fix: Step 11 review fixes (executables and symlinks are code with their lines read whatever their docs, data or config name; never open a symlink)

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

test/fixtures/review-pins/files/lib/review-depth.ts.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"sha":"17617e1ecfc9cf91cd1df564363a67439bb1d451e07e98d38350b79905ec49ec","replay":"GSTA-258-L7"}
+{"sha":"2c08a34c47094a808963e87e6a5eb95e8529d6f68b1896174b8dfa613562468e","replay":"GSTA-258-L7"}

test/fixtures/review-pins/files/lib/review-risk.ts.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"sha":"2b28089481c2209d319d8bd9e7a5feb4045a50aae6bccee1ca6c450804af87cc","replay":"GSTA-258-L7"}
+{"sha":"1d03d5cd8f0cae5f01af85502004849c9fa2545009957f2c4c44a1359d9d0fc0","replay":"GSTA-258-L7"}

test/fixtures/review-pins/replays/GSTA-258-L7.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"replay":"GSTA-258-L7","justification":"GSTA-258 L7 planner no-loss check (GST-1177, Addenda 1 and 7): the change only adds triggers (executables stay code; seal, sealed, custody and egress path tokens; redaction calls (camelCase or snake_case), redaction or outside-voice imports (from, side-effect, require, dynamic and Python forms) and SECRET or CREDENTIAL constants set to a regex literal, a regex list or new RegExp are security; a deleted file is never an executable) and removes none; over the last 200 first-parent main commits to bf2cab34c5, planReview and collectCommit from origin/main and from this branch give the same depth, class, risk classes, next step and dispatches on 195, and the other 5 only raise: ed5c948eb6 (#3921, the GST-1164 secret-egress fix) and c197a139b7 (#3918, approval text in public PR bodies) and 514daebf5f (#3569, lib/sealed-guard.ts) go light to full on security, while 90a170c941 and 71acd83aa6 gain security at unchanged full depth and reviewers; no commit's depth drops ; rerun after the pass 1 review fixes gives the same 200 rows (GStack Minder drive handoffs/GSTA-258/L7-planner-noloss/, l7-200-v2.tsv)"}
+{"replay":"GSTA-258-L7","justification":"GSTA-258 L7 planner no-loss check (GST-1177, Addenda 1 and 7): the change only adds triggers (executables stay code; seal, sealed, custody and egress path tokens; redaction calls (camelCase or snake_case), redaction or outside-voice imports (from, side-effect, require, dynamic and Python forms) and SECRET or CREDENTIAL constants set to a regex literal, a regex list or new RegExp are security; a deleted file is never an executable, and an executable or symlink is code with its lines read whatever its docs, data or config name) and removes none; over the last 200 first-parent main commits to bf2cab34c5, planReview and collectCommit from origin/main and from this branch give the same depth, class, risk classes, next step and dispatches on 195, and the other 5 only raise: ed5c948eb6 (#3921, the GST-1164 secret-egress fix) and c197a139b7 (#3918, approval text in public PR bodies) and 514daebf5f (#3569, lib/sealed-guard.ts) go light to full on security, while 90a170c941 and 71acd83aa6 gain security at unchanged full depth and reviewers; no commit's depth drops ; reruns after the pass 1 and Step 11 review fixes give the same 200 rows (GStack Minder drive handoffs/GSTA-258/L7-planner-noloss/, l7-200-v2.tsv, l7-200-v3.tsv)"}

test/review-collect.test.ts

@@ -130,6 +130,23 @@ describe('GSTA-258 L7 Addendum 1 and 7: executables among data-named paths', ()
     r.write({ 'r.log': null });
     expect(collectLive(r.dir, 'main').executables).toEqual([]);
   });
+  // Value: protects=a docs or config name never hides an executable's lines, and a symlink is never opened (outside voice on #3972);
+  //   fails_when=a 755 prune.txt or prune.json with rm -rf classes light with no security, or a logs/ symlink is read through;
+  //   seam=collectors -> classifyDiff -> matchRisk
+  test('executable .txt and .json scripts are code with security lines; a symlink counts as executable without being read', () => {
+    const r = repo({});
+    const script = '#!/bin/sh\nrm -rf "$1"\n';
+    r.write({ 'scripts/logs/prune.txt': script, 'tools/prune.json': script });
+    for (const p of ['scripts/logs/prune.txt', 'tools/prune.json']) fs.chmodSync(path.join(r.dir, p), 0o755);
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.join(r.dir, 'logs'));
+    fs.symlinkSync('/dev/null', path.join(r.dir, 'logs/run'));
+    const head = r.commit({});
+    for (const c of [collectCommit(r.dir, r.baseSha, head), collectLive(r.dir, 'main')]) {
+      expect(c.executables).toEqual(['logs/run', 'scripts/logs/prune.txt', 'tools/prune.json']);
+      const d = depthOfCommitInput({ ...c, gateTagged: 0 });
+      expect([d.class, d.risk.includes('security'), d.depth]).toEqual(['code', true, 'full']);
+    }
+  });
 });
 
 describe('collectLive: the working tree', () => {