fix(security): delete dead exports the ripped chat path left behind

Three-way split by importer class:

(a) Zero importers, deleted: the whole attack-attempt logging cluster in
security.ts (logAttempt, AttemptRecord, salted hashPayload + device-salt,
attempts.jsonl rotation, telemetry spawn plumbing incl.
buildTelemetrySpawnCommand/resolveBashBinary — the LIVE attempts.jsonl writer
is tunnel-denial-log.ts with its own rotation); the decision-file handshake
(writeDecision/readDecision/clearDecision/excerptForReview — written for
sidebar-agent's poll loop, which no longer exists); sidebar-utils.ts (whole
module — its sanitizeExtensionUrl 'sanitized before embedding in a prompt'
for the deleted prompt builder); 8 dead server.ts imports (sanitizeExtensionUrl,
generateCanary, injectCanary, writeDecision, rotateRoot, serializeRegistry,
restoreRegistry, clearAgentRecord); buildPtyClearCookie + buildSseClearCookie;
WEBDRIVER_MASK_SCRIPT (orphaned by the D7 stealth narrowing — applyStealth
never used it).

(b) Dead-pin tests edited with their exports: the 'still exported' pin in
stealth-layer-c, the string-content describe in stealth-webdriver (its live
applyStealth behavioral coverage untouched), the clear-cookie assertions,
security-review-flow.test.ts deleted whole (all 4 describes exercised the
dead decision mechanism, incl. a 'simulated sidebar-agent poll loop').

(c) KEPT deliberately: leaseCount (live behavioral coverage),
extractPtyCookie + validatePtySessionToken (extractPtyCookie is adopted by
the terminal-agent cookie-parse unification later in this wave),
resetSessionMarker + clearContentFilters (test-support API for the live
content-security layer).

Also fixes two pre-existing red pins found while here, invisible until the
free suite got a CI job: the v1.44 spawnClaude->maybeSpawnPty rename in
terminal-agent.test.ts, and a cross-file test-isolation bug where
content-security.test.ts's clearContentFilters() wiped the auto-registered
url-blocklist filter for every later file in the same bun process
(security-integration.test.ts failed on co-run; afterAll now restores it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-08-14 21:00:17 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 44d58aa6ee
commit ef186cccb3
14 changed files with 26 additions and 759 deletions
-5
View File
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ export function buildPtySetCookie(token: string): string {
return `${PTY_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/; Max-Age=${maxAge}`;
}
/** Clear the PTY session cookie. */
export function buildPtyClearCookie(): string {
return `${PTY_COOKIE_NAME}=; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/; Max-Age=0`;
}
function pruneExpired(now: number): void {
let checked = 0;
for (const [token, session] of sessions) {
+5 -284
View File
@@ -309,222 +309,13 @@ export function checkCanaryInStructure(value: unknown, canary: string): boolean
return false;
}
// ─── Attack logging ──────────────────────────────────────────
export interface AttemptRecord {
ts: string;
urlDomain: string;
payloadHash: string;
confidence: number;
layer: LayerName;
verdict: Verdict;
gstackVersion?: string;
}
// NOTE: attack-attempt logging (logAttempt + salted payload hashing +
// attempts.jsonl rotation + telemetry spawn plumbing) lived here until the
// chat-path scanner that called it was ripped with sidebar-agent.ts. The
// LIVE attempts.jsonl writer is tunnel-denial-log.ts, which owns its own
// rotation.
const SECURITY_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.gstack', 'security');
const ATTEMPTS_LOG = path.join(SECURITY_DIR, 'attempts.jsonl');
const SALT_FILE = path.join(SECURITY_DIR, 'device-salt');
const MAX_LOG_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10MB rotate threshold (eng review 4.1)
const MAX_LOG_GENERATIONS = 5;
/**
* Read-or-create the per-device salt used for payload hashing. Salt lives at
* ~/.gstack/security/device-salt (0600). Random per-device, prevents rainbow
* table attacks across devices (Codex tier-2 finding).
