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docs: sync egress-verify scope and layered iOS Release guard into user docs
ARCHITECTURE.md and README.md now carry the same gstack-egress verify scope disclosure the CLI ships (edits/reordering/mid-chain deletion detected; tail-truncation and ledger deletion out of scope for a forensic log). docs/howto-ios-testing-with-gstack.md documents the second Release-build guard: DebugBridgeTouch.m compiles out behind #if TARGET_OS_IOS && DEBUG via the cSettings DEBUG define. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ Beyond the slash-command skills, gstack ships standalone CLIs for workflows that
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| `gstack-model-benchmark` | **Cross-model benchmark** — run the same prompt through Claude, GPT (via Codex CLI), and Gemini; compare latency, tokens, cost, and (optionally) LLM-judge quality score. Auth detected per provider, unavailable providers skip cleanly. Output as table, JSON, or markdown. `--dry-run` validates flags + auth without spending API calls. |
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| `gstack-taste-update` | **Design taste learning** — writes approvals and rejections from `/design-shotgun` into a persistent per-project taste profile. Decays 5%/week. Feeds back into future variant generation so the system learns what you actually pick. |
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| `gstack-egress` | **Egress receipt auditor** — every gstack-initiated off-machine send writes a tamper-evident, hash-chained receipt to `~/.gstack/security/egress.jsonl` before the send. `list` shows what gstack attempted to send and to which host, `grants` shows the standing consent settings plus the exact command that revokes each, `verify` recomputes the hash chain and exits 3 on tamper. |
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| `gstack-egress` | **Egress receipt auditor** — every gstack-initiated off-machine send writes a tamper-evident, hash-chained receipt to `~/.gstack/security/egress.jsonl` before the send. `list` shows what gstack attempted to send and to which host, `grants` shows the standing consent settings plus the exact command that revokes each, `verify` recomputes the hash chain and exits 3 on tamper (catches edits, reordering, and mid-chain deletion; truncating or deleting the ledger itself is out of scope — it's a forensic log, not tamper-proof storage). |
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| `gstack-context-bill` | **Token bill-of-materials** — read-only, offline audit of what an installed skills tree costs in tokens: always-on frontmatter every session pays vs per-invocation SKILL.md + forced references. `--diff` compares two trees, `--budget` enforces a ceiling, `--exact` opts into Anthropic `count_tokens` (sends file text off-machine; writes an egress receipt first, degrades to the offline estimate if the receipt can't be written). |
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| `gstack-code-intelligence` | **Code-intelligence provider picker** — wraps GBrain, Sourcebot, and Graphify behind one interface: `options`/`status` to see what's available, `select` to pick one, `index`/`search` to use it, `suggest` to check whether the one-time indexing offer should fire here. The offer triggers on large repos (1,000+ tracked files; a decline is persisted). Non-local providers refuse to index *or search* until you record per-repo consent (`consent <repo> yes\|no` — the query text is repo-derived content), the per-repo trust policy's deny and read-only tiers veto write-class operations regardless of consent, and every off-machine send writes an egress receipt. Fully optional — with nothing selected, gstack falls back to grep. |
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| `gstack-verify-gate` | **Verification stop hook (opt-in)** — blocks a Claude Code turn from ending until the project's declared verify command passes (after 3 blocked re-entries it yields with a loud still-RED warning instead of looping forever). Declare it on one line in CLAUDE.md: `<!-- gstack:verify: bun test -->`. Hooks bypass the permission system, so a declared command never runs until you trust it once per repo (`gstack-verify-gate --trust`); editing the command invalidates trust until re-granted, and every grant is audit-logged. `./setup` never registers it for you — opt in with `gstack-settings-hook add-event --event Stop --command ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-verify-gate --source verify-gate`, remove with `gstack-settings-hook remove-source --source verify-gate`. |
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