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v1.91.7.0 feat: add functional QA and pre-publication docs checks (#2983)
* feat: add surface-aware exploratory QA and ship documentation gates * test: preserve delegated QA setup authority after main integration * fix(qa): clarify exploration order and preserve report artifacts * test(qa): follow the shared setup reference directly * refactor(ship): make verification and recovery routes explicit * test(ship): align evidence and review guards with explicit routes * fix(workflows): clarify ship recovery and functional QA evidence * fix(workflows): clarify approval recovery and full QA coverage * refactor(workflows): order review transactions and clarify ship state * fix(ship): clarify final verification and fail closed at publication * fix(evals): attribute native atomic documentation writes * fix(ship): clarify recovery and documentation lifecycle guidance * fix(test): preserve observed native placeholder styling in CI * fix(codex): report watchdog timeouts without a process-exit race * Checkpoint functional QA implementation and workflow validation repairs * Fix documentation and shared-review fixture contracts * docs: clarify judge reuse and evaluation supervision * test: align review evidence and selected case contracts * test: verify append-only documentation checkpoints and recovery * fix: qualify QA workflows and CI validation repairs * fix: launch shared-libs fixture scripts on Windows * fix: qualify QA deadlines, fixture isolation, and shard cleanup * fix: preserve qualified QA and cancellation repairs * fix: enforce functional fixture authority and share strict event decoding * fix: retain free-test evidence and explain recovery * fix: reject malformed native evidence after decoder consolidation * test: use reliable capture for telemetry privacy filters * test: refresh measured quick coverage and document validation costs * Fix native fixture receipts and preserve VM validation evidence * Align negative judge controls with upstream clarity policy * Fix report-only QA preparation and public evidence handling * Clarify QA-only preparation and current-report preservation * Stream Ship quality judgments with an explicit 64k response contract * Validate compact judge reasoning locally with supported wire schema * Align functional QA fixture instructions with evidence acceptance * Bind native browser diagnostics to execution evidence and align review verdicts * Preserve native diagnostic line boundaries * Serialize functional QA evidence from native captures * Keep large QA evidence fixture payload out of Windows argv
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@@ -11,13 +11,27 @@
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Applies when the ship target is an Apple platform app: the repository contains an `.xcodeproj` or `.xcworkspace`, or a Swift package with an app product. Read this BEFORE Step 1's branch gate and any preflight. This adapter extends ship's judgment to the App Store journey end to end, and every upload or submission is treated as a durable external effect (idempotency contract below) — but store distribution is its own release path, not repository landing: ship's branch/PR ceremony (feature-branch gate, commit-review-PR pipeline, merge queue) applies only when the user asked to land repository changes. A user shipping to the App Store or TestFlight proceeds through this adapter from whatever branch they are on; a clean working tree on the base branch is a normal and valid state to archive and upload from. Never abort an App Store release over branch topology.
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**Documentation preflight:** Before archive/upload/submission, Read `~/.claude/skills/gstack/ship/sections/documentation.md` and execute its audit gate in `read-only` mode against the selected release source, including on the base branch. No source edits, Git operations that mutate state, or repository-landing ceremony are authorized by this audit. Resolve blockers or obtain an explicit named documentation-risk exception before distribution; include `updated`/`current`/`blocked` and any exception in the final store-release report. This pointer changes no App Store permissions below.
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One tool runs the entire release: machine-level fastlane — `produce` (app record and bundle ID), `cert` and `sigh` (signing), `gym` (archive and signed export), `pilot` (TestFlight), `deliver` (metadata, screenshots, Submit for Review), `frameit` (device frames). Install it when missing (`brew install fastlane`) with a one-line announcement, not a question — the release authorization covers machine-tool installs. Never install additional App Store CLI tools, and never mention API keys, `.p8` files, sessions, or any credential format to the user DURING the run — the sole exception is the one-line standing-credential disclosure in the closing report (see Storefront completion), which names the durable key the release created so the user can revoke it later; they paid US$99 and want to ship, and the release itself adds no new dependency to the user's project.
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A Mac is required only for the build legs. Archiving, signing, and the binary upload ride Xcode's macOS-only toolchain — Apple ships it nowhere else, and no tool routes around that. On a non-macOS host, say so plainly, then route exactly those legs through a macOS CI runner (a GitHub Actions `macos` runner executing the same `gym` and `deliver`/`pilot` commands, with the minted upload key supplied as a CI secret — key auth is precisely what CI wants); sign-in, key minting, metadata, screenshots, pricing, and submission judgment are plain API work that stays on the user's machine. Never claim the whole release is impossible off a Mac, and never pretend the build leg is possible there.
