diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 24b7111a..8868e5c7 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -1,5 +1,23 @@ # Changelog +## [0.13.2.0] - 2026-03-28 — User Sovereignty + +AI models now recommend instead of override. When Claude and Codex agree on a scope change, they present it to you instead of just doing it. Your direction is the default, not the models' consensus. + +### Added + +- **User Sovereignty principle in ETHOS.md.** The third core principle: AI models recommend, users decide. Cross-model agreement is a strong signal, not a mandate. +- **User Challenge category in /autoplan.** When both models agree your stated direction should change, it goes to the final approval gate as a "User Challenge" instead of being auto-decided. Your original direction stands unless you explicitly change it. +- **Security/feasibility warning framing.** If both models flag something as a security risk (not just a preference), the question explicitly warns you it's a safety concern, not a taste call. +- **Outside Voice Integration Rule in CEO and Eng reviews.** Outside voice findings are informational until you explicitly approve each one. +- **User sovereignty statement in all skill voices.** Every skill now includes the rule that cross-model agreement is a recommendation, not a decision. + +### Changed + +- **Cross-model tension template no longer says "your assessment of who's right."** Now says "present both perspectives neutrally, state what context you might be missing." Options expanded from Add/Skip to Accept/Keep/Investigate/Defer. +- **/autoplan now has two gates, not one.** Premises (Phase 1) and User Challenges (both models disagree with your direction). Important Rules updated from "premises are the one gate" to "two gates." +- **Decision Audit Trail now tracks classification.** Each auto-decision is logged as mechanical, taste, or user-challenge. + ## [0.13.1.0] - 2026-03-28 — Defense in Depth The browse server runs on localhost and requires a token for access, so these issues only matter if a malicious process is already running on your machine (e.g., a compromised npm postinstall script). This release hardens the attack surface so that even in that scenario, the damage is contained. diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION index 883dcff5..dd678579 100644 --- a/VERSION +++ b/VERSION @@ -1 +1 @@ -0.13.1.0 +0.13.2.0