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docs: fold the Codex accuracy review of the release docs
Six findings, all verified against source before fixing: 1. 'Every send writes a receipt' overclaimed — fail-open sinks proceed with a stderr warning when the receipt write fails, so a fail-open send can go unrecorded (lib/egress-receipt.ts:8-14). Descriptive prose now says so; the receipted framing keeps 'attempted'. 2. 'Receipts hash the request body' is wrong for subprocess-owned sends — git pushes record sha256: null (lib/egress-receipt.ts:71). 3. 'grants shows every consent in force' overclaimed — it reports the four standing config settings (bin/gstack-egress:139-181). Reworded in README, ARCHITECTURE, and the CHANGELOG entry. 4. 'Zero-exception scanner' vs reality: the new-sink scanner carries a reasoned SCANNER_EXEMPT list (user-directed fetches, probes, instruction strings, skill prose). CLAUDE.md now names it. 5. Error-catalog cause/fix for the receipt refusal: the writer mkdirs the ledger dir itself, so 'missing' isn't a cause and bare chmod fails when it is absent — cause reworded, fix is mkdir -p && chmod. 6. gbrain-sync first-run steps described the retired binary's behavior: default repo is gstack-artifacts-$USER, and init PRINTS the gbrain hookup command (never auto-executes; bin/gstack-artifacts-init:384-419). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -149,11 +149,11 @@ The browser registry (Comet, Chrome, Arc, Brave, Edge) is hardcoded. Database pa
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### Egress receipt ledger (v1.63.0.0)
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Every gstack-initiated off-machine send writes a hash-chained, tamper-evident receipt to `~/.gstack/security/egress.jsonl` BEFORE the send — `writeReceipt` in `lib/egress-receipt.ts` for TypeScript callers, `_receipted_curl` / `_receipted_git` from `bin/gstack-egress-lib.sh` for shell scripts. Receipts hash the request body; they never store it.
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Every enumerated gstack-initiated off-machine sink writes a hash-chained, tamper-evident receipt to `~/.gstack/security/egress.jsonl` BEFORE the send — `writeReceipt` in `lib/egress-receipt.ts` for TypeScript callers, `_receipted_curl` / `_receipted_git` from `bin/gstack-egress-lib.sh` for shell scripts. Receipts record a sha256 of the exact bytes sent when the caller owns them (subprocess-owned sends like git pushes record `sha256: null`); they never store the body.
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Failure polarity is per-class and pinned by tests. Sensitive sinks are fail-closed: brain-sync pushes, memory-ingest, gbrain-sync, telemetry, ngrok tunnel starts, mcp-verify, and supabase-provision refuse to send if the receipt can't be written (each refusal prints problem + cause + fix). User-facing sinks fail open with a stderr warning: the design binary's OpenAI calls, update-check, the read-only dashboards, and git-class receipts. The zero-exception scanner in `test/egress-receipt-wiring.test.ts` fails CI when any new off-machine sink ships unwired.
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Failure polarity is per-class and pinned by tests. Sensitive sinks are fail-closed: brain-sync pushes, memory-ingest, gbrain-sync, telemetry, ngrok tunnel starts, mcp-verify, and supabase-provision refuse to send if the receipt can't be written (each refusal prints problem + cause + fix). User-facing sinks fail open with a stderr warning — the design binary's OpenAI calls, update-check, the read-only dashboards, and git-class receipts proceed even when the receipt write failed, so a fail-open send can go unrecorded (warned, by design). The new-sink scanner in `test/egress-receipt-wiring.test.ts` fails CI when an off-machine sink ships unwired; its only exemptions are enumerated with reasons (user-directed page fetches, reachability probes, install-doc strings, skill prose).
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Inspect the ledger with `bin/gstack-egress`: `list` (what gstack attempted to send), `verify` (recompute the chain, exit 3 on tamper), `grants` (every consent in force). Threat model: the ledger is forensic observability of ATTEMPTED egress — it records what gstack tried to send so accidents are auditable; it is not an exfiltration control.
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Inspect the ledger with `bin/gstack-egress`: `list` (what gstack attempted to send), `verify` (recompute the chain, exit 3 on tamper), `grants` (the standing consent settings and how to revoke each). Threat model: the ledger is forensic observability of ATTEMPTED egress — it records what gstack tried to send so accidents are auditable; it is not an exfiltration control.
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### Unicode sanitization at server egress (v1.38.0.0)
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