Secrets check stops flagging three code shapes and catches concatenated and commented secrets (GST-3004) (#4457)

The secrets check no longer stops a push on three kinds of ordinary code
that only look like secrets: TypeScript types with spaced generic
arguments, Python arguments that read a settings constant, and camelCase
dotted field paths.

It also catches two kinds of real secrets it used to miss, one built
with `+` from short pieces and one written in a comment, so pushes are
both quieter and safer.

Nothing to do; a secret in any of the loosened positions still fails the
check.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Review-Finding: p1/adversarial-native#1 reader=adversarial-native
Review-Finding: p1/outside-voice#1 reader=outside-voice
Review-Finding: p1/outside-voice#2 reader=outside-voice
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Garry Tanandcapy-ai[bot] authored and GitHub committed 2026-11-17 18:47:18 +00:00
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@@ -1841,6 +1841,29 @@ those, each with its scope and its reason:
Any other call's literal (`make_password("orange_monkey_pass")`), a later
argument or fallback (`os.getenv("SECRET_KEY", "orange_monkey_pass")`) and a
kebab passphrase still report.
- Three more code shapes are names, not credentials (GST-3004): a TypeScript
type with spaced generic arguments
(`session: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof launch>>;`), a Python keyword
argument that reads a CONSTANT_CASE setting
(`aws_secret_access_key=settings.S3_SECRET_KEY,`, #4289), and a quoted
camelCase dotted field path of three word segments
(`"form.section.fieldName"`; an all-lowercase one still reports). Each is
read from the value, never from the key's name or the file's path, and a
secret in the same position, a literal after it on the line, or the same text
in a config file still reports.
- Known limits, still reported, allowlist them by value: a JS/TS template key
built from `${…}` slots (#4287), an array of names in source code
(`"get_token": [load_auth, "authOperations"]`), and a generic type with
string-literal arguments (`Pick<Session, "id" | "forkedFrom">`). Exempting
them needed an entropy test on their text alone, which let random hex and
encoded literals through.
- Two misses are closed (#4289): the string pieces of a `+` chain are joined
and checked (`KEY = "form.x" + "<secret>"`), and a secret-named assignment
right after `#`, `//`, `/*` or `<!--` reports in a trailing or
whole-line comment unless its value is prose or key-naming text
(letters-only words joined by `_ . - | : / #`). An array whose first
element is a quoted secret (`"get_token": ["<secret>"]`) still reports
only through a provider rule such as `stripe.secret`.
The `secrets` row says `N allowlisted (<ids>)` and lists each allowlisted
finding with the entry (`allowlisted env.kv (evals/receipts/t1.json, added line