CalvinBackup/gstack
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git synced 2026-09-18 10:52:24 +02:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

docs: sync egress-verify scope and layered iOS Release guard into user docs

Browse Source 
ARCHITECTURE.md and README.md now carry the same gstack-egress verify
scope disclosure the CLI ships (edits/reordering/mid-chain deletion
detected; tail-truncation and ledger deletion out of scope for a
forensic log). docs/howto-ios-testing-with-gstack.md documents the
second Release-build guard: DebugBridgeTouch.m compiles out behind
#if TARGET_OS_IOS && DEBUG via the cSettings DEBUG define.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-08-16 15:23:25 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 720f5e68a8
commit bae7dd6ffe
3 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
ARCHITECTURE.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ Every enumerated gstack-initiated off-machine sink writes a hash-chained, tamper
Failure polarity is per-class and pinned by tests. Sensitive sinks are fail-closed: brain-sync pushes, memory-ingest, gbrain-sync, telemetry, ngrok tunnel starts, mcp-verify, and supabase-provision refuse to send if the receipt can't be written (each refusal prints problem + cause + fix). User-facing sinks fail open with a stderr warning — the design binary's OpenAI calls, update-check, the read-only dashboards, and git-class receipts proceed even when the receipt write failed, so a fail-open send can go unrecorded (warned, by design). The new-sink scanner in `test/egress-receipt-wiring.test.ts` fails CI when an off-machine sink ships unwired; its only exemptions are enumerated with reasons (user-directed page fetches, reachability probes, install-doc strings, skill prose).
Inspect the ledger with `bin/gstack-egress`: `list` (what gstack attempted to send), `verify` (recompute the chain, exit 3 on tamper), `grants` (the standing consent settings and how to revoke each). Threat model: the ledger is forensic observability of ATTEMPTED egress — it records what gstack tried to send so accidents are auditable; it is not an exfiltration control.
Inspect the ledger with `bin/gstack-egress`: `list` (what gstack attempted to send), `verify` (recompute the chain, exit 3 on tamper), `grants` (the standing consent settings and how to revoke each). `verify` detects in-place edits, reordering, and mid-chain deletion; it does NOT detect tail-truncation, whole-file re-fabrication, or deletion of the ledger itself — guarding against the same-machine, same-user actor who owns the file is out of scope for a forensic log. Threat model: the ledger is forensic observability of ATTEMPTED egress — it records what gstack tried to send so accidents are auditable; it is not an exfiltration control.
### Unicode sanitization at server egress (v1.38.0.0)