*/
let cachedSalt: string | null = null;
function getDeviceSalt(): string {
if (cachedSalt) return cachedSalt;
try {
if (fs.existsSync(SALT_FILE)) {
cachedSalt = fs.readFileSync(SALT_FILE, 'utf8').trim();
return cachedSalt;
}
} catch {
// fall through to generate
}
try {
mkdirSecure(SECURITY_DIR);
} catch {}
cachedSalt = randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
try {
writeSecureFile(SALT_FILE, cachedSalt);
} catch {
// Can't persist (read-only fs, disk full). Keep the in-memory salt
// for this process so cross-log correlation still works within a
// session. Next process gets a new salt, but that's a degraded-mode
// acceptable cost.
}
return cachedSalt;
}
export function hashPayload(payload: string): string {
const salt = getDeviceSalt();
return createHash('sha256').update(salt).update(payload).digest('hex');
}
/**
* Rotate attempts.jsonl when it exceeds 10MB. Keeps 5 generations.
*/
function rotateIfNeeded(): void {
try {
const st = fs.statSync(ATTEMPTS_LOG);
if (st.size < MAX_LOG_BYTES) return;
} catch {
return; // doesn't exist, nothing to rotate
}
// Shift .N -> .N+1, drop oldest
for (let i = MAX_LOG_GENERATIONS - 1; i >= 1; i--) {
const src = `${ATTEMPTS_LOG}.${i}`;
const dst = `${ATTEMPTS_LOG}.${i + 1}`;
try {
if (fs.existsSync(src)) fs.renameSync(src, dst);
} catch {}
}
try {
fs.renameSync(ATTEMPTS_LOG, `${ATTEMPTS_LOG}.1`);
} catch {}
}
/**
* Try to locate the gstack-telemetry-log binary. Resolution order matches
* the existing skill preamble pattern (never relies on PATH — packaged
* binary layouts can break that).
*
* Order:
* 1. ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-telemetry-log (global install)
* 2. .claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-telemetry-log (symlinked dev)
* 3. bin/gstack-telemetry-log (in-repo dev)
*/
function findTelemetryBinary(): string | null {
const candidates = [
path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude', 'skills', 'gstack', 'bin', 'gstack-telemetry-log'),
path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.claude', 'skills', 'gstack', 'bin', 'gstack-telemetry-log'),
path.resolve(process.cwd(), 'bin', 'gstack-telemetry-log'),
];
for (const c of candidates) {
try {
fs.accessSync(c, fs.constants.X_OK);
return c;
} catch {
// try next
}
}
return null;
}
/**
* Resolve a bash binary for invoking shebang scripts on Windows. Mirrors the
* GSTACK_*_BIN override pattern from `browse/src/claude-bin.ts:resolveClaudeCommand`
* (introduced in v1.24.0.0 #1252) so users on WSL/MSYS2/non-default Git Bash
* installs can redirect.
*
* Override precedence:
* 1. GSTACK_BASH_BIN (or BASH_BIN) — absolute path or PATH-resolvable command.
* 2. Plain Bun.which('bash') — finds Git Bash on the standard Windows install.
*
* Returns null if nothing resolves; callers must degrade gracefully (telemetry
* already swallows spawn errors, so a null here means the local attempts.jsonl
* audit trail keeps working without surfacing a Windows-only failure).
*/
export function resolveBashBinary(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string | null {
const PATH = env.PATH ?? env.Path ?? '';
const override = (env.GSTACK_BASH_BIN ?? env.BASH_BIN)?.trim();
if (override) {
const trimmed = override.replace(/^"(.*)"$/, '$1');
return path.isAbsolute(trimmed) ? trimmed : (Bun.which(trimmed, { PATH }) ?? null);
}
return Bun.which('bash', { PATH }) ?? null;
}
/**
* Build the [cmd, args] tuple for invoking a bash-script telemetry binary
* in a way that works on both POSIX and Windows.
*
* POSIX: returns [bin, args] unchanged — shebang gets honored by execve.
* Win32: wraps in bash explicitly. `gstack-telemetry-log` is a shell script
* (`#!/usr/bin/env bash`) and Windows `CreateProcess` can't dispatch on a
* shebang — it tries to load the file as a PE image, fails with ENOEXEC,
* and our 'error' handler silently swallows it. Resolves bash via the same
* Bun.which + GSTACK_*_BIN override pattern as claude-bin.ts.
*
* Returns null when bash can't be resolved on Windows (rare — Git Bash ships
* with the standard gstack install path). Caller skips spawn; the local
* attempts.jsonl write still gives the audit trail.
*
* Exported for testability — resolution is a pure function of (platform,
* env, bin, args) so we can assert on it without actually spawning.