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## The one authorization moment
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The whole journey permits exactly two interactions, and no others. FIRST, up front: confirm the user holds a paid Apple Developer Program membership (US$99/year — the App Store and TestFlight both require it) and authorize the release. Pricing belongs to this same breath, once per app EVER: ask free or paid (and the price if paid) inside the authorization question — never as a separate interruption — after checking the decision store (`bin/gstack-decision-search --scope repo --query "pricing"`); persist the answer (`~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-decision-log`, scope `repo`) so no later release re-asks, and a paid answer names the one-time Paid Apps banking/tax agreement honestly right there, since nothing sells until it is signed. Price is a launch decision the agent never defaults silently: a free launch cannot be un-launched. Apple sign-in happens inside this same moment: run `fastlane spaceauth -u <apple-id>` through the host's interactive command path (in Claude Code, the user types `! fastlane spaceauth -u <email>` so their password and one two-factor code go directly to Apple in-session; a separate terminal window is the fallback only when the host has no interactive path). Keep the printed session token out of the transcript — the cached cookie in `~/.fastlane/spaceship/` is the credential fastlane actually uses; never store, echo, or log the password or token, and re-run the same one command when the session expires. Immediately after the first sign-in, mint the permanent upload key from the session (step 4 of Archive and upload) — when that key already sits at `~/.gstack/apple/api-key.json` and no new app record is needed, skip the sign-in entirely: repeat releases authorize and proceed with zero sign-in. SECOND, only when preflight finds the icon or screenshots missing: the store-assets question below. Everything else — tool installs, upload, storefront, submission — is covered by the authorization and proceeds without asking. Auth menus, tool-choice questions, plan confirmations, and step-by-step narration requests are contract violations.
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Plan for two routine interactions. A genuine blocker may require a safety or named documentation-risk decision; STOP for that decision rather than treating release authorization as a waiver.
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FIRST, up front: confirm the user holds a paid Apple Developer Program membership (US$99/year — the App Store and TestFlight both require it) and authorize the release.
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Pricing belongs to this same breath, once per app EVER: ask free or paid (and the price if paid) inside the authorization question — never as a separate interruption — after checking the decision store (`bin/gstack-decision-search --scope repo --query "pricing"`); persist the answer (`~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-decision-log`, scope `repo`) so no later release re-asks, and a paid answer names the one-time Paid Apps banking/tax agreement honestly right there, since nothing sells until it is signed. Price is a launch decision the agent never defaults silently: a free launch cannot be un-launched.
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Apple sign-in happens inside this same moment: run `fastlane spaceauth -u <apple-id>` through the host's interactive command path (in Claude Code, the user types `! fastlane spaceauth -u <email>` so their password and one two-factor code go directly to Apple in-session; a separate terminal window is the fallback only when the host has no interactive path). Keep the printed session token out of the transcript — the cached cookie in `~/.fastlane/spaceship/` is the credential fastlane actually uses; never store, echo, or log the password or token, and re-run the same one command when the session expires.
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Immediately after the first sign-in, mint the permanent upload key from the session (step 4 of Archive and upload) — when that key already sits at `~/.gstack/apple/api-key.json` and no new app record is needed, skip the sign-in entirely: repeat releases authorize and proceed with zero sign-in.
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SECOND, only when preflight finds the icon or screenshots missing: the store-assets question below.
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After blockers clear, tool installs, upload, storefront and submission are covered by the authorization and proceed without asking. Auth menus, tool-choice questions, plan confirmations, and step-by-step narration requests are contract violations.
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No membership: STOP the App Store path. Offer to walk enrollment at developer.apple.com through the Third-Party Web Actions contract (earlier in this skill) (a purchase the user completes themselves; activation can take a day or two), and name the free-account ceiling honestly: personal-team installs on the user's own devices only, expiring after 7 days, no TestFlight, no App Store.
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@@ -47,8 +61,34 @@ Build this question's options from a LIVE check of installed skills at ask time
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1. Archive and export the signed Release build with `gym` (it drives xcodebuild and the signing minted in preflight). Projects with custom archive requirements may drop to `xcodebuild archive` directly; the output either way is an App Store-signed `.ipa`.
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2. The upload is an external effect: run `pilot` (TestFlight) or `deliver` (App Store) under the durable-effect contract: before executing, append the key `appstore.upload.<bundle-id>.<build>` to `~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/apple-effects.log`; if the key is already present from a prior run (crash, retry), treat the upload as possibly-done and do NOT re-run it. Never re-upload on ambiguity; inspect App Store Connect for the build first.
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3. The cached session, the minted key, and every credential file are env- or file-level secrets: never argv, never echoed, never committed.
