diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index b899b6da..d799c81b 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,5 +1,77 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [1.6.0.0] - 2026-04-21
+
+## **The token leak in pair-agent sessions is closed by splitting the daemon into two HTTP listeners, not by pretending one port can be two things at once.**
+
+`pair-agent --client` is gstack's best onboarding moment. One command, a shareable URL, a remote agent driving your browser. It was also the moment we broadcast an unauthenticated `/health` endpoint to the public internet that handed out root browser tokens on any `Origin: chrome-extension://` spoof. @garagon flagged this in PR #1026 and it re-surfaced in a DM. The initial fix (check `tunnelActive` on the `/health` gate) shipped as a patch in review. Codex's outside voice during `/plan-ceo-review` called that approach brittle, and the user pivoted to the architectural fix: physical port separation. That's what this release is.
+
+When you run `pair-agent --client`, the daemon now binds TWO HTTP listeners. The local port (bootstrap, CLI, sidebar, cookie-picker, inspector) stays on 127.0.0.1 and is never forwarded. The tunnel port serves only `/connect` (pairing ceremony, unauth + rate-limited) and a locked allowlist of browser-driving commands. ngrok forwards only the tunnel port. A caller who stumbles onto your ngrok URL cannot reach `/health`, `/cookie-picker`, `/inspector/*`, or `/welcome` — not because the server denies them, because the HTTP request never arrives at the bootstrap port. Root tokens sent over the tunnel get a 403 with a clear pairing hint.
+
+The wave also closed three other CVE classes Codex surfaced. `/activity/stream` and `/inspector/events` used to accept the root token in `?token=` query params (URLs leak to logs, referer, history). Now they take a separate view-only 30-minute HttpOnly SameSite=Strict cookie that is NOT valid against `/command`. The `/welcome` handler interpolated `GSTACK_SLUG` into a filesystem path without validation. Fixed with a strict regex. The `/connect` rate limit was 3/min globally, which DOS'd any legitimate pair-agent retry. Loosened to 300/min because setup keys are 24 random bytes (unbruteforceable); the limit is for flood defense, not key guessing. The cookie-import-browser CDP port on Windows is documented as a v20 ABE elevation path with a tracking issue (#1136).
+
+### The numbers that matter
+
+| Surface | Before | After |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/health` over tunnel | returns root token to any chrome-extension origin | unreachable (404, wrong port) |
+| `/cookie-picker` over tunnel | HTML embeds the root token | unreachable (404, wrong port) |
+| `/inspector/*` over tunnel | reachable with Bearer | unreachable (404, wrong port) |
+| `/command` over tunnel, root token | executes | 403 with pairing hint |
+| `/command` over tunnel, scoped token | any command | allowlist: 17 browser-driving commands only |
+| `/activity/stream` auth | `?token=<ROOT>` in URL | HttpOnly `gstack_sse` cookie, 30-min TTL, stream-scope only |
+| `/inspector/events` auth | `?token=<ROOT>` in URL | same cookie as /activity/stream |
+| `/connect` rate limit | 3/min (blocked legit retries) | 300/min (flood-only, no pairing DoS) |
+| `/welcome` path traversal | `GSTACK_SLUG="../etc"` interpolates | regex `^[a-z0-9_-]+$`, fallback to built-in |
+| Tunnel auth-denial logging | none | async JSONL to `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl`, rate-capped 60/min |
+| Windows v20 ABE via CDP | undocumented elevation | documented non-goal, tracked as #1136 |
+
+| Review layer | Verdict | Outcome |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/plan-ceo-review` (Claude) | SELECTIVE EXPANSION | 7 proposals, 7 accepted, critical gap on extension sidebar bootstrap caught |
+| `/codex` (outside voice) | 14 findings | 3 factual errors in the plan fixed, 4 substantive tensions resolved, 2 new CVE classes added |
+| `/plan-eng-review` (Claude) | 5 arch decisions locked | tunnel lifecycle, token scoping, PR #1026 handling, SSE cookie design, route allowlist |
+
+### What this means for anyone running pair-agent
+
+Run `pair-agent --client test-agent` on your laptop. Share the ngrok URL with someone. Their agent drives your browser. Your sidebar keeps showing you what they're doing. A stranger who stumbles onto that ngrok URL in the meantime gets 404 on everything except `/connect`, and `/connect` without a setup key goes nowhere. Nothing about the command you type changes.
+
+### Itemized changes
+
+#### Added
+
+- **Dual-listener HTTP architecture.** When a tunnel is active, the daemon binds a dedicated listener on an ephemeral 127.0.0.1 port and points `ngrok.forward()` at it. `/tunnel/start` lazy-binds the listener; `/tunnel/stop` tears it down. Hard-fails on bind error, never falls back to the local port. `BROWSE_TUNNEL=1` startup follows the same pattern. `browse/src/server.ts` ~320 lines.
+- **Tunnel surface filter.** Runs before every route dispatch. 404s paths not on `TUNNEL_PATHS` (`/connect`, `/command`, `/sidebar-chat`). 403s any request carrying the root bearer token with a clear hint. 401s non-/connect requests without a scoped token. Every denial logs to `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl`.
+- **Tunnel command allowlist.** `/command` on the tunnel surface enforces `TUNNEL_COMMANDS` (17 browser-driving commands: `goto`, `click`, `text`, `screenshot`, `html`, `links`, `forms`, `accessibility`, `attrs`, `media`, `data`, `scroll`, `press`, `type`, `select`, `wait`, `eval`). Remote paired agents cannot launch new browsers, configure the daemon, or touch the inspector.
