v1.92.74.0 stamp: merge main a00149e86e into #3841 (land)

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garrytan committed 2026-11-02 11:46:17 +00:00
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@@ -195,7 +195,10 @@ Two stages with separate clocks, both printed:
changed Python (`.py`, `.pyi`) or Dart file is scanned whole and only
findings on its added lines count, so a line added inside an existing
`"""` or `'''` string is still read as a literal; its rows give the file's
line number (`app.py, line 10`).
line number (`app.py, line 10`). A tracked file's whole text is the version
git diffed (a full-context `git diff`), never the working copy; an untracked
file is read whole from disk. A file over the size limit, or whose full diff
does not parse, is scanned on its added lines alone, without that context.
- `strays`: a new file at the repository root, a new top-level directory, or a
scratch name (`zz-*`, `tmp*`, `scratch*`) anywhere.
- `literals`: for every changed exported constant or named timeout/retry
@@ -951,8 +954,11 @@ those, each with its scope and its reason:
(`session: HttpSession,`) and a dict entry or Dart named argument that reads
a name (`"password": request.password`) are code, not credentials, as they
are in TypeScript (#3630). Python's keyword form (`password=request.password`)
still reports. The same line inside a `"""` docstring is text and still
reports; allowlist it by its value. The pre-push hook sees only added lines,
still reports. The same line inside a `"""` docstring, any other string or
a Dart `/* */` comment is text and still reports; allowlist it by its value.
Code inside a Python f-string or t-string `{…}` field, or a non-raw Dart
string's `${…}`, is read as code, and its nested strings and quotes do not
end the outer string (GST-738). The pre-push hook sees only added lines,
so it scans Python and Dart lines without this exemption and may still warn
(MEDIUM, non-blocking) on them.
@@ -1099,7 +1105,8 @@ with a timing flake: never raise the bound.
"answer_markers": ["SEALED ANSWER:"],
"seed_patterns": ["shuffle_seed=\\d+"],
"local_paths": true,
"case_insensitive": true } }
"case_insensitive": true,
"label_keys": ["stratum", "decoy_set"] } }
```
A repo with a `sealed` key gets a configured local check against accidental
@@ -1145,11 +1152,60 @@ gstack-pregate sealed [--range <a..b>] [--remote origin] [--base <branch>] [--js
sealed data. Each exempt path is listed on every push (`exempt <rule>
<file> commit <sha> (sealed.allow_paths <glob>)`) and counted as
`exempt=<n>` on the `SEALED:` line.
- **Version skew.** A gstack older than the release whose CHANGELOG adds
`sealed.allow_paths` refuses `allow_paths` and `case_insensitive` as
unknown keys, so every push and `gstack-pregate run` in the repository
fail on that machine. Raise `min_gstack_version` in
`.gstack/ship-policy.json` to that release before landing either key.
- **Label joins.** Off unless `label_keys` names at least one field. Then
`sealed.label_join` refuses a published record that puts a label field next
to an identifier, the way a panel row with `stratum` beside `head` and
`plan_bytes` tells a model under test which unit it is. A record is a JSON
object at any depth (its own fields plus one level of nested objects, named
like `meta.head`), a JSONL or NDJSON line, a CSV or TSV row, or a row of a
Markdown pipe table (CSV and TSV cells may be quoted). Field names and table headers are compared after
trimming, lowercasing and turning spaces and hyphens into underscores
(`Tree SHA-256` is `tree_sha_256`); this is the rule's own normalization,
separate from `case_insensitive`. An identifier is a field whose name
matches an `identifier_keys` glob (`*` is the only wildcard; the default
is `head`, `head_sha`, `sha`, `commit`, `tree`, `tree_sha*`, `*_sha`,
`*_sha256`, `sha256`, `digest`, `*_digest`, `hash`, `*_hash`,
`*_bytes`, `bytes`, `size`, `files`, `lines`), or any string value (or a
list holding one) of 7 to 64 hex characters with at least one digit and
one letter a to f. An
object key of that shape counts as an identifier of the object it holds
(shown as `(key)`), so a map keyed by sha joins too. Numbers count only
through the field name. A field can be both a label and an identifier, and
a record joins when it has a label field and a different identifier field,
so adding identifier names to `label_keys` never hides a join. Both lists take bare field names: a nested field
matches by its own name (`stratum`, never `meta.stratum`). For each supported file a commit adds,
modifies, renames or copies, the guard fingerprints every joined record
(sha256 over its label and identifier fields and their values, kept in
memory) and compares the set with the parent's version of the file (the
rename or copy source; every parent for a merge). A fingerprint no parent
has is a finding, so unchanged records and formatting-only edits stay clear,
and a replaced, added or widened record refuses even when the count stays
the same. A file whose text never names a label key, ignoring double
quotes (so `"Strat"um` still names `stratum`), cannot hold a join, so
it is skipped without parsing (a commented `tsconfig.json` passes). A file
with a `\u` escape, which could spell a label key, is always parsed, so a
commented one is `sealed.label_join_unchecked`. A
supported file over 4 MiB, one that names a label key and does not parse (one bad
JSONL line is enough), one nested deeper than 64 levels, or a blob git
cannot read is `sealed.label_join_unchecked`. It refuses too, and the
`SEALED:` line counts it as `unchecked=<n>`. Findings print field names
(`keys=`, label fields first), never values; `--json` carries them as
`keys`. `allow_paths` never exempt either rule; a base-branch waiver does.