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4. NEVER demand an app-specific password — the session MINTS the upload key instead. Per fastlane's documented authentication, Apple's binary-upload tool (iTMSTransporter, which `deliver`/`pilot` shell out to for the `.ipa`) does not accept the web session: it takes only an App Store Connect API key or an app-specific password, and Apple's error `-22938` ("Sign in with the app-specific password") is Transporter saying exactly this. That is not a gate and not a question, because the web session creates the key itself, silently: through fastlane's bundled spaceship (`Spaceship::Tunes.login(<apple-id>)` reuses the cached cookie, then raw client requests), `POST https://appstoreconnect.apple.com/iris/v1/apiKeys` with a JSON:API body SCOPED to the app being released, not all apps: `{data:{type:"apiKeys",attributes:{nickname:"gstack-upload",allAppsVisible:false,roles:["APP_MANAGER"],keyType:"PUBLIC_API"},relationships:{apps:{data:[{type:"apps",id:"<asc-app-id>"}]}}}}`, where `<asc-app-id>` is the App Store Connect app id (from `produce`'s output, or `GET https://appstoreconnect.apple.com/iris/v1/apps?filter[bundleId]=<bundle-id>`). `allAppsVisible:false` with an explicit `apps` relationship is least-privilege on purpose — an `allAppsVisible:true` APP_MANAGER key is standing authority over every app on the team, a needless blast radius if the machine is later compromised. The `apps` relationship is REQUIRED, not optional: a key with no app association can see nothing and uploads fail with a permissions error, so scope it to the target app rather than flipping the flag alone. Mint it only after the app record exists (so `produce` runs first when the app is new). Then `GET .../iris/v1/apiKeys/<id>?fields[apiKeys]=privateKey` — the `privateKey` attribute is base64 of the COMPLETE PEM file: decode it exactly once and write `~/.appstoreconnect/private_keys/AuthKey_<id>.p8` (0600) immediately, it is downloadable only at creation. The issuer ID is `provider.publicProviderId` from `GET https://appstoreconnect.apple.com/olympus/v1/session`. Record key id, issuer id, and key content as a fastlane api-key JSON at `~/.gstack/apple/api-key.json` (0600) and run `deliver`/`pilot` with `api_key_path` from then on. The key never expires, so every later release of the SAME app skips sign-in; releasing a DIFFERENT app re-associates that app onto the key (`PATCH .../iris/v1/apiKeys/<id>` adding it to the `apps` relationship) or mints a fresh app-scoped key, because the key is deliberately not all-apps. The session stays necessary only for `produce` (Apple's public API cannot create app records), for that re-association, and for re-minting if the key is ever revoked. Stating that the user must generate any credential themselves while key minting is untried is a contract violation. CLASSIFY the error before touching credentials: an error is an authentication failure ONLY when it says so (401/403, session invalid or expired, "sign in", "app-specific password" in Apple's own words). A `Spaceship::UnexpectedResponse`, missing/invalid attribute, validation, or precheck error is a METADATA problem — fix the payload (for example, Apple's expanded age-rating attributes such as `lootBox`, `ageAssurance`, `parentalControls`, `messagingAndChat` in `app_rating_config.json`) and retry from the CLI. Treating a metadata error as a credential problem is a contract violation.
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5. Within an Apple release, this adapter OVERRIDES the Third-Party Web Actions contract (earlier in this skill): the general agentic-browser offer never applies to App Store Connect, Apple ID, or credential work here. The entire release is CLI (fastlane) plus the two permitted interactions; the ONLY browser use this adapter allows, ever, is the paid-app agreements/banking/tax residue named at the end of this document. Opening a browser — driven or manual — for anything else in this journey is a contract violation. When a real error does force the fallback, QUOTE the error verbatim, then escalate in this order: FIRST mint (or re-mint) the upload key from the session per step 4 and retry the upload with `api_key_path` — an upload-auth error with no key on disk means the mint was skipped, not that the user owes a credential. SECOND, if the minting itself fails with a session error, ask the user to sign in again (the same `! fastlane spaceauth -u <apple-id>` moment as the original authorization), re-mint, and retry. Only when a FRESH session still cannot mint a key — a permissions refusal because the signed-in Apple ID is not Admin or Account Holder on its team — does the app-specific-password path open, and its only shape is self-service: the user generates the password on any device and enters it through the host's in-session masked prompt into the macOS keychain (`fastlane fastlane-credentials add --username <apple-id>`), then the upload is retried. NEVER offer or recommend a browser drive to create credentials — no agentic browser of any kind, for any password, key, or token, under any framing.
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4. NEVER demand an app-specific password — the session MINTS the upload key instead.
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Per fastlane's documented authentication, Apple's binary-upload tool (iTMSTransporter, which `deliver`/`pilot` shell out to for the `.ipa`) does not accept the web session: it takes only an App Store Connect API key or an app-specific password, and Apple's error `-22938` ("Sign in with the app-specific password") is Transporter saying exactly this.
