueueEntry');
expect(fn).toBeTruthy();
// Must check stateFile for '..' — find the stateFile block and look for '..' string
const stateFileIdx = fn.indexOf('stateFile');
expect(stateFileIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const stateFileBlock = fn.slice(stateFileIdx, stateFileIdx + 200);
// The block must contain a check for the two-dot traversal sequence
expect(stateFileBlock).toMatch(/'\.\.'|"\.\."|\.\./);
});
it('isValidQueueEntry stateFile block contains both type check and traversal check', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(AGENT_SRC, 'isValidQueueEntry');
const stateFileIdx = fn.indexOf('stateFile');
const stateBlock = fn.slice(stateFileIdx, stateFileIdx + 300);
// Must contain the type check
expect(stateBlock).toContain('typeof obj.stateFile');
// Must contain the includes('..') call
expect(stateBlock).toMatch(/includes\s*\(\s*['"]\.\.['"]\s*\)/);
});
});
// ─── Round-2 finding 3: stateFile path traversal check ────────────────────
// Tested isValidQueueEntry's stateFile validator on sidebar-agent.ts. Both
// the function and the file are gone (chat queue ripped). The terminal-agent
// PTY path no longer takes a queue entry — it accepts WebSocket frames
// gated on Origin + session token, no on-disk queue to traverse. Path
// traversal in browse-server's tab-state writer is covered by
// browse/test/terminal-agent.test.ts (handleTabState atomic-write tests).
// ─── Task 5: /health endpoint must not expose sensitive fields ───────────────
@@ -421,24 +369,11 @@ describe('cookie-import domain validation', () => {
});
});
// ─── Task 9: loadSession ID validation ──────────────────────────────────────
describe('loadSession session ID validation', () => {
it('loadSession validates session ID format before using it in a path', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SERVER_SRC, 'loadSession');
expect(fn).toBeTruthy();
// Must contain the alphanumeric regex guard
expect(fn).toMatch(/\[a-zA-Z0-9_-\]/);
});
it('loadSession returns null on invalid session ID', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SERVER_SRC, 'loadSession');
const block = fn.slice(fn.indexOf('activeData.id'));
// Must warn and return null
expect(block).toContain('Invalid session ID');
expect(block).toContain('return null');
});
});
// loadSession session ID validation — loadSession lived inside the chat
// agent state block (sidebar-agent.ts session persistence). Chat queue
// is gone, so the function and its session-ID validator are gone. The
// terminal-agent's PTY session has no on-disk session ID — the WebSocket
// holds the session for its lifetime.
// ─── Task 10: Responsive screenshot path validation ──────────────────────────
@@ -520,40 +455,11 @@ describe('Task 11: state load cookie validation', () => {
});
});
// ─── Task 12: Validate activeTabUrl before syncActiveTabByUrl ─────────────────
describe('Task 12: activeTabUrl sanitized before syncActiveTabByUrl', () => {
it('sidebar-tabs route sanitizes activeUrl before syncActiveTabByUrl', () => {
const block = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/sidebar-tabs'", "url.pathname === '/sidebar-tabs/switch'");
expect(block).toContain('sanitizeExtensionUrl');
expect(block).toContain('syncActiveTabByUrl');
const sanitizeIdx = block.indexOf('sanitizeExtensionUrl');
const syncIdx = block.indexOf('syncActiveTabByUrl');
expect(sanitizeIdx).toBeLessThan(syncIdx);
});
it('sidebar-command route sanitizes extensionUrl before syncActiveTabByUrl', () => {
const block = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/sidebar-command'", "url.pathname === '/sidebar-chat/clear'");
expect(block).toContain('sanitizeExtensionUrl');
expect(block).toContain('syncActiveTabByUrl');
const sanitizeIdx = block.indexOf('sanitizeExtensionUrl');
const syncIdx = block.indexOf('syncActiveTabByUrl');
expect(sanitizeIdx).toBeLessThan(syncIdx);
});
it('direct unsanitized syncActiveTabByUrl calls are not present (all calls go through sanitize)', () => {
// Every syncActiveTabByUrl call should be preceded by sanitizeExtensionUrl in the nearby code
// We verify there are no direct browserManager.syncActiveTabByUrl(activeUrl) or
// browserManager.syncActiveTabByUrl(extensionUrl) patterns (without sanitize wrapper)
const block1 = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/sidebar-tabs'", "url.pathname === '/sidebar-tabs/switch'");
// Should NOT contain direct call with raw activeUrl
expect(block1).not.toMatch(/syncActiveTabByUrl\(activeUrl\)/);
const block2 = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/sidebar-command'", "url.pathname === '/sidebar-chat/clear'");
// Should NOT contain direct call with raw extensionUrl
expect(block2).not.toMatch(/syncActiveTabByUrl\(extensionUrl\)/);
});
});
// activeTabUrl sanitized before syncActiveTabByUrl — tested URL sanitization
// on the now-deleted /sidebar-tabs and /sidebar-command routes. The
// terminal-agent reads tab URLs from the live tabs.json file (atomic write
// from background.js), and chrome:// / chrome-extension:// pages are
// filtered server-side in handleTabState — see browse/test/terminal-agent.test.ts.