Both lists are the union of the base branch's and the pushed policy's, each
resolved to its default first, so a push can turn the rule on or widen it
but never turn it off or narrow it. Without `label_keys` the guard reads no
file contents and its output is unchanged. Known limits: joins across files,
joins by reference inside a file (a `decoy_set` list naming units described
elsewhere), a map from an identifier straight to a label value with no
label field name, columnar JSON (`columns` plus `rows`), labels encoded in
file names, and prose.
- **Version skew.** A gstack older than the release that adds a `sealed` key
refuses it as unknown, so every push and `gstack-pregate run` in the
repository fail on that machine. `allow_paths` and `case_insensitive` came
with the release whose CHANGELOG adds `sealed.allow_paths`; `label_keys`
and `identifier_keys` came with the release whose CHANGELOG adds
`sealed.label_join`. Raise `min_gstack_version` in
`.gstack/ship-policy.json` to that release before landing the key.
- **Policy.** The union of the destination base branch's `sealed` and the
pushed commit's: a push can tighten it, never relax it (`allow_paths` come
from the base branch alone, and a pushed deny glob cannot override one). The
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@@ -567,7 +567,8 @@ ones, and the arm lost blockers. `bin/gstack-review-dispatch` closes both ends:
staged manifest (`<dir>/pass-manifest.json`): audit readers marked first, then
the specialists with the other audit readers, then the Red Team, then Step 11's
voices. A QA extra is refused before any reader is created: Step 9.2.1's probes
are the parent's. Each reviewer keeps its plan entry and is rendered by the same code as
are the parent's. `--diff-base` sets every reader's base, a scoped pass's Red
Team included; the targeted reader keeps the merge base. Each reviewer keeps its plan entry and is rendered by the same code as
`render`, once its inputs exist; the Red Team's findings file is the specialists'
`merged.jsonl` lines byte for byte. A brief leaves the bin in indexed chunks of at
most 65,536 characters (`chunk`), so no tool output line carries a whole brief and a
@@ -580,17 +581,26 @@ ones, and the arm lost blockers. `bin/gstack-review-dispatch` closes both ends:
fix-check plan renders its reader from `--fix-list`, `--hunks`, `--tests` and `--callers`,
`--audit-only` runs just the `--extras` readers (Step 14.5's docs audit), and the fork
point is found against `origin/<base>` first, as preflight does.
7. Every brief, audit readers' included, ends with a workspace paragraph naming the
checkout the bins run in (GST-482): a reader on a shared machine starts in the
machine's working directory, so it is told to `cd` there on every command, to give
every file tool an absolute path under it, and to start its reply with
`REVIEWED_TREE: <HEAD^{tree}> <toplevel>` measured there. The paragraph follows the
section's render, which stays byte for byte. `collect` and `mark --state collected`
7. Every brief, audit readers' included, opens with a fingerprint step and ends with a
workspace paragraph naming the checkout the bins run in (GST-482): a reader on a shared
machine starts in the machine's working directory, so it is told to `cd` there on every
command, to give every file tool an absolute path under it, and to start its reply with
the `REVIEWED_TREE: <HEAD^{tree}> <toplevel>` line the step's command outputs there. The
step comes first because a reader following a findings-only format skipped the request
when it only closed the brief (GST-897). The section's render sits between the two,
byte for byte. `collect` and `mark --state collected`
compare that line with the fingerprint recorded at render: a missing or foreign line is
`COLLECT_WRONG_TREE`, a later commit in the same checkout `COLLECT_TREE_MOVED`; nothing
is merged, the reader becomes `failed`, and `verify` reports `NOT_COLLECTED`. An
outside voice's tree failure is recorded `unavailable` only when its reply holds no finding. The line catches a reader that
worked elsewhere by accident; it is not proof of reading, since diff text can predict it.
worked elsewhere by accident; it is not proof of reading, since diff text can predict it. A `printed:` label
before the line (plain, bold or inside its backticks) is still read, and its tree and toplevel are still compared
exactly (GST-776). Capy cannot start a subagent in a chosen directory, so before a stage takes a start token or sends
its first reader, the Capy pass program compares the checkout with the one shared readers start in (the thread's
working directory) and stops when that is another checkout or cannot be read: run /ship in the thread's own checkout.