+- **View-only SSE session cookie.** New `browse/src/sse-session-cookie.ts` registry with `POST /sse-session` mint endpoint. 256-bit tokens, 30-minute TTL, HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict. Scope-isolated from the main token registry at the module-boundary level (the module does not import `token-registry.ts`). Prior learning applied: `cookie-picker-auth-isolation`, 10/10 confidence.
+- **Tunnel auth-denial log.** `browse/src/tunnel-denial-log.ts`, async `fs.promises.appendFile` with 60/min rate cap in-process. Prior learning applied: `sync-audit-log-io`, 10/10 confidence.
+- **E2E pairing test.** `browse/test/pair-agent-e2e.test.ts`, 12 behavioral tests against a spawned daemon (BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1). Verifies `/pair` → `/connect` → scoped token → `/command` flow, `?token=` query param rejection, `/sse-session` cookie flags. ~220ms, no network.
+- **ARCHITECTURE.md dual-listener contract.** Per-endpoint disposition table (local vs tunnel), tunnel denial log model, SSE cookie scope, N2 non-goal documentation.
+
+#### Changed
+
+- **SSE endpoints no longer accept `?token=` in the URL.** `/activity/stream` and `/inspector/events` now take Bearer or the `gstack_sse` cookie. Extension (`extension/sidepanel.js`) fetches the cookie once at bootstrap via `POST /sse-session`, then opens `EventSource` with `withCredentials: true`. The URL never carries a secret.
+- **`/connect` rate limit loosened from 3/min to 300/min.** Setup keys are 24 random bytes; 3/min was a brute-force defense in name only and caused real pairing failures. 300/min handles floods without ever triggering on legitimate use.
+- **`/welcome` GSTACK_SLUG gated on `^[a-z0-9_-]+$`.** Defense-in-depth for a path not exploitable today but trivially mitigable.
+- **`/pair` and `/tunnel/start` probe the cached tunnel via `GET /connect`, not `/health`.** `/health` is no longer reachable on the tunnel surface under the dual-listener design.
+- **`cookie-import-browser.ts` comment corrected.** Previously claimed "no worse than baseline", wrong on Windows with v20 App-Bound Encryption, where the CDP port IS an elevation path. Documented with a tracking issue for the `--remote-debugging-pipe` follow-up.
+
+#### Fixed
+
+- **SSRF via download + scrape.** `page.request.fetch` calls in `browse/src/write-commands.ts` now pass through `validateNavigationUrl`. Blocks cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure), RFC1918 ranges, `file://`. Derived from PR #1029 by @garagon.
+- **Envelope sentinel escape on scoped snapshot.** `browse/src/snapshot.ts` and `browse/src/content-security.ts` now share `escapeEnvelopeSentinels()`. Page content containing the literal envelope delimiter can no longer forge a fake "trusted" block in the LLM context. Derived from PR #1031 by @garagon.
+- **Hidden-element detection across all DOM-reading channels.** Previously only `command === 'text'` ran `markHiddenElements`. Now every DOM channel (`html`, `links`, `forms`, `accessibility`, `attrs`, `media`, `data`, `ux-audit`) surfaces hidden-content warnings in the envelope. Derived from PR #1032 by @garagon.
+- **`--from-file` payload path validation.** `load-html --from-file` and `pdf --from-file` now run `validateReadPath` on the payload path for parity with the direct-API paths. Closes a CLI/API escape hatch for `SAFE_DIRECTORIES`. Derived from PR #1103 by @garagon.
+- **`design/src/serve.ts` interpolated `url.origin` through `JSON.stringify`.** Defensive escape for origin values in served HTML. Contributed by @theqazi (PR #1073 partial).
+- **`scripts/slop-diff.ts` narrows `shell: true` to Windows only.** Matches the platform-specific need without widening the shell-interpretation surface on POSIX. Contributed by @theqazi (PR #1073 partial).
+
+#### For contributors
+
+- F1 (dual-listener refactor) is bisected as four commits on the branch: rate-limit loosening, new `tunnel-denial-log` module, the server.ts refactor, and the new source-level test suite. Each commit is independently green. Subsequent wave items rebase onto F1 cleanly.
+- Credits: @garagon (critical bug surface in PR #1026 plus SSRF, envelope, DOM-channel coverage, and --from-file PRs), @Hybirdss (PR #1002 concept, superseded by F1 but informed the policy model), @HMAKT99 (PRs #469 and #472 — both ended up already-landed-on-main; credit for surfacing the issues), @theqazi (2 commits from #1073, skills portion deferred pending internal voice review per CLAUDE.md).
+- Codex-reviewed plan stored at `~/.gstack/projects/garrytan-gstack/ceo-plans/2026-04-21-security-wave-v1.5.2.md`. Eng-review test plan at `~/.gstack/projects/garrytan-gstack/garrytan-garrytan-sec-wave-eng-review-test-plan-*.md`.
+- Non-goal tracked as #1136: switch cookie-import-browser CDP transport from TCP `--remote-debugging-port` to `--remote-debugging-pipe` so the Windows v20 ABE elevation path is closed. Non-trivial (Playwright doesn't expose the pipe transport; needs a minimal CDP-over-pipe client); intentionally deferred from this wave.
+
 ## [1.5.1.0] - 2026-04-20
 
 ## **Three visible bugs in v1.4.0.0 /make-pdf, all fixed.**
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 50b4d263..9f2da7b1 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.5.1.0
+1.6.0.0
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 4103bb7a..ae987c2b 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "gstack",
-  "version": "1.5.1.0",
+  "version": "1.6.0.0",
   "description": "Garry's Stack — Claude Code skills + fast headless browser. One repo, one install, entire AI engineering workflow.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",