*/
export function buildTelemetrySpawnCommand(
bin: string,
args: string[],
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
): { cmd: string; cmdArgs: string[] } | null {
if (process.platform === 'win32') {
const bashPath = resolveBashBinary(env);
if (!bashPath) return null;
return { cmd: bashPath, cmdArgs: [bin, ...args] };
}
return { cmd: bin, cmdArgs: args };
}
/**
* Fire-and-forget subprocess invocation of gstack-telemetry-log with the
* attack_attempt event type. The binary handles tier gating internally
* (community → upload, anonymous → local only, off → no-op), so we don't
* need to re-check here.
*
* Never throws. Never blocks. If the binary isn't found or spawn fails, the
* local attempts.jsonl write from logAttempt() still gives us the audit trail.
*/
function reportAttemptTelemetry(record: AttemptRecord): void {
const bin = findTelemetryBinary();
if (!bin) return;
try {
const result = buildTelemetrySpawnCommand(bin, [
'--event-type', 'attack_attempt',
'--url-domain', record.urlDomain || '',
'--payload-hash', record.payloadHash,
'--confidence', String(record.confidence),
'--layer', record.layer,
'--verdict', record.verdict,
]);
if (!result) return;
const child = spawn(result.cmd, result.cmdArgs, {
stdio: 'ignore',
detached: true,
});
// unref so this subprocess doesn't hold the event loop open
child.unref();
child.on('error', () => { /* swallow — telemetry must never break sidebar */ });
} catch {
// Spawn failure is non-fatal.
}
}
/**
* Append an attempt to the local log AND fire telemetry via
* gstack-telemetry-log (which respects the user's telemetry tier setting).
* Never throws — logging failure should not break the sidebar.
* Returns true if the local write succeeded.
*/
export function logAttempt(record: AttemptRecord): boolean {
// Fire telemetry first, async — even if local write fails, we still want
// the event reported (it goes to a different directory anyway).
reportAttemptTelemetry(record);
try {
mkdirSecure(SECURITY_DIR);
rotateIfNeeded();
const line = JSON.stringify(record) + '\n';
appendSecureFile(ATTEMPTS_LOG, line);
return true;
} catch (err) {
// Non-fatal. Log to stderr for debugging but don't block.
console.error('[security] logAttempt write failed:', (err as Error).message);
return false;
}
}
// ─── Cross-process session state ─────────────────────────────
@@ -565,76 +356,6 @@ export function readSessionState(): SessionState | null {
}
}
// ─── User-in-the-loop review on BLOCK ────────────────────────
//
// When a tool-output BLOCK fires, the user gets to see the suspected text
// and decide. The sidepanel posts to /security-decision, server writes a
// per-tab file under ~/.gstack/security/decisions/, sidebar-agent polls
// for it. File-based on purpose: sidebar-agent.ts is a separate subprocess
// and this is the same pattern the existing per-tab cancel file uses.
const DECISIONS_DIR = path.join(SECURITY_DIR, 'decisions');
export type SecurityDecision = 'allow' | 'block';
export function decisionFileForTab(tabId: number): string {
return path.join(DECISIONS_DIR, `tab-${tabId}.json`);
}
export interface DecisionRecord {
tabId: number;
decision: SecurityDecision;
ts: string;
reason?: string;
}
export function writeDecision(record: DecisionRecord): void {
try {
mkdirSecure(DECISIONS_DIR);
const file = decisionFileForTab(record.tabId);
const tmp = `${file}.tmp.${process.pid}`;
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(record));
fs.renameSync(tmp, file);
} catch (err) {
console.error('[security] writeDecision failed:', (err as Error).message);
}
}
export function readDecision(tabId: number): DecisionRecord | null {
try {
const file = decisionFileForTab(tabId);
if (!fs.existsSync(file)) return null;
return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
} catch {
return null;
}
}
export function clearDecision(tabId: number): void {
try {
const file = decisionFileForTab(tabId);
if (fs.existsSync(file)) fs.unlinkSync(file);
} catch {
// best effort
}
}
/**
* Truncate + sanitize tool output for display in the review banner.