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That is not a gate and not a question, because the web session creates the key itself, silently: through fastlane's bundled spaceship (`Spaceship::Tunes.login(<apple-id>)` reuses the cached cookie, then raw client requests), `POST https://appstoreconnect.apple.com/iris/v1/apiKeys` with a JSON:API body SCOPED to the app being released, not all apps: `{data:{type:"apiKeys",attributes:{nickname:"gstack-upload",allAppsVisible:false,roles:["APP_MANAGER"],keyType:"PUBLIC_API"},relationships:{apps:{data:[{type:"apps",id:"<asc-app-id>"}]}}}}`, where `<asc-app-id>` is the App Store Connect app id (from `produce`'s output, or `GET https://appstoreconnect.apple.com/iris/v1/apps?filter[bundleId]=<bundle-id>`).
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`allAppsVisible:false` with an explicit `apps` relationship is least-privilege on purpose — an `allAppsVisible:true` APP_MANAGER key is standing authority over every app on the team, a needless blast radius if the machine is later compromised. The `apps` relationship is REQUIRED, not optional: a key with no app association can see nothing and uploads fail with a permissions error, so scope it to the target app rather than flipping the flag alone.
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Mint it only after the app record exists (so `produce` runs first when the app is new).
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Then `GET .../iris/v1/apiKeys/<id>?fields[apiKeys]=privateKey` — the `privateKey` attribute is base64 of the COMPLETE PEM file: decode it exactly once and write `~/.appstoreconnect/private_keys/AuthKey_<id>.p8` (0600) immediately, it is downloadable only at creation. The issuer ID is `provider.publicProviderId` from `GET https://appstoreconnect.apple.com/olympus/v1/session`.
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Record key id, issuer id, and key content as a fastlane api-key JSON at `~/.gstack/apple/api-key.json` (0600) and run `deliver`/`pilot` with `api_key_path` from then on.
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The key never expires, so every later release of the SAME app skips sign-in; releasing a DIFFERENT app re-associates that app onto the key (`PATCH .../iris/v1/apiKeys/<id>` adding it to the `apps` relationship) or mints a fresh app-scoped key, because the key is deliberately not all-apps. The session stays necessary only for `produce` (Apple's public API cannot create app records), for that re-association, and for re-minting if the key is ever revoked.
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Stating that the user must generate any credential themselves while key minting is untried is a contract violation.
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CLASSIFY the error before touching credentials: an error is an authentication failure ONLY when it says so (401/403, session invalid or expired, "sign in", "app-specific password" in Apple's own words). A `Spaceship::UnexpectedResponse`, missing/invalid attribute, validation, or precheck error is a METADATA problem — fix the payload (for example, Apple's expanded age-rating attributes such as `lootBox`, `ageAssurance`, `parentalControls`, `messagingAndChat` in `app_rating_config.json`) and retry from the CLI. Treating a metadata error as a credential problem is a contract violation.
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5. Within an Apple release, this adapter OVERRIDES the Third-Party Web Actions contract (earlier in this skill): the general agentic-browser offer never applies to App Store Connect, Apple ID, or credential work here. The entire release is CLI (fastlane) plus the routine interactions and blocking decisions above; the ONLY browser use this adapter allows, ever, is the paid-app agreements/banking/tax residue named at the end of this document. Opening a browser — driven or manual — for anything else in this journey is a contract violation.
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When a real error does force the fallback, QUOTE the error verbatim, then escalate in this order: FIRST mint (or re-mint) the upload key from the session per step 4 and retry the upload with `api_key_path` — an upload-auth error with no key on disk means the mint was skipped, not that the user owes a credential.
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SECOND, if the minting itself fails with a session error, ask the user to sign in again (the same `! fastlane spaceauth -u <apple-id>` moment as the original authorization), re-mint, and retry.
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Only when a FRESH session still cannot mint a key — a permissions refusal because the signed-in Apple ID is not Admin or Account Holder on its team — does the app-specific-password path open, and its only shape is self-service: the user generates the password on any device and enters it through the host's in-session masked prompt into the macOS keychain (`fastlane fastlane-credentials add --username <apple-id>`), then the upload is retried.
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NEVER offer or recommend a browser drive to create credentials — no agentic browser of any kind, for any password, key, or token, under any framing.
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6. App Review contact details (name, email, phone) are required metadata for submission: infer name and email from the signed-in Apple ID and git config, collect the phone number once inside the authorization moment, persist it to the decision store, and never re-ask. Contact details are metadata, not a blocking gate to announce mid-run.
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## Storefront completion
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