// ─── Task 13: Inbox output wrapped as untrusted ──────────────────────────────
@@ -581,107 +487,17 @@ describe('Task 13: inbox output wrapped as untrusted content', () => {
});
});
// ─── Task 14: DOM serialization round-trip replaced with DocumentFragment ─────
// switchChatTab DocumentFragment + pollChat reentrancy guard tests targeted
// now-deleted chat-tab DOM logic and chat-polling reentrancy. Both are gone
// (Terminal pane is the sole sidebar surface; xterm.js owns its own DOM
// lifecycle, and the WebSocket has no reentrancy hazard).
const SIDEPANEL_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../../extension/sidepanel.js'), 'utf-8');
describe('Task 14: switchChatTab uses DocumentFragment, not innerHTML round-trip', () => {
it('switchChatTab does NOT use innerHTML to restore chat (string-based re-parse removed)', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SIDEPANEL_SRC, 'switchChatTab');
expect(fn).toBeTruthy();
// Must NOT have the dangerous pattern of assigning chatDomByTab value back to innerHTML
expect(fn).not.toMatch(/chatMessages\.innerHTML\s*=\s*chatDomByTab/);
});
it('switchChatTab uses createDocumentFragment to save chat DOM', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SIDEPANEL_SRC, 'switchChatTab');
expect(fn).toContain('createDocumentFragment');
});
it('switchChatTab moves nodes via appendChild/firstChild (not innerHTML assignment)', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SIDEPANEL_SRC, 'switchChatTab');
// Must use appendChild to restore nodes from fragment
expect(fn).toContain('chatMessages.appendChild');
});
it('chatDomByTab comment documents that values are DocumentFragments, not strings', () => {
// Check module-level comment on chatDomByTab
const commentIdx = SIDEPANEL_SRC.indexOf('chatDomByTab');
const commentLine = SIDEPANEL_SRC.slice(commentIdx, commentIdx + 120);
expect(commentLine).toMatch(/DocumentFragment|fragment/i);
});
it('welcome screen is built with DOM methods in the else branch (not innerHTML)', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SIDEPANEL_SRC, 'switchChatTab');
// The else branch must use createElement, not innerHTML template literal
expect(fn).toContain('createElement');
// The specific innerHTML template with chat-welcome must be gone
expect(fn).not.toMatch(/innerHTML\s*=\s*`[\s\S]*?chat-welcome/);
});
});
// ─── Task 15: pollChat/switchChatTab reentrancy guard ────────────────────────
describe('Task 15: pollChat reentrancy guard and deferred call in switchChatTab', () => {
it('pollInProgress guard variable is declared at module scope', () => {
// Must be declared before any function definitions (within first 2000 chars)
const moduleTop = SIDEPANEL_SRC.slice(0, 2000);
expect(moduleTop).toContain('pollInProgress');
});
it('pollChat function checks and sets pollInProgress', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SIDEPANEL_SRC, 'pollChat');
expect(fn).toBeTruthy();
expect(fn).toContain('pollInProgress');
});
it('pollChat resets pollInProgress in finally block', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SIDEPANEL_SRC, 'pollChat');
// The finally block must contain the reset
const finallyIdx = fn.indexOf('finally');
expect(finallyIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const finallyBlock = fn.slice(finallyIdx, finallyIdx + 60);
expect(finallyBlock).toContain('pollInProgress');
});
it('switchChatTab calls pollChat via setTimeout (not directly)', () => {
const fn = extractFunction(SIDEPANEL_SRC, 'switchChatTab');
// Must use setTimeout to defer pollChat — no direct call at the end
expect(fn).toMatch(/setTimeout\s*\(\s*pollChat/);
// Must NOT have a bare direct call `pollChat()` at the end (outside setTimeout)
// We check that there is no standalone `pollChat()` call (outside setTimeout wrapper)
const withoutSetTimeout = fn.replace(/setTimeout\s*\(\s*pollChat[^)]*\)/g, '');
expect(withoutSetTimeout).not.toMatch(/\bpollChat\s*\(\s*\)/);
});
});
// ─── Task 16: SIGKILL escalation in sidebar-agent timeout ────────────────────
describe('Task 16: sidebar-agent timeout handler uses SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation', () => {
it('timeout block sends SIGTERM first', () => {
// Slice from "Timed out" / setTimeout block to processingTabs.delete
const timeoutStart = AGENT_SRC.indexOf("SIDEBAR_AGENT_TIMEOUT");
expect(timeoutStart).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const timeoutBlock = AGENT_SRC.slice(timeoutStart, timeoutStart + 600);
expect(timeoutBlock).toContain('SIGTERM');
});
it('timeout block escalates to SIGKILL after delay', () => {
const timeoutStart = AGENT_SRC.indexOf("SIDEBAR_AGENT_TIMEOUT");
const timeoutBlock = AGENT_SRC.slice(timeoutStart, timeoutStart + 600);
expect(timeoutBlock).toContain('SIGKILL');
});
it('SIGTERM appears before SIGKILL in timeout block', () => {
const timeoutStart = AGENT_SRC.indexOf("SIDEBAR_AGENT_TIMEOUT");
const timeoutBlock = AGENT_SRC.slice(timeoutStart, timeoutStart + 600);
const sigtermIdx = timeoutBlock.indexOf('SIGTERM');
const sigkillIdx = timeoutBlock.indexOf('SIGKILL');
expect(sigtermIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
expect(sigkillIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
expect(sigtermIdx).toBeLessThan(sigkillIdx);
});
});
// ─── Task 16: SIGKILL escalation ────────────────────────────────────────────
// Originally tested sidebar-agent's SIDEBAR_AGENT_TIMEOUT block. The chat
// queue and its watchdog are gone. terminal-agent.ts disposes claude with
// the same SIGINT-then-SIGKILL-after-3s pattern; that's covered by
// browse/test/terminal-agent.test.ts ("cleanup escalates SIGINT to SIGKILL
// after 3s on close").
// ─── Task 17: viewport and wait bounds clamping ──────────────────────────────