fix(security): cookie-import path validation bypass + hardcoded /tmp

Two fixes:
1. cookie-import relative path bypass (#707): path.isAbsolute() gated the
   entire validation, so relative paths like "sensitive-file.json" bypassed
   the safe-directory check entirely. Now always resolves to absolute path
   with realpathSync for symlink resolution, matching validateOutputPath().

2. Hardcoded /tmp in cookie-import-browser (#708): openDbFromCopy used
   /tmp directly instead of os.tmpdir(), breaking Windows support.

Also adds explicit imports for SAFE_DIRECTORIES and isPathWithin in
write-commands.ts (previously resolved implicitly through bundler).

Closes #852

Co-Authored-By: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com>

browse/src/cookie-import-browser.ts

@@ -386,7 +386,8 @@ function openDb(dbPath: string, browserName: string): Database {
 }
 
 function openDbFromCopy(dbPath: string, browserName: string): Database {
-  const tmpPath = `/tmp/browse-cookies-${browserName.toLowerCase()}-${crypto.randomUUID()}.db`;
+  // Use os.tmpdir() instead of hardcoded /tmp for cross-platform support (#708)
+  const tmpPath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `browse-cookies-${browserName.toLowerCase()}-${crypto.randomUUID()}.db`);
   try {
     fs.copyFileSync(dbPath, tmpPath);
     // Also copy WAL and SHM if they exist (for consistent reads)

browse/src/write-commands.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ import { validateNavigationUrl } from './url-validation';
 import { validateOutputPath } from './path-security';
 import * as fs from 'fs';
 import * as path from 'path';
-import { TEMP_DIR } from './platform';
+import { TEMP_DIR, isPathWithin } from './platform';
+import { SAFE_DIRECTORIES } from './path-security';
 import { modifyStyle, undoModification, resetModifications, getModificationHistory } from './cdp-inspector';
 
 /**
@@ -441,16 +442,17 @@ export async function handleWriteCommand(
     case 'cookie-import': {
       const filePath = args[0];
       if (!filePath) throw new Error('Usage: browse cookie-import <json-file>');
-      // Path validation — prevent reading arbitrary files
+      // Path validation — resolve to absolute and check against safe dirs.
-      if (path.isAbsolute(filePath)) {
+      // Fixes #707: relative paths previously bypassed the safe directory check.
-        const safeDirs = [TEMP_DIR, process.cwd()];
+      // Mirrors validateOutputPath() — resolves symlinks (e.g., macOS /tmp → /private/tmp).
-        const resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
+      const resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
-        if (!safeDirs.some(dir => isPathWithin(resolved, dir))) {
+      let resolvedReal = resolved;
-          throw new Error(`Path must be within: ${safeDirs.join(', ')}`);
+      try { resolvedReal = fs.realpathSync(resolved); } catch {
-        }
+        // File may not exist yet — resolve parent dir instead
+        try { resolvedReal = path.join(fs.realpathSync(path.dirname(resolved)), path.basename(resolved)); } catch {}
       }
-      if (path.normalize(filePath).includes('..')) {
+      if (!SAFE_DIRECTORIES.some(dir => isPathWithin(resolvedReal, dir))) {
-        throw new Error('Path traversal sequences (..) are not allowed');
+        throw new Error(`Path must be within: ${SAFE_DIRECTORIES.join(', ')}`);
       }
       if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) throw new Error(`File not found: ${filePath}`);
       const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');

browse/test/commands.test.ts

@@ -1811,7 +1811,8 @@ describe('Path traversal prevention', () => {
       await handleWriteCommand('cookie-import', ['../../etc/shadow'], bm);
       expect(true).toBe(false);
     } catch (err: any) {
-      expect(err.message).toContain('Path traversal');
+      // Traversal blocked by safe-directory check (#707) or explicit .. check
+      expect(err.message).toMatch(/Path must be within|Path traversal/);
     }
   });