* - Max 500 chars (UI budget)
* - Strip control chars, collapse whitespace
* - Append "…" if truncated
*/
export function excerptForReview(text: string, max = 500): string {
if (!text) return '';
const cleaned = text
.replace(/[\x00-\x08\x0B\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]/g, '')
.replace(/\s+/g, ' ')
.trim();
if (cleaned.length <= max) return cleaned;
return cleaned.slice(0, max) + '…';
}
// ─── Status reporting (for shield icon via /health) ──────────
export function getStatus(): StatusDetail {
+3 -4
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@@ -18,21 +18,20 @@ import { handleReadCommand, hasOutArg } from './read-commands';
import { handleWriteCommand } from './write-commands';
import { handleMetaCommand } from './meta-commands';
import { handleCookiePickerRoute, hasActivePicker } from './cookie-picker-routes';
import { sanitizeExtensionUrl } from './sidebar-utils';
import { COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS, PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS, DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS, wrapUntrustedContent, canonicalizeCommand, buildUnknownCommandError, ALL_COMMANDS } from './commands';
import {
wrapUntrustedPageContent, datamarkContent,
runContentFilters, type ContentFilterResult,
markHiddenElements, getCleanTextWithStripping, cleanupHiddenMarkers,
} from './content-security';
import { generateCanary, injectCanary, getStatus as getSecurityStatus, writeDecision } from './security';
import { getStatus as getSecurityStatus } from './security';
import { isSidecarAvailable, scanWithSidecar } from './security-sidecar-client';
import { writeSecureFile, mkdirSecure } from './file-permissions';
import { handleSnapshot, SNAPSHOT_FLAGS } from './snapshot';
import {
initRegistry, validateToken as validateScopedToken, checkScope, checkDomain,
checkRate, createToken, createSetupKey, exchangeSetupKey, revokeToken,
rotateRoot, listTokens, serializeRegistry, restoreRegistry, recordCommand,
listTokens, recordCommand,
isRootToken, checkConnectRateLimit, type TokenInfo,
} from './token-registry';
import { validateTempPath } from './path-security';
@@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ import { inspectElement, modifyStyle, resetModifications, getModificationHistory
// Bun.spawn used instead of child_process.spawn (compiled bun binaries
// fail posix_spawn on all executables including /bin/bash)
import { safeUnlink, safeUnlinkQuiet, safeKill } from './error-handling';
import { readAgentRecord, killAgentByRecord, clearAgentRecord, agentRecordPath, spawnTerminalAgent } from './terminal-agent-control';
import { readAgentRecord, killAgentByRecord, agentRecordPath, spawnTerminalAgent } from './terminal-agent-control';
import { isProcessAlive } from './error-handling';
import { sanitizeBody, stripLoneSurrogateEscapes } from './sanitize';
import { startSocksBridge, testUpstream, type BridgeHandle } from './socks-bridge';
-21
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@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
/**
* Shared sidebar utilities — extracted for testability.
*/
/**
* Sanitize a URL from the Chrome extension before embedding in a prompt.
* Only accepts http/https, strips control characters, truncates to 2048 chars.
* Returns null if the URL is invalid or uses a non-http scheme.
*/
export function sanitizeExtensionUrl(url: string | null | undefined): string | null {
if (!url) return null;
try {
const u = new URL(url);
if (u.protocol === 'http:' || u.protocol === 'https:') {
return u.href.replace(/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/g, '').slice(0, 2048);
}
return null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
-5
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@@ -96,11 +96,6 @@ export function buildSseSetCookie(token: string): string {
return `${SSE_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/; Max-Age=${maxAge}`;
}
/** Build a Set-Cookie header that clears the SSE session cookie. */
export function buildSseClearCookie(): string {
return `${SSE_COOKIE_NAME}=; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/; Max-Age=0`;
}
function pruneExpired(now: number): void {
// Opportunistic cleanup: check up to 20 entries per call so we don't
// stall on a massive registry. O(1) amortized. Runs on every mint
-8
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@@ -461,14 +461,6 @@ export async function applyStealth(context: BrowserContext): Promise<void> {
}
}
/**
* The legacy single-line webdriver mask, exported for backwards
* compatibility with any caller that uses it directly. New callers
* should use applyStealth() which includes this plus the Layer C
* additions.
*/
export const WEBDRIVER_MASK_SCRIPT = `Object.defineProperty(navigator, 'webdriver', { get: () => false });`;
/**
* Args added to chromium.launch's `args` to suppress the
* AutomationControlled blink feature. This is independent of the init