A start directory outside any checkout, such as a multi-repo workspace root, holds no tree to review by mistake and
dispatches. Step 11's voices take the `adversarial-review` start
token by default, and a `logStart` list without it stops before anything runs.
## Where this is enforced
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@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ Instead of guessing and patching, it traces data flow, matches against known bug
## `/verify`
`/verify` is the loop you run while you build: change something, run the repo's checks, fix what broke, run again. `gstack-checks detect` finds the checks the repo already declares (a `gstack:verify:` line or a `## Health Stack` section in CLAUDE.md, else package.json scripts, tsconfig, eslint or biome, pyproject, Cargo.toml, go.mod) and never makes one up. `gstack-checks run` runs them plus the tests `/ship`'s pre-gate selects for your change, using pregate's own selector, so a green `/verify` predicts a green pre-gate.
`/verify` is the loop you run while you build: change something, run the repo's checks, fix what broke, run again. `gstack-checks detect` finds the checks the repo already declares (a `gstack:verify:` line or a `## Health Stack` section in CLAUDE.md, else package.json scripts, tsconfig, eslint or biome, pyproject, Cargo.toml, go.mod) and never makes one up. `gstack-checks run` runs them plus the tests `/ship`'s pre-gate selects for your change, using pregate's own selector, so a green `/verify` predicts a green pre-gate. `/health` finds its tools with the same detector (`gstack-checks detect --for health`), which adds its test, knip, shellcheck and gbrain dimensions.
It asks once before running any repo command (`gstack-checks trust`) and asks again when a command changes. A touched file no test covers is `UNMAPPED`, a selection that ran zero tests is `ZERO_RUN`, and neither counts as green. A missing tool or service is reported, not worked around. It stops after five runs or when the same failure comes back twice, and sends a stubborn red to `/investigate`. When everything passes, `gstack-checks status` prints `READY_FOR_SHIP tree=<tree>` without rerunning anything, and you run `/ship`. It never reviews, bumps versions, pushes or opens a PR.
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@@ -3566,7 +3566,7 @@ base branch's copy or the user-owned file. For the user-owned file, edit it
directly at the path the message names. A user file inside the repository, or
reached through a symlink into it, is ignored rather than read (`--explain`
names it). An unknown `sealed` key that a newer gstack defines (such as
`allow_paths` or `case_insensitive`) means this machine's gstack is older than
`allow_paths`, `case_insensitive`, `label_keys` or `identifier_keys`) means this machine's gstack is older than
the policy: upgrade gstack here, and raise `min_gstack_version` in the
repository's `.gstack/ship-policy.json` before landing such a key.
@@ -4184,7 +4184,10 @@ migration is a code change, so the gate reruns.
sealed path or transcript (binary, empty and later-deleted files included), or
adds a line with a sealed-answer marker, a seed or a local home path, and the
destination is public or its visibility is unknown (a new or unreadable
repository counts as public). An unreadable or malformed sealed policy refuses
repository counts as public). With `sealed.label_keys` set, a new record that
puts a label field next to an identifier (`sealed.label_join`), or a supported
file the guard could not read (`sealed.label_join_unchecked`), refuses the
same way. An unreadable or malformed sealed policy refuses
too. The managed pre-push hook and `gstack-pregate sealed` print one line per
finding: rule, `file[:line]`, commit. They never print the matched text.
@@ -4193,7 +4196,9 @@ reaches the public repository (a later commit that deletes it still publishes
it). A publishable file kept next to sealed data (a `MANIFEST.json` of hashes
and counts) can be exempted from the path rules with a `sealed.allow_paths`
glob in the base branch's `.gstack/pregate.json`; the text rules still read it
([docs/pregate.md#sealed](pregate.md#sealed)). A reviewed false positive gets
([docs/pregate.md#sealed](pregate.md#sealed)). For `sealed.label_join`, drop
the identifier fields (or the labels) from the published file, or keep the file
out of the public repository; `allow_paths` never exempt it. A reviewed false positive gets
one line in the base branch's
`.gstack/sealed-allow.tsv`: `rule<TAB>path<TAB>sha<TAB>reason`, where `sha` is
the full commit sha (a shortened one is ignored and named on stderr). A private
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@@ -230,6 +230,14 @@ credits outside coverage. A parent reads the rows with
`gstack-review-read` and treats `outside_status: unavailable` as missing
coverage, not as a clean outside review.
The pass program (`lib/capy-review-pass.js`) picks the outside voice's model
when `input.models['outside-voice']` is empty and the lane model is
`anthropic/`: `openai/gpt-6.1-sol` at medium reasoning, the pairing the no-loss
rounds ran. Any other lane must name a model. An outside voice from the same
provider as the lane model or the native voice stops the pass (`STOP:`) before
either voice is created, including on a rerun, and each outside voice prints an
`OUTSIDE_VOICE:` line saying whether it is the certified configuration.
### The carry across a base merge or a test-only fix
When the parent merges the base in or fixes a test after the receipt was